Part 1: Consciousness and Qualia [714]
================================

Contents
--------
1.1  Consciousness [102]
1.1a    General [39]
1.1b    The Concept of Consciousness [16]
1.1c    Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought (Rosenthal, etc) [33]
1.1d    Eliminativist Perspectives [14]
1.2  Explaining Consciousness? [82]
1.2a    Subjectivity and Objectivity (Nagel) [40]
1.2b    The Explanatory Gap (Levine) [9]
1.2c    `Hard' and `Easy' Problems (Chalmers) [16]
1.2d    Cognitive Closure (McGinn) [10]
1.2e    Miscellaneous [7]
1.3  Consciousness and Ontology [112]
1.3a    The Knowledge Argument (Jackson) [36]
1.3b    Zombies & Modal Arguments [14]
1.3c    Consciousness and Physicalism, Misc [12]
1.3d    Consciousness and Dualism [19]
1.3e    Panpsychism [7]
1.3f    Mind-Body Problem, Misc [24]
1.4  Functional Approaches to Consciousness [148]
1.4a    Neurobiological Approaches [36]
1.4b    Cognitive Approaches [38]
1.4c    Dennett on Consciousness [50]
1.4d    Functional Approaches, Misc [11]
1.4e    The Function of Consciousness [13]
1.5  Consciousness and Content [73]
1.5a    Consciousness and Intentionality (Searle, etc) [14]
1.5b    The Content of Experience [24]
1.5c    Representationalism [18]
1.5d    Internalism and Externalism about Experience [10]
1.5e    Miscellaneous [7]
1.6  Qualia [65]
1.6a    General [17]
1.6b    Qualia and Materialism [13]
1.6c    Eliminativism about Qualia [10]
1.6d    The Inverted Spectrum [25]
1.7  Functionalism and Qualia [44]
1.7a    Introspection and Absent Qualia (Shoemaker) [10]
1.7b    Absent Qualia, General (Block, etc) [13]
1.7c    Miscellaneous [21]
1.8  The Identity Theory (Smart, etc) [57]
1.9  Essentialism and the Identity Theory (Kripke) [33]
1.10 Machine Consciousness: see 4.3, 4.4

1.1 Consciousness [102]
-----------------

1.1a Consciousness -- General [39]
-----------------------------

Armstrong, D.M. & Malcolm, N. 1984.  _Consciousness and Causality_.  Blackwell.

Block, N., Flanagan, O., & Guzeldere, G. (eds) 1996.  _The Nature of
Consciousness: Philosophical and Scientific Debates_.  MIT Press.
  An anthology of central philosophical papers on consciousness.

Chalmers, D.J. 1991.  Consciousness and cognition.  Manuscript.
  Exploring the link between consciousness and judgments about consciousness.
  Coherence between these => consciousness depends on the functional but isn't
  reducible.  Toward a dual-aspect theory based on pattern and information.

Chalmers, D.J. 1996.  _The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory_.
Oxford University Press.
  Argues against the reductive explanation of consciousness, and for a kind of
  naturalistic dualism.  Moves toward a "fundamental theory" to bridge the
  gap, and draws out some consequences.

Culbertson, J. 1989.  _Consciousness: Natural and Artificial_.  Libra.

Davies, M. & Humphreys, G. 1993.  _Consciousness: Philosophical and
Psychological Essays_.  Blackwell.
  A collection of 5 psychological and 8 philosophical essays on consciousness.

Flanagan, O.J. 1991.  Consciousness.  In _The Science of the Mind_.  MIT Press.
  On the mysteries of consciousness.  Argues with epiphenomenalism, "conscious
  inessentialism", and the "new mysterians" (Nagel, McGinn).  Toward a
  naturalistic theory, drawing on ideas of Edelman, Calvin, Dennett.

Flanagan, O.J. 1992.  _Consciousness Reconsidered_.  MIT Press.
  Argues that consciousness can be accounted for in a naturalistic framework.
  With arguments against eliminativism and epiphenomenalism, evidence from
  neuroscience and psychology, and discussions of the stream and the self.

Flanagan, O.J. 1995.  Consciousness and the natural method.  Neuropsychologia
33:1103-15.
  Consciousness is heterogeneous and should be studied by co-ordinating various
  fields.  Applies to visual consciousness, conscious memory, and dreaming, and
  argues there is no clear adaptationist account of the latter.

Guzeldere, G. 1995.  Consciousness: what it is, how to study it, what to learn
from its history.  Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:30-51.
  A history of the study of consciousness, especially in psychology.

Guzeldere, G. 1995.  Problems of consciousness: A perspective on contemporary
issues, current debates.  Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:112-43.
  A summary of recent philosophical debates over consciousness, focusing on
  the "what/where/who/why/how" questions, the explanatory gap, and the
  stalemate between "essentialist" and "causal" intuitions.

Hannay, A. 1987.  The claims of consciousness: A critical survey.  Inquiry
30:395-434.

Hannay, A. 1990.  _Human Consciousness_.  Routledge.

Jackendoff, R. 1987.  _Consciousness and the Computational Mind_.  MIT Press.
  Separates computational mind from phenomenological mind, and studies the
  former, a third-person approach.  The residue is the "Mind-Mind" problem.
  Consciousness supervenes on an intermediate level of representation. Elegant.

Kirk, R. 1994.  _Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of
Consciousness_.  Oxford University Press.
  Physicalism can explain consciousness in all its glory.  Argues against
  zombies and inverted-spectrum scenarios, and suggests that the explanatory
  gap can be bridged by an account of directly-active information-processing.

Metzinger, T. (ed) 1995.  _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  An excellent collection of 20 philosophical papers on consciousness.

Lycan, W.G. 1987.  _Consciousness_.  MIT Press.

Lycan, W.G. 1996.  _Consciousness and Experience_.  MIT Press.

Nelkin, N. 1996.  _Consciousness and the Origins of Thought_.  Oxford
University Press.

Revonsuo, A. 1993.  Is there a ghost in the cognitive machinery?  Philosophical
Psychology 6:387-405.
  On the place of consciousness in cognitive science.  Argues against
  eliminativism and against Dennett's "multiple drafts" model, appealing to
  scientific work about consciousness.

Revonsuo, A. & Kamppinen, M. (eds) 1994.  _Consciousness in Philosophy and
Cognitive Neuroscience_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Sayre, K.M. 1969.  _Consciousness: A Philosophic Study of Minds and Machines_.
Random House.

Searle, J.R. 1989.  Consciousness, unconsciousness, and intentionality.
Philosophical Topics 17:193-209.
  Argues that the first-person view has been ignored too much in the philosophy
  of mind.  Even unconscious states are only mental by virtue of their
  potential consciousness.

Searle, J.R. 1992.  _The Rediscovery of the Mind_.  MIT Press.
  On the centrality of consciousness to the mind.  Consciousness is irreducible
  but biological.  On the history of the field, the structure of consciousness,
  its role in constituting intentionality, and problems with computation.

Searle, J.R. 1993.  The problem of consciousness.  In _Experimental and
Theoretical Studies of Consciousness_ (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).  Wiley.
  On the notion of consciousness, its relation to the brain, and some features
  that need to be explained: its subjectivity, unity, intentionality, center
  and periphery, Gestalt structure, aspect of familiarity, and so on.

Siewert, C. 1994.  _Understanding Consciousness_.  Dissertation, University of
California at Berkeley.

Smith, D.W. 1986.  The structure of (self-) consciousness.  Topoi 5:149-56.

Smith, D.W. 1992.  Consciousness in action.  Synthese 90:119-43.

Sprigge, T.L.S. 1982.  The importance of subjectivity: An inaugural lecture.
Inquiry 25:143-63.
  Value is only found within streams of consciousness.  Three ways of studying
  it: phenomenology, anthropology, and by relation to the physical.  With an
  analysis of the "self-transcending" nature of conscious intentionality.

Strawson, G. 1994.  _Mental Reality_.  MIT Press.

Tye, M. 1995.  _Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the
Phenomenal Mind_.  MIT Press.

Velmans, M. 1996.  _The Science of Consciousness: Psychological,
Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews_.  Routledge.

Villaneuva, E. (ed) 1991.  _Consciousness: Philosophical Issues_.  Ridgeview.
  A collection of philosophical articles on consciousness.

1.1b The Concept of Consciousness [16]
---------------------------------

Armstrong, D.M. 1981.  What is consciousness?  In _The Nature of Mind_.
Cornell University Press.
  On minimal consciousness, perceptual consciousness, and introspective
  consciousness.  Introspective consciousness seems so special because it gives
  inner awareness of self, and memory of other mental events.

Bisiach, E. 1988.  The (haunted) brain and consciousness.  In (A. Marcel &
E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_.  Oxford University
Press.
  Distinguishes C1 (phenomenal experience) from C2 (access of parts of a system
  to other parts).  C2 is can be scientifically studied, and has a graspable,
  if fragmented, causal role.  C1 is mysterious and perhaps beyond science.

Gennaro, R.J. 1992.  Consciousness, self-consciousness, and episodic memory.
Philosophical Psychology 5:333-47.
  Argues that consciousness entails having episodic memory, which entails
  self-consciousness.  So consciousness entails self-consciousness.

Gennaro, R.J. 1995.  Does mentality entail consciousness?  Philosophia
24:331-58.

Lormand, E. 1995.  What qualitative consciousness is like.  Manuscript.

Lormand, E. 1996.  Nonphenomenal consciousness.  Nous 30:242-61.

Matthews, G. 1977.  Consciousness and life.  Philosophy 52:13-26.

Moody, T.C. 1986.  Distinguishing consciousness.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 47:289-95.
  Separates consciousness from the mental -- functionalist accounts work for
  the latter but not the former.  With remarks on Zen "pure consciousness".

Natsoulas, T. 1978.  Consciousness.  American Psychologist 33:906-14.
  On the role of consciousness in psychology, and distinguishing various
  notions of consciousness: mutual knowledge, internal knowledge, awareness,
  direct awareness, personal unity, wakefulness, and double consciousness.

Nelkin, N. 1987.  What is it like to be a person?  Mind and Language 21:220-41.
  Critiques three senses of consc: awareness, verbalization and phenomenology.
  Argues that none are sufficient for person-consciousness.  Quite good.

Nelkin, N. 1993.  What is consciousness?  Philosophy of Science 60:419-34.
  On three senses of consciousness: phenomenality, intentionality, and
  introspectibility.  Argues from empirical evidence (especially blindsight
  cases) that these three are all dissociable.

O'Shaughnessy, B. 1991.  The anatomy of consciousness.  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Consciousness_.  Ridgeview.

Richards, W. 1984.  Self-consciousness and agency.  Synthese 61:149-71.
  Self-consciousness is consciousness of agency.  Castaneda/Nozick/Nagel.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1990.  The independence of consciousness and sensory quality.
In (E. Villanueva, ed) _Consciousness_.  Ridgeview.
  Argues that consciousness and sensory quality are independent properties:
  there can be unconscious sensations.  Consciousness is a relational property.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1994.  State consciousness and transitive consciousness.  
Consciousness and Cognition 2:355-63.

Shanon, B. 1990.  Consciousness.  Journal of Mind and Behavior 11:137-51.
  On three kinds of consciousness -- sensed being, mental awareness, and
  reflection -- and their relationships.

Tye, M. 1996.  The burning house.  In (T. Metzinger, ed) _Conscious
Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  Uses various puzzles cases to distinguish higher-order consciousness,
  discriminatory consciousness, responsive consciousness, and phenomenal
  consciousness.

1.1c Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought (Rosenthal, etc.) [33]
-------------------------------------------------------------

Aquila, R. 1990.  Consciousness as higher-order thoughts: Two objections.
American Philosophical Quarterly 27:81-87.
  Higher-order thought theories have two unacceptable consequences: one can
  notice one's hearing a sound without noticing one's consciousness of the
  sound; and one can unconsciously perceive one's surroundings as gloomy.

Byrne, A. 1995.  Some like it HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts.
Philosophical Studies.

Carruthers, P. 1989.  Brute experience.  Journal of Philosophy 258-69.
  Argues for a distinction between conscious and non-conscious experiences,
  depending on whether one is conscious of the experience.  Animal experiences
  are of the second kind, and therefore are not morally significant.

Carruthers, P. 1992.  Consciousness and concepts.  Aristotelian Society
Supplement 66:41-59.
  Advocates the "reflexive thinking" account of consciousness over Kirk's
  "presence" account.  Availability for reflexive thinking is naturally
  necessary and sufficient for qualia.  Interesting paper.

Carruthers, P. 1996.  _Language, Thought, and Consciousness_.  Cambridge
University Press.

Dretske, F. 1993.  Conscious experience.  Mind 102:263-283.
  Against higher-order thought accounts: one can have a conscious experience
  without being aware that one is having it.  With remarks on thing-awareness
  vs. fact-awareness and on "inner-sense" accounts.

Dretske, F. 1995.  Are experiences conscious?  In _Naturalizing the Mind_.
MIT Press.
  We're not conscious *of* our experience in general, but conscious *with* it.
  Criticizes HOP theories (not conceptualized enough) and HOT theories (rules
  out animals; there's more in experience than thought).

Francescotti, R.M. 1995.  Higher-order thoughts and conscious experience.
Philosophical Psychology.
  Argues that a higher-order thought is insufficient for consciousness, even
  with Rosenthal's constraint.  A causal constraint is required, but the only
  strong enough such constraint doesn't work.

Gennaro, R.J. 1993.  Brute experience and the higher-order thought theory of
consciousness.  Philosophical Papers 22:51-69.
  Carruthers 1989 misanalyzes higher-order thought theory.  There's no need for
  conscious HOTs, and not too much conceptual sophistication is required, so
  animals might have HOTs and therefore conscious pains.

Gennaro, R.J. 1996.  _Consciousness and Self-consciousness: A Defense of the
Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness_.  John Benjamins.

Guzeldere, G. 1995.  Consciousness and the introspective link principle.  In
(S. Hameroff, A. Kazniak, & A. Scott, eds) _Toward a Science of Consciousness_.
MIT Press.

Guzeldere, G. 1995.  Is consciousness the perception of what passes in one's
own mind?  In (T. Metzinger, ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  A critique of higher-order-perception theories of consciousness.  They're
  either committed to a "representational divide" fallacy or collapse into
  higher-order-thought or first-order theories.

Jamieson, D. & Bekoff, M. 1992.  Carruthers on nonconscious experience.
Analysis 52:23-28.
  Various points against Carruthers 1989.  His examples of nonconscious
  experience are likely conscious, and the higher-order account is circular.

Kobes, B.W. 1995.  Telic higher-order thoughts and Moore's paradox.
Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312.

Lycan, W.G. 1995.  Consciousness as internal monitoring, I.  Philosophical
Perspectives 9:1-14.
  Argues for a Lockean quasi-perceptual view of consciousness as internal
  monitoring via second-order states.  Contra objections, e.g. Rey's point that
  it makes consciousness too prevalent -- consciousness isn't an on-off affair.

Mellor, D.H. 1978.  Conscious belief.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 78:87-101.
  Conscious belief (or assent) is believing that one believes.  Addresses
  various objections, from self-deception and from consciousness of assent.
  Communication needs conscious belief, not just belief.

Mellor, D.H. 1980.  Consciousness and degrees of belief.  In (D.H. Mellor,
ed.) _Prospects for Pragmatism_.  Cambridge University Press.

Natsoulas, T. 1992.  Appendage theory -- pro and con.  Journal of Mind and
Behavior 13:371-96.
  On various pros and cons of HOT theories, to do with reflexivity, objects of
  HOTs, introspection, and so on.  With comparisons to "intrinsic" theories.

Natsoulas, T. 1993.  What is wrong with the appendage theory of consciousness?
Philosophical Psychology 6:137-54.
  On three theories of our direct awareness of conscious states: mental-eye
  theories, self-intimational theories, and appendage theory.  Appendage theory
  (i.e. HOT theory) is promising, but how does an HOT determine its object?

Natsoulas, T. 1993.  The importance of being conscious.  Journal of Mind and
Behavior 14:317-40.
  On the differences between first-order and second-order consciousness.
  Second-order consciousness is essential for communication and locomotion.
  With remarks on "nonconscious consciousness".

Nelkin, N. 1989.  Unconscious sensations.  Philosophical Psychology 2:129-41.
  Separates CN (phenomenological) from C1 (info-processing) and C2 (higher
  order beliefs).  CN is a subset of CS (image-representation state).  We are
  always C2 of CN states, but not of other CS states: unconscious sensations!

Nelkin, N. 1995.  The dissociation of phenomenal states from apperception.  In
(T. Metzinger, ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  Argues that we need not be apperceptively aware of phenomenal states.
  Introspection leaves the matter open, but some empirical results (e.g.
  hue blindsight) and theoretical arguments support dissociability.

Nisbett, R. & Wilson, T. 1977.  Telling more than we can know: verbal reports
on mental processes.  Psychological Review 84:231-59.
  Experimental evidence on our confabulation about our inner processes.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1986.  Two concepts of consciousness.  Philosophical Studies
49:329-59.
  Consciousness should be construed neither as sensation nor intentionality,
  but as the existence of higher-order thoughts.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1995.  A theory of consciousness.  In (N. Block, O. Flanagan,
and G. Guzeldere, eds.) _The Nature of Consciousness_.  MIT Press.
  A conscious mental state is a state that is the subject of a higher-order
  thought.  Consciousness is not essential to mentality, should be separated
  from sensory quality, and is not an intrinsic property of conscious states.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1990.  Why are verbally expressed thoughts conscious?
Bielefeld Report.
  Because verbally expressing and reporting are easily and immediately
  connected for 1st-order thoughts.  But not for 2nd-order thoughts.  Hmmm.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1993.  Thinking that one thinks.  In (M. Davies and G.
Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays_.
Blackwell.
  Conscious states are states that are the contents of higher-order thoughts.
  Express/report distinction: we report them, and express the HOT (which may
  be unconscious).  Defense against dispositional and collapsing objections.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1993.  Explaining consciousness.  Manuscript.
  Distinguishes the sense in which we are aware of conscious states; argues for
  the separation of consciousness and sensation; and outlines how higher-order
  thoughts might explain the what-it's-like of conscious states.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1993.  Higher-order thoughts and the appendage theory of
consciousness.  Philosophical Psychology 6:155-66.
  In response to Natsoulas, HOT theory needn't answer the general question of
  how intentional states determine their objects.  With remarks on the
  other alternatives and the dangers of self-intimation.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1995.  Moore's paradox and consciousness.  Philosophical
Perspectives 9:313-33.

Seager, W.E. 1994.  Dretske on HOT theories of consciousness.  Analysis
54:270-76.

Shoemaker, S. 1990.  First-person access.  Philosophical Perspectives
4:187-214.
  We have a limited special authority about the contents of our mental states.
  This follows from the link between a state and beliefs about it in the
  functional definition of that kind of state.

Shoemaker, S. 1993.  Functionalism and consciousness.  In _Experimental and
Theoretical Studies of Consciousness_ (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).  Wiley.
  Argues that introspective access is essential to many sorts of mental state,
  due to constitutive rationality requirements.  Against a perceptual model of
  introspection; introspecting and introspected states are closer than that.

1.1d Eliminativist Perspectives [14]
-------------------------------

Allport, A. 1988.  What concept of consciousness?  In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach,
eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_.  Oxford University Press.

Churchland, P.S. 1983.  Consciousness: the transmutation of a concept.  Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 64:80-95.
  Experimental evidence against consciousness/introspection/transparency.

Dennett, D.C. 1976.  Are dreams experiences?  Philosophical Review 73:151-71.
Reprinted in _Brainstorms_ (MIT Press, 1978).
  Argues that dreams might not be experienced, but rather be stored directly
  into memory (the "cassette-tape" theory of dreaming).

Dennett, D.C. 1979.  The onus re experiences: A reply to Emmett.  Philosophical
Studies 35, 315-18.

Emmett, K. 1978.  Oneiric experiences.  Philosophical Studies 34:445-50.

Nikolinakos, D. 1994.  General anesthesia, consciousness, and the skeptical
challenge.  Journal of Philosophy 2:88-104.
  Consciousness is an indispensable concept in anesthesiology, and therefore
  (contra Churchland and Wilkes) is a scientifically legitimate kind.  With
  empirical details and anesthesiological theory on levels of consciousness.
  
Rey, G. 1982.  A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness.  In
(R. Davidson, S. Schwartz, & D. Shapiro, eds) _Consciousness and
Self-Regulation_, Vol 3.  Plenum Press.
  One could make a machine, duplicating the usual abilities that go along with
  consciousness, but surely it wouldn't be conscious.  So what are the
  conditions for consciousness?  Maybe there are none.

Rey, G. 1986.  A question about consciousness.  In (H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds)
_Perspectives on Mind_.  Kluwer.
  A rerun of Rey 1982: An unconscious machine could duplicate all the obvious
  criteria for consciousness, so maybe even we aren't conscious.  With remarks
  on the relation between our belief in consciousness and consciousness itself.

Rey, G. 1995.  Toward a projectivist account of conscious experience.  In (T.
Metzinger, ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  We "project" consciousness into ourselves and others.  There are no
  explanation-transcendent phenomena for which there is non-question-begging
  evidence.  With remarks on self-attribution and Wittgenstein.

Smith, D.W. 1986.  In (H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds) _Perspectives on Mind_.
Kluwer.
  Commentary on Rey 1986: we are directly aware of our consciousness.  It's not
  a theoretical entity, but rather something to be explained.

Tienson, J.L. 1987.  Brains are not conscious.  Philosophical Papers 16:187-93.
  A skeptical argument: single neurons are not conscious, and adding a neuron
  won't produce consciousness, so finite brains are not conscious.

Wilkes, K.V. 1984.  Is consciousness important?  British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 35:223-43.
  No, and it's not very coherent either.  It divides into awakeness, sensation,
  sensory experience, and propositional attitudes.  Also a history of the term.

Wilkes, K.V. 1988.  Yishi, Duh, Um and consciousness.  In (A. Marcel &
E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_.  Oxford University
Press.

Wilkes, K.V. 1995.  Losing consciousness.  In (T. Metzinger, ed) _Conscious
Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  Consciousness is not a tenable notion in either commonsense or
  scientific psychology; we should return instead to the "psuche".


1.2 Explaining Consciousness? [82]
----------------------------

1.2a Subjectivity and Objectivity (Nagel) [40] (see also 1.3a)
---------------------------------

Nagel, T. 1974.  What is it like to be a bat?  Philosophical Review 4:435-50.
Reprinted in _Mortal Questions_ (Cambridge University Press, 1979).
  Physicalist explanations leave out consciousness, i.e. what it is like to be
  an organism.  Objective accounts omit points of view (could there be an
  objective phenomenology?).  Physicalism may be true, but we can't see how.

Nagel, T. 1979.  Subjective and objective.  In _Mortal Questions_.  Cambridge
University Press.
  Subjective and objective views clash e.g. on meaning of life, free will,
  personal identity, mind-body problem, ethics.  How to reconcile: reduction,
  elimination, annexation?  Maybe just let multiple viewpoints coexist.

Nagel, T. 1986.  _The View From Nowhere_.  Oxford University Press.
  Seeing philosophy as a clash between the subjective and objective views of
  various phenomena (mental states, self, knowledge, freedom, value, ethics).
  Eliminating the subjective is impossible.

Akins, K. 1993.  What is it like to be boring and myopic?  In (B. Dahlbom, ed)
_Dennett and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  Gives a detailed account of perceptual processing in bats, and suggests that
  we can know what bat-experience is like: it's like nerd experience.  But then
  is there an unexplained residue?

Akins, K. 1993.  A bat without qualities?  In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys,
eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays_.  Blackwell.
  On what science tells us about the experience of bats, birds, and others.
  Why a movie of bat-experience isn't good enough -- because of the
  inseparability of intentionality and experience.  Science can do OK.

Biro, J.I. 1991.  Consciousness and subjectivity.  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Consciousness_.  Ridgeview.
  No real problems are posed by subjectivity and points of view, no matter
  how they are construed (fixed, portable, tokens, types).  It's either a
  confusion or a triviality about the logic of indexicality.

Biro, J.I. 1993.  Consciousness and objectivity.  In (M. Davies and G
Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays_.
Blackwell.

Davis, L. 1982.  What is it like to be an agent?  Erkenntnis 18:195-213.
  On what is required for consciousness of agency (rather than qualia): belief,
  intention, and most importantly desire, enabling a capacity to care.  A
  robot could have all this, and it would be like something to be it.

Flanagan, O.J. 1985.  Consciousness, naturalism and Nagel.  Journal of Mind and
Behavior 6:373-90.
  Naturalism can do autophenomenology just fine.

Foss, J.E. 1989.  On the logic of what it is like to be a conscious subject.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67:305-320.
  A Super Neuroscientist will know how we describe and think about experience,
  so will know as much as a Super Sympathist.  One doesn't have to imagine to
  know what it's like.  With remarks on bat experience.

Foss, J.E. 1993.  Subjectivity, objectivity, and Nagel on consciousness.
Dialogue 32:725-36.
  Nagel conflates metaphysical and epistemological versions of the subjective/
  objective distinction.  Consciousness is metaphysically subjective, and
  science is epistemically objective, so there is incompatibility.

Francescotti, R.M. 1993.  Subjective experience and points of view.  Journal of
Philosophical Research 18:25-36.
  Being graspable from only one point of view does not define the class of
  facts about conscious experience.  Various ways of cashing this out fail.

Haksar, V. 1981.  Nagel on subjective and objective.  Inquiry 24:105-21.
  The objective and subjective don't conflict, but complement each other.

Hanna, P. 1990.  Must thinking bats be conscious?  Philosophical Investigations
13:350-55.

Hiley, D.R. 1978.  Materialism and the inner life.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy 16:61-70.
  Nagel conflates questions about sensory qualities with those about a unique
  point of view.  The truth of physicalism is irrelevant to uniqueness.

Hill, C.S. 1977.  Of bats, brains, and minds.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 38:100-106.

Kekes, J. 1977.  Physicalism and subjectivity.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 37:533-6.
  The subjective/objective distinction is ill-drawn.  Objective descriptions
  aren't species-independent, but in terms of the space-time causal network.
  Science can explain the experience this way, but not provide the experience.
 
Lewis, D. 1983.  Postscript to "Mad pain and Martian pain".  In _Philosophical
Papers_, Vol. 1.  Cambridge University Press.
  Knowing what it's like consists in an ability, not possession of information.

Lycan, W.G. 1987.  "Subjectivity".  In _Consciousness_.  MIT Press.
  Various anti-Nagel points.

Lycan, W.G. 1990.  What is the "subjectivity" of the mental?  Philosophical
Perspectives.
  The subjectivity of the mental is no more special than usual propositional
  subjectivity.  It can be handled by a self-scanner model of introspection.

Malcolm, N. 1988.  Subjectivity.  Philosophy 63:147-60.
  A critique of Nagel's idea of a "point of view" that is occupied by a
  "subject".  There aren't any peculiar facts about given viewpoints.

Maloney, J.C. 1986.  About being a bat.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy
64:26-49.

Mellor, D.H. 1993.  Nothing like experience.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 63:1-16.
  There are no fact about what an experience is like.  Knowing what it's like
  is an ability to imagine, recognize, and recall; this explains ineffability,
  etc.  With remarks on the experience of imagining an experience.

McClamrock, R. 1992.  Irreducibility and subjectivity.  Philosophical Studies
67:177-92.
  Phenomenological properties cannot be picked out in physical or computational
  terms; argues against Lycan's criticism of Nagel.  But all this is compatible
  with materialism.  With comments on the phenomenological tradition.

McCulloch, G. 1988.  What it is like.  Philosophical Quarterly 38:1-19.
  Criticizes absent/inverted qualia arguments for a special "what it is like",
  but argues that the possibility of "what it is like" differences relative to
  semantic states shows that something's not conveyed by functional accounts.

McMullen, C. 1985.  `Knowing what it's like' and the essential indexical.
Philosophical Studies 48:211-33.
  The Nagel/Jackson argument is analogous to the Perry indexical argument,
  and can be treated the same way.

Muscari, P. 1985.  The subjective character of experience.  Journal of Mind
and Behavior 6:577-97.

Muscari, P. 1987.  The status of humans in Nagel's phenomenology.
Philosophical Forum 19:23-33.
  Nagel's dilemma: separating feeling from process.  Moral consequences?

Nelkin, N. 1987.  What is it like to be a person?  Mind and Language
2:220-41.
  Nagel-consciousness exists, but isn't so important.  It's essential for
  sensations, but not for thoughts.  Beings without it could still be persons.

Nemirow, L. 1980.  Review of Nagel's _Mortal Questions_.  Philosophical Review
89:473-7.
  Understanding does not consist only in facts; we can understand via sympathy.

Nemirow, L. 1990.  Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance.  In
(W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_.  Blackwell.
  Knowing what it's like is really knowing how to imagine.  We should reduce
  Nagel's question to a question about possession of a certain ability.

Pugmire, D. 1989.  Bat or batman.  Philosophy 64:207-17.
  Subjectivity is not something we have knowledge of, as we lack comparisons.

Rorty, R. 1993.  Holism, intrinsicality, and the ambition of transcendence.
In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and His Critics_.  Blackwell.
  On the Nagel/Dennett debate: Nagel holds out for unexplained intrinsic
  properties once the relational is all accounted for; Dennett can renounce the
  transcendental ambition.  Remarks on realism, holism, and metaphilosophy.

Russow, L. 1982.  It's not like that to be a bat.  Behaviorism 10:55-63.
  Divides Nagel's problem: qualitative differences, special access, mineness.

Taliaferro, C. 1988.  Nagel's vista or taking subjectivity seriously.  Southern
Journal of Philosophy 26:393-401.
  Nagel's `View from Nowhere' doesn't take subjectivity seriously enough.

Teller, P. 1992.  Subjectivity and knowing what it's like.  In (A. Beckermann,
H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive
Physicalism_. De Gruyter.
  Rebutting various intuitions for the non-physical nature of experience.  The
  Nagel/Jackson argument commits an intensional fallacy; experiences are
  physical states known from a different perspective.

Tilghman, B.R. 1991.  What is it like to be an aardvark?  Philosophy 66:325-38.
  A Wittgensteinian critique of Nagel.  Nagel's question is confused: "what
  it's like" is a matter of behavior, sociality, etc, not inner experience.

van Gulick, R. 1985.  Physicalism and the subjectivity of the mental.
Philosophical Topics 13:51-70.
  Reducing doesn't imply understanding.  Two different kinds of reduction.

Wider, K. 1989.  Overtones of solipsism in Nagel's `What is it like to be a
bat?' and `The view from nowhere'.  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
49:481-99.
  Nagel is an epistemological solipsist, whether he likes it or not.

Wright, E. 1996.  What it isn't like.  American Philosophical Quarterly
 33:23-42.

1.2b The Explanatory Gap (Levine) [9]
------------------------

Bieri, P. 1995.  Why is consciousness puzzling?  In (T. Metzinger, ed)
_Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  Reflections on the explanatory gap between physical processes and conscious
  experience.  With remarks on different sorts of consciousness, and on why we
  need an intelligible necessary connection.

Hardin, C.L. 1987.  Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:281-98.
  On the physiological bases of phenomenal states, particularly color.
  Inverted spectrum isn't really coherent, as coolness/warmth would have to
  be inverted too.  So the contingency of qualia is diminished.

Hardin, C.L. 1992.  Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors.  In
(A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects
for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter.
  Argues in detail that psychophysics can provide a structural map to close the
  explanatory gap.  If there is an explanatory residue, perhaps panpsychism
  can help.

Harnad, S. 1994.  Why and how we are not zombies.  Journal of Consciousness
Studies 1:164-67.

Levin, J. 1991.  Analytic functionalism and the reduction of phenomenal states.
 Philosophical Studies 61:211-38.
  Contra Kripkean arguments, a good enough functional theory may help close
  the conceivability/explanatory gap between the physical and qualia.  Contra
  Nagel/Jackson, such a theory could provide us with recognitional abilities.

Levine, J. 1983.  Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.  Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 64:354-61.
  How do we explain the apparent contingency of the qualia-matter reduction?
  Even if it's not metaphysically contingent, it's conceptually contingent, so
  there's a gap in any physical explanation of qualia.  Excellent.

Levine, J. 1993.  On leaving out what it's like.  In (M. Davies and G.
Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays_.
Blackwell.
  Physical accounts leave out qualia epistemologically but not metaphysically.
  So physicalism holds, but there is an explanatory gap.  Discusses Kripke's
  and Jackson's arguments in detail; also explanation and content.

Price, M.C. 1996.  Should we expect to feel as if we understand consciousness?
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3.
  Argues that the explanatory gap between brain and consciousness is just the
  same as that found with causal relations everywhere; it's just that we
  usually overlook it in the latter case.

Sturgeon, S. 1994.  The epistemic basis of subjectivity.  Journal of Philosophy
91:221-35.
  Qualia can't be explained in more basic terms, as that sort of explanation
  works by accounting for a property's canonical evidence, but the canonical
  evidence for qualia are qualia themselves.  But they still may be physical.


1.2c `Hard' and `Easy' Problems (Chalmers) [16]
-------------------------------

Chalmers, D.J. 1995.  Facing up to the problem of consciousness.  Journal of
Consciousness Studies.  Also in (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott, eds.)
_Toward a Science of Consciousness_.  MIT Press.
  Divides the problems of consciousness into easy and hard problems; the hard
  problem eludes reductive explanation as it isn't about explaining functions.
  Argues instead for a nonreductive theory with psychophysical laws.

Chalmers, D.J. 1995.  The puzzle of conscious experience.  Scientific
American 273(6):80-86.
  Like the JCS article, but shorter, more accessible, and with pretty pictures.

Chalmers, D.J. 1996.  Can consciousness be reductively explained?  In _The
Conscious Mind_.  Oxford University Press.
  There is no a priori entailment from the physical to phenomenal facts
  (arguments from conceivability, epistemology, analysis), so reductive
  explanation fails.  With a critique of existing empirical proposals.

Churchland, P.S. 1996.  The hornswoggle problem.  Journal of Consciousness
Studies.
  Argues that the "hard problem" in effect invokes an argument from ignorance,
  and that there's no deep difference between consciousness and other domains.

Clark, T. 1995.  Function and phenomenology: Closing the explanatory gap.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:241-54.
  Argues contra Chalmers that experience is identical to certain functions,
  rather than emerging from them.

Crick, F. and Koch, C. 1995.  Why neuroscience may be able to explain
consciousness.  Scientific American 273(6):84-85.
  Divides the hard problem into three parts, and argues that neuroscience can
  make progress on at least one part (incommunicability); and maybe "meaning"
  holds the key to the rest.

Dennett, D.C. 1996.  Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:4-6.
  Argues contra Chalmers 1995 that functions are all we need to explain.

Hodgson, D. 1996.  The easy problems ain't so easy.  Journal of Consciousness
Studies 3:69-75.
  Argues that consciousness plays a vital role in performing mental functions,
  so the easy problems won't be solved until the hard problem is solved.

Libet, B. 1996.  Solutions to the hard problem of consciousness.  Journal of
Consciousness Studies 3:33-35.
  Endorses the idea of consciousness as fundamental, but criticizes Chalmers'
  psychophysical laws.  Advocates a theory with a "conscious mental field".

Lowe, E.J. 1995.  There are no easy problems of consciousness.  Journal of
Consciousness Studies 2:266-71.
  Argues that the "easy problems" -- reportability, attention, etc -- all
  involve concepts and therefore experience itself, for Kantian reasons, and
  therefore are not mechanisticcally explainable.

Mills, E.O. 1996.  Giving up on the hard problem of consciousness.  Journal of
Consciousness Studies 3:26-32.
  Argues that the truly hard problem is that of giving a constitutive
  account of consciousness, and Chalmers doesn't solve that (laws aren't good
  enough); in fact it's unsolvable.

O'Hara, K. & Scutt, T. 1996.  There is no hard problem of consciousness.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3.
  Argue that we should work on the easy problems for now, as nobody has any
  good ideas about the hard problem; maybe it will gradually fade away.

Robinson, W.S. 1996.  The hardness of the hard problem.  Journal of
Consciousness Studies 3:14-25.

Shear, J. 1996.  The hard problem: Closing the empirical gap.  Journal of
Consciousness Studies 3:54-68.
  On the epistemology of the hard problem.  Argues that a scientific study of
  phenomenology is possible, drawing on work in developmental psychology and
  Eastern thought.  "Pure consciousness" may be relevant to a resolution.

