Intentionality: Past and Future (Miskolc,
2002 June 21-23)
June 20, Thursday
12:00- arrival and registration
19:00- opening
reception by the president of Miskolc University
June 21, Friday
9:15-11:15 Plenary session
break
11:30-12:30 Plenary session
lunch break
14:00-15:45 Sections I and II
break
16:00-17:10 Sections I and II
break
17:20-18:30 Sections I and II
18:45- dinner at Avasi Sörház
June 22, Saturday
9:15-11:00 Sections I and II
break
11:15-12:25 Sections I and II
lunch break
14:00-15:00 Plenary session
break
15:15-17:15 Plenary session
17:15- departure
for Tokaj
June 23, Sunday
9:15-11:15 Plenary session
break
11:30-12:40 Sections I and II
lunch break
14:15-16:00 Sections I and II
break
16:15-17:25 Sections I and II
18:00- barbecue dinner at Hotel Kikelet
Detailed Programme
June 21, Friday
June 22, Saturday
June 23, Sunday
June 21, Friday
June 22, Saturday
June 23, Sunday
Plenary session, chair: Howard M. Robinson
9:15-10:15 Ruth Garrett
Millikan
: The Cake Under the Icing of Teleological Theories of Content
10:15-11:15 Ned Block
: What Are Experiments “About Consciousness” Really About?
break
11:30-12:30 Tim Crane
: On the Distinction Between Intentionality and Intensionality
lunch break
Section I, chair: Erwin Tegtmeier
14:00-14:35 Arkadiusz
Chrudzimski
: Brentano’s Theory of Immanent Objects
14:35-15:10 Philip J.
Bartok
: Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of the Mental
15:10-15:45 Helena
De Preester
: Intentionality: From Phenomenology to Naturalized Phenomenology
Section II, chair: Brian McLaughlin
14:00-14:35 Juraj
Hvorecky
: Intentionality of Non-Veridical Perception
14:35-15:10 Zoltán
Jakab
: On the Failure of Wide Intentionalism (Representational Externalism)
to Account for Phenomal Character
15:10-15:45 Filip
Buekens
: Do Qualia Have Intentions Contents?
break
Section I, chair: Vijay Mascarenhas (for the rest
of the day)
16:00-16:35 Greg R.
Jesson
: The Ontological and Intentional Status of Fregean Senses
16:35-17:10 Shannon
Vallor
: The Intentionality of Reference in Husserl and the Analytic Tradition
Section II, chair: Tim Crane (for the rest of the
day)
16:00-16:35 Julien
Deonna
: Les Liaisons Dangereuses: Crane and Bermudez on Non-Conceptual Content
16:35-17:10 Bence Nánay
: Nonconceptual Content: The Interface Between Perception and Action?
break
Section I
17:20-17:55 Gábor
Forrai
: Lockean Ideas as Intentional Contents
17:55-18:20 Balázs M.
Mezei
: The Problem of Intentionality in Husserl’s Criticism of Locke’s Theory
of Knowledge
Section II
17:20-17:55 William Fish
: Emotions, Moods and Intentionality
17:55-18:20 János
Tőzsér
: The Content of Perceptual Experience (Arguments for the Disjunctive
Theory)
June 22, Saturday
June 21, Friday
June 22, Saturday
June 23, Sunday
Section I, chair: Balázs M. Mezei (the whole
morning)
9:15-9:50 Erwin
Tegtmeier
: What’s Wrong With the Measurement-Theoretical Approach to Intentionality?
9:50-10:25 Jean-François
Lavigne
: Husserl versus Searle on Intentional and Mental States:
Some Aspects of a Phenomenological Criticism of J. Searle’s Conception of
Intenitonality
10:25-11:00 Stefania Ruzsits
Jha
: Michael Polanyi’s Phenomenology of Science and Knowledge
Section II, chair: Ruth Garrett Millikan (the whole
morning)
9:15-9:50 Ferenc
Huoranszki
: Intentionality, Laws and Dispositions
9:50-10:25 Susan
Schneider
: Direct Reference, Psychological Explanation, and Frege Cases
10:25-11:00 Agustín
Vicente
: A Tension in the Naturalistic Program
break
Section I
11:15-11:50 Vijay
Mascarenhas
: Intentionality, Causality and Self-Consciousness: Implications for the
Naturalization of Consciousness
11:50-12:25 Mihály
Tóth
: Toward an Intentional Theory of Revelation
Section II
11:15-11:50 Anandi
Hattiangadi
: Naturalism and the Normativity of Content
11:50-12:25 Jussi
Haukioja
: Normativity and Mental Content
lunch break
Plenary session, chair: Ned Block
14:00-15:00 Daniel C. Dennett: Building up to Intentionality
break
15:15-16:15 Jesse Prinz
: Reconciling Approaches to Intentionality
16:15-17:15 Laird Addis
: The Necessity and Nature of Mental Content
June 23, Sunday
June 21, Friday
June 22, Saturday
June 23, Sunday
Plenary session, chair: Daniel C. Dennett
9:15-10:15 Howard M.
Robinson
: Sense-Data, Intentionality and the ’Veil of Perception’
10:15-11:15 Brian
McLaughlin
: The Place of Color in Nature
break
Section I, chair: Gábor Forrai
11:30-12:05 Csaba Pléh
: Animal Teleology and Animal Intentionality in Early Comparative Psychology
12:05-12:40 György
Kampis
: Causal Intentionality
Section II, chair: Laird Addis
11:30-12:05 Rob
Vanderbeeken
: Causal Mechanical Explanations of Intentional Action
12:05-12:40 Tamás
Demeter
: Intentional Explanation and Ceteris Paribus Laws
lunch break
Section I, chair: Ferenc Huoranszki (for the rest
of the day)
14:15-14:50 Pierre
Le Morvan
: Intentionality: Tranparent, Translucent, and Opaque
14:50-15:25 Alberto
Voltolini
– Clotilde Calabi
: Do We Get Intentionality by Language?
15:25-16:00 Sean
Crawford
: Suspension of Belief De Re Without Mental Representation
Section II, chair: György Kampis (for the rest of the
day)
14:15-14:50 Tomis
Kapitan
: Intentional Agency and the Content of Intentions
14:50-15:25 Mark
Rowlands
: Representation in Action
15:25-16:00 István
Danka
: Did Donald Really Want to Kill Alvin? Davidson, Intentionality and the
Individuation of Events
break
Section I
16:15-16:50 Gergely Ambrus
: Functionalism and Intentionality
16:50-17:25 Kenneth
Williford
: The Intentionality of Consciousness and Consciousness of Intentionality
Section II
16:15-16:50 Jorge Louçã
: Modeling Intentional Agents: Contextual Cognitive Maps Standing for
Mental States
16:50-17:25 Dan Ryder
: Models in the Brain