Varela, F. 1995.  Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard
problem.  Journal of Consciousness Studies 3.
  Advocates a careful phenomenological study of consciousness in its own right,
  systematucally linked with a neurophysiological investigation.

Velmans, M. 1995.  The relation of consciousness to the material world.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:255-65.
  Agrees with Chalmers on nonreductionism, but disagrees on "awareness",
  organizational invariance, and thermostats.  Advocates a kind of dual-aspect
  theory, where the physical world is present within consciousness,

1.2d Cognitive Closure (McGinn) [10]
----------------------

Kirk, R. 1991.  Why shouldn't we be able to solve the mind-body problem?
Analysis 51:17-23.
  McGinn asks too much of a solution to the M-B problem.  We might understand
  consciousness without understanding specific experiences; we could get at it
  by studying brain and consciousness not separately but simultaneously.

Kukla, A. 1995.  Mystery, mind, and materialism.  Philosophical Psychology
8:255-64.

McGinn, C. 1989.  Can we solve the mind-body problem?  Mind 98:349-66.
Reprinted in _The Problem of Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991).
  Argues that the mind-body problem might be solvable in principle, but beyond
  human capacities.  Neither perception of the brain nor introspection of
  consciousness can uncover the property by which consciousness arises.

McGinn, C. 1991.  _The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution_.
Blackwell.
  A collection of articles on the problem of consciousness, advocating a view
  on which the phenomenon is natural but permanently mysterious to us.

McGinn, C. 1991.  Consciousness and the natural order.  In _The Problem of
Consciousness_.  Blackwell.
  Argues that a naturalistic account of the intentionality of conscious states
  requires an account of their embodiment; and that embodiment may depend on
  the hidden structure of conscious states, not accessible to introspection.

McGinn, C. 1991.  The hidden structure of consciousness.  In _The Problem of
Consciousness_.  Blackwell.
  Suggests that consciousness may have a hidden structure, analogous to the
  deep structure of language, that relates its surface properties to physical
  properties.  We may not be able to understand this hidden structure, however.

McGinn, C. 1993.  _Problems in Philosophy_.  Blackwell.

McGinn, C. 1995.  Consciousness and space.  In (T. Metzinger, ed) _Conscious
Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.

Sacks, M. 1994.  Cognitive closure and the limits of understanding.  Ratio
7:26-42

Whitely, C.H. 1990.  McGinn on the mind-body problem.  Mind 99:289.

1.2e Miscellaneous [7]
------------------

Hardcastle, V.G. 1993.  The naturalists versus the skeptics: The debate over a
scientific understanding of consciousness.  Journal of Mind and Behavior
14:27-50.
  Argues that consciousness can be handled within a scientific framework.  We
  can translate first-person accounts into third-person accounts.  Replies to
  skeptical objections using analogies from elsewhere in science.

Hardcastle, V.G. 1996.  The why of consciousness: A non-issue for materialists.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:7-13.
  A "committed materialist" will not see any explanatory gap, or any "brute
  fact".  The entrenched differences lie in one's choice of initial framework.

Hesslow, G. 1996.  Will neuroscience explain consciousness?  Journal of
Theoretical Biology 171:29-39.

Kirk, R. 1995.  How is consciousness possible?  In (T. Metzinger, ed)
_Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.

Kurthen, M. 1995.  On the prospects of a naturalistic theory of phenomenal
consciousness.  In (T. Metzinger, ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand
Schoningh.

van Gulick, R. 1993.  Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just
armadillos?  In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness:
Psychological and Philosophical Essays_. Blackwell.
  Qualia pose no insurmountable problems for materialism: knowledge argument
  can be answered, explanatory gap can be closed, and absent qualia arguments
  beg the question.  With speculations on their functional role.

van Gulick, R. 1995.  What would count as explaining consciousness?  In (T.
Metzinger, ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  Distinguishes six explananda, four explanatory restrictions, and four
  sorts of relations between them, making 96 possible problems.  With a
  discussion of whether and how the central problems might be answered.


1.3 Consciousness and Ontology [107]
------------------------------

1.3a The Knowledge Argument (Jackson) [36] (see also 1.2a)
-------------------------------------

Jackson, F. 1982.  Epiphenomenal qualia.  Philosophical Quarterly 32:127-136.
Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_ (Blackwell, 1990).
  Knowing a completed neuroscience does not imply knowing about qualia.  Mary,
  the colorblind neuroscientist, gains color vision and learns about red.  So
  physicalism is false, as there are facts over and above the physical facts.

Jackson, F. 1986.  What Mary didn't know.  Journal of Philosophy 83:291-5.
  Reply to Churchland 1985: Mary *learns*, Churchland misstates the argument.

Alter, T. 1995.  Mary's new perspective.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy
73:585-84.
  Contra Pereboom 1994: The way a color sensation appears is a fact about it.

Bachrach, J.E. 1990.  Qualia and theory reduction: A criticism of Paul
Churchland.  Iyyun 281-94.
  Argues that Churchland's neuroscientific descriptions must leave at least
  some qualia behind: they might account for what we know (e.g. brain states)
  in qualia-knowledge, but can't handle distinctions in how we know.

Bigelow, J. & Pargetter, R. 1990.  Acquaintance with qualia.  Theoria.
  Mary gains knowledge of old facts, in a new way: she gains a new mode of
  acquaintance with those facts.  Analogies with indexical knowledge: her new
  knowledge eliminates no possible worlds.

Churchland, P.M. 1985.  Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain
states.  Journal of Philosophy 82:8-28.  Reprinted in _A Neurocomputational
Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989).
  Qualia can undergo a normal reduction to the neurophysiological.  Jackson
  commits an intensional fallacy; in any case, perhaps Mary can understand red.
  When we apprehend qualia, we are directly introspecting our brain state.

Churchland, P.M. 1989.  Knowing qualia: A reply to Jackson.  In _A
Neurocomputational Perspective_.  MIT Press.
  Rejoinder to Jackson 1986.  The key lies in knowing-how vs. knowing-that.

Conee, E. 1985.  Physicalism and phenomenal properties.  Philosophical
Quarterly 35:296-302.
  Contra Lewis, Nemirow, and Horgan on the knowledge argument.  But qualia may
  still be physical (though outside vocab of science) due to their causal role.

Conee, E. 1994.  Phenomenal knowledge.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
  Mary knew all the facts about qualia beforehand, she just wasn't acquainted
  with them.  Knowledge by acquaintance isn't factual knowledge.

Cummins, R. 1984.  The mind of the matter: Comments on Paul Churchland.
Philosophy of Science Association 1984, 2:791-8.
  Speculation on how consciousness might be left out by a physical account.

Dennett, D.C. 1991.  "Epiphenomenal" qualia?  In _Consciousness Explained_, pp.
398-406.  Little-Brown.
  Argues that most people don't really imagine Mary's situation.  In fact,
  Mary would be able to identify blue objects from the way they make her react.

Furash, G. 1989.  Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against materialism.
Dialogue 32:1-6.
  Defends Jackson's argument against criticisms by Nemirow, Smith & Jones,
  Warner, Horgan, & Conee.  The argument forces physicalism into a quandary:
  either deny qualia, or make the confused claim that qualia are physical.

Harman, G. 1993.  Can science understand the mind?  In (G. Harman, ed)
_Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays on Honor of George A. Miller_.  Lawrence
Erlbaum.
  On Dilthey's "Verstehen", or "understanding from within".  Mostly about
  meaning, but with application to the knowledge Mary gains.

Horgan, T. 1984.  Jackson on physical information and qualia.  Philosophical
Quarterly 34:147-83.
  Mary didn't know all the physical facts: she knew all the explicitly physical
  information, but not all the ontologically physical information.

Lahav, R. 1994.  A new challenge for the physicalist: Phenomenal
indistinguishabilty.  Philosophia 24:77-103.
  A new version of the knowledge argument: given all the physical facts, one
  can't know when two experiences are indistinguishable.  This avoids
  various objections to the standard version.

Levin, J. 1986.  Could love be like a heatwave?: Physicalism and the subjective
character of experience.  Philosophical Studies 49:245-61.  Reprinted in (W.
Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_ (Blackwell, 1990).
  Contra Nagel/Jackson:  Understand qualia through relational properties, and
  separate the mental concept from the recognitional capacity.

Lewis, D. 1990.  What experience teaches.  In (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and
Cognition_.  Blackwell.
  Against the hypothesis that phenomenology carries information.  If it does,
  then qualia are epiphenomenal.  Better to analyze the "new information" as
  acquiring an ability instead.  In-depth and entertaining.

Loar, B. 1990.  Phenomenal states.  Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
  Phenomenal and functional concepts are distinct, but the relevant properties
  may be identical.  We directly refer to phenomenal properties by recognition.
  Remarks on other minds, transparency, incorrigibility & more.  A meaty paper.

Lycan, W.G. 1995.  A limited defense of phenomenal information.  In (T.
Metzinger, ed.) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  Gives nine arguments against the Lewis/Nemirow ability analysis, and proposes
  instead that the same fact is learned a new way, like water and H2O facts.
  This sort of phenomenal information is no danger to materialism.

McConnell, J. 1995.  In defense of the knowledge argument.  Philosophical
Topics 22:157-187.
  Defends against objections from Dennett, Churchland, etc.  Horgan's objection
  (same fact different ways) has a certain force, but the argument can be
  reformulated to avoid them and imply property dualism.  With remarks on Loar.

Nemirow, L. 1995.  Understanding rules.  Journal of Philosophy 92:28-43.

Newton, N. 1986.  Churchland on direct introspection of brain states.  Analysis
46:97-102.
  Contra Churchland 1985: we couldn't introspect sensations as brain states, 
  although we could interpret them as such.

Nida-Rumelin, M. 1995.  What Mary couldn't know: Belief about phenomenal
states.  In (T. Metzinger, ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  Reconstructing the Mary case as a Marianna case, and introducing a
  distinction between phenomenal and nonphenomenal beliefs, to support the
  knowledge argument.  A very nice and sophisticated paper.

Papineau, D. 1993.  Physicalism, consciousness, and the antipathetic fallacy.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71:169-83.
  Mary goes from a third-person concept of experience to a first-person
  concept, but they co-refer; we can refer to an experience without having the
  experience.  Physical and phenomenal properties are brutely identical.

Papineau, D. 1995.  The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of
consciousness.  In (T. Metzinger, ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand
Schoningh.

Pereboom, D. 1994.  Bats, brain scientists, and the limits of introspection.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:315-29.
  Mary learns an old fact under a new mode of presentation, and doesn't even
  learn a new fact about a mode of presentation.  Her access to internal states
  is always mediated by representation, so we can always ascend to a new mode.

Raymont, P. 1995.  Tye's criticism of the knowledge argument.  Dialogue
34:713-26.

Robinson, D. 1993.  Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties.  Philosophical
Studies 69:1-34.
  A thorough discussion of Lewis 1990.  Phenomenal information implies
  epiphenomenalism, even at the intra-psychic level.  Remarks on ineffability,
  and on whether properties should be individuated by nomic role or by essence.

Robinson, H. 1993.  Dennett on the knowledge argument.  Analysis 53:174-7.
  Contra Dennett, Mary can't tell an object's color unless she already knows
  about experience.  The knowledge argument bears on thought, not just qualia.

Robinson, H. 1993.  The anti-materialist strategy and the "knowledge argument".
In (H. Robinson, ed) _Objections to Physicalism_.  Oxford University Press.

Shoemaker, S. 1984.  Churchland on reduction, qualia, and introspection.
Philosophy of Science Association 1984, 2:799-809.
  Introspection reveals functional properties, not physical, so qualia should
  be reduced to the functional, not to the physical.

Stemmer, N. 1989.  Physicalism and the argument from knowledge.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 67:84-91.
  Physicalism explains all the relevant evidence, hence all facts, and needn't
  admit mental entities; belief in mental entities is based on physical facts.

Thompson, E. 1992.  Novel colours.  Philosophical Studies 68:321-49.
  Interesting remarks on what it would be for someone to see colors that we
  cannot, combining philosophical considerations with empirical findings about
  color space.  Argues that science could tell us what such colors are like.

Warner, R. 1986.  A challenge to physicalism.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 64:249-65.
  A Jackson-like argument that physical knowledge can't give you the knowledge
  of what pain feels like.  With detailed consideration of objections and
  replies.  Argues from limited incorrigibility to factualism about pains.

Watkins, M. 1989.  The knowledge argument against the knowledge argument.
Analysis, 49:158-60.
  Epiphenomenalism => qualia don't cause beliefs => we don't know about qualia.

Zemach, E. 1990.  Churchland, introspection, and dualism.  Philosophia 20:3-13.

1.3b Zombies & Modal Arguments [14] (see also 1.9)
------------------------------

Chalmers, D.J. 1996.  Naturalistic dualism.  In _The Conscious Mind_.  Oxford
University Press.
  Argues from the lack of logical supervenience to the falsity of physicalism.
  A two-dimensional analysis shows that objections from a posteriori necessity
  fail.  Argues for a naturalistic variety of property dualism.

Dennett, D.C. 1995.  The unimagined preposterousness of zombies.  Journal of
Consciousness Studies 2:322-26.

Guzeldere, G. 1995.  Varieties of zombiehood.  Journal of Consciousness
Studies 2:326-33.

Kirk, R. 1974.  Sentience and behaviour.  Mind 81:43-60.
  Describing a situation where we would be justified in believing in zombies.
  Argues that zombies are logically possible, which seems incompatible with
  most or all varieties of materialism.

Kirk, R. 1974.  Zombies vs materialists.  Aristotelian Society Supplement
48:135-52.
  Materialism requires that physical states logically entail all non-relational
  states; but zombies are logically possible, so materialism fails.  With a
  description of a zombie, and replies to a verificationist.  All very true.

Kirk, R. 1977.  Reply to Don Locke on zombies and materialism.  Mind 86:262-4.
  Reply to Locke 1976: materialism needs zombies to be logically impossible.

Kraemer, E.R. 1980.  Imitation-man and the `new' epiphenomenalism.  Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 10:479-487.
  If Campbell's imitation man is possible, then the causal relation between
  the physical and phenomenal is unreliable.

Locke, D. 1976.  Zombies, schizophrenics, and purely physical objects.  Mind
83:97-99.
  Contra Kirk: the logical possibility of zombies is compatible with empirical
  materialism.  With some comments on Kirk's thought-experiment.

Moody, T. 1994.  Conversations with zombies.  Journal of Consciousness Studies
1:196-200.
  Argues that behavioral differences in zombies would show up, in their
  discourse about consciousness.

Perkins, M. 1970.  Matter, sensation, and understanding.  American
Philosophical Quarterly 8:1-12.
  On the possibility of an Insentient Perceiver, who perceives the world
  without sensation.  Sensation is inessential to perception and understanding,
  except understanding in the "whatlike" manner.

Perkins, M. 1971.  Sentience.  Journal of Philosophy 68:329-37.
  Argues for the conceivability of insentient perception of colors (in
  "Insent", a kind of blindsighter or zombie), in order to argue for a
  realistic account of colors.

Robinson, H. 1976.  The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy.  Zygon
11:346-360.
  A discussion of materialism and its difficulties.  The conceivability of
  zombies poses special problems.  Criticism of Smart's & Armstrong's analyses.

Squires, R. 1974.  Zombies vs materialists II.  Aristotelian Society Supplement
48:153-63.

Tye, M. 1983.  On the possibility of disembodied existence.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 61:275-282.
  There's no reason to believe that disembodied existence is possible: lack of
  logical contradiction doesn't imply possibility, conceivability is too weak a
  criterion, and it's not obvious that the situation is imaginable.

1.3c Consciousness and Physicalism, Misc [12] (see also 1.2, 1.3, 1.6b, 1.8)
----------------------------------------

Fox, M. 1978.  Beyond materialism.  Dialogue 17:367-70.

Hill, C.S. 1991.  _Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism_.  Cambridge
University Press.
  Defending type materialism, by way of criticism of dualism and functionalism.
  With treatments of introspection, sensory concepts, and other minds.

Jackson, F. 1994.  Finding the mind in the natural world.  In (R. Casati, B.
Smith, & S. White, eds) _Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences_.
Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
  On why materialism requires conceptual analysis to locate mental properties
  in the natural world.  Even a posteriori necessary connections have to be
  backed by a priori links.  With remarks on supervenience.  A nice paper.
 
Kirk, R. 1979.  From physical explicability to full-blooded materialism.
Philosophical Quarterly 29:229-37.
  If every physical events has a physical explanation, and the mental is
  causally efficacious, then mental facts are strictly implied by physical
  facts.  A nice argument.

Kirk, R. 1982.  Physicalism, identity, and strict implication.  Ratio
24:131-41.
  Physicalism requires that all mental facts be strictly implied by the
  physical facts.  Once this is recognized, questions about necessary or
  contingent identity are beside the point, and indeed identity is irrelevant.

Madell, G. 1988.  _Mind and Materialism_.  Edinburgh University Press.
  On the problems posed for materialism by intentionality, autonomy, awareness,
  and indexicality.  Tentatively advocates a Cartesian position.

Margolis, J. 1978.  _Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Non-Reductive
Materialism_.  D. Reidel.

Robinson, H. 1982.  _Matter and Sense_.  Cambridge University Press.

Robinson, H. (ed) 1993.  _Objections to Physicalism_.  Oxford University Press.
  A collection of arguments against physicalism, mostly based on worries about
  consciousness and qualia.

Seager, W.E. 1992.  _Metaphysics of Consciousness_.  Routledge and Kegan Paul.
  Consciousness could be physical even if not explicable; but supervenience
  worries make it hard to see how it *could* be physical, though causal role
  suggests that it must be.  We need a new conception.  A stimulating book.

Sellars, W. 1981.  Is consciousness physical?  Monist 64:66-90.
  On the place of "occurrent pink" and the "sensorium" in the physical world.
  It may turn out that the physics of the brain differs from other physics, in
  order to accommodate the causal role of sensations.

Smith, A.D. 1993.  Non-reductive physicalism?  In (H. Robinson, ed) _Objections
to Physicalism_.  Oxford University Press.
  A careful discussion of how to characterize physicalism, in terms of identity
  or supervenience, and argues that physicalism must reduce (bowdlerize) qualia
  to something they are not, as physicalism requires topic-neutral analyses.

1.3d Consciousness and Dualism [19] (see also 1.2c, 1.3a, 1.3b)
------------------------------

Churchland, P.M. 1996.  The rediscovery of light.  Journal of Philosophy
93:211-28.
  Parodies arguments by Searle, Jackson, and Chalmers for the irreducibility
  of consciousness with analogous arguments for the irreducibility of
  "luminescence".  The consciousness arguments are no better.

Double, R. 1983.  Nagel's argument that mental properties are nonphysical.
Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22.

Elitzur, A. 1989.  Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical
explanation of behavior.  Journal of Mind and Behavior 10:1-20.
  Argues from the fact that we talk about consciousness to the conclusion that
  consciousness plays an active role, so physical laws must be incomplete.

Elitzur, A. 1995.  Consciousness can no longer be ignored.  Journal of
Consciousness Studies 2:353-58.

Foster, J. 1991.  _The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist
Conception of Mind_.  Routledge.

Hart, W.D. 1988.  _The Engines of the Soul_.  Cambridge University Press.

Hodgson, D. 1991.  _The Mind Matters_.  Oxford Unversity Press.

Honderich, T. 1981.  Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems.
Inquiry 24:277-303.
  Defending lawlike connections between physical states & conscious occurrents.
  Contra anomalous monism and identity theory for occurrents.  But occurrents
  may not be causally efficacious.  Comments by Wilson/Sprigge/Mackie/Stich.

Lahav, R. & Shanks, N. 1992.  How to be a scientifically respectable `property
dualist'.  Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:211-32.
  Argues that the hypothesis of consciousness as an irreducible global property
  of the brain is compatible with what we know of both neuroscience and
  physics.  With interesting remarks on quantum mechanics.

Lindahl, B.I.B. & Arhem, P. 1996.  Mind as a force field: Comments on a new
interactionistic hypothesis.  Journal of Theoretical Biology 171:111-22.

McGinn, C. 1993.  Consciousness and cosmology: Hyperdualism ventilated.  In
(M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and
Philosophical Essays_.  Blackwell.
  A dialogue with a "hyperdualist".  On the pros and cons of materialist
  vs. dualist ontology and cosmology.  Dualism avoids the "magic" of emergence
  at the cost of an inflated and bizarre ontology.

Popper, K. & Eccles, J. 1977.  _The Self and Its Brain_.  Springer.

Popper, K. 1994.  _Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of
Interaction_.  Routledge.

Robinson, W.S. 1982.  Causation, sensation, and knowledge.  Mind 91:524-40.
  Argues that we can have non-inferential knowledge of sensations even if they
  don't make a causal difference to our beliefs, so epiphenomenalism is OK.
  All theories have a similar problems.

Robinson, W.S. 1988.  _Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and its Causal
Conditions_.  Temple University Press.

Snyder, D. 1990.  On Elitzur's discussion of the impact of consciousness on the
physical world.  Journal of Mind and Behavior.
  Argues with Elitzur on quantum mechanics and consciousness.  With response.

Sprigge, T.L.S. 1994.  Consciousness.  Synthese 98:73-93.
  On the non-physical nature of consciousness, and the threat of a merely
  contingent connection to behavior; suggests a denial of "Hume's principle".
  Perhaps consciousness is the noumenal essence of the physical.  A nice paper.

von Wright, G.H. 1994.  On mind and matter.  Journal of Theoretical Biology
171:101-10.

Warner, R. 1996.  Facing ourselves: Incorrigibility and the mind-body problem.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:217-30.

1.3e Panpsychism [7]
----------------

Chalmers, D.J. 1996.  Is experience ubiquitous?  In _The Conscious Mind_.
Oxford University Press.

de Quincey, C. 1994.  Consciousness all the way down?  Journal of Consciousness
Studies 1:217-29.
  An analysis of a debate between Griffin and McGinn on panexperientialism,
  arguing for new forms of understanding.

Hut, P. & Shepard, R.  Turning the "hard problem" upside-down and sideways.
Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  Argues for a new fundamental feature ("X") which stands to consciousness as
  time stands to motion, thus making consciousness possible and ubiquitous.

Nagel, T. 1979.  Panpsychism.  In _Mortal Questions_.  Cambridge University
Press.
  Material composition, nonreductionism, realism, non-emergence => panpsychism.

Rosenberg, G.H. 1996.  Rethinking nature: A hard problem within the hard
problem.  Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:76-88.
  On why a theory of consciousness must go beyond the domain of cognition.
  Instead, we need to rethink nature itself.  Argues against laws based on
  complexity, functionality, and biology, and advocates a sort of panpsychism.

Seager, W. 1995.  Consciousness, information, and panpsychism.  Journal of
Consciousness Studies 2:272-88.
  Examines a position on which experience is fundamental to the world, and
  suggests that this ought to lead to panpsychism.  With some connections
  to information and quantum mechanics.

van Cleve, J. 1990.  Mind -- dust or magic? Panpsychism versus emergence.
Philosophical Perspectives 4:215-226.
  On Nagel 1979: emergence is more plausible than panpsychism.  A construal of
  emergence as nomological supervenience without logical supervenience.

1.3f Mind-Body Problem, General [24]
-------------------------------

Campbell, K.K. 1970.  _Body and Mind_.  Doubleday.

Cheng, C. (ed) 1975.  _Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem_.  Hawaii
University Press.

Feigl, H. 1960.  The mind-body problem: Not a pseudo-problem.  In (S. Hook, ed)
_Dimensions of Mind_.  New York University Press.

Fodor, J.A. 1981.  The mind-body problem.  Scientific American 244:114-25.
  An overview: behaviorism, identity theory, functionalism, etc.

Foss, J.E. 1987.  Is the mind-body problem empirical?  Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 17:505-32.
  Yes it is.  Empirical evidence bears on materialism, property dualism,
  emergentism, functionalism, interactive dualism, idealism, etc.

Gomes, G. 1995.  Self-awareness and the mind-brain problem.  Philosophical
Psychology 8:155-65.

Gunderson, K. 1970.  Asymmetries and mind-body perplexities.  Minnesota Studies
in the Philosophy of Science 4:273-309.
  The core of the mind-body problem is the first/third-person asymmetry.  It's
  like a periscope trying to place itself between its crosshairs.  But this
  doesn't imply any strong ontological consequences.

Honderich, T. 1989.  _Mind and Brain_.  Oxford University Press.

Honderich, T. 1995.  Consciousness, neural functionalism, and real
subjectivity.
American Philosophical Quarterly  32:369-381.
  Against "neural functionalism", and on how Searle's view reduces to either
  neural functionalism or property dualism.

Howard, D.J. 1986.  The new mentalism.  International Philosophical Quarterly
26:353-7.

Levin, M.  _Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem_.  Oxford University Press.

Lockwood, M. 1989.  _Mind, Brain, and the Quantum_.  Oxford University Press.
  On the mind-body problem and physical theory.  Against reductive physicalism;
  instead, experience is the intrinsic nature of the physical.  Discusses the
  interpretation of quantum mechanics and much else.  A very enjoyable book.

Lockwood, M. 1993.  The grain problem.  In (H. Robinson, ed) _Objections to
Physicalism_.  Oxford University Press.
  On the "grain problem" for the intrinsic-nature view -- how do lots of
  microphysical qualities add up into a smooth experience?  Appeals to quantum
  mechanics and a preferred set of observables.

Lund, D.H. 1994.  _Perception, Mind, and Personal Identity: A Critique of
Materialism_.  University Press of America.

Matson, W.I. 1976.  _Sentience_.  University of California Press.

Nagel, T. 1993.  What is the mind-body problem?  In _Experimental and
Theoretical Studies of Consciousness_ (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).  Wiley.
  On ways in which we might locate consciousness within the natural world via
  scientific study.  Perhaps we need an wider conception of objective reality.

Ripley, C. 1984.  Sperry's concept of consciousness.  Inquiry 27:399-423.
  An in-depth analysis of Sperry's views on consciousness.  Sperry is not
  a dualist; he simply believes in "structural causation" based on
  emergent properties.  Thorough and interesting.

Rosenthal, D.M. (ed) 1971.  _Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem_.
Prentice-Hall.
  A collection of essays from the 1960s on the identity theory, functionalism,
  eliminative materialism.

Senchuk, D.M. 1991.  Consciousness naturalized: Supervenience without
physical determinism.  American Philosophical Quarterly 28:37-47.

Sperry, R.W. 1969.  A modified concept of consciousness.  Psychological Review
76:532-36.
  Consciousness is an emergent property of brain dynamics that itself governs
  low-level flow of excitation.  Midway between mentalism and materialism.

Sperry, R. 1980.  Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism yes, dualism no.
Neuroscience 5:195-206.
  A summary of the position whereupon mental properties are emergent and have
  independent causal powers.  With a contrast to Popper and Eccles' dualism.

Sperry, R.W. 1992.  Turnabout on consciousness: A mentalist view.  Journal of
Mind and Behavior 13:259-80.
  An account of the "new mentalist paradigm".  Clarifies earlier work, comments
  on others' interpretations.  The view is monist and functionalist, but
  consciousness is a distinct emergent quality with a "downward" causal role.

Strawson, G. 1994.  The experiential and the non-experiential.  In (R. Warner
& T. Szubka, eds) _The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate_.
Blackwell.

Warner, R. & Szubka, T. 1994.  _The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the
Current Debate_.  Blackwell.
  A collection of 27 (mostly original) papers on the mind-body problem.


1.4 Functional Approaches to Consciousness [144]
------------------------------------------

1.4a Neurobiological Approaches [34]
-------------------------------

Baars, B.J. & Newman, J. 1994.  A neurobiological interpretation of the Global
Workspace theory of consciousness.  In (A. Revonsuo & M. Kamppinen, eds)
_Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Bogen, J.E. 1995.  On the neurophysiology of consciousness, parts I and II.
Consciousness and Cognition 4:52-62 & 4:137-58.

Buck, R. 1993.  What is this thing called subjective experience?  Reflections
on the neuropsychology of qualia.  Neuropsychology 7:490-99.

Calvin, W. 1990.  _The Cerebral Symphony: Seashore Reflections on the Structure
of Consciousness_.  Bantam.

Churchland, P.S. 1981.  On the alleged backward referral of experience
and its relevance to the mind-body problem.  Philosophy of Science 48:165-81.
  Argues against Libet on subjective re-ordering of experiences.  His
  experimental methodology is suspect, and in any case the data are
  compatible with a physicalist hypothesis wherein experiences are delayed.

Churchland, P.S. 1988.  Reduction and the neurobiological basis of
consciousness.  In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in
Contemporary Science_.  Oxford University Press.
  Remarks on reduction, and on the different notions underlying consciousness.
  Outlines some counter-intuitive cases, and gives a detailed presentation of
  neurobiological results concerning the sleep-dream-wake cycle.

Churchland, P.S. 1994.  Can neurobiology teach us anything about consciousness?
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67:23-40.
  Argues against objections to a neurobiological approach to consciousness, and
  presents two hypotheses about neural mechanisms due to Crick and Llinas.

Crick, F. & Koch, C. 1990.  Toward a neurobiological theory of consciousness.
Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275.
  Advocates a neurobiological approach, and suggests that 40-70 hertz
  oscillations in the cortex may be the neural basis of consciousness, due to
  their role in facilitating the binding of information contents.

Crick, F. & Koch, C. 1992.  The problem of consciousness.  Scientific American
267(3):152-60.

Crick, F. 1994.  _The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the
Soul_.  Scribners.
  Largely an account of the neurobiology of the processes underlying visual
  awareness, with some remarks on consciousness.

Delacour, J. 1995.  An introduction to the biology of consciousness.
Neuropsychologia 33:1061-1074.

Donald, M. 1995.  The neurobiology of human consciousness: An evolutionary
approach.  Neuropsychologia 33:1087-1102.

Edelman, G. 1989.  _The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of
Consciousness_.  Basic Books.
  Uses the theory of re-entrant neural circuits developed in _Neural Darwinism_
  to provide an account of perceptual awareness and its relation to memory
  and language.

Flohr, H. 1990.  Brain processes and phenomenal consciousness: A new and
specific hypothesis.  Theory and Psychology 1:245-62.
  Consciousness comes from rapid assembly-formation in the brain.

Flohr, H. 1992.  Qualia and brain processes.  In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, &
J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_.
De Gruyter.

Flohr, H. 1995.  Sensations and brain processes.  Behavioral Brain Research
71:157-61.

Gazzaniga, M. 1993.  Brain mechanisms and conscious experience.  In
_Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness_ (Ciba Foundation
Symposium 174).  Wiley.

Gillett, G. 1988.  Consciousness and brain function.  Philosophical Psychology
1:325-39.

Gillett, G. 1995.  Consciousness, thought, and neurological integrity.
Journal of Mind and Behavior 16:215-33.

Green, C. & Gillett, G. 1995.  Are mental events preceded by their physical
causes?  Philosophical Psychology 8:333-340.
  A critique of Libet: his argument makes suspect assumptions about intentions
  and timability of mental events; and the timing method is also questionable.

Greenfield, S. 1995.  _Journey to the Centers of the Mind_.  W.H. Freeman.

Hardcastle, V.G. 1995.  _Locating Consciousness_.  John Benjamins.

Hardcastle, V.G. 1996.  Discovering the moment of consciousness? I: Bridging
techniques at work, & II: An ERP analysis of priming using novel visual
stimuli.  Philosophical Psychology 9:149-96.
  Argues contra Dennett & Kinsbourne that an ERP analysis allows one to
  localize consciousness in a processing stream.  With results on the ERP's
  for implicit vs. explicit processes.  Plus a reply by H.L. de Jong.

Hobson, J.A. 1994.  _The Chemistry of Conscious States_.  Basic Books.

Kinsbourne, M. 1988.  An integrated field theory of consciousness.  In (A.
Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_.  Oxford
University Press.

Kinsbourne, M. 1993.  Integrated cortical field model of consciousness.  In
(Ciba Foundation) _Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness.
Wiley.

Koch, C. & Braun, J. 1996.  Toward the neuronal correlate of visual awareness.
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 6:158-64.

Lahav, R. 1993.  What neuropsychology tells us about consciousness.  Philosophy
of Science 60:67-85.
  Argues from neuroscientific data that consciousness is a unitary kind: a
  junction of information allowing global, integrated and flexible behavior.
  Discusses explicit vs implicit knowledge in blindsight, neglect, etc.

Libet, B. 1978.  Neuronal vs. subjective timing for a conscious sensory
experience.  In (P. Buser & A. Rougeul-Buser, eds) _Cerebral Correlates of
Conscious Experience_.  Elsevier.
  On experiments that showing that the subjective timing of experiences differs
  from neural timing, suggesting the "backward referral" of experience in time.

Libet, B. 1985.  Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will
in voluntary action.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:529-66.
  On experimental evidence that the onset of conscious events is preceded by
  unconscious neural processes.  The role of the conscious will may be only to
  act as a veto.

Libet, B. 1993.  The neural time factor in conscious and unconscious events.
In _Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness_ (Ciba Foundation
Symposium 174).  Wiley.
  On a neural "time-on" theory suggesting that about 350 milliseconds is
  required for an unconscious neural event to become conscious, accounting for
  delays in experience of intention.

Milner, D. & Rugg, M. (eds) 1991.  _The Neuropsychology of Consciousness_.
Academic Press.

Newton, N. 1991.  Consciousness, qualia, and re-entrant signaling.  Behavior
and Philosophy 19:21.
  So far, reductive accounts explain what red is like but not what it is like
  to experience red.  Uses theories of re-entrant neural signals to address
  this: experience is like seeing our own seeing.

O'Keefe, J. 1985.  Is consciousness the gateway to the hippcampal cognitive
map?  A speculative essay on the neural basis of mind.  In (D. Oakley, ed)
_Brain and Mind_.  Methuen.

Picton, T.W. & Stuss, D.T. 1994.  Neurobiology of conscious experience.
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 4:256-65.

Proust, J. 1994.  Time and conscious experience.  In (C.C. Gould, ed.)
_Artifacts, Representations, and Social Practice_.  Kluwer.

1.4b Cognitive Approaches [38]
-------------------------

Baars, B.J. 1988.  _A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness_.  Cambridge University
Press.
  Advocates a "global workspace" theory of consciousness, on which conscious
  contents are contained within a central workspace for the communication of
  information between multiple specialized unconscious processes.

Baars, B.J. 1994.  A thoroughly empirical approach to consciousness.  Psyche 1.
  Advocates the method of "contrastive analysis" for studying conscious
  processes.  Comments by Allen, Bringsjord, Davis, Mangan, Newman, Velmans.

Baars, B.J. 1996.  Understanding subjectivity: Global workspace theory and
the resurrection of the observing self.  Journal of Consciousness Studies
3:211-17.

Bechtel, W. 1995.  Consciousness: Perspectives from symbolic and connectionist
AI.  Neuropsychologia.
  Argues that connectionist models can do quite well at explaining conscious
  state's intrinsic intentionality and a subject's awareness of their content,
  but qualitative character poses greater difficulties.

Burks, A.W. 1986.  An architectural theory of functional consciousness.  In
(N. Rescher, ed) _Current Issues in Teleology_.  University Press of America.

Cabanac, M. 1996.  On the origin of consciousness, a postulate, and its
corollary.  Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 20:33-40.
  Argues that consciousness evolved from sensation, as e.g. both have the
  same quadridimensional structure (quality, quantity, affectivity, duration).

Cam, P. 1989.  Notes toward a faculty theory of cognitive consciousness.  In
(P. Slezak, ed) _Computers, Brains and Minds_.  Kluwer.
  Consciousness mediates interaction between faculties, with the contents of
  consciousness corresponding to the outputs of faculties.  With remarks on
  mental imagery and confabulation.

Carr, T.H. 1979.  Consciousness in models of human information processing:
Primary memory, executive control, and input regulation.  In (G. Underwood &
R. Stevens, eds) _Aspects of Consciousness, Vol. 1.  Academic Press.

Cotterill, R.M.J. 1995.  On the unity of conscious experience.  Journal of
Consciousness Studies 2:290-311.

Cotterill, R.M.J. 1996.  Prediction and internal feedback in conscious
perception.  Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:245-66.

Ellis, R.D. 1995.  _Questioning Consciousness: The Interplay of Imagery,
Cognition, and Emotion in the Human Brain_.  John Benjamins.

Farrell, B.A. 1970.  The design of a conscious device.  Mind 79:321-46.
 An outline of the design requirements for a conscious machine: reactivity,
 negative feedback, categorization, associative learning.  Compares this
 machine's abilities to those of a child.

Harnad, S. 1982.  Consciousness: An afterthought.  Cognition and Brain Theory
5:29-47.
  Consciousness comes from "pseudoconation" and auto-referentiality.

Harth, E. 1995.  The sketchpad model: A theory of consciousness, perception,
and imagery.  Consciousness and Cognition 4:346-68.

Hilgard, E.R. 1980.  Consciousness in contemporary psychology.  Annual Review
of Psychology 31:1-26.

John, E.R. 1976.  A model of consciousness.  In (G. Schwartz & D. Shapiro, eds)
_Consciousness and Self-Regulation_.  Plenum Press.

Johnson-Laird, P. 1983.  A computational analysis of consciousness.  Cognition
and Brain Theory 6:499-508.
  Consciousness divides into awareness, control, self-awareness, and
  intentionality.  Achieved computationally through parallelism, recursively
  embedded models, and a high-level internal model of the system.

Kihlstrom, J.F. 1984.  Conscious, subconscious, unconscious: A cognitive
perspective.  In (K.S. Bowers & D. Meichenbaum, eds) _The Unconscious
Reconsidered_.  Wiley.

Lloyd, D. 1995.  Consciousness: A connectionist manifesto.  Minds and Machines
5.

Lloyd, D. 1996.  Consciousness, connectionism, and cognitive neuroscience: A
meeting of the minds.  Philosophical Psychology 9:61-78.
  On the properties of sensory awareness (modality-specific, compulsory,
  relatively few, relatively basic) and how a connectionist account with
  phenomenal superposition might explain them.

Mandler, G. 1975.  Consciousness: respectable, useful, and probably necessary.
In (R. Solso, ed) _Information-Processing and Cognition_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.
  Consciousness is respectable as its the object of serious experiemental
  research, useful because it avoids circumlocutions (short-term memory, focal
  attention), and necessary to tie together many disparate concepts.

Mandler, G. 1992.  Toward a theory of consciousness.  In (H.G. Geissler, S.W.
Link, & J.T. Townsend, eds) _Cognition, Information Processing, and
Psychophysics: Basic Issues_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Mandler, G. 1996.  Consciousness redux.  In (J. Cohen & J. Schooler, eds.)
_Cognitive and Neuroscientific Approaches to Consciousness_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Michie, D. 1994.  Consciousness as an engineering issue (Parts 1 and 2).
Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:192-95, 2:52-66.

Natsoulas, T. 1974.  The subjective, experiential element in perception.
Psychological Bulletin 81:611-31.

Natsoulas, T. 1981.  Basic problems of consciousness.  Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 41:132-78.
  On various problems associated with consciousness in psychology: experience,
  intentionality, imagination, awareness, introspection, personal unity, the
  subject, the waking state, conscious behavior, and explicit consciousness.

Natsoulas, T. 1983.  A selective review of conceptions of consciousness with
special reference to behavioristic contributions.  Cognition and Brain Theory
6:417-47.
  Ideas about consciousness from Locke, Brentano, Hebb, Dennett, Skinner,
  Sellars,  Aristotle, Gibson.  Theories: inner eye vs. verbal vs. outer eye.

Oatley, K. 1988.  On changing one's mind: A possible function of
consciousness.  In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary
Science_.  Oxford University Press.
  Distinguishes Helmholtzian, Woolfian, Vygotskyan, and Meadean consciousness
  (related to conclusions, imagery, inner speech, model of self).  The function
  may be to draw conclusions from a socially-constructed model of self.

Posner, M.I. & Klein, M. 1973.  On the functions of consciousness.  In
(S. Kornblum, ed) _Attention and Performance_, vol 4.  Academic Press.

Schacter, D.L., McAndrews, M.P., and Moscovitch, M. 1986.  Access to
consciousness: Dissociations between implicit and explicit knowledge in
neuropsychological syndromes.  In (L. Weiskrantz, ed) _Thought Without
Language_.  Oxford University Press.
  Surveys evidence for implicit without explicit knowledge: amnesia, aphasia,
  blindsight, prosopagnosia, dyslexia, hemineglect.  Discusses hypotheses and
  proposes a disconnection between specific modules and conscious mechanism.

Schacter, D.L. 1989.  On the relation between memory and consciousness:
Dissociable interactions and conscious experience.  In (H. Roediger & F. Craik,
eds) _Varieties of Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of Endel Tulving_.
  Suggests that there is a local system devoted to consciousness, a gateway to
  executive control.  Experiences arise from interactions with modules.
  Dissociations such as blindsight arise from disconnection of modules.

Shallice, T. 1972.  Dual functions of consciousness.  Psychological Review
79:383-93.
  Toward an information-processing account of phenomenological consciousness
  in terms of selector input to the dominant action system.

Shallice, T. 1978.  The dominant action system: An information-processing
approach to consciousness.  In (K.S. Pope & J.L. Singer, eds) _The Stream of
Consciousness: Scientific Investigation  into the Flow of Experience_.  Plenum.

Shallice, T. 1988.  Information-processing models of consciousness:
possibilities and problems.  In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in
Contemporary Science_.  Oxford University Press.

Shallice, T. 1991.  The revival of consciousness in cognitive science.  In
(W. Kessen, A. O1rtony, & F. Craik, eds) _Memories, Thoughts, and Emotions:
Essays in Honor of George Mandler_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Sommerhoff, G. 1996.  Consciousness as an internal integrating system.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:139-57.

Taylor, J.G. 1995.  Modeling what it is like to be.  In (S. Hameroff, A.
Kazniak, & A. Scott, eds) _Toward a Science of Consciousness_.  MIT Press.

Wilks, Y. 1984.  Machines and consciousness.  In (C. Hookway, ed) _Minds,
Machines and Evolution_.  Cambridge University Press.

1.4c Dennett on Consciousness [50]
-----------------------------

Akins, K. 1996.  Lost the plot?  Reconstructing Dennett's multiple drafts
theory of consciousness.  Mind and Language 11:1-43.

Akins, K, & Winger, S. 1996.  Ships in the night: Churchland and Ramachandran
on Dennett's theory of consciousness.  In (K. Akins, ed) _Perception_.
Oxford University Press.

Arbib, M.A. 1972.  Consciousness: The secondary role of language.  Journal of
Philosophy 69.

Baker, L.R. 1995.  Content meets consciousness.  Philosophical Topics 22:1-22.

Block, N. 1995.  What is Dennett's theory a theory of?  Philosophical Topics
22:23-40.

Bricke, J. 1984.  Dennett's eliminative arguments.  Philosophical Studies
45:413-29.
  Criticizing Dennett's accounts of pains, dreams, and images: in no case do
  his arguments earn their eliminative conclusions.

Bricke, J. 1985.  Consciousness and Dennett's intentionalist net.
Philosophical Studies 48:249-56.
  Reportability is no good for capturing consciousness: it completely leaves
  out the qualitative content of conscious states.

Churchland, P.S. & Ramachandran, V.S. 1993.  Filling in: Why Dennett is
wrong.  In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and His Critics_.  Blackwell.
  Argues that Dennett's account of the blindspot and scotomas are wrong.
  Neurophysiological data suggests that blind areas are represented explicitly;
  psychological data shows that it's not just "more of the same".

Clark, S.R.L. 1993.  Minds, memes, and rhetoric.  Inquiry 36:3-16.

Dennett, D.C. 1968.  _Content and Consciousness_.  Routledge.

Dennett, D.C. 1978.  Reply to Arbib and Gunderson.  In _Brainstorms_.  MIT
Press.
  On various notions of awareness: contents of the speech center, contents
  directing behavior, and contents of attention.  We have privileged access to
  one sort, but it is a different sort that plays the main role in control.

Dennett, D.C. 1978.  Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness.  Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9.  Reprinted in _Brainstorms_ (MIT
Press, 1978).
  Conscious contents are contents of a buffer memory to which a public report
  module has access.  We only have conscious access to propositional judgments,
  not to underlying processes.  With a cute functional diagram.

Dennett, D.C. 1979.  On the absence of phenomenology.  In (D. Gustafson &
B. Tapscott, eds) _Body, Mind, and Method_.  Kluwer.
  There is no real phenomenology.  There are only *judgments* about
  phenomenology, and nothing more is going on.  We don't have privileged access
  to anything, except perhaps certain propositional episodes.

Dennett, D.C. 1982.  How to study human consciousness empirically, or, nothing
comes to mind.  Synthese 53:159-80.
  We can study consciousness by the method of heterophenomenology: studying the
  things we say about conscious states, which we can interpret as we interpret
  texts.  Autophenomenology gives nothing extra.  With comments by Rorty.
  
Dennett, D.C. 1988.  The evolution of consciousness.  Manuscript.
  Consciousness is a virtual machine which evolved.

Dennett, D.C. 1991.  _Consciousness Explained_.  Little-Brown.
  Argues against the "Cartesian Theatre", advocating a "multiple drafts" model
  of consciousness.  Presents a detailed model of processes underlying verbal
  report, and argues that there is nothing else (e.g. qualia) to explain.

Dennett, D.C. & Kinsbourne, M. 1992.  Time and the observer: The where and when
of consciousness in the brain.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
  Using temporal anomalies in consciousness to support a "Multiple Drafts"
  theory of consciousness rather than a "Cartesian Theater".  Contents of
  consciousness are wholly determined by effects on action/memory.

Dennett, D.C. 1993.  Precis of _Consciousness Explained_.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 53:889-931.
  A discussion of _Consciousness Explained_, with comments by Tye, Jackson,
  Shoemaker, and Rosenthal, and a reply by Dennett.

Dennett, D.C. 1993.  Living on the edge.  Inquiry 36:135-59.
  A reply to Clark, Fellows & O'Hear, Foster, Lockwood, Seager, Siewert,
  and Sprigge.

Dennett, D.C. 1993.  Caveat emptor.  Consciousness and Cognition 2:48-57.
  A reply to Baars & McGovern, Mangan, Toribio.

Dennett, D.C. 1995.  Is perception the "leading edge" of memory.  In (A.
Spafadora, ed) _Memory and Oblivion_.
  There is no "leading edge" of consciousness, separating perception and
  memory.  With an analysis of metacontrast cases, etc.

Dennett, D.C. 1995.  Get real.  Philosophical Topics 22:505

Dennett, D.C. 1996.  Seeing is believing -- or is it?  In (K. Akins, ed)
_Perception_.  Oxford University Press.

Dretske, F. 1995.  Differences that make no difference.  Philosophical Topics
22:41-57.
  Criticizes Dennett's first-person operationalism as Cartesian.  There can be
  awareness without judgment -- e.g. non-epistemic perception.  This comes from
  information or "micro-judgments", and is not conceptual.

Fellows, R. & O'Hear, A. 1993.  Consciousness avoided.  Inquiry 36: 73-91.

Foster, J. 1993.  Dennett's rejection of dualism.  Inquiry 36:17-31.

Gunderson, K. 1972.  _Content and Consciousness_ and the mind-body problem.
Journal of Philosophy 69.

Jackson, F. 1993.  Appendix A (for philosophers).  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 53:897-901.
  Presses Dennett on the "truth-maker" question for materialists: what sort of
  physical fact makes it true that people are conscious?

Kirk, R. 1993.  "The best set of tools"?  Dennett's metaphors and the mind-body
problem.  Philosophical Quarterly 43:335-43.
  Joycean machines and multiple drafts turn out to shed no light on the
  question of what features make a conscious system conscious.

Lockwood, M. 1993.  Dennett's mind.  Inquiry.
  Argues for a suitably sophisticated Cartesian Theatre, and against the
  identification of phenomenology with judgments.

Mangan, B. 1993.  Dennett, consciousness, and the sorrows of functionalism.
Consciousness and Cognition 2:1-17.

Marbach, E. 1988.  How to study consciousness phenomenologically or quite a lot
comes to mind.  Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 19:252-268.

Marbach, E. 1994.  Troubles with heterophenomenology.  In (R. Casati, B.
Smith, & S. White, eds) _Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences_.
Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.

McCauley, R.N. 1993.  Why the blind can't lead the blind: Dennett on the blind
spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia.  Consciousness and Cognition 2:155-64.
  Brings empirical evidence to bear against Dennett's "filling-in" account of
  the blindspot, and argues that blindsight and the blindspot aren't analogous.

McGinn, C. 1995.  Consciousness evaded: Comments on Dennett.  Philosophical
Perspectives 9:241-49.

Radner, D. 1994.  Heterophenomenology: Learning about the birds and the bees.
Journal of Philosophy 91:389-403.

Rey, G. 1995.  Dennett's unrealistic psychology.  Philosophical Topics
22:259-89.

Robinson, W.S. 1972.  Dennett's analysis of awareness.  Philosophical Studies
23:147-52.

Robinson, W.S. 1994.  Orwell, Stalin, and determinate qualia.  Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 75:151-64.
  Dennett's Orwell/Stalin argument doesn't establish its conclusion, as "brain
  smear" is quite compatible with determinate qualia.

Rorty, R. 1972.  Dennett on awareness.  Philosophical Studies 23:153-62.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1993.  Multiple drafts and higher-order thoughts.  Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 53:911-18.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1994.  First-person operationalism and mental taxonomy.
Philosophical Topics 22:319-349.

Rosenthal, D.M. 1995.  Multiple drafts and the facts of the matter.  In (T.
Metzinger, ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  We can subtract first-person operationalism from Dennett's multiple-drafts
  account, giving a higher-order thought theory.

Seager, W.E. 1993.  Verification, skepticism, and consciousness.  Inquiry.
  An elucidation of Dennett's fundamental eliminativism about phenomenology,
  resting on verificationist arguments.  Like many sceptical arguments, it
  ends up too powerful to be convincing.

Shoemaker, S. 1993.  Lovely and suspect ideas.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 53:903-908.

Siewert, C. 1993.  What Dennett can't imagine and why.  Inquiry.
  Argues that zombies are conceivable, via partial zombiehood in blindsight
  patients who respond unprompted.  Dennett's arguments rely on a
  question-begging third-person absolutism.

Sprigge, T.L.S. 1993.  Is Dennett a disillusioned zimbo?  Inquiry 36:33-57.

Toribio, J. 1993.  Why there still has to be a theory of consciousness.
Consciousness and Cognition 2:28-47.
  Criticizes behavioral, localist, and "intransitive" approaches to
  consciousness, and recommends a "transitive" metacognitive approach.  But
  criticizes Dennett for not explaining subjective experience.

Tye, M. 1993.  Reflections on Dennett and consciousness.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 53:891-6.
  Argues that Dennett's verificationism begs the question, and that "seeming"
  cannot be identified with believing or judging.

Van Gulick, R. 1995.  Dennett, drafts, and phenomenal realism.  Philosophical
Topics 22:443-55.

1.4d Functional Accounts, Misc [11]
------------------------------

Beckermann, A. 1995.  Visual information-processing and phenomenal
consciousness.  In (T. Metzinger, ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand
Schoningh.

Cam, P. 1985.  Phenomenology and speech dispositions.  Philosophical Studies
47:357-68.
  Reportability is not phenomenology, as blindsight has reportability but no
  phenomenology.

Chalmers, D.J. 1996.  Availability: The cognitive basis of experience?  In
(N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere, eds.) _The Nature of Consciousness_.
MIT Press.
  Argues that the cognitive correlate of consciousness is direct availability
  for global control.

Dennett, D.C. 1986.  Julian Jaynes' software archaeology.  Canadian Psychology
27:149-54.
  Casting Jaynes as a heroic explorer of fossil traces left by the mind.

Goswami, A. 1990.  Consciousness in quantum physics and the mind-body problem.
Journal of Mind and Behavior 11:75-96.
  Argues for a view on which consciousness collapses brain function, yielding
  a "tangled hierarchy" of mechanisms, and self-referential awareness.

Humphrey, N. 1992.  _A History of the Mind_.  Simon and Schuster.
  On sensation as the central problem of consciousness, and an account of
  indexicality and ownership in terms of sensory short-circuits.  An
  entertaining book with some interesting discussion.

Jaynes, J. 1976.  _The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the
Bicameral Mind_.  Houghton Mifflin.
  Self-awareness came along only recently, replacing voices of the gods.

Kirk, R. 1992.  Consciousness and concepts.  Aristotelian Society Supplement
66:23-40.
  Analyzes consciousness in terms of the "presence" of information to the
  main decision-making processes of a system.  No great conceptual capacities
  required, no higher-order thoughts.  With application to blindsight.

Metzinger, T. 1995.  Faster than thought: Holism, homogeneity, and temporal
coding.  In (T. Metzinger, ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.

van Gulick, R. 1988.  A functionalist plea for self-consciousness.
Philosophical Review 97:149-88.
  How functionalism can handle consciousness: Self-consciousness is the
  possession of reflexive metapsychological information.  This helps understand
  learning, representation, and belief.  Phenomenal experience is still tricky.

White, S. 1987.  What is it like to be a homunculus?  Pac Philosophical
Quarterly 68:148-74.
  Weird examples of homunculi that are conscious but not self-conscious.
  Self-consciousness, not consciousness, is what really counts.

1.4e The Function of Consciousness? [13]
-----------------------------------

Baars, B. 1988.  The functions of consciousness.  In _A Cognitive Theory of
Consciousness_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Argues for nine major functions of consciousness: in defining inputs, 
  adaptation, debugging, recruiting & control, prioritizing, decision-making,
  analogy-forming, self-monitoring, and self-maintenance.

Bechtel, W. & Richardson, R.C. 1983.  Consciousness and complexity:
evolutionary perspectives on the mind-body problem.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 61:378-95.
  Contra Popper, evolution doesn't provide an argument against physicalism or
  epiphenomenalism.  Speculation on what the function of consciousness might
  be, and how it might be realized: e.g. selecting information.

Block, N. 1995.  On a confusion about the function of consciousness.
Behaviora and Brain Sciences 18:227-47.
  Separates phenomenal consciousness from access consciousness, and argues that
  cases like blindsight only suggest a function for access consciousness, not
  phenomenal consciousness.  The latter remains a mystery.  With commentaries.

Dretske, F. 1995.  What good is consciousness?  Manuscript.

Flanagan, O. & Polger, T. 1995.  Zombies and the function of consciousness.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:313-21.
  Argues for the possibility of zombies (contra Moody), then notes that any
  function could be performed by an unconscious zombie, it seems, so there's
  no function of consciousness in sight.

Gregory, R.L. 1996.  What do qualia do?  Perception 25:377-79.
  Suggests that qualia serve to distinguish hypotheses about present from past.

Kraemer, E.R. 1984.  Consciousness and the exclusivity of function.  Mind
93:271-5.
  Contra Mott 1982: Function needn't be exclusive, and brain processes and
  consciousness may share a function, due to their close relationship.

McGinn, C. 1981.  A note on functionalism and function.  Philosophical Topics
12:169-70.
  Function always underdetermines intrinsic nature, so absent/inverted qualia
  cases aren't incompatible with consciousness having a function.

Mott, P. 1982.  On the function of consciousness.  Mind 91:423-9.
  Consciousness doesn't have a function, as any function it might have is a
  function of brain processes.

Tye, M. 1996.  The function of consciousness.  Nous 30:287-305.
  Argues that the function of consciousness is not obvious, but that once one
  accepts a representational view of consciousness, it becomes obvious.

van Gulick, R. 1989.  What difference does consciousness make?  Philosophical
Topics 17:211-30.
  Trying to counter absent qualia arguments by finding a role for consciousness
  e.g. in metacognition, or as as a way to achieve semantic transparency.  But
  consciousness doesn't seem necessary for these, so it's still a mystery.

van Gulick, R. 1994.  Deficit studies and the function of phenomenal
consciousness.  In (G. Graham & G.L. Stephens, eds) _Philosophical
Psychopathology_.  MIT Press.

Velmans, M. 1992.  Is human information-processing conscious?  Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 14:651-69.
  Uses experimental evidence to argue that consciousness is functionally
  inessential: the tasks associated with consciousness can be performed without
  consciousness.  Only focal-attentive processing is required.

1.5 Consciousness and Content [73]
------------------------------

1.5a Consciousness and Intentionality (Searle, etc) [14]
-------------------------------------

Cole, D. 1994.  Thought and qualia.  Minds and Machines 4:283-302.

Davies, M. 1995.  Consciousness and the varieties of aboutness.  In (C.
Macdonald, ed) _Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological
Explanation_.  Oxford University Press.

Fodor, J. & Lepore, E. 1994.  What is the Connection Principle?  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 54:837-45.
  Searle's formulation of the connection principle is unclear, and there is no
  formulation is both plausible and interesting.

Gunderson, K. 1990.  Consciousness and intentionality: Robots with and without
the right stuff.  In (C.A. Anderson & J. Owens, eds) _Propositional Attitudes:
The Role of Content in Language, Logic, and Mind_.  CSLI.

Natsoulas, T. 1992.  Intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity.  Journal
of Mind and Behavior 13:281-308.

Nelkin, N. 1989.  Propositional attitudes and consciousness.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 49:413-30.
  About conscious beliefs.  We are not "conscious of" beliefs, merely
  "conscious that" -- i.e. belief is not phenomenological.

Nelkin, N. 1993.  The connection between intentionality and consciousness.  In
(M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and
Philosophical Essays_. Blackwell.
  Against Searle: some intentional states aren't even potentially conscious
  (blindsight, etc) and intentional content doesn't require a particular
  phenomenal feel.  So there's no essential link.  With remarks on McGinn.

Schweizer, P. 1994.  Intentionality, qualia, and mind/brain identity.  Minds
and Machines 4:259-82.

Searle, J.R. 1984.  Intentionality and its place in nature.  Synthese.
  (Subjective) intentionality sure is real.  It causes and is caused.

Searle, J.R. 1990.  Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13:585-642.
  Advocates a "connection principle": intentional states must be potentially
  conscious.  If not, they're brutely neurophysiological.  So cog-sci talk of
  "intentional" cognitive mechanisms below the conscious level isn't justified.

Searle J.R. 1994.  The connection principle and the ontology of the
unconscious: A reply to Fodor and Lepore.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 54:847-55.
  Clarifying the connection principle -- it's necessary in order to see how
  certain nonconscious neural states qualify as unconscious mental states.

van Gulick, R. 1988.  Consciousness, intrinsic intentionality, and
self-understanding machines.  In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness
in Contemporary Science_.  Oxford University Press.

van Gulick, R. 1995.  Why the connection argument doesn't work.  Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 55:201-7.

van Gulick, R. 1995.  How should we understand the relation between
intentionality and phenomenal consciousness.  Philosophical Perspectives
9:271-89.

1.5b The Content of Experience [24]
------------------------------

Baldwin, T. 1992.  The projective theory of sensory content.  In (T. Crane,
ed.) _The Contents of Experience_.  Cambridge University Press.

Bermudez, J.L. 1994.  Peacocke's argument against the autonomy of nonconceptual
representational content.

Bermudez, J.L. 1995.  Nonconceptual content: From perceptual experience to
subpersonal computational states.  Mind and Language 10:333-69.

Berger, G. 1987.  On the structure of visual sentience.  Synthese 71:355-70.

Bilgrami, A. 1994.  On McDowell on the content of perceptual experience.
Philosophical Quarterly 44:206-13.

Clark, R. 1973.  Sensuous judgments.  Nous 7:45-56.

Clark, R. 1981.  Sensing, perceiving, thinking.  Grazer Philosophische
Studien 12:273-95.

Crane, T. (ed) 1992.  _The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception_.
Cambridge University Press.

Crane, T. 1992.  The nonconceptual content of experience.  In (T. Crane, ed.)
_The Contents of Experience_.  Cambridge University Press.

DeBellis, M. 1991.  The representational content of musical experience.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51:303-24.
  Contra Peacocke, we don't need sensational properties to understand the
  content of musical experience.  Fine-grained representational properties can
  do the job,  with the help of some Schenkerian analysis.

Hamlyn, D.W. 1994.  Perception, sensation, and non-conceptual content.
Philosophical Quarterly 44:139-53.

Lowe, E.J. 1992.  Experience and its objects.  In (T. Crane, ed.) _The Contents
of Experience_.  Cambridge University Press.

Martin, M.G.F. 1992.  Perception, concepts, and memory.  Philosophical Review
101:745-63.

McDowell, J. 1994.  The content of perceptual experience.  Philosopical
Quarterly 44:190-205.

Millar, A. 1991.  Concepts, experience, and inference.  Mind 100:495-505.

Peacocke, C. 1983.  _Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and their
Relations_.  Oxford University Press.

Peacocke, C. 1984.  Colour concepts and colour experience. Synthese 58:365-82.

Peacocke, C. 1989.  Perceptual content.  In (J.Almog, J. Perry, & H. Wettstein,
eds) _Themes from Kaplan_.  Oxford University Press.

Peacocke, C. 1992.  Scenarios, concepts, and perception.  In (T. Crane, ed.)
_The Contents of Experience_.  Cambridge University Press.

Peacocke, C. 1994.  Nonconceptual content: Kinds, rationales, and relations.
Mind and Language 4:419-30.

Pendlebury, M. 1987.  Perceptual representation.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 87:91-106.

Pendlebury, M. 1990.  Sense experiences and their contents: A defense of the
propositional account.  Inquiry 33:215-30.
  Lots of reasons why experiences have propositional content (i.e., their
  content is truth-evaluable, etc).  A nice paper.

Snowdon, P. 1990.  The objects of perceptual experience.  Aristotelian Society
Supplement, 64:121-50.

Valberg, J.J. 1992.  _The Puzzle of Experience_.  Oxford University Press.

1.5c Representationalism (see also 1.4) [18]
------------------------

Block, N. 1990.  Inverted earth.  Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
  Uses Inverted Earth case, colors and lenses inverted, to argue vs Harman
  that qualitative states aren't intentional states.  Also, less convincingly,
  to argue that qualitative states aren't functional states.

Block, N. 1996.  Mental paint and mental latex.  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Perception_.  Ridgeview.

Dretske, F. 1995.  _Naturalizing the Mind_.  MIT Press.

Harman, G. 1990.  The intrinsic quality of experience.  Philosophical
Perspectives.
  There are no real qualia problems, just Intentional confusions.

Harman, G. 1996.  Explaining objective color in terms of subjective experience.
In (E. Villaneuva, ed) _Perception_.  Ridgeview.

Lloyd, D. 1991.  Leaping to conclusions: connectionism, consciousness, and the
computational mind.  In (T. Horgan & J. Tienson, eds) _Connectionism and the
Philosophy of Mind_.  Kluwer.
  Suggests that conscious states are identical to representational states, and
  that unconscious representation is impossible; transition between conscious
  states is non-representational.  Appeals to connectionist models in support.

Lycan, W.G. 1996.  Layered perceptual representation.  In (E. Villaneuva, ed)
_Perception_.  Ridgeview.

Lycan, W.G. 1996.  _Consciousness and Experience_.  MIT Press.

McCulloch, G. 1993.  The very idea of the phenomenological.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 67:39-57.
  The phenomenological can be reduced to the intentional.  Intentional states
  have a what-it-is-like, and there is no special phenomenal object of
  introspection.

Shoemaker, S. 1990.  Qualities and qualia: What's in the mind?  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research Supplement 50:109-131.
  Qualia can't be reduced to standard intentional properties (due to certain
  inversion cases).  Projectivist and sense-reference accounts don't work
  either.  Perhaps qualia are necessarily-illusory intentional properties.

Shoemaker, S. 1991.  Qualia and consciousness.  Mind 100:507-24.
  On the relationship between phenomenal and intentional aspects of qualia,
  and in particular on the accessibility of qualia to conscious awareness.
  Phenomenal & intentional similarity are connected but must be distinguished.

Stalnaker, R. 1996.  On a defense of the hegemony of representation.  In
(E. Villanueva, ed) _Perception_.  Ridgeview.

Tye, M. 1992.  Visual qualia and visual content.  In (T. Crane, ed) _The
Contents of Experience_.  Cambridge University Press.

Tye, M. 1994.  Do pains have representational content?  In (R. Casati, B.
Smith, & S. White, eds) _Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences_.
Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.

Tye, M. 1995.  A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal
character.  Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.
  Argues that pain is representational, and that its phenomenal character
  is narrow nonconceptual content.  They have a complex representational
  structure, with map-like arrays of sentential contents.

Tye, M. 1995.  What "what it is like" is like.  Analysis.
  Argues that "what it is like to X" is an intentional context, which solves
  some of the associated problems.

Tye, M. 1996.  _Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the
Phenomenal Mind_.  MIT Press.

Tye, M. 1996.  Orgasms again.  In (E. Villanueva. ed) _Perception_.  Ridgeview.

1.5d Internalism and Externalism about Experience (and its content) [10]
-------------------------------------------------

Davies, M. 1992.  Perceptual content and local supervenience.  Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.
  Argues that perceptual content does not supervene on internal state, even
  though it is non-conceptual.  Constructs an Twin scenario to that effect.
  With remarks on the relation between perceptual content and phenomenology.

Davies, M. 1993.  Aims and claims of externalist arguments.  In (E. Villanueva,
ed) _Naturalism and Normativity_.  Ridgeview.
  Distinguishes modal and constitutive externalism, characterizes perceptual
  content and its relation to sensational content, and argues for externalism
  about perceptual content by examples.

de Vries, W.A. 1996.  Experience and the swamp creature.  Philosophical
Studies 82:55-80.
  Argues that a swampthing isn't intelligent or intentional, with different
  physiological processes and no sensations, as these are functional kinds.

Dretske, F. 1996.  Phenomenal externalism, or if meanings ain't in the head,
where are qualia?  In (E. Villanueva, ed) _Perception_.  Ridgeview.
  We only have access to qualia through our concepts, which are external; so
  internal qualia would be inaccessible.  So if qualia are knowable, they're
  external; and if not, why posit them?  With comments by Kim, Horwich, Biro.

Kirk, R. 1994.  The trouble with ultra-externalism.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 68:293-307.

Kirk, R. 1996.  Why ultra-externalism goes too far.  Analysis.

McCulloch, G. 1990.  Externalism and experience.  Analysis 50:244-50.
  Argues against McGinn that one should embrace a form of "strong externalism"
  about experience.  Experience can be laden with externally-grounded concepts.

McCulloch, G. 1994.  Not much trouble for ultra-externalism.  Analysis
54:265-9.

Sartwell, C. 1995.  Radical externalism concerning experience.  Philosophical
Studies 78:55-70.
  There is no epistemically available aspect of experience that is determined
  internally; experiences are "fused" with the environment.

Tappenden, P. 1996.  The roundsquare copula: A semantic internalist's
rejoinder.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:395-400.

1.5e Miscellaneous [7]
------------------

Cam, P. 1984.  Consciousness and content-formation.  Inquiry 27:381-98.

Falk, B. 1993.  Consciousness, cognition, and the phenomenal.  Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society 67:55-73.
  On conceptual influences on experience, and aspectual seeing, focusing on
  bodily and dynamic elements.  Self-awareness is not of phenomenal states but
  *in* them.  With commentary by S. Mulhall.

Jacquette, D. 1984.  Sensation and intentionality.  Philosophical Studies
47:229-40.
  Sensations don't have intentional objects, they *are* intentional objects.

Maloney, J.C. 1986.  Sensuous content.  Philosophical Papers 15:131-54.

McGinn, C. 1988.  Consciousness and content.  Proceedings of the British
Academy 74:219-39.  Reprinted in _The Problem of Consciousness_ (Blackwell,
1991).
  Comparing the problems of consciousness and content, and reconciling optimism
  on content with pessimism on consciousness.  The phenomenological nature of
  content may be mysterious, but the individuation of contents is not.

Nelkin, N. 1994.  Phenomena and representation.  Philosophy of Science
45:527-47.
  Arguing against the view that phenomenal properties are "read off" in making
  perceptual judgments.  Experiences do not literally have color or shape.

Sosa, E. 1986.  Experience and intentionality.  Philosophical Topics 14:67-83.
  On a propositional conception of experience, and making sense of awareness of
  experience and various problems for sense-data monadicism.


1.6 Qualia [65]
----------

1.6a General [17]
------------

Burgess, J.A. 1990.  Phenomenal qualities and the nontransitivity of matching.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Clark, A. 1985.  Qualia and the psychophysical explanation of color perception.
Synthese 65:377-405.
  One can give an information-theoretic explanation of color perception, which
  leaves nothing out.  Rebuts various qualia objections, e.g. from the
  possibility of inversion.  Qualia are codes for external properties.

Clark, A. 1989.  The particulate instantiation of homogeneous pink.  Synthese
80:277-304.
  Explains homogeneity in terms of nontransitive matching among pixelized parts
  of vision.  Experience of continuity, not continuous experience.  Experiences
  may have subphenomenal parts (e.g. invisible pixels).

Clark, A. 1992.  _Sensory Qualities_.  Clarendon.
  Argues that psychology is in the business of explaining sensory qualities,
  and does a perfectly good job using discriminability as a basis.  With
  detailed argument and many interesting examples.

Fox, I. 1989.  On the nature and cognitive function of phenomenal content --
Part one.  Philosophical Topics 17:81-103.
  Searching for a theory of qualia: rejects epiphenomenalism, separation of the
  form and quality of experience, and immediate perception of phenomenal
  objects.  Experience consists in represented (inexistent) objects of thought.

Gilbert, P. 1992.  Immediate experience.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 66:233-250.
  Against an account of phenomenal content as given by inner discrimination.
  Argues that the character of experience consists in its reason-giving role. 

Kitcher, P.S. 1979.  Phenomenal qualities.  American Philosophical Quarterly
16:123-9.
  Qualia problems stem from assuming direct awareness of perceptual states.
  Instead, we should acknowledge only an ability to detect and label these
  states.  Also argues for the possibility of unconscious and illusory pains.

Leeds, S. 1993.  Qualia, awareness, Sellars.  Nous 27:303-330.
  A discussion of in what sense we are aware of qualia, and how we can have
  beliefs about them, with reference to Sellars.  Ends up reducing qualia to
  phenomenal beliefs in a language of thought.  A rich and subtle paper.

Leon, M . 1988.  Characterising the senses.  Mind and Language 3:243-70.

Levine, J. 1995.  Qualia: Intrinsic, relational, or what?  In (T. Metzinger,
ed.) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.

Lormand, E. 1995.  Qualia! (Now showing at a theater near you.)  Philosophical
Topics 22:127-156.

Nelkin, N. 1987.  How sensations get their names.  Philosophical Studies
51:325-39.
  Sensations are an inessential element of experiences.  Experiences are typed
  by their cognitive component, and the naming of sensations is derivative on
  this.  With examples and empirical evidence about pain, color, perception.

Nelkin, N. 1990.  Categorizing the senses.  Mind and Language.

Putnam, H. 1981.  Mind and body.  In _Reason, Truth and History_.  Cambridge
University Press.
  Considers qualia, inverted and absent, and various other stuff.  Wishy-washy.

Rey, G. 1993.  Sensational sentences.  In (M. Davies & G. Humphreys, eds)
_Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays_.  Blackwell.
  Explicating sensory experience in terms of an appropriate computational
  relation to a sentence in the language of thought.  Argues that this handles
  many features of qualia (privacy, ineffability, grainlessness, unity, etc).

Schick, T.W. 1992.  The epistemic role of qualitative content.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 52:383-93.
  Contra Sellars, Rorty, and Churchland: knowledge of qualitative content is
  an important aspect of our understanding of mental concepts, although it
  is not everything.

Shepard, R.N. 1993.  On the physical basis, linguistic representation, and
conscious experience of colors.  In (G. Harman, ed) _Conceptions of the Human
Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Shoemaker, S. 1975.  Phenomenal similarity.  Critica 7:3-37.  Reprinted in
_Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1984).
  Where does similarity come from?  From belief therein?  Similarity of
  experience = experience of similarity.  Also relation to projectibility.

Shoemaker, S. 1994.  Phenomenal character.  Nous 28:21-38.
  Phenomenal character is bestowed by representation of certain relational
  properties, defined by relation to experience.  With a discussion of possible
  candidates, and argument against other views such as projectivism.

1.6b Qualia and Materialism [13] (see also 1.2, 1.3)
---------------------------

Clark, A. 1985.  A physicalist theory of qualia.  Monist 68:491-506.
  A Goodman-like theory of qualia discrimination.

Cornman, J.W. 1971.  _Materialism and Sensations_.  Yale University Press.

Double, R. 1985.  Phenomenal properties.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 45:383-92.
  A somewhat vague defense of materialism against objections from phenomenal
  properties.  The only problems are epistemological.

Harding, G. 1991.  Color and the mind-body problem.  Review of Metaphysics
45:289-307.
  On the unique nature of color expanses, which are laid bare to perception as
  they are in themselves.  These are incompatible with functionalist accounts
  of mind, but might still be physical, on a broader conception thereof.

Holborow, L.C. 1973.  Materialism and phenomenal qualities.  Aristotelian
Society Supplement 47:107-19.

Horgan, T. 1987.  Supervenient qualia.  Philosophical Review 96:491-520.
  Arguing from the causal efficacy of qualia and the closedness of physical
  causation to the conclusion that qualia conceptually supervene on the
  physical.  A very thorough paper.

Lewis, D. 1995.  Should a materialist believe in qualia?  Australasian Journal
of Philosophy 73:140-44.
  Materialists can believe in qualia, qua occupier of the folk psychological
  role.  But they cannot accept the Identification Thesis, that having qualia
  allows us to know exactly what they are.

Lycan, W.G. 1988.  Phenomenal objects: A backhanded defense.  Philosophical
Perspectives 3:513-26.
  Argues that qualia, if viewed as simple properties of phenomenal individuals,
  are problematic for materialism.  Considers the case for phenomenal
  individuals, and argues that they are intentional inexistents.

Marras, A. 1993.  Materialism, functionalism, and supervenient qualia.
Dialogue 32:475-92.
  Qualia aren't reducible to physical properties, but they are supervenient
  (and ontologically dependent) on microfunctional properties.  With remarks
  on the knowledge argument, Kripke, absent qualia, epiphenomenalism, etc.

Mellor, D.H. 1973.  Materialism and phenomenal qualities II.  Aristotelian
Society Supplement 47:107-19.

Raffman, D. 1995.  On the persistence of phenomenology.  In (T. Metzinger, ed)
_Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
  Argues that our inability to reidentify qualia is a problem for materialism.
  How are they represented?  Empty demonstrative would be vacuous, predicate
  would be reidentified, so maybe a plain presentation?  Very interesting.

Stubenberg, L. 1995.  The place of qualia in the world of science.  In (S.
Hameroff, A. Kazniak, & A. Scott, eds) _Toward a Science of Consciousness_.
MIT Press.

Tye, M. 1986.  The subjective qualities of experience.  Mind 95:1-17.
  Absent/inverted qualia aren't really imaginable.  The Knowledge Argument
  fails, as discovering new experiences doesn't imply learning new facts,
  but only coming to know old facts in a new way.

1.6c Eliminativism about Qualia [10]
-------------------------------

Dennett, D.C. 1978.  Why you can't make a computer that feels pain.  Synthese
38.  Reprinted in _Brainstorms* (MIT Press, 1978).
  The concept of pain is incoherent, as it's asked to do too many things at
  once.  With a discussion of drugs, flowcharts, reportability, etc.

Dennett, D.C. 1981.  Wondering where the yellow went.  Monist 64:102-8.
  A response to Sellars.  All there is to seeing occurrent yellow is the
  judgment that one is seeing occurrent yellow.

Dennett, D.C. 1988.  Quining qualia.  In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds)
_Consciousness in Contemporary Science_.  Oxford University Press.
  Argues against the existence of ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly
  accessible properties.  With lots of meaty-thought experiments, and arguments
  that there is no fact of the matter about inversion cases.

Dennett, D.C. 1991.  Lovely and suspect qualities.  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Consciousness_.  Ridgeview.

Everett, A. 1996.  Qualia and vagueness.  Synthese 106:205-226.
  There are no qualia: qualia would have to be vague (for Sorites reasons), but
  there can be no vague properties in nature.  The usual Sorites defenses don't
  work here, as there's no appearance/reality distinction for qualia.

Jacoby, H. 1985.  Eliminativism, meaning, and qualitative states.
Philosophical Studies 47:257-70.
  Arguing against eliminativism for qualia.  Even if nothing satisfies all the
  common-sense properties of qualia, reference of qualia terms is still fixed
  under a Putnam-style theory of meaning.  Argues for scientific functionalism.

Levin, M. 1981.  Phenomenal properties.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 42:42-58.
  There are no irreducible phenomenal properties.  Materialism can handle our
  direct awareness of inner states by the right sort of causal connection.
  Gives a materialism account of discrimination and learning mental concepts.

Levine, J. 1994.  Out of the closet: A qualophile confronts qualophobia.
Philosophical Topics 22:107-126.
  On bold vs. modest qualophilia, and against various qualophobic strategies.
  With remarks on scientific objectivity, qualia as an explanandum, and on how
  our knowledge of qualia is consistent with the conceivability of zombies.

Ross, D. 1993.  Quining qualia Quine's way.  Dialogue 32:439-59.

Seager, W.E. 1993.  The elimination of experience.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 53:345-65.
  Dennett's 1988 argument against ineffability, etc., doesn't nearly make the
  case against qualia, and largely relies on verificationist assumptions.

1.6d The Inverted Spectrum [25]
--------------------------

Block, N. 1990.  Inverted earth.  Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
  Uses Inverted Earth case, colors and lenses inverted, to argue vs Harman
  that qualitative states aren't intentional states.  Also, less convincingly,
  to argue that qualitative states aren't functional states.

Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. 1981.  Functionalism, qualia and
intentionality.  Philosophical Topics 12:121-32.  Reprinted in _A
Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989).
  Functional role counts more than qualitative content in determining what
  e.g. "redness" is.

Clark, A. 1985.  Spectrum inversion and the color solid.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy 23:431-43.
  Argues that there could be inverted spectra even without a symmetrical color
  space.  Qualia must be distinguished from their place in color space.

Cole, D.J. 1990.  Functionalism and inverted spectra.  Synthese 82:207-22.
  Acquired spectrum inversions do not refute functionalism, if qualia revert
  after behavioral adaptation (as they do with inverting lenses).

Dennett, D.C. 1994.  Instead of qualia.  In (A. Revonsuo & M. Kamppinen, eds)
_Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.
  Describes some "inverted spectrum" scenario in computer registers, and argues
  that in the absence of a "central clearing house", the inversion of qualia
  is indeterminate.  There's no reason to believe in non-dispositional qualia.

Gert, B. 1965.  Imagination and verifiability.  Philosophical Studies 16:44-47.
  Inverted spectra with constant behavior is a meaningful hypothesis even under
  verificationism.  Switching nerve endings, tinting contact lenses, etc.

Hardin, C.L. 1987.  Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:281-98.
  On the physiological bases of phenomenal states, particularly color.
  Inverted spectrum isn't really coherent, as coolness/warmth would have to
  be inverted too.  So the contingency of qualia is diminished.

Hardin, C.L. 1988.  _Color for Philosophers_.  Hackett.
  Distinguishes various functionally distinct inverted spectrum cases.

Hardin, C.L. 1991.  Reply to Levine.  Philosophical Psychology 4:41-50.
  Reply to Levine 1991.  "Green residue" and "red residue" may be identical.
  Physiology might put more constraints on qualia, eventually ruling out all
  other possibilities.  But there may still be absent/alien qualia problems.

Harrison, B. 1967.  On describing colors.  Inquiry 10:38-52.

Harrison, B. 1973.  _Form and Content_.  Blackwell.
  The inverted spectrum is impossible, due to asymmetries in color space.

Harvey, J. 198x.  Systematic transposition of colours.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 211-19.
  The inverted spectrum can be detected, if a single person experiences both.

Johnsen, B.C. 1986.  The inverted spectrum.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy
64:471-6.
  Against Shoemaker: physical realizations do not give empirical conditions
  for qualia inversion.  Nice.

Johnsen, B.C. 1993.  The intelligibility of spectrum inversion.  Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 23:631-6.

Kirk, R. 1982.  Goodbye to transposed qualia.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 82:33-44.
  The possibility of an inverted spectrum w.r.t. dispositions implies the
  falsity of physicalism.  But this rests on an implausible "slide-viewer"
  model of seeing, and is incoherent otherwise.

Levine, J. 1988.  Absent and inverted qualia revisited.  Mind and Language
3:271-87.
  Inverted qualia, with respect to a functional account, are no more plausible
  than absent qualia (by analysis of thought experiments).  Both lead to
  first-person skepticism about qualia.

Levine, J. 1991.  Cool red.  Philosophical Psychology 4:27-40.
  Contra Hardin 1988: there's a "green residue" after coolness is subtracted,
  so inverted spectrum could still be possible.  In any case, the impossibility
  of IS doesn't affect the explanatory gap for qualia, which is epistemic.

Lycan, W.G. 1973.  Inverted spectrum.  Ratio 15:315-9.
  Inverted spectrum holding behavior constant is at least a coherent idea.
  Hook up brain in different ways, etc.

Lycan, W.G. 1993.  Functionalism and recent spectrum inversions.  Manuscript.
  Argues that qualia are intentional properties, and that inverted spectra,
  though conceivable, are metaphysically impossible, due to considerations
  about society and normality.  Argues against Block's "inverted earth".

Nida-Rumelin, M. 1996.  Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia
inversion?  Philosophical Studies 82:145-57.
  A fascinating note on the possibility of people with doubled colorblindness
  genes, thus inverting color processing; such people may actually exist.

Rey, G. 1992.  Sensational sentences reversed.  Philosophical Studies
68:289-319.
  Argues for a computational/sentential theory under which qualia are fixed by
  functional organization.  Argues against Block's 1990 inversion: qualia might
  slowly change back as associations fade.  Memory isn't 100% reliable.

Shoemaker, S. 1975.  Phenomenal similarity.  Critica 7:3-37.  Reprinted in
_Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1984).
  Maybe IS is ongoing, with memory changes.  What is the logic of "appears"?

Shoemaker, S. 1982.  The inverted spectrum.  Journal of Philosophy 79:357-381.
Reprinted in _Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1984).
  All about the coherence and otherwise thereof.  Uses switch in state for IS
  IS wrt behavior.  Also claims that IS wrt function is possible as qualia are
  fixed by realizing state, not functional state.  Bad assumption.

Taylor, D. 1966.  The incommunicability of content.  Mind 75:527-41.
  Inverted spectra thought-experiments show that experiential content is
  incommunicable.  Accounts for the fact that attempts to describe such
  cases lead to contradiction (I'm seeing green & not seeing green).

Tye, M. 1993.  Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum.  Nous.
  Argues that qualia are intentional properties, along the lines of "looks
  F to P".  Handles inverted earth and related cases by taking the narrow
  intentional content.  With remarks on the semantics of color terms.

1.7 Functionalism and Qualia [44]
---------------------------------

1.7a Introspection and Absent Qualia (Shoemaker) [10]
------------------------------------------------

Shoemaker, S. 1975.  Functionalism and qualia.  Philosophical Studies
27:291-315.  Reprinted in _Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University
Press, 1984).
  Absent qualia possible => qualia make no causal difference => no knowledge
  of qualia, therefore absent qualia are impossible.  If qualia are
  introspectively accessible, they must be functional.  An important argument.

Shoemaker, S. 1981.  Absent qualia are impossible -- A reply to Block.
Philosophical Review 90:581-99.  Reprinted in _Identity, Cause, and Mind_
(Cambridge University Press, 1984).
  Reply to Block 1980.  Distinguishes two AQ theses, and argues that if AQ are
  possible, then the problem for functionalism isn't due solely to qualia.

Averill, E.W. 1990.  Functionalism, the absent qualia objection, and
eliminativism.  Southern Journal of Philosophy 28:449-67.
  Defending Shoemaker's argument against Conee: immediate awareness and
  qualitative beliefs are the same.  But maybe people *can't* tell whether
  they're having genuine or ersatz pain.  Eliminativism is the best option.

Block, N. 1980.  Are absent qualia impossible?  Philosophical Review 89:257-74.
  Reply to Shoemaker 1975.  The possibility of absent qualia is compatible with
  a functional role for qualia, as qualia can make a causal difference that is
  independent of a given functional account.

Conee, E. 1985.  The possibility of absent qualia.  Philosophical Review
94:345-66.
  Contra Shoemaker: qualia cause qualitative beliefs, which are affected by the
  absence of qualia, so we know about qualia even if AQ are possible.

Davis, L. 1982.  Functionalism and absent qualia.  Philosophical Studies
41:231-49.
  Elucidating Shoemaker's argument: if absent qualia are possible, then the
  difference between real and ersatz pain makes no difference to belief, so
  qualia aren't introspectively accessible.  A nice analysis.

Doore, G. 1981.  Functionalism and absent qualia.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 59:387-402.
  Qualia and qualitative beliefs are the same, so Shoemaker's argument fails.
  A numbness/pain inversion argument shows that pain isn't a functional state;
  it yields an introspectible difference without a functional difference.

Francescotti, R.M. 1994.  Qualitative beliefs, wide content, and wide behavior.
Nous 28:396-404.
  Qualitative beliefs can supervene on behavioral dispositions even if absent/
  /inverted qualia are possible.  We just individuate belief contents and
  behavior widely, with wide content fixed to the qualia. 

Hill, C.S. 1991.  Introspection and the skeptic.  In _Sensations: A Defense of
Type Materialism_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Argues that the possibility of absent qualia is compatible with introspective
  knowledge.  The fact that we have evidence of qualia isn't altered by the
  fact that we'd still think we had that evidence if we didn't have qualia.

White, N. 1985.  Professor Shoemaker and the so-called `qualia' of experience.
Philosophical Studies 47:369-383.
  Shoemaker's account leaves out experienced relations, such as experienced
  similarity.  Experienced similarity is not the same as similarity between
  experiences.  Being experienced is not an experienced feature.

1.7b Absent Qualia (Block, etc) [13]
-------------------------------

Block, N. & Fodor, J.A. 1972.  What psychological states are not.
Philosophical Review 81:159-81.
  As a criticism of functionalism. raises the possibility that realizations of
  any given functional account of mental states may lack qualia.

Block, N. 1980.  Troubles with functionalism.  In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in
the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol 1.  Harvard University Press.
  All kinds of absent qualia cases: homunculi-headed robots, the population of
  China, and so on.  There is a prima facie doubt that such cases lack qualia,
  so there is a prima facie case against functionalism.

Bogen, J. 1981.  Agony in the schools.  Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:1-21.
  It's OK for bizarre realizations to lack pain, as functionalism requires
  teleology as well as organization.  With remarks on the relation between
  pain and "introspectible noxiousness".

Carleton, L. 1983.  The population of China as one mind.  Philosophy Research
Archives 9:665-74.
  Taking the personal stance, we should regard the Chinese nation as having
  qualia.  A lack of qualia would make a functional difference.

Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. 1981.  Functionalism, qualia and
intentionality.  Philosophical Topics 12:121-32.  Reprinted in _A
Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989).
  Absent qualia are impossible.  Also, qualia aren't essential to mental
  state, functional role is.

Cuda, T. 1985.  Against neural chauvinism.  Philosophical Studies 48:111-27.
  Replace neurons one by one with homunculi: what happens?  Beliefs don't
  change, does consciousness fade?  Very nice.

Elugardo, R. 1983.  Functionalism, homunculi-heads and absent qualia.  Dialogue
21:47-56.
  If absent qualia are possible, then either qualia are inexplicable or species
  chauvinism is true.  Homunculi-heads could make similar arguments about us.

Elugardo, R. 1983.  Functionalism and the absent qualia argument.  Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 13:161-80.

Jacoby, H. 1990.  Empirical functionalism and conceivability arguments.
Philosophical Psychology 2:271-82.
  Conceivability arguments are only a problem for empirical functionalism
  insofar as they are a problem for materialism in general.  Very true.

Levin, J. 1985.  Functionalism and the argument from conceivability.  Canadian
Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:85-104.
  Argues that metaphysical conclusions can be drawn from conceivability
  arguments, but that absent qualia cases have not been clearly and distinctly
  conceived.  The functionalist is better off than the identity theorist here.

Levine, J. 1988.  Absent and inverted qualia revisited.  Mind and Language
3:271-87.
  IQ are no more plausible than AQ (by analysis of thought experiments and
  skepticism).  So there's no reason to choose physicalist-functionalism over
  pure functionalism, as Shoemaker does.  Nice.

Sayan, E. 1988.  A closer look at the Chinese Nation argument.  Philosophy
Research Archives 13:129-36.
  The Chinese Nation would require less people than Churchland & Churchland
  1981 suggest, as we'd only need to handle a subset of all possible inputs.

Tye, M. 1993.  Blindsight, the absent qualia hypothesis, and the mystery of
consciousness.  In (C. Hookway, ed) _Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences_.
Cambridge University Press.
  Gives a thorough neurophysiological analysis of blindsight and related
  pathologies, and argues that these cannot be used to support the possibility
  of absent qualia.  With remarks on the mystery of consciousness.

1.7c Functionalism and Qualia, Miscellaneous [21]
--------------------------------------------

Brown, M. 1983.  Functionalism and sensations.  Auslegung 10:218-28.
  Various comments on functionalism's troubles with qualia, including absent
  and inverted qualia.  Analogis with biology and information theory.

Chalmers, D.J. 1995.  Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia.  In
(T. Metzinger, ed.) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.
Press.
  Argues that absent qualia and inverted qualia are empirically impossible
  (though logically possible), using neural-replacement thought-experiments.
  So functional organization fully determines conscious experience.

Cole, D.J. 1990.  Functionalism and inverted spectra.  Synthese 82:207-22.
  Acquired spectrum inversion doesn't refute functionalism, if qualia revert
  after behavioral adaptation.  With empirical evidence.

Dumpleton, S. 1988.  Sensation and function.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 66:376-89.

Eshelman, L.J. 1977.  Functionalism, sensations, and materialism.  Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 7:255-74.
 
Graham, G. & Stephens, G. 1985.  Are qualia a pain in the neck for
functionalists?  American Philosophical Quarterly 22:73-80.
  Pain-qualia are in the body, not the mind, and so aren't part of psychology.

Graham, G. & Stephens, G. 1987.  Minding your P's and Q's: Pain and sensible
qualities.  Nous 21:395-405.

Hill, C.S. 1991.  The failings of functionalism.  In _Sensations: A Defense of
Type Materialism_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Gives a number of arguments against both analytic functionalism and
  psychofunctionalism: arguments from absent qualia, absent functional role,
  epistemology, semantics, and heterogeneity of functional roles.

Horgan, T. 1984.  Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum.  Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 44:453-69.
  Argues that non-phenomenal mental events are functional, while qualia are
  low-level physiological.

Lycan, W.G. 1981.  Form, function and feel.  Journal of Philosophy 78:24-50.
  Accuses Block of a perspective error.  Functionalism can handle a lot, if
  it's multi-levelled.

Lycan, W.G. 1987.  Homunctionalism and qualia.  In _Consciousness_.  MIT
Press.
  Various stuff, mostly against absent qualia arguments.

Marcel, A. 1988.  Phenomenal experience and functionalism.  In (A. Marcel &
E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_.  Oxford University
Press.

Moor, J.H. 1988.  Testing robots for qualia.  In (H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds)
_Perspectives on Mind_.  Kluwer.
  Behavioral evidence for qualia is always indirect.  And you can't check by
  replacing own neurons by chips, as you'll still believe you have qualia if
  you're functionally identical.  Posit robot qualia as explanatory construct?

Nemirow, L. 1979.  Functionalism and the subjective quality of experience.
Dissertation, Stanford University.

Rey, G. 1994.  Wittgenstein, computationalism, and qualia.  In (R. Casati, B.
Smith, & S. White, eds) _Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences_.
Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
  Computational functionalism about qualia is compatible with Wittgenstein's
  views.  It makes sense of the points about "dividing through" my private
  objects, for example.  With remarks on spectrum inversions.

Seager, W.E. 1983.  Functionalism, qualia and causation.  Mind 92:174-88.
  Functionalism can't explain the causal role of qualia by identifying them
  with functional states (circularity) or physical realizations (chauvinism).
  Which leaves property dualism, epiphenomenalism, or eliminativism for qualia.

Shoemaker, S. 1994.  The first-person perspective.  Proceedings and Addresses
of the American Philosophical Association 68:7-22.
  Against drawing strong conclusions from first-person imaginings.  Considers
  Searle's silicon-replacement scenario: we might infer that perception isn't
  veridical, that there's another mind about, or even another body.

van Gulick, R. 1988.  Qualia, functional equivalence and computation.  In
(H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds) _Perspectives on Mind_.  Kluwer.
  Commentary on Moor 1988.  Systems that differ in qualitative properties will
  likely differ in functional organization.

White, S. 1986.  Curse of the qualia.  Synthese 68:333-68.
  Criticism of "physicalist-functionalism", where functional organization
  doesn't completely determine qualia (e.g. Shoemaker/Block).  The only tenable
  options are pure functionalism or transcendental dualism.  Nice.

White, S. 1989.  Transcendentalism and its discontents.  Philosophical Topics
17:231-61.
  Taking transcendental dualism seriously.  Privileged access provides strong
  arguments against objective theories, but it turns out that transcendentalism
  can't explain it any better, so maybe embrace objective theories after all.

Wright, E. 1995.  More qualia trouble for functionalism: The Smythies TV-hood
analogy.  Synthese 97:365-82.

Zuboff, A. 1994.  What is a mind?  Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19:183-205.
  Replacing a brain chunk while preserving causal role must preserve
  experience;


1.8 The Identity Theory (Smart, etc) [57] (see also 1.9, 3.4b)
-------------------------------------

Feigl, H. 1958.  The `mental' and the `physical'.  Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 2:370-497.

Feigl, H. 1960.  Mind-body, not a pseudoproblem.  In (S. Hook, ed) _Dimensions
of Mind_.  New York UP.

Place, U.T. 1956.  Is consciousness a brain process?  British Journal of
Psychology 47:44-50.  Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_
(Blackwell, 1990).
  The idea that consciousness is a brain process is logically coherent.  It's
  a scientific hypothesis, not a necessary truth.  On the "is" of composition
  vs the "is" of definition, and the fallacy of the internal phenomenal field.

Smart, J.J.C. 1959.  Sensations and brain processes.  Philosophical Review
68:141-56.
  Defending the thesis that sensations are contingently identical to brain
  processes against various objections.  Topic-neutral analysis of sensation
  reports.  Materialism beats epiphenomenalism on grounds of simplicity.

Abelson, R. 1970.  A refutation of mind-body identity.  Philosophical Studies
18:85-90.
  The number of possible mental states is infinite (think of any number),
  whereas there are only finitely many brain states, so they're not identical.

Armstrong, D.M. 1968.  The headless woman and the defense of materialism.
Analysis 29.
  Likens the anti-materialist position to the "headless woman" fallacy: "I'm
  not aware the mental states are physical", so "I'm aware that mental states
  are non-physical".

Armstrong, D.M. 1973.  Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of
mind.  Philosophy of Science 40:178-93.
  A prima facie case for materialism based on grounds of rational consensus,
  arising especially from common-sense and scientific evidence.  Mental states
  exist (common-sense) but should be analyzed causally (evidence from science).

Baier, K. 1962.  Smart on sensations.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy
40:57-68.
  Mental states are necessarily private, and so cannot be physical states,
  which are public.  We have epistemological authority about our mental states.

Blumenfeld, J-B. 1979.  Phenomenal properties and the identity theory.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:485-93.
  Argues that phenomenal properties aren't needed to identify sensations with
  brain-states, and nor are topic-neutral analyses.

Borst, C.V. (ed) 1970.  _The Mind/Brain Identity Theory_.  Macmillan.
  An anthology of central articles on the identity theory.

Bradley, M.C. 1963.  Sensations, brain-processes, and colours.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 41.

Brandt, R. 1960.  Doubts about the identity theory.  In (S. Hook, ed)
_Dimensions of Mind_.  New York UP.

Brandt, R. & Kim, J. 1967.  The logic of the identity theory.  Journal of
Philosophy 66:515-537.
  Arguing for an event-identity construal of the identity theory.  Comparing
  the identity theory to the weaker "principle of simultaneous isomorphism".
  The only reason to accept the identity theory is ontological simplicity.

Candlish, S. 1970.  Mind, brain, and identity.  Mind 79:502-18.

Carney, J. 1971.  The compatibility of mind-body identity with dualism.  Mind.
  Argues that the identity theory is compatible with linguistic dualism, as the
  mental and the physical may differ in intensional properties only.

Clarke, J. 1971.  Mental structure and the identity theory.  Mind 80:521-30.

Coder, D. 1973.  The fundamental error of central-state materialism.  American
Philosophical Quarterly 10:289-98.
  On problems with theories that leave the nature of mind open a priori: how
  can we even understand the possibilities?

Cornman, J. 1962.  The identity of mind and body.  Journal of Philosophy
59:486-92.

Coburn, R.C. 1963.  Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain
processes.  Journal of Philosophy 60:89.
  Location of mental states by convention (Shaffer 1961) won't work, as it (a)
  makes mental states public, and (b) conflicts with connections to behavior.

Feigl, H. 1971.  Some crucial issues of mind-body monism.  Synthese.

Heil, J. 1970.  Sensations, experiences, and brain processes.  Philosophy
45:221-6.

Joske, W. 1960.  Sensations and brain processes: A reply to Professor Smart.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:157-60.
  On topic-neutral reports, after-images, and after-radishes.  Such a report
  requires epistemic access to physical resemblance, which we don't have.

Kim, J. 1966.  On the psycho-physical identity theory.  American Philosophical
Quarterly 3:227-35.
  There's no empirical support for identity, over and above that for
  correlation; and unity of science gives no reason to accept identity.  The
  only reason might be that of ontological simplicity.

Kim, J. 1972.  Phenomenal properties, psychophysical laws and the identity
theory.  Monist 56:178-92.
  Deal with phenomenal properties by allowing only mental events, and
  eliminating mental objects.  Identity theories needn't suppose psychophysical
  laws.  With defense against multiple realizability arguments.

Kitcher, P.S. 1982.  Two versions of the identity theory.  Erkenntnis
17:213-28.
  Recasting the identity theory and functionalism, using Kripkean theories of
  reference, so mental states can refer to physiological or psychological
  states that we don't yet understand; and qualia problems are handled better.

Lewis, D. 1965.  An argument for the identity theory.  Journal of Philosophy
63:17-25.  Reprinted in _Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1_ (Oxford University
Press, 1980).
  Mental states are defined by their causal roles.  So, by the completeness
  of physics, they must be physical states.

Locke, D. 1971.  Must a materialist pretend he's anaesthetized?  Philosophical
Quarterly 21:217-31.
  On how materialism, as opposed to a double aspect view, can handle mental
  features -- by moving them into the world via a realist theory of perception.
  Remarks on identification of states.  After-images, etc, cause problems.

Lockwood, M. 1984.  Einstein and the identity theory.  Analysis.
  Using the special theory of relativity to show that if mental events have
  a temporal location, then they must have a spatial location.

Malcolm, N. 1964.  Scientific materialism and the identity theory.  Dialogue
3:115-25.
  The identity theory is meaningless, if identity is analyzed as spatiotemporal
  coincidence, as thoughts don't have location.  Thoughts also require context.
  Even if identity holds, explaining brain doesn't imply explaining mind.

Macdonald, C. 1989.  _Mind-Body Identity Theories_.  Routledge.

Meehl, P. 1966.  The compleat autocerebroscopist: A thought-experiment on
Professor Feigl's mind-body identity thesis.  In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell,
eds) _Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of
Herbert Feigl_.  University of Minnesota Press.

Mucciolo, L. 1974.  The identity theory and criteria for the mental.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35.

Munsat, S. 1969.  Could sensations be processes?  Mind.
  Sensations and processes have different logical type, so it is a priori
  impossible that they should be identical.

Nagel, T. 1965.  Physicalism.  Philosophical Review 74:339-56, 1965.

Noren, S.J. 1970.  Smart's materialism.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Pepper, S. 1975.  A split in the identity theory.  In (C. Cheng, ed)
_Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem_.  Hawaii University Press.

Pitcher, G. 1960.  Sensations and brain processes: A reply to Professor Smart.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:150-7.
  Identity requires explanation to be accepted, but Smart doesn't provide this.
  But one can deny identity without claiming dualism -- e.g. a "duck-rabbit"
  theory of mind/brain.  With remarks on the completeness of descriptions.

Place, U.T. 1960.  Materialism as a scientific hypothesis.  Philosophical
Review 69:101-4.
  Contra Smart 1959: Materialism is a scientific hypothesis, if we accept
  certain logical criteria for what a sensation is; otherwise it's just false.

Place, U.T. 1972.  Sensations and processes: A reply to Munsat.  Mind.

Place, U.T. 1988.  Thirty years on -- Is consciousness still a brain process?
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:208-19.
  Comparing contemporary materialism to Pace's 1956 variety.  With remarks
  on whether the thesis is empirical or a priori, and on deciding the issue
  between materialism and epiphenomenalism.

Place, U.T. 1989.  Low claim assertions.  In (J. Heil, ed) _Cause, Mind, and
Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin_.  Kluwer.
  Discusses a paper of Martin's and the genesis of the identity theory, with a
  focus on `public' and 'private logic' and topic-neutral descriptions.

Puccetti, R. 1978.  The refutation of materialism.  Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 8:157-62.
  The identity theory must be false, as pain centers in vitro will not be
  pains.  With a reply by G. Pearce and a rejoinder.

Rosenbaum, S. 1977.  The property objection and the principles of identity.
Philosophical Studies 32.

Routley, R. & MaCrae, V. 1966.  On the identity of sensations and physiological
occurrences.  American Philosophical Quarterly 3.

Scriven, M. 1966.  The limitations of the identity theory.  In (P. Feyerabend &
G. Maxwell, eds) _Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in
Honor of Herbert Feigl_.  University of Minnesota Press.
  On the identity theory as a linguistic proposal, compatible with dualism;
  epiphenomenalism and parallelism must be false, leaving interactionism.

Shaffer, J. 1961.  Could mental states be brain processes?  Journal of
Philosophy 58:813-22.
  Mental states don't have a location, and brain processes do; but we could
  stipulate a location for mental states.  With remarks on possible relations
  between mental and physical features, states, and concepts.

Shaffer, J. 1963.  Mental events and the brain.  Journal of Philosophy
60:160-6.
  We identify mental events by noticing mental features that must be
  nonphysical, but still might be empirically reducible.  Against topic-neutral
  definitions, and with response to Coburn 1963 on location.

Smart, J.J.C. 1961.  Further remarks on sensations and brain processes.
Philosophical Review.
  Reply to Stevenson 1960: There are no irreducible mental properties; they
  reduce to physical properties via topic-neutral definitions.

Smart, J.J.C. 1962.  Brain processes and incorrigibility.  Australasian Journal
of Philosophy 40:68-70.
  Reply to Baier 1962: epistemological authority is compatible with
  materialism.  Mental state reports are not completely incorrigible, though.

Smart, J.J.C. 1963.  Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 60:651-62.
  Defending topic-neutral analyses of mental reports, and arguing against
  Wittgensteinian behaviorism via brain-in-vat examples.  With remarks on the
  appeal of materialism and on compatibility with ordinary language.

Smart, J.J.C. 1972.  Further thoughts on the identity theory.  Monist
56:177-92.
  On some problems for the identity theory arising from the intensionality of
  mental states and from the appeal to properties, and on how to modify the
  translation form of the theory without embracing the disappearance version.

Stevenson, J.T. 1960.  `Sensations and brain processes': A reply to J.J.C.
Smart.  Philosophical Review 69:505-10.
  Identity theory implies nomological danglers, due to the irreducibility of
  defining mental properties.

Stoutland, F. 1971.  Ontological simplicity and the identity hypothesis.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  The identity thesis isn't ontologically simpler than dualism: we still need
  a dualism of properties, and explanatory danglers.  Not much turns on the
  issue, except in teleological explanation.

Sosa, E. 1965.  Professor Malcolm on `Scientific materialism and the identity
theory'.  Dialogue 3:422-23.
  Contra Malcolm 1965: explaining brain will explain mind, if the explanation
  is conjoined with the identity statement.  With rejoinder from Malcolm.

Swartz, N. 1974.  Can the theory of contingent identity between
sensation-states and brain-states be made empirical?  Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 3:405-17.

Swinburne, R. 1993.  Are mental events identical with brain events?  American
Philosophical Quarterly 19:173-181.
  Property identity theses fail due to meaning differences, and event identity
  these fail due to a lack of entailment relations.  Rebuts objections from
  weaker identity criteria and analogies with scientific identification.

Thalberg, I. 1978.  A novel approach to mind-brain identity.  Philosophy of
Science 3:255-72.
  Suggests a theory in which neural states are components of, but not identical
  to, overall psychological states.  This can accommodate raw feels if
  necessary as a further component, but is mostly materialistic.

1.9 Essentialism and the Identity Theory (Kripke) [33]
--------------------------------------------------

Kripke, S.A. 1971.  Identity and necessity.  In (M. Munitz, ed) _Identity and
Individuation_.
  An identity between mental and physical states can't be contingent, as it
  relates rigid designators.  But nevertheless the co-occurrence of certain
  mental and physical states is contingent, so the identity theory is false.

Kripke, S.A. 1972.  _Naming and Necessity_.  Harvard University Press.
  Both "pain" and "C-fibres firing" are rigid designators, so if they are
  identical, this must be necessary.  But their co-occurrence is contingent,
  and this can't be explained away epistemically, so the identity theory fails.

Barnette, R. 1977.  Kripke's pains.  Southern Journal of Philosophy 15.
  Argues that pain and the associated epistemic situation are inequivalent.
  Beliefs about pain are simply produced by mechanisms, and could come about
  without any sensation.

Bayne, S.R. 19xx.  Kripke's Cartesian argument.  Philosophia.
  Trying to turn Kripke's argument against him: it's possible that pains and
  C-fibre stimulations are identical, so it's necessary that they're identical.

Bealer, G. 1994.  Mental properties.  Journal of Philosophy 91:185-208.
  On four arguments against the identity theory: multiple-realizability, modal,
  knowledge, and certainty arguments.  All face difficulties due to scientific
  essentialism, but the latter two can be reformulated to avoid them.

Blumenfeld, J. 1975.  Kripke's refutation of materialism.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 53:151-6.
  Kripke's argument doesn't refute token identity.  Pains can have other
  essential properties besides painfulness, so psychophysical token identities
  can be necessary.

Boyd, R. 1980.  Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not
entail.  In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, vol 1.
Harvard University Press.
  Materialism doesn't need rigid identities, due to the compositional
  plasticity of mental states.  So the possibility of disembodiment is
  compatible with materialism.  The possibility of zombies is illusory.

Carney, J. & von Bretzel, P. 1973.  Modern materialism and essentialism.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51:78-81.
  A materialist must deny essentialism to meet Kripke's argument.

Carney, J. 1975.  Kripke and materialism.  Philosophical Studies 27:279-282.
  Comments on Feldman 1974: Feldman's view requires rejection of Kripke's views
  on necessity, or a problematic mixed view on rigid designators.

Cole, D.J. & Foelber, F. 1984.  Contingent materialism.  Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 65:74-85.
  Argues that materialism is only contingently true, as it's conceptually
  possible that we could become immaterial by gradual replacement.

Della Rocca, M. 1993.  Kripke's essentialist arguments against the identity
theory.  Philosophical Studies 69:101-112.
  Kripke's premise that pains are essentially mental either begs the question
  (by assuming pains don't have physical properties) or weakens the premise
  that physical events aren't essentially mental.

Double, R. 1976.  The inconclusiveness of Kripke's argument against the
identity theory.  Auslegung 3:156-65.

Feldman, F. 1973.  Kripke's argument against materialism.  Philosophical
Studies 24:416-19.
  Painfulness need not be an essential feature of pains.

Feldman, F. 1974.  Kripke on the identity theory.  Journal of Philosophy
71:665-76.
  Kripke's arguments against person-body and mind-brain identity rely on the
  essentialness of aliveness to persons and painfulness to pains.  There's no
  reason to grant this.  If we do, rigidity is irrelevant to the argument.

Feldman, F. 1980.  Identity, necessity, and events.  In (N. Block, ed)
_Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol. 1.  Harvard University Press.
  Defending a contingent event identity thesis against Kripke.  Mental
  properties (which are distinct from physical properties) may not be essential
  properties of an event.

Gjelsvik, O. 1988.  A Kripkean objection to Kripke's arguments against the
identity-theories.  Inquiry 30:435-50.
  Uses Kripke's 1979 direct-reference theory against him.  When rigid
  designators don't have associated reference-fixing descriptions, we can't
  expect the "explaining away" strategy to work.

Hill, C.S. 1981.  Why Cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity
thesis.  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42:254-65.
  The apparent contingency of identity is due to the fact that one can be aware
  of pain without being aware of C-fibers and vice versa, as well as to the
  fact that "C-fibers" may be picked out by a contingent description.

Holman, E. 1988.  Qualia, Kripkean arguments, and subjectivity.  Philosophy
Research Archives 13:411-29.
  Defending Kripkean arguments against various objections.  Analysis in terms
  of manifest properties and their role in fixing reference to the subjective
  and objective.

Jackson, F. 1980.  A note on physicalism and heat.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 58:26-34.
  A Kripkean argument against non-analytic physicalism.  Even if pain rigidly
  designates a brain state, the physicalist still has problems explaining the
  property of "pain-presents".

Jacquette, D. 1987.  Kripke and the mind-body problem.  Dialectica 41:293-300.
  Kripke's argument doesn't refute contingent identity between minds and
  nonrigidly designated bodies, which is all materialism needs.

Kirk, R. 1982.  Physicalism, identity, and strict implication.  Ratio
24:131-41.
  Materialism doesn't need a identity thesis.  The requirement that mental
  facts are entailed by physical facts plays the role played by Kripke's
  requirement of necessary identity, and is more reasonable.

Leplin, J. 1979.  Theoretical identification and the mind-body problem.
Philosophia 8:673-88.
  Some theoretical identification are analogous to mental-physical
  identifications -- entities are introduced by properties considered
  essential within a theory, but this doesn't preclude identification.

Levin, M. 1975.  Kripke's argument against the identity thesis.  Journal of
Philosophy 72:149-67.
  The reference of "pain" is fixed not by essential features but by contingent
  topic-neutral descriptions; this is the real moral of Wittgenstein's private
  language argument.  So Kripke's apparent contingency can be explained away?

Levin, M. 1995.  Tortuous dualism.  Journal of Philosophy 92:313-22.
  Reply to Bealer 1994.  Tries to clarify the dialactic, and argues that the
  materialist can explain "possibility" of straw thought as thought conjoined
  with mere appearance of straw.

Lycan, W.G. 1974.  Kripke and the materialists.  Journal of Philosophy
71:677-89.
  Kripke equivocates on "pain-sensation": pains aren't the same as impressions
  of pain.  Argues that imaginability arguments aren't decisive, and that
  functionalism may be less vulnerable than the identity theory.

Lycan, W.G. 1987.  Functionalism and essence.  In _Consciousness_.  MIT Press. 
  Painfulness needn't be essential to pains: pains are events, not objects,
  and events don't have essences; and the reference of "pain" is fixed by
  topic-neutral descriptions.  With remarks on pains vs. pain-sensations.

Maxwell, G. 1979.  Rigid designators and mind-brain identity.  Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9.
  "Brain state" reference is fixed by topic-neutral description; picks out pain
   but mightn't have, explaining the illusion of contingency.  "Nonphysicalist
   materialism" results, with mind the essence of matter.  An important paper.

McGinn, C. 1977.  Anomalous monism and Kripke's Cartesian intuitions.  Analysis
2:78-80.  Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of
Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980).
  Token identity theories aren't vulnerable to Kripke's argument: it may be
  essential to this pain that it is a C-fibre firing, although not to pain as a
  type.

McMullen, C. 1984.  An argument against the identity theory.  Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 65:277-87.
  We can explain away the apparent contingency of identity in terms of possible
  differences in *evidence* for the physical state.  With a discussion on
  identities between something perceived and something described. 

Merricks, T. 1994.  A new objection to a priori arguments for dualism.
American Philosophical Quarterly 31:81-85.
  Physicalism is compatible with the possibility of disembodiment: one can
  hold that mind and body are identical, that the body is physical, but that
  it is not essentially physical.

Mucciolo, L. 1975.  On Kripke's argument against the identity thesis.
Philosophia 5:499-506.
  "Pain" need not be a rigid designator, but instead may pick out a state by
  its causal role.  If it is a rigid designator, then the apparent contingency
  of identity comes from imagining something else filling the causal role.

Sher, G. 1977.  Kripke, Cartesian intuitions, and materialism.  Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 7:227-38.
  The reference of "C-fibre stimulation" might be fixed contingently, allowing
  the intuitive contingency of identity to be explained away.

Woodfield, A. 1978.  Identity theories and the argument from epistemic
counterparts.  Analysis 38:140-3.
  Contra McGinn 1977, the counterpart strategy fails as any pain that occurred
  here now would have been this pain.  A counterpart strategy on brain states
  may work.  With a reply by McGinn and a later rejoinder by Woodfield.  

--
Compiled by David Chalmers, Department of Philosophy, University of California,
Santa Cruz.  (c) 1996 David J. Chalmers.

Part 2: Mental Content [635]
======================

Contents
--------
2.1  The Status of Propositional Psychology [211]
2.1a    The Language of Thought (Fodor) [39]
2.1b    The Intentional Stance (Dennett) [34]
2.1c    Eliminativism (Churchlands, etc) [52]
2.1d    Propositional Attitudes, General [28]
2.1e    The Nature of Folk Psychology [25]
2.1f    The Simulation Theory [33]
2.2  Internalism and Externalism [200]
2.2a    Is Content in the Head? (Putnam, Burge) [33]
2.2b    Externalism and Psychological Explanation (Burge, Fodor) [35]
2.2c    Externalism and Mental Causation [25]
2.2d    Externalism and the Theory of Vision [11]
2.2e    Externalism and Computation [8]
2.2f    Externalism and Self-Knowledge [27]
2.2g    The Status of Narrow Content [39]
2.2h    Miscellaneous [22]
2.3  Causal Theories of Content [86]
2.3a    Information-Based Accounts (Dretske, etc) [24]
2.3b    Asymmetric Dependence (Fodor) [18]
2.3c    Causal Accounts, General [12]
2.3d    Teleological Approaches (Millikan, etc) [32]
2.4  Conceptual Role Semantics [14]
2.5  Representation, General [24]
2.6  The Explanatory Role of Content (Dretske, etc) [21]
2.7  Concepts [27]
2.8  Meaning Holism [16]
2.9  Mental Content, Misc [36]

2.1 The Status of Propositional Psychology [211]
------------------------------------------

2.1a The Language of Thought (Fodor) [39]
------------------------------------

Fodor, J.A. 1975.  _The Language of Thought_.  Harvard University Press.
  Argues that thought involves computation upon representations, and that these
  are structured as sentences in a mental language.  With linguistic and
  psychological evidence, and arguments that the mental language is innate.

Fodor, J.A. 1987.  Why there still has to be a language of thought.  In
_Psychosemantics_.  MIT Press.
  Because it fits explanatory methodology, it coheres with the usual
  ontology of psychological processes, and it explains systematicity.

Fodor, J.A. 1978.  Propositional attitudes.  Monist 61:501-23.  Reprinted in
_RePresentations_ (MIT Press, 1980).
  About what PA's are, and why they're at the foundations of thought.

Bonjour, L. 1991.  Is thought a symbolic process?  Synthese 89:331-52.
  Argues that symbol processing can't account for the intrinsically contentful
  nature of thought: using a symbol doesn't give understanding of its content.
  With defense against arguments from twin earth and conceptual-role semantics.

Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Fitzpatrick, J. 1990.  Explanation and the language of
thought.  Synthese 83:3-29.
  No need to postulate LOT: diachronic explanation is as good as synchronic,
  and high-level laws can exist without high-level causal connections.

Clark, A. 1988.  Thoughts, sentences and cognitive science.  Philosophical
Psychology 1:263-78.

Crane, T. 1990.  The language of thought: No syntax without semantics.  Mind
and Language 5:187-213.

Davies, M. 1992.  Aunty's own argument for the language of thought.  In (J.
Ezquerro & J. Larrazabal, eds) _Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy_.  Kluwer.

Dennett, D.C. 1977.  A cure for the common code.  Mind.  Reprinted in
_Brainstorms_ (MIT Press, 1978).
  Review of Fodor's LOT.  Fodor's view is too strong: function, not structure,
  is criterial for content.  The structure of a predictive theory need not be
  directly reflected in inner processing.

Dennett, D.C. 1975.  Brain writing and mind reading.  Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 7:403-15.  Reprinted in _Brainstorms_ (MIT Press, 1978).
  On the explicit representation of belief: criteria, plausibility, and
  relationship to verbal reports and conscious judgments.

DeWitt, R. 1995.  Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought.  Psyche 1.

Dunlop, G. 1990.  Conceptual dependency as the language of thought.  Synthese
82:275-96.
  Relates Schank's conceptual dependency to Fodor's LOT.

Egan, M.F. 1991.  Propositional attitudes and the language of thought.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21:379-88.
  Contra two of Fodor's arguments for LOT.  Complex causes need not have LOT
  constituency structure; and evidence from psychological theory falls short.

Field, H. 1978.  Mental representation.  Erkenntnis 13:9-18.  Reprinted in
(N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980).
  Analyzes belief into a relation between a person and an internal sentence,
  along with a semantic relation between that sentence and e.g. a proposition.
  With arguments against functionalist analyses, and against propositions.

Garson, J.W. 1994.  Syntax in a dynamic brain.  Manuscript.
  There are no good arguments for LOT of the form "The brain needs to do X, and
  X entails LOT".  Considers X = concatenation, logical form, tracking,
  combinatorial encoding.  Either LOT is weakened deeply or is unnecessary.

Gauker, C. 1995.  _Thinking Out Loud: An Essay on the Relation between Thought
and Language_.  Princeton University Press.

Harman, G. 1973.  _Thought_.  Princeton University Press.

Harman, G. 1975.  Language, thought, and communication.  Minnesota Studies in
the Philosophy of Science 7:270-298.
  Argues that the primary role of language is in thought rather than in
  communication, and the language of thought incorporates natural language.

Harman, G. 1977.  How to use propositions.  American Philosophical Quarterly.

Harman, G. 1978.  Is there mental representation?  Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 9.

Heil, J. 1981.  Does cognitive psychology rest on a mistake?  Mind 90:321-42.
  LOT confuses processes with descriptions of processes.  Also, symbols cannot
  denote solely in virtue of structure, so must rely on human interpretation.

Kaye, L.J. 1995.  The languages of thought.  Philosophy of Science 62:92-110.

Loar, B. 1982.  Must beliefs be sentences?  Philosophy of Science Association.

Lycan, W.G. 1982.  Toward a homuncular theory of believing.  Cognition and
Brain Theory 4:139-59.
  Defends sententialism of the homuncular variety: little modules all the
  way in.  Lots of pro-belief arguments.

Lycan, W.G. 1990.  Mental content in linguistic form.  Philosophical Studies
58:147-54.
  Distinguishes varieties of Sententialism, reasonable vs. mad-dog.

Lycan, W.G. 1993.  A deductive argument for the representational theory of
thinking.  Mind and Language 8:404-22.
  Argues from the unboundedness of thinking and the need for a finite stock of
  elements to something like a language of thought.  With remarks on
  connectionism and instrumentalism, and a reply by Stalnaker.

Matthews, R.J. 1989.  The alleged evidence for representationalism.  In
(S. Silvers, ed) _Rerepresentation_.  Kluwer.
  Argues that contrary to some claims, cognitive psychology does not provide
  much support for a computational/representational theory of propositional
  attitudes.  Specifically considers research in psycholinguistics and vision.

Matthews, R.J. 1991.  Is there vindication through representationalism?  In
(B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  Fodor's theory can't deal with inexplicit attitudes: the core/derivative
  distinction is untenable.  But we can make sense of intentional causation
  and psychological explanation without explicit representation.

Millikan, R. 1993.  On mentalese orthography.  In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett
and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  On some problems typing tokens in the language of thought.  There's no
  principled distinction between type-identical tokens and type-distinct tokens
  with an identity judgment.  With interesting remarks on co-identification.

Pessin, A. 1995.  Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places.
Philosophical Studies 78:33-53.
  Argues that there is no good way to individuate syntactic types in Mentalese.
  Neural typing, causal typing, and semantic typing all fail.

Rey, G. 1995.  A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thought.
Philosophical Perspectives 9:201-22.

Schiffer, S. 1991.  Does Mentalese have a compositional semantics?  In
(B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  Argues that the language of thought need not have a compositional semantics;
  productivity and systematicity can be explained without it.

Schiffer, S. 1994.  The language-of-thought relation and its implications.
Philosophical Studies 76:263-85.

Sher, G. 1975.  Sentences in the brain.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 36:94-99.
  On Danto's suggestion that beliefs are like sentences.  Conventionality poses
  problems, as does differentiating between different sorts of attitudes.

Stalnaker, R.C. 1990.  Mental content and linguistic form.  Philosophical
Studies 58:129-46.

Sterelny, K. 1983.  Mental representation: What language is Brainese?
Philosophical Studies, 43:365-82.
  Motivates LOT and defends it against various objections: e.g. tacit belief,
  identity conditions, infinite regress, and semantic nativism.

Stich, S.P. 1978.  Beliefs and subdoxastic states.  Philosophy of Science
45:499-518.

Tienson, J. 1990.  Is this any way to be a realist?  Philosophical Psychology.

Warmbrod, K. 1989.  Beliefs and sentences in the head.  Synthese 2:201-30.

2.1b The Intentional Stance (Dennett) [34]
-------------------------------------

Dennett, D.C. 1978.  _Brainstorms_.  MIT Press.

Dennett, D.C. 1971.  Intentional systems.  Journal of Philosophy 68:87-106
Reprinted in _Brainstorms_ (MIT Press, 1978).
  Can view systems from physical stance, design stance, or intentional stance.
  Beliefs/desires are attributed under the intentional stance, with help from
  certain idealized norms of rationality and accuracy licensed by evolution.

Dennett, D.C. 1981.  Making sense of ourselves.  Philosophical Topics 12:63-81.
Reprinted in _The Intentional Stance_ (MIT Press, 1987).
  Reply to Stich 1981.  Irrationality is misdesign (take design stance).  Etc.

Dennett, D.C. 1987.  _The Intentional Stance_.  MIT Press.
  Beliefs/desires are useful predictive attributions.  This isn't inconsistent
  with a certain degree of realism (abstracta/illata distinction).

Dennett, D.C. 1988.  Precis of _The Intentional Stance_.  Behavioral and Brain
Sciences.
  TIS, with commentaries and replies.

Dennett, D.C. 1990.  The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement) 50.
  Mental states are underdetermined: like interpreting a text, or finding an
  object's function.  Even adaptationist teleology gives no fact of the matter.

Dennett, D.C. 1991.  Real patterns.  Journal of Philosophy 88:27-51.
  Proposition attitudes have the ontological status of a noisy pattern that
  helps make sense of behavior.  This degree of realism falls on a scale: 
  Fodor > Davidson > Dennett > Rorty > Churchland.

Baker, L.R. 1987.  Instrumentalism: Back from the brink?  In _Saving Belief_.
Princeton University Press.
  Dennett vacillates between stance-dependence, -independence; e.g. on
  rationality, design features.  Instrumentalism can't be rescued.

Baker, L.R. 1989.  Instrumental intentionality.  Philosophy of Science
56:303-16.

Bechtel, W. 1985.  Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance.
Cognitive Science 9:265-92.
  Dennett should be a realist, of the relative-to-environment variety.

Cam, P. 1984.  Dennett on intelligent storage.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 45:247-62.

Clark, A. 1990.  Belief, opinion and consciousness.  Philosophical Psychology.
  Argues contra Dennett and Smolensky that language is fundamental, not just an
  add-on.

Cohen, B. 1995.  Patterns lost: Indeterminism and Dennett's realism about
beliefs.  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76:17-31.

Cummins, R. 1981.  What can be learned from _Brainstorms_?  Philosophical
Topics 12:83-92.
  Questioning Dennett on the bridge between intentional characterization
  and functional characterization.  Arguing for the importance of context.

Davies, D. 1995.  Dennett's stance on intentional realism.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy 33:299-312.

Fodor, J.A. 1981.  Three cheers for propositional attitudes.  In
_Representations_.  MIT Press.
  Dennett's rationality/intentional idealization assumptions should not be
  viewed as Platonic but epistemic.  PA's are real and play real roles.

Fodor, J.A. & LePore, E. 1993.  Is intentional ascription intrinsically
normative?  In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and His Critics_.  Blackwell.
  Against "interpretivism" about intentionality: projectivism is hopeless,
  and Dennett's arguments for normativism (via charity and evolution)
  go wrong or beg the question.

Foss, J. 1994.  On the evolution of intentionality as seen from the intentional
stance.  Inquiry 37:287-310.

Gauker, C. 1988.  Objective interpretationism.  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
69:136-51.

Haugeland, J. 1993.  Pattern and being.  In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and His
Critics_.  Blackwell.

Hornsby, J. 1992.  Physics, biology, and common-sense psychology.  In (D.
Charles & K. Lennon, eds) _Reduction, Explanation and Realism_.  Oxford
University Press.

Lyons, W. 1990.  Intentionality and modern philosophical psychology, I.  The
modern reduction of intentionality.  Philosophical Psychology 3:247-69.

Matthews, R.J. 1994.  The measure of mind.  Mind 103:131-46.
  A theory of propositional attitude ascription as like numerical measurement.

McLaughlin, B. & O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. 1995.  Dennett's logical behaviorism.
Philosophical Topics 22:189-258.

McCulloch, G. 1990.  Dennett's little grains of salt.  Philosophical Quarterly
40:1-12.
  Dennett must be one of: realist, eliminativist, instrumentalist.

Nelkin, N. 1993.  Patterns.  Mind and Language 9:56-87.
  Dennett's instrumentalism can't explain the acquisition of intentional
  concepts.  Proposition attitudes are directly introspectible entities,
  although still theoretical and still patterns.

Price, H. 1995.  Psychology in perspective.  In (M. Michael & J.
O'Leary-Hawthorne, eds) _Philosophy in Mind_.  Kluwer.

Richard, M. 1995.  What isn't a belief?  Philosophical Topics 22:291-318.

Richardson, R.C. 1980.  Intentional realism or intentional instrumentalism?
Cognition and Brain Theory 3:125-35.

Sharpe, R. 1989.  Dennett's journey towards panpsychism.  Inquiry 32:233-40.

Slors, M. 1996.  Why Dennett cannot explain what it is to adopt the
intentional stance.  Philosophical Quarterly 46:93-98.

Stich, S.P. 1980.  Headaches.  Philosophical Books 21:65-73.
  Critical review of _Brainstorms_, with response.

Stich, S.P. 1981.  Dennett on intentional systems.  Philosophical Topics
12:39-62.  Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990).
  Dennett has problems with rationality, realism, etc.  Hard line/soft line:
  either intentional stance is too close to FP or too far away.

Yu, P. & Fuller, G. 1986.  A critique of Dennett.  Synthese 66:453-76.
  Very thorough account of the evolution of Dennett's views.  Elucidates
  abstracta/illata, criticizes intentional subpersonal psychology.

2.1c Eliminativism (Churchlands) [52]
--------------------------------

Churchland, P.S. 1980.  Language, thought, and information processing.  Nous
14:147-70.
  Sentential processing is out.  Against Harman's mental English and Fodor's
  Mentalese.  Arguments from learning, evolution, neuroscience, mental images.

Churchland, P.M. 1981.  Eliminative materialism and the propositional
attitudes.  Journal of Philosophy 78:67-90.  Reprinted in _A Neurocomputational
Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989).
  Eliminate beliefs/desires, remnants of a stagnant folk theory.

Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. 1983.  Stalking the wild epistemic engine.
Nous 17:5-20.  Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell,
1990).
  How to dethrone language and still handle content.

Churchland, P.M. 1985.  On the speculative nature of our self-conception.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:157-173.
  Reply to Foss 1985: EM is plausible, though certainly not applicable
  everywhere -- e.g. sensations will be reduced, not eliminated.

Churchland, P.M. 1989.  _A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind
and the Structure of Science_.  MIT Press.
  14 glimpses of the neurophilosophical golden age.

Churchland, P.M. 1993.  Theory, taxonomy, and methodology: A reply to Haldane's
"Understanding folk".  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
67:313-19.
  Reply to Haldane 1988.  Even observations can be reconceived.  With remarks
  perceptual plasticity and propositions, and a rejoinder by Haldane.

Churchland, P.M. 1993.  Evaluating our self-conception.  Mind and Language
8:211-22.
  It's "bad faith" to accept modern epistemology but to deny the possibility of
  eliminativism.  On various objections: "functional kinds", "self-defeating",
  "what could falsify it?", "different purposes", "no alternatives".

Baker, L.R. 1987.  The threat of cognitive suicide.  In _Saving Belief_.
Princeton University Press.
  Elaborating the paradoxes of disbelieving in belief.  Rational acceptability,
  assertion, and truth are all at risk.

Baker, L.R. 1988.  Cognitive suicide.  In (R. Grimm & D. Merrill, eds)
_Contents of Thought_.  University of Arizona Press.
  Eliminativism is pragmatically incoherent, as it implies that language isn't
  meaningful and that the thesis isn't formulable.  Folk psychology needn't be
  scientifically reduced to be true.  With comments by Chastain, and reply. 

Bertolet, R. 1994.  Saving eliminativism.  Philosophical Psychology 7:87-100.
  Against Baker's cognitive-suicide arguments against eliminativism.  We don't
  know what a replacement theory will look like, but that doesn't show that
  none is forthcoming.

Bickle, J. 1992.  Revisionary physicalism.  Biology and Philosophy 7:411-30.
  Argues for a revisionary reduction of the propositional attitudes, rather
  than elimination or smooth reduction.  Sentential aspects will go, but
  coarse-grained functional profiles and content will remain.

Blunt, P.K. 1992.  A defense of folk psychology.  International Philosophical
Quarterly 32:487-98.

Boghossian, P. 1990.  The status of content.  Philosophical Review 99:157-84.
  Irrealism about mental content (and therefore truth-conditions) can't be
  made sense of.  An error thesis presupposes factual truth-conditions, and
  a non-factualist thesis presupposes a non-deflationary theory of truth.

Boghossian, P. 1991.  The status of content revisited.  Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 71:264-78.
  Reply to Devitt 1990.

Clark, A. 1996.  Dealing in futures: Folk psychology and the role of
representations in cognitive science.  In (R. McCauley, ed) _The Churchlands
and their Critics_.  Blackwell.

Cling, A. 1989.  Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency.
Philosophical Studies 56:53-75.
  Unbelief in belief is not incoherent.  Argues with Baker.

Cling, A. 1990.  Disappearance and knowledge.  Philosophy of Science 57:226-47.

Cling, A. 1991.  The empirical virtues of belief.  Philosophical Psychology
4:303-23.
  Cognitive states like belief are necessary to explain the dependence of
  behavior on perceptual features of the environment.  Informational states
  alone are not enough, as they can't explain selective response to features.

Devitt, M. 1990.  Transcendentalism about content.  Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 71:247-63.
  Against Boghossian's critique: the eliminativism will express her claim in a
  new framework, so appeals to truth beg the question.  With a response.

Devitt, M. & Rey, G. 1991.  Transcending transcendentalism.  Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 72:87-100.
  Rejoinder to Boghossian 1990.

Foss, J.E. 1985.  A materialist's misgivings about eliminative materialism.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:105-33.
  EM needs much more evidence before being so gung ho.

Graham, G. & Horgan, T. 1992.  Southern fundamentalism and the end of
philosophy.  In (E. Villanueva, ed) _Truth and Rationality_.  Ridgeview.

Greenwood, J.D. 1991.  Reasons to believe.  In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future
of Folk Psychology_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Argues that folk psychological states exist, even if they aren't useful as
  causal explanation.  We have independent reason to believe in them, e.g.
  from self-knowledge.  They're useful in social psychology, too.

Greenwood, J.D. 1992.  Against eliminative materialism: from folk psychology to
Volkerpsychologie.  Philosophical Psychology 5:349-68.

Haldane, J. 1988.  Understanding folk.  Aristotelian Society Supplement
62:222-46.
  Argues that folk psychology is not a theory, and that psychological knowledge
  is a pre-theoretical given.  With remarks on laws, the prediction of
  behavior, and neuroscience.

Hannan, B. 1990.  `Non-scientific realism' about propositional attitudes as a
response to eliminativist arguments.  Behavior and Philosophy 21-31.

Hannan, B. 1993.  Don't stop believing: the case against eliminative
materialism.  Mind and Language 8:165-179.
  A bundle of arguments against eliminativism, e.g. from incoherence, the lack
  of alternatives, and against the folk-theory-theory.  With commentary.

Horgan, T. & Woodward, J. 1985.  Folk psychology is here to stay.
Philosophical Review 94:197-225.  Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and
Cognition (Blackwell, 1990).
  Defending folk psychology against the arguments of Churchland and Stich: e.g.
  incompleteness, stagnation, irreducibility, dual-control, modularity, and
  unfalsifiability.  Even with no neat reduction, folk psychology may be OK.

Horgan, T. & Graham, G. 1990.  In defense of Southern Fundamentalism.
Philosophical Studies 62:107-134.
  FP is almost certainly true, irrespective of scientific absorbability or the
  language of thought.  FP's commitments are austere, and mostly behavioral.
  Arguments from semantic competence and conceptual conservatism.

Horgan, T. 1993.  The austere ideology of folk psychology.  Mind and Language.
  Argues that FP is not committed to much.  The austere conception is supported
  by intuitions, conservatism, and the inconceivability of dropping it.
  Responds to phlogiston objections: they are not analogous.

Horst, S. 1995.  Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief'.  Synthese
104:123-45.
  Clarifies different senses of "theoretical" and "belief".  Some beliefs are
  relevantly theoretical (dispositional, infra-conscious, unconscious
  ones), but conscious occurrent beliefs are not, and so can't be eliminated.

Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1990.  In defense of folk psychology.  Philosophical
Studies 59:31-54.
  FP holds that beliefs/desires play a certain functional role, and it's almost
  certain that objects playing that role exist, so FP is fine, whether or not
  propositional attitudes are good scientific entities.

Jacoby, H. 1985.  Eliminativism, meaning and qualitative states.  Philosophical
Studies.
  Even if nothing satisfies all or most common-sense properties of mental
  terms, reference can still be fixed under a Putnam style theory of meaning.
  (More about qualia than about intentional states.)

Kitcher, P.S. 1984.  In defense of intentional psychology.  Journal of
Philosophy 81:89-106.
  The Churchlands underestimate the resources of intentional psychology.

Lahav, R. 1992.  The amazing predictive power of folk psychology.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 70:99-105.

O'Brien, G. 1987.  Eliminative materialism and our psychological
self-knowledge.  Philosophical Studies 52:49-70.
  Uses empirical evidence to argue that there is prelinguistic awareness, so
  nominalistic arguments for eliminativism fail.  And some awareness is innate,
  so we can't reconceive things in less than evolutionary time.

Ramsey, W. 1990.  Where does the self-refutation objection take us?  Inquiry
33:453-65.
  The self-refutation objection reduces to other standard objections:
  counterexample, promissory note or reductio.

Ramsey, W., Stich, S.P. & Garon, J. 1991.  Connectionism, eliminativism, and
the future of folk psychology.  In (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds)
_Philosophy and Connectionist Theory_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.
  If connectionism is true, then eliminativism is true, as you can't isolate
  the causal role of individual beliefs in a connectionist system.

Reppert, V. 1991.  Ramsey on eliminativism and self-refutation.  Inquiry
34:499-508.
  Response to Ramsey 1990: If there are no beliefs and so no assertions, there
  is no identifiable propositional content, and truth and knowledge are out.
  Eliminativism is pragmatically self-refuting.

Reppert, V. 1992.  Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the
question.  Metaphilosophy 23:378-92.
  A careful analysis of whether self-refutation arguments against eliminativism
  beg the question by supposing that assertion requires belief.  An account of
  what it is to beg the question, and a comparison to arguments about vitalism.

Resnick, P. 1994.  Intentionality is phlogiston.  In (E. Dietrich, ed)
_Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons_.  Academic Press.

Robinson, W.S. 1985.  Toward eliminating Churchland's eliminationism.
Philosophical Topics 13:60-67.
  There's no reason to abandon FP, even if it doesn't reduce.

Rosenberg, A. 1991.  How is eliminative materialism possible?  In (R. Bogdan,
ed) _Mind and Common Sense_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Explaining how singular causal claims based on FP may be true even if FP is
  false; by analogy with phlogiston, and also because of near-vacuousness.  EM
  isn't incoherent, as we can use a non-intentional replacement for belief.

Saidel, E. 1992.  What price neurophilosophy?  Philosophy of Science
Association 1:461-68.
  Folk psychology is compatible with neuroscientific models, but it need not
  smoothly reduce to neuroscience to have an important role.

Schwartz, J. 1991.  Reduction, elimination, and the mental.  Philosophy of
Science 58:203-20.

Stich, S.P. 1991.  Do true believers exist?  Aristotelian Society Supplement
65:229-44.
 Eliminativism may have no determinate truth-conditions, as if folk psychology
 is a poor theory, the question of whether or not "belief" refers may be empty.

Stich, S.P. 1992.  What is a theory of mental representation?  Mind 101:243-61.
  Philosophical analysis isn't sufficient to understand intentional concepts;
  real cognitive science is required, with conceptual revision.  The truth of
  eliminativism will be relative to the theory of reference that we choose.

Stich, S.P. 1996.  Deconstructing the mind.  In _Deconstructing the Mind_.
Oxford University Press, 1996.

Taylor, K.A. 1994.  How not to refute eliminative materialism.  Philosophical
Psychology 7:101-125.
  Against transcendental arguments against eliminativism.  These fail on their
  own terms, and even if successful they would not establish causal/explanatory
  relevance for the attitudes, which is the real key for folk psychology.

Tomberlin, J. 1994.  Whither Southern Fundamentalism?  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Truth and Rationality_,  Ridgeview.

Trout, J.D. 1991.  Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under
theoretical stress.  Synthese 87:379-400.

Wright, C. 1996.  Can there be a rationally compelling argument for
anti-realism about ordinary ("folk") psychology?  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Content_.  Ridgeview.

2.1d Propositional Attitudes, General [28]
-------------------------------------

Audi, R. 1994.  Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe.  Nous
28:419-34.

Baker, L.R. 1987.  _Saving Belief_.  Princeton University Press.
  Beliefs are OK, despite no physicalist reduction of content.

Baker, L.R. 1993.  What beliefs are not.  In (S. Wagner & R. Warner, eds)
_Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal_.  University of Notre Dame Press.
  Against beliefs construed as physically realized internal causes of behavior:
  syntax of these states can't be determinate, and their explanatory role wrt
  causation leads to a circle.  Belief is irreducible.

Baker, L.R. 1994.  Attitudes as nonentities.  Philosophical Studies 76:175-203.

Bennett, J. 1991.  Analysis without noise.  In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Mind and Common
Sense_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Remarks on the conceptual analysis of belief/desire attribution.  On the
  roles of causation, inner-route explanations, belief-desire-action triangles,
  teleology, unity, the presumption of simplicity, and evolution.

Bennett, J. 1991.  Folk-psychological explanations.  In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The
Future of Folk Psychology_.  Cambridge University Press.
  On requirements for belief/desire explanations: input/output patterns, the
  unity condition (i.e. no single associated mechanism), and teleological bases
  for generalizations, e.g. through evolution or educability.

Butler, K. 1992.  The physiology of desire.  Journal of Mind and Behavior
13:69-88.
  Argues that desire will smoothly reduce to a neurophysiological kind.

Clark, A. 1991.  Radical ascent.  Aristotelian Society Supplement 65:211-27.
  The conditions on being a believer are mostly behavioral; to claim otherwise
  is to fall into a "modularity trap".  A counterfactual account of mental
  causation is enough.  With a defense of mentality for giant look-up tables.

Clark, A. 1994.  Beliefs and desires incorporated.  Journal of Philosophy
91:404-25.

Crimmins, M. 1992.  Tacitness and virtual beliefs.  Mind and Language 7:240-63.

Egan, M.F. 1989.  What's wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind.  Philosophy
of Science 56:664-74.
  Stich is confused about type-token, syntax/content, etc.

Fodor, J.A. 1986.  Fodor's guide to mental representation: The intelligent
auntie's vade-mecum.  Mind 94:76-100.  Reprinted in _A Theory of Content and
Other Essays_ (MIT Press, 1990).
  A taxonomy of positions on the representation of propositional attitudes:
  dividing up via questions about realism, functionalism, monadicity, and
  truth-conditions.  With arguments for structured representations.

Garfield, J. 1988.  _Belief in Psychology: A Study in the Ontology of Mind_.
MIT Press.

Graham, G. & Horgan, T. 1988.  How to be realistic about folk psychology.
Philosophical Psychology 1.

Jacquette, D. 1990.  Intentionality and Stich's theory of brain sentence
syntax.  Philosophical Quarterly, 40:169-82.
  Things are only syntactic (in SS's sense) in virtue of intentionality. True.

Lycan, W.G. 1986.  Tacit belief.  In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Belief: Form, Content,
and Function_.  Oxford University Press.

Maloney, J.C. 1990.  It's hard to believe.  Mind and Language 5:122-48.

Manfredi, P.A. 1993.  Tacit beliefs and other doxastic attitudes.  Philosophia.
  Argues that there are no tacit beliefs: dispositions to believe can do all
  the explanatory work at lower cost.  With some remarks on subdoxastic states,
  and the difference between belief and opinion.

Millikan, R.G. 1986.  Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content.
Philosophical Review 95:47-80.
  Folk psychology isn't a theory about laws, but about proper functions.
  desires are identified by proper functions; beliefs by Normal explanations.

Peacocke, C. 1983.  Between instrumentalism and brain-writing.  In _Sense and
Content_.  Oxford University Press.
  Instrumentalism about belief can't be right, because of Martian marionettes,
  but the language of thought is too strong a requirement.  A state's
  structured content may reside in its pattern of relations to other states.

Possin, K. 1986.  The case against Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind.
Philosophical Studies 49:405-18.
  Stich is wrong, circular, and representational anyway.

Pratt, I. 1993.  Analysis and the attitudes.  In (S. Wagner & R. Warner, eds)
_Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal_.  University of Notre Dame Press.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1987.  What's in a mind?  Synthese 70:97-122.
  Must individuate mental states by semantics, not just by function.

Robinson, W.S. 1990.  States and beliefs.  Mind 99:33-51.

Schwartz, J. 1992.  Propositional attitude psychology as an ideal type.  Topoi
11:5-26.

Smith, D.M. 1994.  Toward a perspicuous characterization of intentional states.
Philosophical Studies 74:103-20.

Stich, S.P. 1983.  _From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science_.  MIT Press.
  Beliefs/desires are out, new Syntactic Theory is in.

Stich, S.P. 1984.  Relativism, rationality, and the limits of intentional
ascription.  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

2.1e The Nature of Folk Psychology [25]
----------------------------------

Blackburn, S. 1992.  Theory, observation, and drama.  Mind and Language 7:187.

Bogdan, R.G. (ed) 1991.  _Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on
Commonsense Psychology_.  Cambridge University Press.

Botterill, G. 1996.  Folk psychology and theoretical status.  In (P. Carruthers
& P. Smith, eds) _Theories of Theories of Mind_.  Cambridge University Press.

Churchland, P.M. 1988.  Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:209-21.  Reprinted in _A
Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989).
  Folk psychology is a theory: defense against objections from logicality,
  softness of laws, practical function, behavior, and simulation.  It needn't
  be a deductive-nomological theory; e.g. it might be based on prototypes.

Clark, A. 1987.  From folk psychology to naive psychology.  Cognitive Science
11:139-54.
  Hey, folk psychology isn't all *that* bad.  It survived evolution after all.

Dennett, D.C. 1991.  Two contrasts: Folk craft vs folk science and belief vs
opinion.  In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_.  Cambridge
University Press.
  FP is craft, not theory.  Opinions rather than beliefs are interesting.

Fletcher, G.J.O. 1995.  Two uses of folk psychology: Implications for
Psychological Science.  Philosophical Psychology 8:375-88.

Goldman, A. 1992.  The psychology of folk psychology.  Behavioral and Brain
Sciences.
  On the psychology of self-ascription of mental states.  Functionalism has
  serious problems, as we don't have direct access to causal roles.  Defends a
  qualia-based account, even for propositional attitudes. 

Gopnik, A. 1990.  Developing the idea of intentionality: Children's theories
of mind.  Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20:89-114.
  On the development of folk-psychological concepts in children.  First the
  appearance/reality distinction, then more complex theories of perception,
  representation, and belief.  Implications for the status of folk psychology.

Gopnik, A. & Wellman, H. 1992.  Why the child's theory of mind really is a
theory.  Mind and Language 7:145-71.
  
Graham, G. 1987.  The origins of folk psychology.  Inquiry 30:357-79.

Greenwood, J.D. (ed) 1991.  _The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and
Cognitive Science_.  Cambridge University Press.

Margolis, J. 1991.  The autonomy of folk psychology.  In (J. Greenwood, ed)
_The Future of Folk Psychology_.  Cambridge University Press.

McDonough, R. 1991.  A culturalist account of folk psychology.  In
(J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_.  Cambridge University
Press.

Morton, A. 1980.  _Frames of Mind_.  Oxford University Press.

Morton, A. 1991.  The inevitability of folk psychology.  In (R. Bogdan, ed)
_Mind and Common Sense_.  Cambridge University Press.

Morton, A. 1996.  Folk psychology is not a predictive device.  Mind 105:119-37.

Pickering, M. & Chater, N. 1995.  Why cognitive science is not formalized folk
psychology.  Minds and Machines 5.

Preston, J.M. 1989.  Folk psychology as theory or practice?  The case for
eliminative materialism.  Inquiry 32:277-303.
  Defending the claim that folk psychology is an empirical pre-scientific
  theory, with its own laws.  In a particular, a detailed reply to the
  criticisms in Wilkes 1984.

Robinson, W.S. 1996.  Mild realism, causation, and folk psychology.
Philosophical Psychology 8:167-87.

Sharpe, R. 1987.  The very idea of a folk psychology.  Inquiry 30:381-93.

Stich, S.P., & Ravenscroft, R. 1994.  What is folk psychology?  Cognition
50:447-68.  Reprinted in (Stich) _Deconstructing the Mind_.  Oxford University
Press, 1996.
  Distinguishes internal and external accounts of folk psychology (mechanisms
  vs systematizations), and various versions of each of these.  Only some are
  compatible with eliminativist arguments.

Wilkes, K.V. 1984.  Pragmatics in science and theory in common sense.  Inquiry
27:339-61.

Wilkes, K.V. 1991.  The relationship between scientific psychology and
common-sense psychology.  Synthese 89:15-39.
  Common-sense psychology is no theory at all, and not in competition with
  scientific psychology.  CSP is particular, rich, vague; SP is general,
  austere, precise.  CSP will be neither subsumed nor eliminated by SP.

Wilkes, K.V. 1991.  The long past and the short history.  In (R. Bogdan, ed)
_Mind and Common Sense_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Argues that commonsense and scientific psychology are quite distinct in
  their aims, scope, framework, and nature, but have been confused by
  philosophy.  With support from historical considerations.

2.1f The Simulation Theory [33]
--------------------------

Carruthers, P. 1996.  Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of the
theory-theory.  In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) _Theories of Theories of
Mind_.  Cambridge University Press.

Carruthers, P. & Smith, P. 1996.  _Theories of Theories of Mind_.  Cambridge
University Press.

Currie, G. 1995.  Visual imagery as the simulation of vision.  Mind and
Language 10:25-44.

Currie, G. 1996.  Simulation-theory, theory-theory, and the evidence from
autism.  In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) _Theories of Theories of Mind_.
Cambridge University Press.

Davies, M. 1992.  The mental simulation debate.  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Truth and Rationality_.  Ridgeview.

Davies, M. & Stone, T. (eds) 1995.  _Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind
Debate_.  Blackwell.

Davies, M. & Stone, T. (eds) 1995.  _Mental Simulation: Evaluations and
Applications_.  Blackwell.

Freeman, N.H. 1995.  Theories of mind in collision: Plausibility and authority.
In (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) _Mental Simulation_.  Blackwell.

Fuller, G. 1995.  Simulation and psychological concepts.  In (M. Davies & T.
Stone, eds) _Mental Simulation_.  Blackwell.

Goldman, A. 1989.  Interpretation psychologized.  Mind and Language 4:161-85.
Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) _Folk Psychology_.  Blackwell.

Goldman, A. 1992.  In defense of the simulation theory.  Mind and Language
7:104-119.  Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) _Folk Psychology_.
Blackwell.

Goldman, A. 1996.  Simulation and interpersonal utility.  In (L. May,
M. Friedman, & A. Clark, eds) _Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive
Science_.  MIT Press.

Gopnik, A. & Wellman, H.M. 1995.  Why the child's theory of mind really is a
theory.  Mind and Language.  Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) _Folk
Psychology_.  Blackwell.

Gordon, R.M. 1986.  Folk psychology as simulation.  Mind and Language 1:158-71.
Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) _Folk Psychology_.  Blackwell.
  FP is a strategy for prediction via simulation; an ability, not a theory.

Gordon, R.M. 1992.  The simulation theory: objections and misconceptions.  Mind
and Language 7:11-34.  Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) _Folk
Psychology_.  Blackwell.

Gordon, R.M., & Barker, J.A. 1994.  Autism and the "theory of mind" debate.  In
(G. Graham & G.L. Stephens, eds) _Philosophical Psychopathology_.  MIT Press.

Gordon, R.M. 1995.  Simulation without introspection or inference from me to
you.  In (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) _Mental Simulation_.  Blackwell.

Gordon, R.M. 1996.  Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator.  In
(L. May, M. Friedman, & A. Clark, eds) _Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and
Cognitive Science_.  MIT Press.

Gordon, R.M. 1996.  `Radical' simulationism.  In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith,
eds) _Theories of Theories of Mind_.  Cambridge University Press.

Heal, J. 1986.  Replication and functionalism.  In (J. Butterfield, ed)
_Language, Mind, and Logic_.  Cambridge University Press.  Reprinted in
(M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) _Folk Psychology_.  Blackwell.

Heal, J. 1994.  Simulation vs. theory-theory: What is at issue?  In (C.
Peacocke, ed) _Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness_.
Oxford University Press.

Heal, J. 1995.  How to think about thinking.  In (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds)
_Mental Simulation_.  Blackwell.

Heal, J. 1996.  Simulation and cognitive penetrability.  Mind and Language
11:44-67.

Heal, J. 1996.  Simulation, theory, and content.    In (P. Carruthers &
P. Smith, eds) _Theories of Theories of Mind_.  Cambridge University Press.

Kuhberger, A, Perner, J., Schulte, M., & Leingruber, R. 1995.  Choice or no
choice: Is the Langer effect evidence against simulation?  Mind and Language
10:423-36.

Leslie, A.M. & German, T.P. 1995.  Knowledge and ability in "theory of mind":
A one-eyed overview of a debate.  In (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) _Mental
Simulation_.  Blackwell.

Nichols, S., Stich, S., & Leslie, A. 1995.  Choice effects and the
ineffectiveness of simulation.  Mind and Language 10:437-45.

Nichols, S., Stich, S., Leslie, A., Klein, D. 1996.  Varieties of off-line
simulation.  In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) _Theories of Theories of Mind_.
Cambridge University Press.

Perner, J. 1994.  The necessity and impossibility of simulation.  In (C.
Peacocke, ed) _Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness_.
Oxford University Press.

Perner, J. 1996.  Simulation as explicitation of predication-implicit knowledge
about the mind: Arguments for a simulation-theory mix.  In (P. Carruthers &
P. Smith, eds) _Theories of Theories of Mind_.  Cambridge University Press.

Stich, S.P., and Nichols, S. 1993.  Folk psychology: simulation or tacit
theory?  Mind and Language 7:35-71.  Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds)
_Folk Psychology_.  Blackwell.

Stich, S.P., & Nichols, S. 1995.  Second thoughts on simulation.  In (M.
Davies & T. Stone, eds) _Mental Simulation_.  Blackwell.

Stone, T. & Davies, M. 1996.  The mental simulation debate: A progress report.
In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) _Theories of Theories of Mind_.  Cambridge
University Press.

2.2 Internalism and Externalism [199] (see also 1.5d)
-------------------------------

2.2a Is Content in the head? (Putnam, Burge) [33]
--------------------------------------------

Antony, M. 1993.  Social relations and the individuation of thought.  Mind
102:247-61.

Bilgrami, A. 1987.  An externalist account of psychological content.
Philosophical Topics 15:191-226.
  Developing an externalist account consistent with psychological explanation.
  Contra Burge, social links aren't constitutive of content.  Causal links
  are indirectly constitutive of content, via our conceptions.

Burge, T. 1979.  Individualism and the mental.  Midwest Studies in Philosophy
4:73-122.
  Belief contents are not fully determined by internal state, as the linguistic
  community plays an important role: arthritis, brisket, contract, sofa, etc.
  So mental states are not individuated individualistically.

Burge, T. 1982.  Other bodies.  In (A. Woodfield, ed) _Thought and Object_.
Oxford University Press.
  On Putnam's Twin Earth.  Natural kind terms are not indexical.  Even de dicto
  attitudes are not in the head; they presuppose the existence of other things.

Burge, T. 1986.  Intellectual norms and foundations of mind.  Journal of
Philosophy 83:697-720.
  On non-individualist elements due to by intellectual norms in the community,
  to which meanings are answerable.  Even meaning-giving truths can be doubted.
  With remarks on sofas/safos, and on linguistic meaning vs. cognitive value.

Butler. K. 1993.  Individualism, computationalism, and folk psychology.
Manuscript.
  Challenges Burge's interpretations of the thought-experiments: e.g. twins
  have the same concept, neither of which is the public concept of arthritis.
  With remarks on computationalism and Marr's theory.

Campbell, J. 1982.  Extension and psychic state: Twin Earth revisited.
Philosophical Studies 42:67-89.
  Argues that natural kind terms are token-reflexive, with reference ultimately
  fixed to the underlying explanatory properties of the surface qualities of
  local matter.

Crane, T. 1991.  All the difference in the world.  Philosophical Quarterly
41:1-25.
  Twins share the same concepts.  Contra Putnam: essentialism is fallacious;
  contra Burge: speakers share beliefs, but one has false belief about meaning.

Cummins, R. 1991.  Methodological reflections on belief.  In (R. Bogdan, ed)
_Mind and Common Sense_.  Cambridge University Press.
  We shouldn't rely on intuitions about thought-experiments; we need an
  empirical theory about belief.  Belief contents are distinct from sentence
  contents; we have to distinguish linguistic from psychological semantics.

Devitt, M. 1990.  Meanings just ain't in the head.  In (G. Boolos, ed) _Meaning
and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Against Searle's theory of internal intentionality.  Searle's theory
  requires magic to grasp external contents internally.

Dretske, F. 1993.  The nature of thought.  Philosophical Studies 70:185-99.
  Argues that thought is extrinsic, but it is not essentially social.  A
  system without a linguistic community could have thoughts, if it had an
  appropriate learning history.

Elugardo, R. 1993.  Burge on content.  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
53:367-84.
  Contra Burge on sofas: oblique that-clauses can't identify the (wide) way
  that the subject thinks of sofas, which is idiosyncratic and inexpressible.

Forbes, G. 1987.  A dichotomy sustained.  Philosophical Studies 51:187-211.
  Gives a Fregean account of belief semantics to handle the Burge cases, and
  argues that the *type* of a proposition may be internal even if the token
  itself is not.  With remarks on the relevance to Grice's program.

Horowitz, A. 1995.  Putnam, Searle, and externalism.  Philosophical Studies
81:27-69.
  Argues for a moderate externalism by synthesizing Putnam and Searle:
  internal intension leaves extension indeterminate, but it specifies the
  facts relevant to filling in the indeterminacy.

Koethe, J. 1992.  And they ain't outside the head either.  Synthese 90:27-53.

Ludwig, K. 1993.  Externalism, naturalism, and method.  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Naturalism and Normativity_.  Ridgeview.

Ludwig, K. 1996.  Duplicating thoughts.  Mind and Language 11:92-102.

Mandelkar, S. 1991.  An argument against the externalist account of
psychological content.  Philosophical Psychology 4:375-82.
  Argues that conscious experience is required for intentional states, and that
  any external relations could be satisfied without this experience, so
  external relations cannot suffice for intentional content.

McCulloch, G. 1992.  The spirit of twin earth.  Analysis 52:168-174.
  Various arguments against Crane 1991 on externalism.

McDowell, J. 1977.  On the sense and reference of a proper name.  Mind.

McKinsey, M. 1991.  The internal basis of meaning.  Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 72:143-69.
  Argues that meaning is determined by a certain kind of internal state,
  involving de se cognitive attitudes.  These states aren't shared by twins,
  but are still narrow in a strong sense.

McKinsey, M. 1993.  Curing folk psychology of arthritis.  Philosophical
Studies 70:323-36.

McKinsey, M. 1994.  Individuating beliefs.  Philosophical Perspectives
8:303-30.

Owens, J. 1983.  Functionalism and the propositional attitudes.  Nous
17:529-49.
  Functional organization doesn't determine attitude content, even if we
  include inputs and outputs.

Perry, J. 1979.  The problem of the essential indexical.  Nous 13:3-21.
  Indexicals are essential to some beliefs, so belief cannot just be a
  relation to a proposition.  Belief contents must be at least in part
  construed relative to a subject.  Separate belief object and belief state.

Putnam, H. 1975.  The meaning of `meaning'.  Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.  Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_
(Cambridge University Press, 1975).
  What is in the head doesn't determine the reference of our thoughts: my twin
  on Twin Earth refers to XYZ where I refer to H2O.  Content is determined by
  environment and linguistic community as well as by internal stereotypes.

Putnam, H. 1987.  Meaning, other people, and the world.  In _Representation and
Reality_.  MIT Press.
  Meanings *still* aren't in the head.

Searle, J.R. 1983.  _Intentionality_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Sure, meanings *are* in the head -- e.g. the content of a given visual
  experience is "the thing that is causing this experience".

Sosa, E. 1991.  Between internalism and externalism.  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Consciousness_.  Ridgeview.

Sosa, E. 1993.  Abilities, concepts, and externalism.  In (J. Heil & A. Mele,
eds) _Mental Causation_.  Oxford University Press.
  On concepts as abilities, and on construals of abilities that lead to
  internalism and externalism.  Maybe the relevant abilities are characterized
  externally but determined internally.  Remarks on Putnam, Davidson, Burge.

Stalnaker, R. 1993.  Twin earth revisited.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 63:297-311.
  Making sense of twin earth intuitions with an information-theoretic account
  of content: information depends on relations in normal conditions, which are
  extrinsic.  With remarks on the context-sensitivity of content-attribution.

Woodfield, A. 1982.  Thought and the social community.  Inquiry 25:435-50.
  Burge's arguments show only that context-ascription is pragmatically
  sensitive to context, depending on the epistemic predicament of the ascriber.
  Content itself is still internal.

Zemach, E.M. 1976.  Putnam's theory on the reference of substance terms.
Journal of Philosophy 73:116-27.
  Argues that the extension of `water' is the same on earth and twin earth,
  using arguments from isotopes and scientific development.  Molar properties
  determine classification.  Remarks on historicism and the division of labor.

2.2b Externalism and Psychological Explanation (Burge, Fodor) [35]
-------------------------------------------------------------

Burge, T. 1982.  Two thought experiments reviewed.  Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic 23:284-94.
  Reply to Fodor 1982, clarification of position.

Burge, T. 1986.  Individualism and psychology.  Philosophical Review 95:3-45.
  Psychology should be and is done non-individualistically, i.e. with reference
  to environment.  Examples from vision, e.g. Marr.

Clark, A. & Chalmers, D.J. 1995.  The extended mind.  Manuscript.
  Advocates a different sort of "active externalism", based on the role of the
  environment in actively driving cognition.  Beliefs can extend into an
  agent's immediate environment (e.g. a notebook) in this way.

Dretske, F. 1992.  What isn't wrong with folk psychology.  Metaphilosophy
23:1-13.
  Argues that extrinsic properties can play a respectable role in scientific
  explanation; e.g. the histories of plants, animals, and devices are relevant
  in explaining their current behavior.

Egan, F. 1991.  Must psychology be individualistic?  Philosophical Review
100:179-203.
  Maybe, maybe not.  Contra Fodor: science can be non-individualistic.
  Contra Burge re oblique ascriptions and Marr.

Fodor, J.A. 1980.  Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive
psychology.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:63-109.  Reprinted in
_RePresentations_ (MIT Press, 1980).
  Should do psychology without reference to the external world. What counts for
  psychology is in the head; who cares about truth, reference, and the rest?

Fodor, J.A. 1982.  Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem.  Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic 23:98-118.
  Twin Earth isn't a problem for cognitive science.  Intents of utterances, de
  re/de dicto, etc. Truth conditions aren't in the head, but that's no problem.

Gauker, C. 1987.  Mind and chance.  Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17:533-52.

Globus, G. 1984.  Can methodological solipsism be confined to psychology?
Cognition and Brain Theory 7:233-46.
  Methodological solipsism implies epistemological solipsism.

Jacob, P. 1993.  Externalism and the explanatory relevance of broad content.
Mind and Language 8:131.

Kitcher, P.S. 1984.  Narrow taxonomy and wide functionalism.  Philosophy of
Science 52:78-97.
  Argues against Stich, Fodor, Block: use different taxonomies (narrow/wide)
  for different purposes.  Both are OK, functionalism *and* content survive.

Kobes, B. 1989.  Semantics and psychological prototypes.  Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 70:1-18.
  Relates the individualism debate to Roschian prototype research.

Losonsky, M. 1995.  Emdedded systems vs. individualism.  Minds and Machines 5.

Macdonald, C. 1992.  Weak externalism and psychological reduction.  In (D
Charles & K. Lennon, eds) _Reduction, Explanation and Realism_.  Oxford
University Press.

Marras, A. 1985.  The Churchlands on methodological solipsism and computational
psychology.  Philosophy of Science 52:295-309.
  MS doesn't rule out all use of content, just of wide content.  Narrow is OK.
  Stuff on folk psychology and computation. Good in places, confused in others.

Maloney, J.C. 1985.  Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research
strategy in cognitive psychology.  Philosophy of Science 52:451-69.
  Various problems for computational psychology handling content.  It shares
  the problems of a naturalistic psychology.  Confused.

McClamrock, R. 1991.  Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive
principle of scientific inquiry.  Philosophical Psychology 4:343-54.

McClamrock, R. 1995.  _Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the
World_.  University of Chicago Press.

Noonan, H.W. 1984.  Methodological solipsism: A reply to Morris.  Philosophical
Studies 48:285-290.

Noonan, H.W. 1986.  Russellian thoughts and methodological solipsism.  In (J.
Butterfield, ed) _Language, Mind, and Logic_.  Cambridge University Press.

Noonan, H.W. 1990.  Object-dependent thoughts and psychological redundancy.
Analysis 51:1-9.

Noonan, H.W. 1993.  Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity
but deep contingency?  In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_.  Oxford
University Press.
  Object-dependent thoughts are redundant in psychological explanation, as an
  explanation applying to a hallucinator will work as well.  But this needn't
  defeat externalism in general.  With remarks on self-knowledge.
  
Patterson, S. 1990.  The explanatory role of belief ascriptions.  Philosophical
Studies 59:313-32.
  Uses examples to argue that in explaining behavior we often ascribe beliefs
  in an individualistic way, even in cases where individual and community use
  diverge.  These contents are at least sometimes expressible.

Patterson, S. 1991.  Individualism and semantic development.  Philosophy of
Science 58:15-35.
  Developmental psychologists attribute concepts individualistically.

Peacocke, C. 1993.  Externalist explanation.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 67: 203-30.
  Externalist states are required for the explanation of relational properties.
  Counters objections from conceptual connections and dormitive-virtue worries,
  and applies to teleology, self-knowledge, etc.

Petrie, B. 1990.  Nonautonomous psychology.  Southern Journal of Philosophy
28:539-59.
  Argues that behavior is often individuated widely for explanatory purposes,
  so that wide content is relevant, and that there is more to causation than
  local causation, so Stich's autonomy principle fails.

Pettit, P. 1986.  Broad-minded explanation and psychology.  In (P. Pettit &
J. McDowell, eds) _Subject, Thought and Context_.  Oxford University Press.

Rowlands, M. 1995.  Against methodological solipsism: The ecological Approach.
Philosophical Psychology 8:5-24.

Segal, G. 1989.  The return of the individual.  Mind 98:39-57.

Sterelny, K. 1990.  Animals and individualism.  In (P. Hanson, ed)
_Information, Language and Cognition_.  University of British Columbia Press.

Stich, S.P. 1978.  Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis.  Monist
61:573-91.  Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990).
  Beliefs are not in the head, so aren't good for psychological explanation.
  Interesting, but confuses the role of truth-values with truth-conditions.

Tuomela, R. 1989.  Methodological solipsism and explanation in psychology.
Philosophy of Science 56:23-47.

Wallace, J. & Mason, H.E. 1990.  On some thought experiments about mind and
meaning.  In (C. Anderson & J. Owens, eds) _Propositional Attitudes_.  CSLI.

Wilson, R.A. 1994.  Causal depth, theoretical appropriateness, and
individualism in psychology.  Philosophy of Science 61:55-75.

Wilson, R.A. 1995.  _Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and
the Sciences of the Mind_.  Cambridge University Press.

2.2c Externalism and Mental Causation [25]
-------------------------------------

Adams, F. 1993.  Fodor's modal argument.  Philosophical Psychology 6:41-56.

Allen, C. 1995.  It isn't what you think: A new idea about intentional
causation.  Nous 29:115-26.

Baker, L.R. 1994.  Content and context.  Philosophical Perspectives 8:17-32.
  Argues contra Fodor that broad contents can be explanatory -- if they can't,
  no relational properties can.  Fodor's "no-conceptual-connection" and
  "cross-context" tests for causal powers fail to do the job.

Braun, D. 1991.  Content, causation, and cognitive science.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 69:375-89.
  Arguments for the causal significance of broad content.  Physical twins can
  differ in causal powers; broad content figures in (ceteris paribus) causal
  generalizations; can make twin arguments against narrow content too.  Hmm.

Burge, T. 1989.  Individuation and causation in psychology.  Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 707:303-22.
  Contra Fodor: psychological processes can play differing causal roles,
  despite being physically identical.

Burge, T. 1995.  Intentional properties and causation.  In (C. Macdonald & G.
Macdonald, eds) _Philosophy of Psychology: Debates about Psychological
Explanation_.  Blackwell.
  Reply to Fodor 1991.

Butler, K. 1996.  Content, causal powers, and context.  Philosophy of Science
63:105-14.

Christensen, D. 1992.  Causal powers and conceptual connections.  Analysis
52:163-8.
  Fodor's modal argument for narrow content rests on a false analogy between
  cases concerning thoughts and those concerning planets.

Fodor, J.A. 1991.  A modal argument for narrow content.  Journal of Philosophy
88:5-26.
  On when a difference in effects amounts to a difference in causal powers:
  when the effects are connected contingently, not conceptually, to the causes.
  Differences in wide content don't satisfy this, so aren't causal powers.

Garcia-Carpintero, M. 1994.  The supervenience of mental content.  Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society 68:117-135.
  Mental content can be extrinsic and efficacious.  Narrow content strategies
  don't work, as observation concepts are still extrinsic.  One can't screen
  of the intrinsic part from the rest.  Thought-experiments are inconclusive.

Heil, J. & Mele, A. 1991.  Mental causes.  American Philosophical Quarterly
28:61-71.
  Reconciling Twin Earth with the causal relevance of content.  Historical
  factors can be causally relevant.

Jacob, P. 1992.  Externalism and mental causation.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 66:203-19.
  Argues that externalist content is not causally efficacious, but is
  relevant to causal explanations of behavior indirectly, via the cognitive
  activities of others external to the system.

Klein, M. 1996.  Externalism, content, and causation.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 96:159-76.

Ludwig, K. 1993.  Causal relevance and thought content.  Philosophical
Quarterly 44:334-53.

McGinn, C. 1991.  Conceptual causation.  Mind 100:525-46.

Montgomery, R. 1995.  Non-Cartesian explanations meet the problem of mental
causation.  Southern Journal of Philosophy 33:221-41.

Owens, J. 1993.  Content, causation, and psychophysical supervenience.
Philosophy of Science 60:242-61.

Russow, L.M. 1993.  Fodor, Adams, and causal properties.  Philosophical
Psychology 6:57-61.

Saidel, E. 1994.  Content and causal powers.  Philosophy of Science 61:658-65.

Segal, G. & Sober, E. 1991.  The causal efficacy of content.  Philosophical
Studies 63:1-30.

Seymour, D. 1993.  Some of the difference in the world: Crane on intentional
causation.  Philosophical Quarterly 43:83-89.

Sturgeon, S. 1994.  Good reasoning and cognitive architecture.  Mind and
Language 9:88-101.
  Epistemology requires the causal relevance of content, and the relevant
  content is narrow.  On how various architectures might support this causal
  relevance, by being realized by more specific intrinsic features.

van Gulick, R. 1989.  Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't
work.  In (S. Silvers, ed) _ReRepresentation_.  Kluwer.
  Against some arguments for internalism: local causation doesn't imply local
  type-individuation, as distal relations affect distal causes and effects; and
  processes can have access to semantic properties via formal properties.

Wilson, R.A. 1992.  Individualism, causal powers, and explanation.
Philosophical Studies 68:103-39.
  Science frequently appeals to relational and historical taxonomies, so either
  causal powers can be non-intrinsic or science needn't taxonomize by causal
  powers.  With remarks on causal properties and conceptual connections.

Wilson, R.A. 1993.  Against a priori arguments for individualism.  Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 74:60-79.
  Arguments from causal powers beg the question, either on whether relational
  properties can have causal powers or on whether science taxonomizes by
  causal powers, as relational properties are common in scientific explanation.

2.2d Externalism and the Theory of Vision [11]
-----------------------------------------

Burge, T. 1986.  Individualism and psychology.  Philosophical Review 95:3-45.
  Psychology should be and is done non-individualistically, i.e. with reference
  to environment.  Examples from vision, e.g. Marr.

Davies, M. 1991.  Individualism and perceptual content.  Mind 100:461-84.

Egan, F. 1992.  Individualism, computation, and perceptual content.  Mind
101:443-59.

Egan, F. 1996.  Intentionality and the theory of vision.  In (K. Akins, ed)
_Perception_.  Oxford University Press.

Francescotti, R.M. 1991.  Externalism and the Marr theory of vision.  British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42:227-38.

Kitcher, P.S. 1988.  Marr's computational theory of vision.  Philosophy of
Science 55:1-24.

Morton, P. 1993.  Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory.
Philosophy of Science 60:86-99. 

Patterson, S. 1996.  Success-orientation and individualism in the theory of
vision.  In (K. Akins, ed) _Perception_.  Oxford University Press.

Segal, G. 1989.  Seeing what is not there.  Philosophical Review 97:189-214.
  Contra Burge, Marr's theory is individualistic.  Intentional contents therein
  are neutral between twins' environments; nothing grounds a more specific
  attribution.

Segal, G. 1991.  Defence of a reasonable individualism.  Mind 100:485-94.

Shapiro, L.A. 1993.  Content, kinds, and individualism in Marr's theory of
vision.  Philosophical Review 102:489-513.
  Contra Segal, Marr's theory is non-individualistic even though it may
  classify twins together.  Computational-level task descriptions rather than
  behavior guide content ascription, so the environment plays a crucial role.

2.2e Externalism and Computation [8]
--------------------------------

Andler, D. 1995.  Can we knock off the shackles of syntax?  In (E. Villanueva,
ed) _Content_.  Ridgeview.

Egan, F. 1995.  Computation and content.  Philosophical Review 104:181-203.

Kazez, J.R. 1994.  Computationalism and the causal role of content.
Philosophical Studies 75:231-60.

Kobes, B. 1990.  Individualism and artificial intelligence.  Philosophical
Perspectives 4:429-56.
  Winograd's SHRDLU doesn't support individualism: its concepts are anchored
  (to a fictional world) via its programmer, and it could have made errors.

Miscevic, N. 1996.  Computation, content, and cause.  Philosophical Studies
82:241-63.

Peacocke, C. 1995.  Content, computation, and externalism.  In (E. Villanueva,
ed) _Content_.  Ridgeview.

Seager, W.E. 1992.  Thought and syntax.  Philosophy of Science Association
1992, 1:481-91.
  Syntax is extrinsically determined, as well as semantics.  So if broad
  content is irrelevant to psychology, syntax is too.

Wilson, R.A. 1994.  Wide computationalism.  Mind 103:351-72.

2.2f Externalism and Self-Knowledge [27]
-----------------------------------

Bernecker, S. 1996.  Davidson on first-person authority and externalism.
Inquiry 39:121-39.

Bernecker, S. 1996.  Externalism and the attitudinal component of
self-knowledge.  Nous 30:262-75.

Bilgrami, A. 1992.  Can externalism be reconciled with self-knowledge?
Philosophical Topics 20:233-68.

Boghossian, P. 1989.  Content and self-knowledge.  Philosophical Topics
17:5-26.
  We can't know our thought-contents by inference (circular), by introspection
  (because they're relational), or directly, so we can't know them at all.

Boghossian, P. 1994.  The transparency of mental content.  Philosophical
Perspectives 8:33-50.

Brueckner, A. 1990.  Scepticism about knowledge of content.  Mind 99:447-51.

Brueckner, A. 1992.  What an anti-individualist knows a priori.  Analysis
52:111-18.
  Contra McKinsey 1991, anti-individualism doesn't lead to a priori knowledge.
  The belief that water is wet doesn't conceptually entail facts about the
  external world (e.g. H2O), although it may metaphysically necessitate them.

Brueckner, A. 1993.  Skepticism and externalism.  Philosophia 22:169-71.

Brueckner, A. 1994.  Knowledge of content and knowledge of the world.
Philosophical Review:103-327-43.

Burge, T. 1988.  Individualism and self-knowledge.  Journal of Philosophy
85:649-63.
  Knowledge of our thoughts is compatible with externalism: its content is
  self-referential and self-verifying.  We needn't be able to explicate the
  content or its enabling conditions, or rule out twin possibilities.

Davidson, D. 1987.  Knowing one's own mind.  Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association.

Ebbs, G. 1996.  Can we take our words at face value?  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 56:499-530.

Falvey, K. & Owens, J. 1994.  Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism.
Philosophical Review 103:107-37.

Gallois, A. 1994.  Deflationary self-knowledge.  In (M. Michael & J.
O'Leary-Hawthorne, eds) _Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the
Study of Mind_.  Kluwer.

Gallois, A. & O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. 1996.  Externalism and skepticism.
Philosophical Studies 81:1-26.
  Externalist anti-skeptical arguments fail as they require us to know a priori
  that our terms designate natural kinds, and also because they require us to
  know a priori that externalism is true.  A thorough analysis.

Georgalis, N. 1990.  No access for the externalist: Discussion of Heil's
"Privileged Access".  Mind 100:101-8.

Glock, H.J. & Preston, J.M. 1995.  Externalism and first-person authority.
Monist 78:515-33.

Heil, J. 1988.  Privileged access.  Mind 98:238-51.

LePore, E. 1990.  Subjectivism and environmentalism.  Inquiry 33:197-214.
  Subjectivism and environmentalism seem to clash on knowledge of content, but
  it's OK: under environmentalism we still know our contents w/o evidence.

Ludlow, P. 1995.  Externalism, self-knowledge, and the prevalence of
slow-switching.  Analysis 55:45-49.
  Argues that cases of switching between language communities are quite
  common, so that Warfield's case for externalist self-knowledge doesn't work.

Ludlow, P. 1995.  Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory.  Analysis
55:157-59.

Macdonald, C. 1995.  Externalism and first-person authority.  Synthese
104:99-122.
  On reconciling externalism with the non-evidential character of first-person
  knowledge.

McKinsey, M. 1987.  Apriorism in the philosophy of language.  Philosophical
Studies 52:1-32.
  Argues that we can know the meaning of our words a priori.  Analyzes twin
  earth cases by separating propositional meaning from linguistic meaning,
  which is indexical, fixes reference, and is knowable a priori.

McKinsey, M. 1991.  Anti-individualism and privileged access.  Analysis
51:9-16.
  Contra Burge: if there are conceptual connections between wide contents and
  and the external world, then we can't know wide contents a priori, as
  otherwise we could know a priori that the world exists.

McKinsey, M. 1994.  Accepting the consequences of anti-individualism.  Analysis
54:124-8.
  Reply to Brueckner 1992:  The claim that belief metaphysically necessitate
  external facts is trivial.  Almost all states do that, for Kripkean reason.

Warfield, T.A. 1992.  Privileged self-knowledge and externalism are compatible.
Analysis 52:232-37.
  Boghossian's argument that externalism threatens self-knowledge fails: twin
  cases needn't be relevant alternatives (unless they are actual), so they
  don't threaten knowledge of content, by the usual standards of knowledge.

Warfield, T.A. 1995.  Knowing the world and knowing our minds.  Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research.
  Argues that externalism and self-knowledge imply the falsity of skepticism
  (though externalism alone does not).  And arguments against externalist
  self-knowledge are no better than standard skeptical arguments.

2.2g The Status of Narrow Content [39]
---------------------------------

Adams, F., Drebushenko, D., Fuller, G. & Stecker, R. 1990.  Narrow content:
Fodor's folly.  Mind and Language 5:213-29.
  Traces and criticizes Fodor's position on narrow content. Argues that narrow
  content isn't content, and doesn't explain behavior.  Fun but arguable.

Adams, F. & Fuller, G. 1992.  Names, contents, and causes.  Mind and Language
7:205-21.
  Argues that problems with names don't require an appeal to narrow content in
  explanation.  Broad content plus associated descriptions will do the job.

Antony, L. 1989.  Semantic anorexia: On the notion of content in cognitive
science.  In (G. Boolos, ed) _Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary
Putnam_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Representational cognitive science has no need for narrow content -- wide
  contents and formal properties can do all the work.  Argues that the
  semantics of mental expressions needn't mirror the semantics of language.

Baker, L.R. 1985.  A farewell to functionalism.  Philosophical Studies 48:1-14.
  Argues that type-identical functional states can differ in narrow content, so
  methodological solipsism fails.  Uses the example of identical programs for
  playing chess and arms negotiations.

Baker, L.R. 1985.  Just what do we have in mind?  Midwest Studies in Philosophy
10:25-48.
  Some implausible twin cases trying to show that mental life can vary wildly
  while preserving physical/computational state.  Bizarre.

Baker, L.R. 1986.  Content by courtesy.  Journal of Philosophy 84:197-213.

Baker, L.R. 1987.  _Saving Belief_.  Princeton University Press.
  Lots of arguments against narrow content.  Very stimulating, though wrong.

Biro, J.I. 1992.  In defense of social content.  Philosophical Studies
67:277-93.
  Contra Loar 1988, the contents of "that"-clauses often reflects psychological
  content, even if it sometimes does not.  We don't need narrow content.

Block, N. 1991.  What narrow content is not.  In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds)
_Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  There are big problems specifying the "mapping" and the relevant contexts for
  Fodor's theory noncircularly.  Narrow content either collapses into syntax or
  is too coarse-grained.  Nontrivial narrow content must be holistic.

Block, N. 1995.  Ruritania revisited.  In (E. Villanueva, ed) _Content_.
Ridgeview.

Brown, C. 1993.  Belief states and narrow content.  Mind and Language 8:343-67.
  Criticizes the "bracketing" strategy of Stich and Walker, and argues that
  intrinsic belief state should be individuated according to how it embeds
  in different environments.  With a comparison with Fodor's related theory.

Chalmers, D.J. 1994.  The components of content.  Manuscript.
  Argues for a two-dimensional intensional theory, with different kinds of
  intensions constituting notional and relational content.  Notional content
  governs the dynamics of thought and behavior, and is primary in explanation.

Davies, M. 1986.  Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:263-83.
  Comments on Fodor 1987.  Fodor doesn't make a conclusive case against
  externalism; but narrow content may be promising, and inexpressibility
  doesn't pose any real problems.  With comparisons to neo-Fregean theories.

Dennett, D.C. 1983.  Beyond belief.  In (A. Woodfield, ed) _Thought and
Object_.  Oxford University Press.  Reprinted in _The Intentional Stance_ (MIT
Press, 1987).
  What matters are not propositional attitudes but notional attitudes; but
  it's hard to calibrate notional worlds.  Very nice.

Devitt, M. 1990.  The narrow representational theory of mind.  In (W. Lycan,
ed) _Mind and Cognition_.  Blackwell.
  Not syntactic psychology nor wide psychology, but narrow psychology.

Field, H. 1989.  "Narrow" aspects of intentionality and the
information-theoretic approach to content.  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
 _Information, Semantics, and Epistemology_.  Blackwell.

Fodor, J.A. 1987.  Individualism and supervenience.  In _Psychosemantics_.  MIT
Press.
  Science taxonomizes by causal powers, which are locally supervenient, so
  psychology needs a narrow notion of content.  Proposes that a relativized
  notion -- a function from context to extension -- can do the job.  Nice.

Jackson, F., and Pettit, P. 1993.  Some content is narrow.  In (J. Heil and
A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_.  Oxford University Press.
  Argues that folk psychology needs a notion of narrow content to provide
  robust predictive behavioral generalizations that covers doppelgangers.
  If not, then some behavioral patterns would be flukey.

LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1986.  Solipsistic semantics.  Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 10:595-614.
  There's no good way to construe narrow content.  Phenomenologist strategy
  is intrinsically wide, and indexicalist strategy can't specify content.

LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1989.  Dual aspect semantics.  In (S. Silvers, ed)
_ReRepresentation_.  Kluwer.

Loar, B. 1987.  Social content and psychological content.  In (R. Grimm &
D. Merrill, eds) _Contents of Thought_.  University of Arizona Press.
  Uses examples to argue that psychological content is not fixed by the content
  of "that"-clauses in belief ascription, and vice versa.  We require a subtler
  kind of narrow content to capture what's going on.

Loar, B. 1987.  Subjective intentionality.  Philosophical Topics 15:89-124.

Maloney, J.C. 1991.  Saving psychological solipsism.  Philosophical Studies
61:267-83.
  Contests the "provoked/aggravated assault" example of Baker 1986.  If they're
  doppelgangers, then their narrow content can't differ.

Manfredi, P. 1993.  Two routes to narrow content: both dead ends.
Philosophical Psychology 6:3-22.

McDermott, M. 1986.  Narrow content.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy
64:277-88.
  Narrow beliefs are de re beliefs about our inputs and outputs.

Putnam, H. 1987.  Fodor and Block on narrow content.  In _Representation and
Reality_.  MIT Press.
  Against perceptual-prototype and conceptual-role accounts of narrow content.

Quillen, K. 1986.  Propositional attitudes and psychological explanation.  Mind
and Language 1:133-57.
  Can't get a `mode of presentation' account of narrow content to work, either
  through description theory or prototypes. Psych should be non-individualist.

Recanati, F. 1990.  Externalism and narrow content.  Nous.
  There are levels of narrowness, varying by whether independence is of actual
  or normal environment.  Argues that this can be consistent with externalism.

Recanati, F. 1994.  How narrow is narrow content?  Dialectica 48:209-29.

Schiffer, S. 1989.  Fodor's character.  In (E. Villanueva, ed) _Information,
Semantics, and Epistemology_.  Blackwell.

Silverberg, A. 1995.  Narrow content: A defense.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy 33:109-27.

Stalnaker, R.C. 1990.  Narrow content.  In (C.A. Anderson & J. Owens, eds)
_Propositional Attitudes_.  CSLI.
  On some problems with narrow content, contra Loar 1987.  Narrow content is
  hard to spell out with "diagonal" propositions.  Loar doesn't show that
  psychological content is narrow.  With some remarks on privileged access.

Stich, S.P. 1991.  Narrow content meets fat syntax. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey,
eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  Argues that narrow content is still too coarse-grained for explanation,
  classifying psychologically distinct states together.  Use syntax instead.

Taylor, K. 1989.  Supervenience and levels of meaning.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy 27:443-58.
  Argues that the partial character construal of narrow content is not
  interestingly semantic.  It collapses into syntax or phenomenology.

Taylor, K. 1989.  Narrow content functionalism and the mind-body problem.  Nous
23:355-72.
  Uses a "fraternal twin earth" thought experiment to show that even de dicto
  attributions don't supervene on narrow role, and that narrow content can't be
  explicated descriptively unless it collapses into phenomenalism.

Vaughan, R. 1989.  Searle's narrow content.  Ratio 2:185-90.

White, S. 1982.  Partial character and the language of thought.  Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 63:347-65.
  Replies to Burge/Stich arguments by introducing partial character -- a
  function from context to content, analogous to Kaplan's character -- as the
  semantic property determined by functional state and relevant to explanation.

White, S. 1992.  Narrow content and narrow interpretation.  In _The Unity of
the Self_.  MIT Press.
  Argues for an account of narrow content in terms of notional worlds, by
  considering "objective optimality" across worlds.  This allows for a sort
  of narrow radical interpretation.  With arguments against Stalnaker.

Williams, M. 1990.  Social norms and narrow content.  Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 15:425-462.
  Narrow content theories can't handle the normativity of content.  In-depth
  treatment of Burge cases and of the failures of causal and conceptual-role
  accounts.  Normativity is fundamentally social.  A long, interesting paper.

2.2h Miscellaneous [22]
------------------

Brown, D.J. 1993.  Swampman of La Mancha.  Canadian Journal of Philosophy
23:327-48.
  An entertaining fable about a swampthing doppelganger of a murder witness.
  Does he have content?  With plot twists about personal identity.
 
Buekens, F. 1994.  Externalism, content, and causal histories.  Dialectica
48:267-86.

de Vries, W.A. 1996.  Experience and the swamp creature.  Philosophical
Studies 82:55-80.
  Argues that a swampthing isn't intelligent or intentional, with different
  physiological processes and no sensations, as these are functional kinds.

Edwards, S. 1994.  _Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind_.  Avebury.

Engel, P. 1987.  Functionalism, belief, and content.  In (Torrance, ed) _The
Mind and the Machine_.  Horwood.

Gauker, C. 1991.  Mental content and the division of epistemic labour.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69:302-18.

Gibbons, J. 1993.  Identity without supervenience.  Philosophical Studies
70:59-79.

Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1988.  Functionalism and broad content.  Mind
97:318-400.
  Should construe functionalism broadly rather than narrowly; then can handle
  the problem of broad content.

Katz, J. 1990.  The domino theory.  Philosophical Studies 58:3-39.
  Anti-intensional arguments are not independent but a series of dominos.
  Quine/Quine/Davidson/Putnam/Burge rise and fall together.

Macdonald, C. 1990.  Weak externalism and mind-body identity.  Mind 99:387-404.

McCulloch, G. 1995.  _The Mind and its World_.  Routledge.

McGinn, C. 1982.  The structure of content.  In (A. Woodfield, ed) _Thought and
Object_.  Oxford University Press.
  Belief content has two distinct elements, one causal-explanatory, the other
  truth-related.

Owens, J. 1987.  In defense of a different Doppelganger.  Philosophical Review
96:521-54.

Owens, J. 1992.  Psychophysical supervenience: Its epistemological foundation.
Synthese 90:89-117.

Pereboom, D. 1995.  Conceptual structure and the individuation of content.
Philosophical Perspectives 9:401-428.

Rey, G. 1992.  Semantic externalism and conceptual competence.  Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society 66:315-33.
  Supplements externalist "locking" theories of content with an account of
  internal "conceptions" by which thoughts lock onto environmental kinds, with
  that aid of dthat operators, thus solving various philosophical problems.

Rowlands, M. 1995.  Externalism and token-token identity.  Philosophia
24:359-75.

Seager, W.E. 1992.  Externalism and token identity.  Philosophical Quarterly
42:439-48.

Stalnaker, R.C. 1989.  On what's in the head.  Philosophical Perspectives
3:287-319.

Walker, V. 1990.  In defense of a different taxonomy: A reply to Owens.
Philosophical Review 99.
  Contra Owens 1987: wide intentional descriptions and molar bodily
  descriptions don't exhaust the options.  A bracketing strategy gives a narrow
  intentional taxonomy of mental states.
  
Williams, M. 1990.  Externalism and the philosophy of mind.  Philosophical
Quarterly 40:352-80.

Woodfield, A. 1986.  Two categories of content.  Mind and Language 1:319-54.


2.3 Causal Theories of Content [86]
------------------------------

2.3a Information-Based Accounts (Dretske, etc) [24]
----------------------------------------------

Barwise, J. & Perry, J. 1983.  _Situations and Attitudes_.  MIT Press.

Barwise, J. 1986.  Information and circumstance.  Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic.
  Defending information against Fodor 1986.  Information is objective but
  relational, and depends on the relevant constraints between representation
  and environment.  Circumstances play a vital role.

Barwise, J. 1987.  Unburdening the language of thought.  Mind and Language.

Bogdan, R.J. 1988.  Information and semantic cognition: An ontological account.
Mind and Language.
  From material (formal) info to semantic info via teleology; from semantic
  information to representation via internal structure.  Cute.  With a good
  reply by Israel, and a terse reply by Dretske.

Bogdan, R.J. 1987.  Mind, content and information.  Synthese.

Clark, A. 1993.  Mice, shrews, and misrepresentation.  Journal of Philosophy
90:290-310.
  Uses information theory to analyze misrepresentation.  A signal represents
  what it carries most information about, not what it correlates best with.
  Treating some signals as noise can increase information content.

Dretske, F. 1981.  _Knowledge and the Flow of Information_.  MIT Press.
  Defines knowledge content is in terms of information-flow from events, and
  applies to various aspects of psychology.

Dretske, F. 1983.  Precis of _Knowledge and the Flow of Information_.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6:55-90.
  A summary of the book, with commentary and replies.

Dretske, F. 1990.  Putting information to work.  In (P. Hanson, ed)
_Information, Language and Cognition_.  University of British Columbia Press.
  On the causal role of information  (as opposed to meaning).  Information is
  causally efficacious if considered with respect to learning.  With
  commentary by Brian Smith.

Fodor, J.A. 1986.  Information and association.  Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic 27.
  Transmission of information is no good without the encoding of information.
  With criticisms of associative networks, which transmit without encoding,
  and criticism of Barwise & Perry's account of attunement to a relation.

Fodor, J.A. 1987.  A situated grandmother.  Mind and Language.

Foley, R. 1987.  Dretske's `information-theoretic' account of knowledge.
Synthese.

Gjelsvik, O. 1991.  Dretske on knowledge and content.  Synthese 86:425-41.

Grandy, R. 1987.  Information-based epistemology, ecological epistemology
and epistemology naturalized.  Synthese 70:191-203.
  Shannon's notion of information is more useful for naturalized epistemology
  than Dretske's.

Hardcastle, V.G. 1994.  Indicator semantics and Dretske's function.
Philosophical Psychology 7:367-82.

Heller, M. 1991.  Indication and what might have been.  Analysis 51:187-91.
  We need to analyze indication in terms of "close enough" worlds; the
  relevant conditionals are "might"-conditionals.

Israel, D. & Perry, J. 1990.  What is information?  In (P. Hanson, ed)
_Information, Language and Cognition_.  University of British Columbia Press.

Jackendoff, R. 1985.  Information is in the mind of the beholder.  Linguistics
and Philosophy 8:23-33.
  Argues that a representationalist theory of semantics beats a realist one.

Loewer, B. 1987.  From information to intentionality.  Synthese.

Morris, W.E. 1990.  The regularity theory of information.  Synthese 82:375-398.
  Dretske has problems with ruling out alternative possibilities; and there is
  a gap between information-caused belief and knowledge.

Savitt, S. 1987.  Absolute informational content.  Synthese 70:185-90.
  Makes a distinction between absolute information and information that's
  relative to other knowledge.

Sayre, K. 1987.  Cognitive science and the problem of semantic content.
Synthese 70:247-69.
  On problems with a computational approach to content: computers process
  info(t), the non-semantic content of communication theory, not info(s), or
  semantic content.  Get info(s) from efficient processing of mutual info(t).

Taylor, K. 1987.  Belief, information and semantic content: A naturalist's
lament.  Synthese 71:97-124.

Winograd, T. 1987.  Cognition, attunement and modularity.  Mind and Language.

Zalabardo, J.L. 1995.  A problem for information-theoretic semantics.  Synthese
105:1-29.

2.3b Asymmetric Dependence (Fodor) [18]
----------------------------------

Fodor, J.A. 1987.  Meaning and the world order.  In _Psychosemantics_.  MIT
Press.
  Defends and refines a causal theory, using the notion of asymmetric
  dependence of a token upon the world.

Fodor, J.A. 1990.  A theory of content II.  In _A Theory of Content_.  MIT
Press.
  Defending the asymmetric dependence theory against various objections.

Adams, F. & Aizawa, K. 1992.  `X' means X: Semantics Fodor-style.  Minds and
Machines 2:175-83.

Adams, F. & Aizawa, K. 1993.  Fodorian semantics, pathologies, and Block's
problem.  Minds and Machines 3:97-104.

Adams, F. & Aizawa, K.  `X' means X: Fodor/Warfield semantics.  Minds and
Machines 4:215-31.

Antony, L. & Levine, J. 1991.  The nomic and the robust.  In (B. Loewer &
G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.

Baker, L.R. 1990.  On a causal theory of content.  Philosophical Perspectives.

Baker, L.R. 1991.  Has content been naturalized?  In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds)
_Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.

Bernier, P. 1993.  Narrow content, context of thought, and asymmetric
dependence.  Mind and Language 8:327-42.

Boghossian, P. 1991.  Naturalizing content.  In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds)
_Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  Argues that Fodor's theory is a type-1 theory, requiring naturalistically
  specifiable circumstances in which a symbol is only caused by its referent;
  and that these theories fail for various reasons, e.g. verificationism.

Cram, H-R. 1992.  Fodor's causal theory of representation.  Philosophical
Quarterly 42:56-70.
  Fodor's theory has counterexamples and can't explain its counterfactuals; but
  we can save it by borrowing from Dretske's account of misrepresentation.

Gibson, M. 1996.  Asymmetric dependencies, ideal conditions, and meaning.
Philosophical Psychology 9:235-59.

Loar, B. 1991.  Can we explain intentionality?  In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds)
_Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.

Maloney, J.C. 1990.  Mental misrepresentation.  Philosophy of Science
57:445-58.

Manfredi, P.A. & Summerfield, D.M. 1992.  Robustness without asymmetry: A flaw
in Fodor's theory of content.  Philosophical Studies 66:261-83.

Seager, W.E. 1993.  Fodor's theory of content: problems and objections.
Phiosophy of Science 60:262-77.

Wallis, C. 1995.  Asymmetric dependence, representation, and cognitive science.
Southern Journal of Philosophy 33:373-401.

Warfield, T.A. 1994.  Fodorian semantics: A reply to Adams and Aizawa.  Minds
and Machines 4:205-14.

2.3c Causal Accounts, General [12]
-----------------------------

Aizawa, K. 1994.  Lloyd's dialectical theory of representation.  Mind and
Language 9:1-24.

Cummins, R. 1989.  Representation and covariation.  In (S. Silvers, ed)
_ReRepresentation_.  Kluwer.

Fodor, J.A. 1984.  Semantics, Wisconsin style.  Synthese 59:231-50.  Reprinted
in _RePresentations_ (MIT Press, 1980).
  A somewhat sympathetic commentary on the Dretske/Stampe causal theories,
  but raising the problem of misrepresentation.

Fodor, J.A. 1990.  Information and representation.  In (P. Hanson, ed)
_Information, Language and Cognition_.  University of British Columbia Press.

Godfrey-Smith, P. 1989.  Misinformation.  Canadian Journal of Philosophy
19:533-50.
  On various attempts to solve the error problem and why they don't work.

Godfrey-Smith, P. 1991.  Signal, decision, action.  Journal of Philosophy
88:709-22.
  World-head reliability is just as important as head-world reliability.
  With arguments and examples from signal detection theory.

Maloney, J.C. 1994.  Content: Covariation, control, and contingency.  Synthese
100:241-90.

McLaughlin, B.P. 1987.  What is wrong with correlational psychosemantics.
Synthese.

Stampe, D. 1977.  Towards a causal theory of linguistic representation.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2:42-63.

Stampe, D. 1986.  Verificationism and a causal account of meaning.  Synthese
69:107-37.

Stampe, D. 1991.  Content, context, and explanation.  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
 _Information, Semantics, and Epistemology_.  Blackwell.

Warmbrod, K. 1992.  Primitive representation and misrepresentation.  Topoi
11:89-101.

2.3d Teleological Approaches (Millikan, etc) [32]
--------------------------------------------

Agar, N. 1993.  What do frogs really believe?  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 71:1-12.
  Argues that a teleological account can resolve content indeterminacies, by
  an appeal to counterfactuals in examining what properties were selected for.

Bogdan, R. 1994.  _Grounds for Cognition: How Goal-Guided Behavior Shapes the
Mind_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Clarke, M. 1996.  Darwinian algorithms and indexical representation.
Philosophy of Science 63:27-48.

Dennett, D.C. 1988.  Fear of Darwin's optimizing rationale.  Manuscript.
  Defends evolutionary theories of content against Fodor.

Dennett, D.C. 1988.  Evolution, error and intentionality.  In _The Intentional
Stance_.  MIT Press.
  Attacks original intentionality (Fodor/Burge/Dretske/Searle/Kripke) -- our
  intentionality, if anything, is derived through evolution, and so is as
  indeterminate as that of an artifact.

Dretske, F. 1986.  Misrepresentation.  In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Belief: Form,
Content, and Function_.  Oxford University Press.
  Tries to deal with misrepresentation by appealing to function.

Fodor, J.A. 1990.  Psychosemantics, or, Where do truth conditions come from?
In (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_.  Blackwell.
  Truth conditions are "entry conditions" for belief under "normal function".
  Later repudiated.

Fodor, J.A. 1990.  A theory of content I.  In _A Theory of Content_.  MIT
Press.
  Teleological solutions can't work, because of underdetermination and so on.

Macdonald, G. 1989.  Biology and representation.  Mind and Language 4:186-200.

Matthen, M. 1988.  Biological functions and perceptual content.  Journal of
Philosophy 85:5-27.

Millikan, R.G. 1979.  An evolutionist approach to language.  Philosophy
Research Archives 5.

Millikan, R.G. 1984.  _Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories_.  MIT
Press.
  An evolutionary account of thought, content, and various intentional
  phenomena, appealing to proper functions and adaptational role to
  individuate contents.

Millikan, R.G. 1986.  Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content.
Philosophical Review 95:47-80.
  The content of a desire is its adaptational Proper Function; the content of
  a belief is its Normal Condition for success.

Millikan, R.G. 1989.  Biosemantics.  Journal of Philosophy 86:281-97.
  Representation content is determined by the consumption of a representation,
  not its production.  The representation-world correspondence is best taken
  as a normal condition for the consumer's function.

Millikan, R.G. 1989.  In defense of proper functions.  Philosophy of Science
56:288-302.

Millikan, R.G. 1990.  Compare and contrast Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan on
teleosemantics.  Philosophical Topics 18:151-61.
  Contrasting positions on the role of representation production and
  consumption; also on the role of reliability, articulateness, and learning.

Millikan, R.G. 1991.  Speaking up for Darwin.  In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds)
_Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  A reply to some of Fodor's criticisms of teleological theories in
  _Psychosemantics_ and elsewhere.  With some remarks on Fodor's asymmetric
  dependence theory.

Millikan, R.G. 1993.  _White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice_.
MIT Press,
  A collection of papers on teleological semantics and other issues about
  psychology and mental content.

Millikan, R.G. 1996.  On swampkinds.  Mind and Language 11:103-17.

Neander, K. 1995.  Dretske's innate modesty.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 74:258-74.

Neander, K. 1996.  Swampman meets swampcow.  Mind and Language 11:118-29.
  It's not unreasonable to deny a swampthing beliefs: swampcows aren't cows and
  swamphearts aren't hearts.  Semantic norms are plausibly grounded in
  biological norms and so in history.

Newton, N. 1992.  Dennett on intrinsic intentionality.  Analysis 52:18-23.
  Contra Dennett 1988, designed creatures can have intrinsic (if not original)
  intentionality.  Overall purpose is dependent on designer's goals, but
  specific contents need not be.

Papineau, D. 1984.  Representation and explanation.  Philosophy of Science
51:550-72.
  A teleological theory of belief/desire contents: the satisfaction conditions
  for a desire are those effects for which it was selected; truth conditions
  for a belief are circumstances resulting in satisfaction of desires.

Papineau, D. 1990.  Truth and teleology.  In (D. Knowles, ed) _Explanation and
its Limits_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Best theory is combination of a success-guaranteeing account of
  truth-conditions with a teleological account of desire.

Papineau, D. 1991.  Teleology and mental states.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 65.

Pickles, D. 1989.  Intentionality, representation, and function.  Sussex
University, Cognitive Science Research Paper 140.
  Combining the analysis-relative and historical accounts of function, and
  using these to give an account of intentionality: representation are produced
  by conditional productive functions.  Argues against Fodor on indeterminacy.

Pietrowski, P.M. 1992.  Intentionality and teleological error.  Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 73:267-82.
  Millikan's theory has an implausible consequence: creatures' belief contents
  can involve properties which they cannot discriminate.  With examples.

Ross, D. & Zawidzki, T. 1994.  Information and teleosemantics.  Southern
Journal of Philosophy 32:393-419.

Sehon, S.R. 1994.  Teleology and the nature of mental states.  American
Philosophical Quarterly 31:63-72.

Shapiro, L. 1992.  Darwin and disjunction: Foraging theory and univocal
assignments of content.  Philosophy of Science Association 1992, 1:469-80.

Sullivan, S.R. 1993.  From natural function to indeterminate content.
Philosophical Studies 69:129-37.

Wagner, S. 1996.  Teleosemantics and the troubles of naturalism.  Philosophical
Studies 82:81-110.
  Teleosemantics has big problems with indeterminacy, holism, false belief, and
  "psychophysical normalcy" in causation.  So do all naturalistic stories.

2.4 Conceptual Role Semantics [14]
-----------------------------

Block, N. 1986.  Advertisement for a semantics for psychology.  Midwest Studies
in Philosophy 10:615-78.
  An in-depth program for conceptual-role semantics, and its role in
  a two-factor account of meaning.  Also a defense of narrow content.

Block, N. 1988.  Functional role and truth conditions.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.
  A defense of functional role semantics, and an account of its relation to
  truth-conditional factors.  A two-factor theory will handle wide content.

Boghossian, P.A. 1994.  Inferential-role semantics and the analytic/synthetic
distinction.  Philosophical Studies.
  No matter how we understand the denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction,
  the falsity of inferential-role semantics does not follow.  The
  meaning-constitutive inferences needn't be the analytic inferences.

Cummins, R. 1992.  Conceptual role semantics and the explanatory role of
content.  Philosophical Studies 65:103-127.
  CRS conflates representation content and attitude content (which depends on a
  representation's "target"), so can't handle representation content; it makes
  all content-based explanations vacuous; and it can't handle error properly.

Field, H. 1977.  Logic, meaning, and conceptual role.  Journal of Philosophy
74:379-409.
  Explicates conceptual role in terms of conditional probability, and analyzes
  meaning as conceptual role plus reference.  With remarks on truth,
  descriptions, and synonymy.

Field, H. 1978.  Mental representation.  Erkenntnis 13:9-61.

Fodor, J.A. & LePore, E. 1991.  Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role.
Mind and Language 6:328-43.
  Conceptual role semantics isn't compatible with compositional semantics and
  the denial of an analytic/synthetic distinction, as full conceptual roles
  aren't compositional, and there's no way to specify a relevant subset.

Harman, G. 1974.  Meaning and semantics.  In (M. Munitz & P. Unger, eds)
_Semantics and Philosophy_.  New York University Press.

Harman, G. 1975.  Language, thought, and communication.  In (K. Gunderson, ed)
_Language, Mind, and Knowledge_.  University of Minnesota Press.

Harman, G. 1982.  Conceptual role semantics.  Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic 28:242-56.
  Meaning and content is determined by the role of symbols in thought (e.g.
  inference and perception). With remarks on indeterminacy, context-dependence,
  the linguistic division of labor, qualia, speech acts, and more.

Loar, B. 1982.  Conceptual role and truth conditions.  Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic 23:272-83.
  On the relation between conceptual role and truth-conditions.  Contra
  Harman, truth-conditions are to an extent independent of conceptual role.

Loewer B. 1982.  The role of `Conceptual role semantics'.  Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic 23:305-15.
  Contra Harman 1982, truth-conditions are central to a semantic theory.

Silverberg, A. 1992.  Putnam on functionalism.  Philosophical Studies
67:111-31.
  Argues against Putnam 1987 that conceptual role plays an important role
  in determining meaning.  Appeals to the induction theory of Holland et al.

Warfield, T.A. 1993.  On a semantic argument against conceptual role semantics.
Analysis 53:298-304.
  Contra Fodor and Lepore, meanings can be compositional even if inferential
  roles are not, as long as meanings only supervene on inferential role.

2.5 Representation (General) [24] (see also 4.7)
----------------------------

Bickhard, M. 1993.  Representational content in humans and machines.  Journal
of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 5:285-33.

Chomsky, N. 1980.  Rules and representations.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences
3:1-61.

Clark, A. 1995.  Moving minds: Situating content in the service of real-time
success.  Philosophical Perspectives 9:89-104.

Cummins, R. 1996.  _Representations, Targets, and Attitudes_.  MIT Press.

Dalenoort, G.J. 1990.  Toward a general theory of representation.
Psychological Research 52:229-237.

Dretske, F. 1986.  Aspects of cognitive representation.  In (M. Brand &
R. Harnish, eds) _The Representation of Knowledge and Belief_.  University of
Arizona Press.
  On the reference and content of representations.  Reference is determined by
  causation; content, i.e. representation "as", is determined by functional
  role, when functioning normally in natural habitat.

Fodor, J.A. 1986.  Why paramecia don't have mental representations.  Midwest
Studies in Philosophy 10:3-23.
  Because paramecia can't respond to non-nomic properties of the stimulus.
  Perceptual categories vs. sensory manifolds.

Gillett, G. 1989.  Representations and cognitive science.  Inquiry 32:261-77.

Goldman, A. 1986.  Constraints on representation.  In (M. Brand & R. Harnish,
eds) _The Representation of Knowledge and Belief_.  University of Arizona
Press.

Hatfield, G. 1989.  Computation, representation and content in noncognitive
theories of perception.  In (S. Silvers, ed) _ReRepresentation_.  Kluwer.

Hogan, M. 1994.  What is wrong with an atomistic account of mental
representation.  Synthese 100:307-27.

Jackendoff, R. 1991.  The problem of reality.  Nous 25:411-33.
  On the philosophical (inward-out) vs. psychological (outward-in) approaches
  to the mind-world relation; the psychological approach is more useful in
  understanding representation.  Internal reality is an imperfect construction.

Kukla, R. 1992.  Cognitive models and representation.  British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 43:219-32.

Lloyd, D. 1987.  Mental representation from the bottom up.  Synthese 70:23-78.

Lycan, W.G. 1989.  Ideas of representation.  In (Weissbord, ed) _Mind, Value
and Culture: Essays in Honor of E.M. Adams_.  Ridgeview.

Matthews, R.J. 1984.  Troubles with representationalism.  Social Research
51:1065-97.

Millikan, R.G. 1995.  Pushmi-pullyu representations.  Philosophical
Perspectives 9:185-200.

Richardson, R.C. 1981.  Internal representation: Prologue to a theory of
intentionality.  Philosophical Topics 12:171-212.

Shanon, B. 1991.  Representations -- senses and reasons.  Philosophical
Psychology 4:355-74.
  On different senses of "representation" -- external, experiential, mental
  locus, substrate of meaning, mediating functions, technical-psychological.

Shanon, B. 1993.  _The Representational and the Presentational: An Essay on
Cognition and the Study of Mind_.  Prentice-Hall.

Sober, E. 1976.  Mental representations.  Synthese 33:101-48.

Sterelny, K. 1995.  Basic minds.  Philosophical Perspectives 9:251-70.

van Gulick, R. 1982.  Mental representation: A functionalist view.  Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 63:3-20.
  On the distinction between representation and representation-use.

Wallis, C. 1994.  Representation and the imperfect ideal.  Philosophy of
Science 61:407-28.

2.6 The Explanatory Role of Content (Dretske, etc) [21]
-----------------------------------

Adams, F. 1991.  Causal contents.  In (B. McLaughlin, ed) _Dretske and his
Critics_.  Blackwell.
  On Dretske's account of the causal role of content.  Addresses some
  objections: Dennett's worries about intrinsic intentionality, Fodor's
  about external causal powers, and some worries about syntax.

Baker, L.R. 1991.  Dretske on the explanatory role of belief.  Philosophical
Studies 63:99-111.

Bogdan, R.J. 1989.  Does semantics run the psyche?  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 49:687-700.
  A critique of Fodor.  Semantics per se doesn't cause.  Also, Fodor's is an
  account of the what, not the how, of semantics.  Somewhat bizarre.

Cummins, R. 1991.  Mental meaning in psychological explanation.  In
(B. McLaughlin, ed) _Dretske and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  Criticizes Dretske's account of the role of content, especially because of
  its dependence on an organism's history; also, it may not cohere with work in
  cognitive science.  Argues for an interpretational, not a causal account.

Devitt, M. 1991.  Why Fodor can't have it both ways.  In (B. Loewer & G. Rey,
eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.

Dretske, F. 1987.  The explanatory role of content.  In (R. Grimm & D. Merrill,
eds) _Contents of Thought_.  University of Arizona Press.
  Content must explain why (not how) an internal state caused a certain output.
  The explanation is given in terms of what a state has historically indicated.
  With thermostats and sea-snails as examples.  Comments by Cummins, and reply.

Dretske, F. 1988.  _Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes_.  MIT
Press.

Dretske, F. 1990.  Does meaning matter?  In (E. Villanueva, ed) _Information,
Semantics, and Epistemology_.  Blackwell.

Dretske, F. 1994.  Reply to Slater and Garcia-Carpintero.  Mind and Language
9:203-8.

Dretske, F. 1995.  Reply: Causal relevance and explanatory exclusion.  In (E.
Villanueva, ed) _Information, Semantics, and Epistemology_.  Blackwell.

Dretske, F. 1996.  The explanatory role of content: Reply to Melnyk and
Noordhof.  Mind and Language 11:223-29.

Fodor, J.A. 1986.  Banish DisContent.  In (J. Butterfield, ed) _Language, Mind,
and Logic_.  Cambridge University Press.  Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind
and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990).

Garcia-Carpintero, M. 1994.  Dretske on the causal efficacy of meaning.  Mind
and Language 9:181-202.

Horgan, T. 1991.  Actions, reasons, and the explanatory role of content.  In
(B. McLaughlin, ed) _Dretske and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  Distinguishes three problems of mental causation (extrinsic factors,
  exclusion of the nonphysical, anomalism).  Criticizes Dretske's theory (can't
  handle unlearnt or here-and-now reasons), offers a counterfactual account.

Melnyk, A. 1996.  The prospects for Dretske's account of the explanatory role
of belief.  Mind and Language 11:203-15.

Noordhof, P. 1996.  Accidental associations, local potency, and a dilemma for
Dretske.  Mind and Language 11:216-22.

Perry, J. & Israel, D. 1991.  Fodor and psychological explanation.  In
(B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1987.  What's in a mind?  Synthese 70:97-122.
  We must individuate mental states by semantics, not just by function, as we
  need representation to capture generalizations about behavior; particularly
  due to the information-sensitivity and stimulus-independence of behavior.

Slater, C. 1994.  Discrimination without indication: Why Dretske can't lean on
learning.  Mind and Language 9:163-80.

Wallis, C. 1994.  Using representation to explain.  In (E. Dietrich, ed)
_Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons_.  Academic Press.

2.7 Concepts [27]
------------

Burge, T. 1993.  Concepts, definitions, and meaning.  Metaphilosophy 24:309-25.

Cussins, A. 1990.  The connectionist construction of concepts.  In (M. Boden,
ed) _The Philosophy of AI_.  Oxford University Press.
  Connectionism builds up concepts from the nonconceptual level.  From
  nonconceptual content (e.g. perceptual experiences) to the emergence of
  objectivity.

Fodor, J. & Lepore, E. 1996.  The red herring and the pet fish: Why concepts
still can't be prototypes.  Cognition 58:253-70.

Fodor, J. 1995.  Concepts: A potboiler.  Cognition 50:133-51.  Also in
(E. Villanueva, ed) _Content_.  Ridgeview.

Franks, B. 1992.  Realism and folk psychology in the ascription of concepts.
Philosophical Psychology 5:369-90.

Gauker, C. 1993.  An extraterrestrial perspective on conceptual development.
Mind and Language 8:105-30.

Grandy, R.E. 1989.  Concepts, prototypes, and information.  In (E. Villanueva,
ed) _Information, Semantics, and Epistemology_.  Blackwell.

Jackendoff, R. 1989.  What is a concept, that a person may grasp it?  Mind
and Language 4:68-102.

Khalidi, M.A. 1995.  Two concepts of concept.  Mind and Language 10:402-22.

Livingston, K.R. 1989.  Concepts, categories, and epistemology.  Philosophia
19:265-300.

Neisser, U. (ed) 1981.  _Concepts and Conceptual Development_.  Cambridge
University Press.

Osherson, D.N. & Smith, E.E. 1981.  On the adequacy of prototype theory as a
theory of concepts.  Cognition 9:35-58.

Margolis, E. 1995.  The significance of the theory analogy in the psychological
study of concepts.  Mind and Language 10:45-71.

Peacocke, C. 1989.  What are concepts?  Midwest Studies of Philosophy 14.

Peacocke, C. 1989.  Possession conditions: A focal point for theories of
concepts.  Mind and Language 4:51-56.

Peacocke, C. 1991.  The metaphysics of concepts.  Mind 100:525-46.

Peacocke, C. 1992.  _A Study of Concepts_.  MIT Press.

Peacocke, C. 1996.  Precis of _A Study of Concepts_.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 56:407-52.
  A symposium on the book, with comments by Heal, Rey, Papineau.

Peacocke, C. 1996.  Can a theory of concepts explain the a priori: A reply to
Skorupski.  International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4:154-60.

Ramsey, W. 1992.  Prototypes and conceptual analysis.  Topoi 11:59-70.
  On the significance of psychological work on concepts for philosophical
  conceptual analysis -- simple, precise analyses do not exist in general.

Rey, G. 1983.  Concepts and stereotypes.  Cognition 15:237-62.

Rips, L.J. 1995.  The current status of research on concept combination.  Mind
and Language 10:72-104.

Smith, E.E. & Medin, D.L. 1981.  _Categories and Concepts_.  Harvard University
Press.

Sosa, E. 1993.  Abilities, concepts, and externalism.  In (J. Heil & A. Mele,
eds) _Mental Causation_.  Oxford University Press.
  On concepts as abilities, and on construals of abilities that lead to
  internalism and externalism.  Maybe the relevant abilities are characterized
  externally but determined internally.  Remarks on Putnam, Davidson, Burge.

Thagard, P. 1990.  Concepts and conceptual change.  Synthese 82:255-74.

von Brakel, J. 1991.  Meaning, prototypes, and the future of cognitive science.
Minds and Machines 1.

Weitz, M. 1988.  _Theories of Concepts: A History of the Major Philosophical
Traditions_.  Routledge.

Woodfield, A. 1991.  Conceptions.  Mind 100:547-72.

2.8 Meaning Holism [16]
------------------

Block, N. 1995.  An argument for holism.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 95:151-70.
  Uses Putnam's "Ruritania" example to argue that narrow content, if it exists,
  is holistic.  Twins in different communities start with same narrow content,
  diverge by acquiring new beliefs; so belief change affects narrow content.

Callaway, H.G. 1992.  Meaning holism and semantic realism.  Dialectica
46:41-59.

Devitt, M. 1994.  A critique of the case for semantic holism.  Philosophical
Perspectives 8:281-306.

Devitt, M. 1994.  Semantic localism: Who needs a principled basis?  In (R.
Casati, B. Smith, & S. White, eds) _Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences_.
Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.

Fodor, J.A. & LePore, E. 1992.  _Holism: A Shopper's Guide_.  Blackwell.
  Rebutting arguments for meaning holism: those based on confirmation holism
  (Quine), normativity of interpretation (Davidson, Dennett, Lewis), and
  functional-role semantics (Block, Field, Churchland).

Fodor, J.A. & LePore, E. 1993.  Precis of _Holism: A Shopper's Guide_.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:637-682.
  A discussion of _Holism_ with comments by Devitt, Rey, McLaughlin, Brandom,
  and Churchland, and a reply by Fodor and Lepore.

Gauker, C. 1993.  Holism without meaning: A critical review of Fodor and
Lepore's _Holism: A Shopper's Guide_.  Philosophical Psychology 6:441-49.

Heal, J. 1994.  Semantic holism: Still a good buy.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 68:325-39.
  A critique of Fodor and Lepore.  Distinguishes versions of holism, and argues
  for a weak version.  Real thinkers are subjects, which imposes constraints
  on the interrelations of thoughts.  Science fiction is irrelevant here.

Kukla, A. & Kukla, R. 1989.  Meaning holism and intentional psychology.
Analysis 173-53.
  Contra Fodor, meaning holism is compatible with intentional psychology.  Most
  psychological generalizations quantify over contents, rather than appealing
  to specific contents.

Lormand, E. 1996.  How to be a meaning holist.  Journal of Philosophy 93:51-73.

McClamrock, R. 1989.  Holism without tears: Local and global effects in
cognitive processing.  Philosophy of Science 56:258-74.

Perry, J. 1994.  Fodor and Lepore on holism.  Philosophical Studies 73:123-58.
  The argument from anatomism and the failure of the analytic/synthetic
  distinction to holism fails.  On the many different interpretations of
  holism and anatomism: there is a reasonable molecularist position.

Senor, T.D. 1992.  Two-factor theories, meaning holism, and intentionalistic
psychology: A reply to Fodor.  Philosophical Psychology 5:133-51.

Silverberg, A. 1994.  Meaning holism and intentional content.  Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 75:29-53.

Stich, S.P. 1983.  Some evidence against narrow causal theories of belief.  In
_From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science_.  MIT Press.

Talmage, C.J.L. & Mercer, M. 1991.  Meaning holism and interpretability.
Philosophical Quarterly 41:301-15.

2.9 Mental Content, Misc [36]
------------------------

Allen, C. 1992.  Mental content.  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
43:537-53.

Bestor, T.W. 1991.  Naturalizing semantics: New insights or old folly?  Inquiry
34:285-310.

Bilgrami, A. 1992.  _Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental
Content_.  Blackwell.

Bogdan, R.J. 1986.  The manufacture of belief.  In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Belief:
Form, Content, and Function_.  Oxford University Press.

Butler, K. 1995.  Content, context, and compositionality.  Mind and Language
10:3-24.

Callaway, H.G. 1995.  Intentionality naturalized: Continuity, reconstruction,
and instrumentalism.  Dialectica 49:147-68.

Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. 1983.  Stalking the wild epistemic engine.
Nous 17:5-18.
  On "translational" (conceptual) and "calibrational" (referential) content.
  Relation of content issues to computational issues.

Cummins, R. 1989.  _Meaning and Mental Representation_.  MIT Press.
  Critiques other views, offers interpretational semantics.

Cummins, R. 1991.  Form, interpretation, and the uniqueness of content: A
response to Morris.  Minds and Machines 1:31-42.
  Morris 1991 is wrong: formal individuation is easy, and objectively
  determinate content isn't needed.  External grounding is also irrelevant.

Dennett, D.C. 1991.  Ways of establishing harmony.  In (B. McLaughlin, ed)
_Dretske and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  On the ways in which meanings can come to cohere with their causal roles:
  learning, natural selection, and design.  Criticizes Dretske for undervaluing
  the latter two: all three are in the same boat.

Devitt, M. 1994.  The methodology of naturalistic semantics.  Journal of
Philosophy 91:519-44.

Fodor, J.A. 1987.  _Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy
of Mind_.  MIT Press.

Fodor, J.A. 1990.  _A Theory of Content and Other Essays_.  MIT Press.

Fodor, J.A. 1994.  _The Elm and the Expert_.  MIT Press.

Gillett, G. 1992.  _Representation, Meaning, and Thought_.  Oxford University
Press.

Haldane, J.J. 1989.  Naturalism and the problem of intentionality.  Inquiry
32:305-22.

Haugeland, J. 1990.  The Intentionality All-Stars.  Philosophical Perspectives
4:383-427.
  Intentionality around the diamond: neoCartesianism, neobehaviorism,
  neopragmatism.  1B=Fodor/Pylyshyn, 2B=Dennett/Quine, 3B=Heidegger/Sellars.
  SS=Wittgenstein.  RF=Searle, CF=Skinner, LF=Rorty/Derrida.  Lots of fun.

Horgan, T. 1994.  Naturalism and intentionality.  Philosophical Studies
76:301-26.

Kaye, L.J. 1995.  A scientific psychologistic foundation for theories of
meaning.  Minds and Machines 5.

Lehrer, K. 1986.  Metamind: Belief, consciousness and intentionality.  In
(R. Bogdan, ed) _Belief: Form, Content, and Function_.  Oxford University
Press.

Lycan, W.G. 1986.  Thoughts about things.  In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, ed) _The
Representation of Knowledge and Belief_.  University of Arizona Press.

Madell, G. 1989.  Physicalism and the content of thought.  Inquiry 32:107-21.

Maloney, J.C. 1989.  _The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language_.  Cambridge
University Press.

McGinn, C. 1989.  _Mental Content_.  Blackwell.
	
Morris, M. 1991.  Why there are no mental representations.  Minds and Machines
1:1-30.
  There can be no non-stipulative content to non-semantically individuated
  tokens.  Mostly a critique of Cummins; also Fodor and Dennett.

Newton, N. 1996.  _Foundations of Understanding_.  John Benjamins.

Peacocke, C. 1986.  _Thoughts: An Essay on Content_.  Blackwell.

Peacocke, C. 1991.  Content and norms in a natural world.  In (E. Villanueva,
ed) _Information, Semantics, and Epistemology_.  Blackwell.

Pollock, J. 1990.  Understanding the language of thought.  Philosophical
Studies 58:95-120.
  Remarks on a number of aspects of mental content -- narrow, propositional,
  qualitative -- with respect to functionalism and the language of thought.
  With comments by Baker.

Schiffer, S. 1981.  Truth and the theory of content.  In (H. Parret, ed)
_Meaning and Understanding_.  Berlin.

Schiffer, S. 1987.  _Remnants of Meaning_.  MIT Press.

Silvers, S. 1991.  On naturalizing the semantics of mental representation.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42:49-73.

Stalnaker, R. 1991.  How to do semantics for the language of thought.  In
(B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics_.  Blackwell.
  On some tensions in Fodor's view of content: e.g. narrow content must be
  dependent on functional role, which seems to lead to holism.  The role of
  denotational semantics as a defense is unclear.

Sterelny, K. 1990.  _The Representational Theory of Mind_.  Blackwell.

Stich, S.P. 1982.  On the ascription of content.  In (A. Woodfield, ed)
_Thought and Object_.  Oxford University Press.
  On the tacit theories underlying the folk psychology of belief: beliefs are
  states associated with typical causal patterns.  With remarks on ambiguity,
  content identity and similarity, and environmental dependence.

Stich, S.P., and Laurence, S. 1994.  Intentionality and naturalism.  Midwest
Studies in Philosophy 19:159-82.  Reprinted in (Stich) _Deconstructing the
Mind_.  Oxford University Press, 1996.
  Argues that a failure to "naturalize" intentionality won't lead to disasters
  such as irrealism, irrelevance, or non-science, whether naturalization is
  understood as analysis, property identity, supervenience, or whatever.

Tye, M. 1994.  Naturalism and the problem of intentionality.  Midwest Studies
in Philosophy 19:122-42.
  There's no deep problem of naturalism about intentionality, as we know it's
  true already.  The real puzzle is that of finding a mechanism to close the
  gap, e.g. via analysis or essentialism.  But naturalism doesn't require that.

--
Compiled by David Chalmers, Department of Philosophy, University of California,
Santa Cruz.  (c) 1996 David J. Chalmers.

Part 3: Psychophysical Relations and Psychological Explanation [369]
==============================================================

Contents
--------
3.1  Supervenience [73]
3.1a    Psychophysical Supervenience (Kim, etc) [10]
3.1b    Supervenience and Physicalism [18]
3.1c    Technical Issues in Supervenience [22]
3.1d    Supervenience, General [23]
3.2  Anomalous Monism (Davidson) [41]
3.3  Reduction [34]
3.4  Psychophysical Relations, Misc [49]
3.4a    Physicalism [11]
3.4b    Token Identity [6]
3.4c    Emergence [8]
3.4d    Dualism [16]
3.4e    Miscellaneous [8]
3.5  Mental Causation [43]
3.6  Functionalism [59]
3.6a    Causal Role Functionalism (Armstrong/Lewis) [15]
3.6b    Machine Functionalism (Putnam) [15]
3.6c    Miscellaneous [29]
3.7  Psychology and Neuroscience [27]
3.8  Psychological Laws [7]
3.9  Psychological Explanation, Misc [13]
3.10 Philosophy of Mind, General [23]

3.1 Supervenience [73]
-----------------

3.1a Psychophysical Supervenience (Kim, etc) [10]
--------------------------------------------

Crane, T. 1991.  Why indeed? Papineau on supervenience.  Analysis 51:32-7.
  Contra Papineau 1989: the assumption of completeness is false or trivial.
  Maybe the mental is part of a complete physics.  With response by Papineau.

Elugardo, R. 1988.  Against weak psychophysical supervenience.  Dialectica
42:129-43.
  Various objections to Kim's arguments for supervenience.  Not all internal
  states relevant to I/O relations are psychological states.  Strange.

Kim, J. 1979.  Causality, identity and supervenience in the mind-body problem.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:31-49.
  Supervenience of the mental on the physical is what is required to make
  mental causation possible.  Very nice.

Kim, J. 1982.  Psychophysical supervenience.  Philosophical Studies 41:51-70.
Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
  Internal mental states (i.e. ones that are not rooted outside) supervene on
  synchronous internal physical states, and internal states are all that is
  relevant in the explanation of behavior.

Kim, J. 1982.  Psychophysical supervenience as a mind-body theory.  Cognition
and Brain Theory 5:129-47.
  Distinguishes weak (within-world) vs strong (across-worlds) supervenience.
  Relates to reduction, internal/external mental states, and various theories.

Lewis, H. 1985.  Is the mental supervenient on the physical?  In (B. Vermazen &
M. Hintikka, eds) _Essays on Davidson_.  Oxford University Press.
  On some problems with supervenience, the relation between supervenience and
  reduction, and on reasons for accepting psychophysical supervenience.  Loose.

Loar, B. 1993.  Can we confirm supervenient properties?  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Naturalism and Normativity_.  Ridgeview.
  If mental properties are supervenient but irreducible to physical/functional
  properties, we can't confirm them.  Confirmation requires an indispensable
  explanatory role, which irreducibility precludes.  With comments by Schiffer.

Macdonald, C. 1995.  Psychophysical supervenience, dependency, and reduction.
In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_.  Cambridge
University Press.

Papineau, D. 1989.  Why supervenience?  Analysis 50:66-71.
  Psychophysical supervenience follows from completeness of physical laws.

Papineau, D. 1995.  Arguments for supervenience and physical realization.  In
(E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_.  Cambridge
University Press.

3.1b Supervenience and Physicalism [18]
----------------------------------

Armstrong, D.M. 1982.  Metaphysics and supervenience.  Critica 42:3-17.
  Argues that everything is logically supervenient on the physical.  Considers
  classes, possibilities, numbers, universals, and objects of thought.

Chalmers, D.J. 1996.  Supervenience and materialism.  In _The Conscious Mind_
(pp. 41-42).  Oxford University Press, 1996.

Charles, D. 1992.  Supervenience, composition, and physicalism.  In (D. Charles
& K. Lennon, eds) _Reduction, Explanation and Realism_.  Oxford University
Press.

Haugeland, J. 1984.  Ontological supervenience.  Southern Journal of Philosophy
Supplement 22:1-12.
  Supervenience is all we need for materialism.  Various materialist arguments
  (unity, "nothing but", history, fear of darkness, simplicity, law) don't
  support physical exhaustion & token identity, over and above supervenience.

Hellman, G. & Thomson, F. 1975.  Physicalism: ontology, determination and
reduction.  Journal of Philosophy 72:551-64.

Hellman, G. & Thomson, F. 1977.  Physicalist materialism.  Nous 11:309-45.
  Some applications of the earlier treatment: examples of determination without
  reduction; the statuf of properties and universals; the mental; the life
  sciences; modalities and essentalism; theoretical equivalence.

Hellman, G. 1985.  Determination and logical truth.  Journal of Philosophy
82:607-16.
  Some remarks on determination, physicalism, model theory, and logical truth.

Horgan, T. 1981.  Token physicalism, supervenience, and the generality of
physics.  Synthese 49:395-413.
  Argues that the generality of physics should be a supervenience thesis, not
  token physicalism.  Fodor's token physicalism is untenable but might be
  saved with an appropriate view of events.

Horgan, T. 1982.  Supervenience and microphysics.  Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 63:29-43.
  An account of how all facts supervene on microphysical facts, and how all
  intrinsic facts supervene on intrinsic microphysical facts.

Horgan, T. 1984.  Supervenience and cosmic hermeneutics.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy Supplement 22:19-38.
  Laplacean demon's job: number crunching, plus cosmic hermeneutics to explain
  high-level truths.  All high-level truths follow from low-level by meaning
  constraints.  Application to theoretical/mentalistic/everyday terms.  Nice.

Jack, A. 1994.  Materialism and supervenience.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 72:426-43.
  Supervenience is neither necessary nor sufficient for materialism.  With
  various (contentious) counterexamples.  So we need a different formulation.

Kirk, R. 1996.  Strict implication, supervenience, and physicalism.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74:244-57.
  Argues for strict implication rather than supervenience as a formulation of
  "minimal physicalism" (unless supervenience is formulated just right).

Lewis, D. 1983.  New work for a theory of universals.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy.
  Formulates a definition of materialism: among worlds where no natural
  properties alien to our worlds are instantiated, no two differ without
  differing physically.  With a lot of other material on universals.

Melnyk, A. 1991.  Physicalism: From supervenience to elimination.  Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 51:573-87.
  How can supervenience, as a relationship between ontologically distinct
  properties, be explained?  Modal realism and grand-properties don't work.
  Eliminativism about supervenient properties is the only possibility.

Moser, P, & Trout, J.D. 1996.  Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence.
In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_.  Cambridge
University Press.

Pettit, P. 1993.  A definition of physicalism.  Analysis 53:213-23.
  Defines physicalism in terms of claims that microphysical entities constitute
  everything and that microphysical laws govern everything.  With a reply by
  Crane.

Seager, W.E. 1988.  Weak supervenience and materialism.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 48:697-709.
  Weak supervenience provides a more tenable form of materialism than strong
  supervenience, because of inverted spectrum possibilities, etc.

Snowdon, P.F. 1989.  On formulating materialism and dualism.  In (J. Heil, ed)
_Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin_.  Kluwer.
  A construal of materialism in terms of constitution, not identity.  Discusses
  the entailment between physical properties and mental properties; considers
  a nonreductive physicalism and a primitive dualism.

3.1c Technical Issues in Supervenience [22]
--------------------------------------

Bacon, J. 1986.  Supervenience, necessary coextensions, and reducibility.
Philosophical Studies 49:163-76.
  A modal-logic analysis of the relations between various notions of
  supervenience.  Most concepts of supervenience entail necessary co-extension,
  under certain closure assumptions for properties.

Bacon, J. 1995.  Weak supervenience supervenes.  In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin,
eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_.  Cambridge University Press.

Bonevac, D. 1988.  Supervenience and ontology.  American Philosophical
Quarterly 25:37-47.
  A model-theoretic treatment of supervenience, in terms of relations between
  theories.  Supervenience turns out to be equivalent to reduction.

Bovens, L. 1994.  Principles of supervenience.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 72:294-301.

Divers, J. 1996.  Supervenience for operators.  Synthese 106:103-12.

Forrest, P. 1988.  Supervenience: The grand-property hypothesis.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 66:1-12.
  A nonreductive supervenience hypothesis: supervenient properties are
  properties of properties, e.g intrinsic goodness is a property of an object's
  nature.

Forrest, P. 1992.  Universals and universalisability: An interpretation of
Oddie's discussion of supervenience.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy
70:93-98.

Grimes, T. 1991.  Supervenience, determination, and dependency.  Philosophical
Studies 62:81-92.
  On dependency supervenience (B properties determine A properties) versus
  determination supervenience (A properties need B properties).

Grimes, T. 1995.  The Tweedledum and Tweedledee of supervenience.  In
(E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_.  Cambridge
University Press.

Kim, J. 1984.  Concepts of supervenience.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 45:153-76.  Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
  Distinguishes weak and strong supervenience.  A mistaken proof that strong
  and global supervenience are equivalent.  Strong supervenience implies a kind
  of reduction, but not an explanatorily useful reduction.

Kim, J. 1987.  `Strong' and `global' supervenience revisited.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 48:315-26.  Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_
(Cambridge University Press, 1993).
  Reasons why global supervenience doesn't entail strong supervenience, and
  trying to rescue global supervenience as a useful notion.  Suggests a
  similarity-based notion of global supervenience.

Kim, J. 1988.  Supervenience for multiple domains.  Philosophical Topics
16:129-50.  Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press,
1993).
  How properties in one domain can supervene on properties in another, with
  or without co-ordination between domains.  Relation to global supervenience.

Klagge, J.C. 1995.  Supervenience: Model theory or metaphysics?  In
(E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_.  Cambridge
University Press.

Marras, A. 1993.  Supervenience and reducibility: An odd couple.  Philosophical
Quarterly 43:215-222.
  Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility, as necessary coextension doesn't
  suffice, and is incompatible with reducibility, due to ontological asymmetry.

McLaughlin, B.P. 1995.  Varieties of supervenience.  In (E. Savellos &
U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Distinguishes modal-operator and possible-worlds versions of supervenience,
  and explicates global supervenience and its relation to weak and strong.
  With remarks on multiple-domain supervenience and the relation to reduction.

Moser, P.K. 1992.  Physicalism and global supervenience.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy 30:71-82.
  Argues that global supervenience has epistemological problems -- how could
  we ever know that it holds, and that certain worlds are impossible?

Oddie, G. & Tichy, P. 1990.  Resplicing properties in the supervenience base.
Philosophical Studies 58:259-69.
  Closure under resplicing makes supervenience both too narrow and too wide.
  Weak supervenience is generally too weak to capture the dependence relation.

Oddie, G. 1991.  Supervenience and higher-order universals.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 69:20-47.

Paull, R.C. & Sider, T.R. 1992.  In defense of global supervenience.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:833-53.
  Gives a proof of the distinction between strong and global supervenience
  that improves on Petrie's, and argues contra Kim that global supervenience
  is a perfectly reasonable dependence relation for physicalism.

Petrie, B. 1987.  Global supervenience and reduction.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 48:119-30.
  Defending global supervenience: it's weaker than strong supervenience, as
  base properties of other individuals are relevant.  It doesn't entail type or
  token reducibility.  On the relation to implicit definability and reduction.

Post, J.F. 1995.  "Global" supervenient determination: Too permissive?  In
(E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_.  Cambridge
University Press.

van Cleve, J. 1990.  Supervenience and closure.  Philosophical Studies
58:225-38.
  Properties in supervenience relations shouldn't be closed under negation
  or resplicing, due to bad consequences.  With reply by Bacon on resplicing.

3.1d Supervenience, General [23]
---------------------------

Blackburn, S. 1984.  Supervenience revisited.  In (I. Hacking, ed) _Exercises
in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy_.  Cambridge University Press.
  On the incompatibility of weak supervenience without strong supervenience
  and realism.  With discussion of various strengths of necessity involved in
  supervenience claims, and application to moral realism and anomalous monism.

Currie, G. 1984.  Individualism and global supervenience.  British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 35:345-58.
  How social facts supervene on the totality of individual facts.  Application
  to belief, etc.

Enc, B. 1996.  Nonreducible supervenient causation.  In (E. Savellos &
U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_.  Cambridge University Press.

Grimes, T. 1988.  The myth of supervenience.  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
69:152-60.
  Supervenience is too weak to function as a dependency relation, as e.g. it
  can hold in two directions at once.

Hare, R.M. 1984.  Supervenience.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
58:1-16.
  On the universal conditionals that underlie supervenience, and the necessity
  thereof.  A discussion of the necessity of moral, natural kind, and other
  sorts of supervenience.  Contra Davidson, anomalous supervenience is silly.

Heil, J. 1995.  Supervenience redux.  In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds)
_Supervenience: New Essays_.  Cambridge University Press.

Hellman, G. 1992.  Supervenience/determination a two-way street?  Yes, but one
of the ways is the wrong way!  Journal of Philosophy 89:42-47.
  Reply to Miller 1990.  Miller underestimates the modal force of supervenience
  and invokes irrelevant dispositional properties.

Horgan, T. 1993.  From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the
demands of a material world.  Mind 102:555-86.
  An overview of supervenience, with focus on the problem of explaining
  supervenience relations.  With remarks on mental causation, emergence,
  physicalism, and reduction.

Kim, J. 1978.  Supervenience and nomological incommensurables.  American
Philosophical Quarterly 15:149-56.
  Developing and motivating the notion of supervenience.  Investigating the
  relationship to reducibility and definability (equivalence, under certain
  conditions), and to microphysical determination.

Kim, J. 1984.  Supervenience and supervenient causation.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy Supplement 22:45-56.
  On weak/strong supervenience, and high-level causation via supervenience.

Kim, J. 1991.  Supervenience as a philosophical concept.  Metaphilosophy
21:1-27.  Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press,
1993).
  A nice overview of supervenience and covariance.

Kim, J. 1993.  _Supervenience and Mind_.  Cambridge University Press.
  A collection of articles on supervenience and causation in metaphysics and
  the philosophy of mind, with some added postscripts.

Kincaid, H. 1987.  Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility.  Southern Journal
of Philosophy 25:343-56.
  Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility, which is epistemological.  The
  problem's not just huge disjuncts, but also the sharing of bases, no local
  correlations, and base-properties presupposing supervenient properties.

Kincaid, H. 1988.  Supervenience and explanation.  Synthese 77:251-81.
  Argues that lower-level theories can explain supervenient but irreducible
  higher-level theories, but only under certain conditions, as low-level
  accounts don't have the relevant kind terms.

Klagge, J.C. 1988.  Supervenience: Ontological and ascriptive.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 66:461-70.
  On supervenience as an ontological relation (via metaphysical necessity) or
  as an ascriptive relation (via conceptual necessity).  The first doesn't
  preclude the second.  Moral realism and mental realism are in the same boat.

Loewer, B. 1995.  An argument for strong supervenience.  In (E. Savellos &
U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_.  Cambridge University Press.

McLaughlin, B.P. 1983.  Event supervenience and supervenient causation.
Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:71-91.

McLaughlin, B.P. 1994.  Varieties of supervenience.  In (E. Savellos & O.
Yalchin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_.
  On a number of issues: possible worlds vs modal notions, explicating global
  supervenience, the relation between weak/strong/global supervenience,
  multiple-domain supervenience, and implications for reduction.

Miller, R.B. 1990.  Supervenience is a two-way street.  Journal of Philosophy
87:695-701.
  If supervening properties can make arbitrarily fine distinctions, then
  physical properties supervene on moral/aesthetic/mental properties.

Noonan, H. 1987.  Supervenience.  Philosophical Quarterly 37:78-85.
  Contra Blackburn 1984 on the possibility of weak supervenience without strong
  supervenience, even with metaphysical necessity; using Nozick's concept
  structures, or indexical definitions.  With application to moral realism.

Post, J.F.  On the determinacy of valuation.  Philosophical Studies 45:315-33.

Teller, P. 1984.  The poor man's guide to supervenience and determination.
Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:137-62.
  Compares the Hellman/Thompson notion of determination with Kim's development
  of supervenience.  Uses these to investigate the concept of materialism, and
  argues that materialism isn't contingent.

Teller, P. 1985.  Is supervenience just disguised reduction?  Southern Journal
of Philosophy 23:93-100.

3.2 Anomalous Monism (Davidson) [41]
-------------------------------

Davidson, D. 1970.  Mental events.  In (L. Foster & J. Swanson, eds)
_Experience and Theory_.  Humanities Press.  Reprinted in _Essays on Action and
Events_ (Oxford University Press, 1980).
  Arguing for anomalous monism: no strict psychophysical laws, no strict
  psychological laws, and token identity without type identity.  Mental events
  can still cause, via subsumption under physical laws.

Davidson, D. 1973.  The material mind.  In (P. Suppes, ed) _Logic, Methodology
and the Philosophy of Science_.  North-Holland.  Reprinted in _Essays on Action
and Events_ (Oxford University Press, 1980).
  The psychological supervenes on the physical but is not reducible to it,
  because of the holistic nature of intentional attribution.  So building a
  perfect physical model may not explain psychology.

Davidson, D. 1974.  Psychology as philosophy.  In (S. Brown, ed) _Philosophy
of Psychology_.  Harper & Row.  Reprinted in _Essays on Action and Events_
(Oxford University Press, 1980).
  On the differing constitutive standards of mental and physical concepts.
  Attribution of mental concepts is holistic, and presupposes a background of
  rationality, etc.  With examples from decision theory.

Davidson, D. 1980.  _Essays on Actions and Events_.  Oxford University Press.
  A collection of papers on action, causation and the philosophy of psychology.

Davidson, D. 1987.  Problems in the explanation of action.  In (P. Pettit,
R. Sylvan, & J. Norman, eds) _Metaphysics and Morality_.  Blackwell.
  Remarks on how mental properties can explain action without strict laws.  The
  mental is a conceptual, not an ontological category, governed by normative
  standards, and not reducible to the non-normative.

Davidson, D. 1992.  Thinking causes.  In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental
Causation_.  Oxford University Press.

Antony, L. 1989.  Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force.
Philosophical Review 98: 153-87.
  Criticism of Davidson's argument for rational causation.  Reasons must cause
  in virtue of their rational properties.  Token identities can't exist, due to
  normativity.  Quinean psychology can't yield rational explanations.

Bickle, J. 1992.  Mental anomaly and the new mind-brain reductionism.
Philosophy of Science 59:217-30.

Child, W. 1993.  Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations.
Philosophical Review.
  Anomalism is compatible with supervenience, if it is construed as denying
  psychophysical laws useful for explaining behavior.  It is incompatible with
  token identity, though.  With much on the uncodifiability of rationality.

Cooper, W.E. 1980.  Materialism and madness.  Philosophical Papers 9:36-40.

Elgin, C. 1980.  Indeterminacy, underdetermination and the anomalous monism.
Synthese 45:233-55.

Goldberg, B. 1977.  A problem with anomalous monism.  Philosophical Studies
32:175-80.
  Davidson's argument equivocates on the term "physical": the physical events
  that mental events cause might not be subsumed under laws.

Hess, P. 1981.  Actions, reasons and Humean causes.  Analysis 41:77-81.
  Anomalous monism implies that mental properties don't cause anything.

Honderich, T. 1982.  The argument for anomalous monism.  Analysis 42:59-64.
  If anomalous monism is true, mental events may cause, but their mental
  properties aren't causally relevant.

Johnston, M. 1985.  Why having a mind matters.  In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore,
eds) _Action and Events_.  Blackwell.
  Anomalous monism loses out to Australian materialism.  It can't be a priori,
  it leads to exhaustive monism, it doesn't support a new view of free action,
  and it implies the causal irrelevance of the mental.

Kalderon, M.E. 1987.  Epiphenomenalism and content.  Philosophical Studies
52:71-90.
  Davidson's view leads to epiphenomenalism about content, as it can't support
  the appropriate counterfactuals.  Strong supervenience might be a way out,
  but that is inconsistent with anomalism.

Kernohan, A. 1985.  Psychology: Autonomous or anomalous?  Dialogue 24:427-42.

Kim, J. 1985.  Psychophysical laws.  In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds)
_Action and Events_.  Blackwell.  Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_
(Cambridge University Press, 1993).
  How there can be psychophysical generalizations but no laws -- they might
  lack modal force.  On the relation between psychophysical anomalism and
  psychological anomalism.  Casting Davidson as a Kantian dualist.

Klagge, J.C. 1990.  Davidson's troubles with supervenience.  Synthese
85:339-52.
  Anomalous supervenience is consistent, at the cost of anti-realism about the
  mental.  Supervenience is a constraint on interpretation, but needn't support
  counterfactuals as different interpretation schemes are possible, 

Klee, R. 1992.  Anomalous monism, ceteris paribus, and psychological
explanation.  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43:389-403.
  Problems with holism and ceteris paribus laws aren't unique to psychology.
  One finds the same thing in the physical sciences.  So rationality plays no
  special role, and psychological laws are as reasonable as physical laws.

LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1987.  Mind matters.  Journal of Philosophy 630-42.
  Anomalous monism is not committed to epiphenomenalism, as even non-strict
  laws can ground counterfactuals and so support the causal relevance of
  mental properties.

Lycan, W.G. 1981.  Psychological laws.  Philosophical Topics 12:9-38.
  A functionalist defense against anomalous monism.  Psychofunctional laws
  and psychological laws, though not psychophysical laws, may exist.  Rebutting
  arguments from rationality, indeterminism, intensionality, etc.

McDowell, J. 1985.  Functionalism and anomalous monism.  In (B. McLaughlin &
E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_.  Blackwell.
  Against Loar's functionalist reductionism: it doesn't begin to capture the
  normative role of rationality or the subjectivity of the mental.

McLaughlin, B.P. 1985.  Anomalous monism and the irreducibility of the mental.
In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_.  Blackwell.
  A very thorough summary of Davidson's views.  Highly recommended.

McLaughlin, B.P. & LePore, E. (eds) 1985.  _Actions and Events_.  Blackwell.
  30 essays on Davidson.

McLaughlin, B.P. 1992.  Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism.
In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_.  Oxford University Press.
  Comments on Davidson 1992.  Davidson can respond to critics accepting causal
  relevance of mental properties and still denying strict laws.  Davidson
  misconstrues his critics' positions on supervenience.

Melchert, N. 1986.  What's wrong with anomalous monism.  Journal of Philosophy
80:265-74.
  Davidson is concerned with intentional, not phenomenal states; and his
  characterization of these is just as physical states under a certain
  description.  So he avoids epiphenomenalism (contra e.g. Honderich 1982).

Miller, A. 1993.  Some anomalies in Kim's account of Davidson.  Southern
Journal of Philosophy 31:335-44.
  Kim's version of Davidson's argument against psychophysical laws cannot
  work.  Elucidating the notion of a constitutive principle.

Noren, S.J. 1979.  Anomalous monism, events, and `the mental'.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 40:64-74.

Patterson, S.A. 1996.  The anomalism of psychology.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 96:37-52.

Rosenberg, A. 1985.  Davidson's unintended attack on psychology.  In
(B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_.  Blackwell.
  Anomalous monism implies that there aren't even heteronomic psychological
  generalizations, as variables can't be independently measured.

Rowlands, M. 1990.  Anomalism, supervenience, and Davidson on
content-individuation.  Philosophia  295-310.
  Supervenience is compatible with anomalism: biconditional laws are ruled out
  by the disjunctive base, and the wideness of mental states rules out one-way
  psychophysical laws, as there's no single property in the base.

Seager, W.E. 1981.  The anomalousness of the mental.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy 19:389-401.
  Elucidating Davidson's argument, focusing on the argument against
  strict psychophysical laws.  Generalizations involve disjunctive kinds
  and so are heteronomic and not law-like.

Seager, W.E. 1991.  Disjunctive laws and supervenience.  Analysis 51:93-98.
  Argues contra Kim that supervenience is compatible with anomalous monism: the
  the disjunctive generalizations aren't lawlike, as they aren't confirmed by
  their instances.

Smart, J.J.C. 1985.  Davidson's minimal materialism.  In (B. Vermazen &
M. Hintikka, eds) _Essays on Davidson_.  Oxford University Press.
  Some comments on holism, indeterminacy, anomalism, and materialism.

Smith, P. 1982.  Bad news for anomalous monism?  Analysis 42:220-4.
  Response to Honderich 1982: physical events are individuated as mental states
  by virtue of their causal role, so the mental is causally relevant.

Stanton, W.L. 1983.  Supervenience and psychophysical law in anomalous monism.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:72-9.
  Supervenience entails psychophysical principles, but this is compatible with
  anomalous monism.  On what constitutes a strict psychophysical law.

Suppes, P. 1985.  Davidson's views on psychology as a science.  In (B. Vermazen
& M. Hintikka, eds) _Essays on Davidson_.  Oxford University Press.
  Various: physics is indeterministic and intensional, animals have beliefs,
  psychology has derived laws, and decision-theory doesn't need speech.

van Gulick, R. 1980.  Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mental.
Philosophy Research Archives 7:1404.
  Rationality constraints don't introduce an irreducibly normative element into
  intentional attributions.  Rationality serves as a condition of adequacy for
  psychophysical theories, but it doesn't rule them out.

Vermazen, B. & Hintikka, M. (eds) 1985.  _Essays on Davidson_.  Oxford
University Press.
  12 essays on Davidson, with replies.

Zangwill, N. 1993.  Supervenience and anomalous monism: Blackburn on Davidson.
Philosophical Studies 71:59-79.

3.3 Reduction [33]
-------------

Beckermann, A. 1992.  Reductive and nonreductive physicalism.  In (A.
Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for
Nonreductive Physicalism_.  De Gruyter.
  On varieties of physicalism with respect to reduction: semantic physicalism,
  identity theory, supervenience, and the denial of emergence.  Advocates a
  version on which physical states realize mental states.

Bickle, J. 1995.  Psychoneural reduction of the genuinely cognitive: Some
accomplished facts.  Philosophical Psychology 8:265-85.
  Argues that cognitive theories have already been reduced to neurobiology
  in some domains, such as associative learning.  

Bickle, J. 1996.  New wave psychophysical reductionism and the methodological
caveats.  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56:57-78.

Bolender, J. 1995.  Is multiple realizability compatible with antireductionism?
Southern Journal of Philosophy 33:129-42.

Boyd, R. 1980.  Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not
entail.  In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol 1.
MIT Press.

Brooks, D.H.M. 1994.  How to perform a reduction.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 54:803-14.
  Reduction comes to supervenience plus explicability.  Thus biconditionals,
  multiple realizability, etc, are irrelevant.  Biology is already reduced
  (mostly via functional explanation), and psychology looks promising.  Nice.

Bunzl, M. 1987.  Reductionism and the mental.  American Philosophical Quarterly
24:181-9.
  On the links between supervenience, reduction, and explanation. Supervenience
  is compatible with reductive explanation of a localized variety.  We don't
  need laws, but explanatory links.

Churchland, P.M. 1982.  Is `thinker' a natural kind?  Dialogue 21:223-38.
  Psychology shouldn't be autonomous from natural science.  By analogy with
  biology, nature provides (a) conceptual insight, and (b) real constraints,
  e.g. thermodynamic ones.  Biology and psychology are continuous.

Dupre, J. 1988.  Materialism, physicalism, and scientism.  Philosophical
Topics 16:31-56.
  Arguing for a pluralistic conception.  With criticism of Churchland's
  reductionism, Davidson's token identity, and more generally reverential
  "scientism".  Reductionist explanation is not the general rule.

Endicott, R.P. 1991.  Macdonald on type reduction via disjunction.  Southern
Journal of Philosophy 29:209-14.

Endicott, R.P. 1989.  On physical multiple realization.  Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 70:212-24.

Endicott, R.P. 1993.  Species-specific properties and more narrow reductive
strategies.  Erkenntnis 38:303-21.
  On species-specific reductions.  These can't reduce standard psychological
  properties, and problems with intra-species multiple realization can't be
  circumvented without giving up property reduction for token event identity.

Fodor, J.A. 1974.  Special sciences.  Synthese 28:97-115.  Reprinted in (N.
Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980).
  Psychological kinds can't be reduced to physical kinds, due to
  cross-classification, although token physicalism still holds.  How to
  maintain the generality of physics without a reductionist unity of science.

Hill, C.S. 1984.  In defense of type materialism.  Synthese 59:295-320.

Kitcher, P.S. 1980.  How to reduce a functional psychology.  Philosophy of
Science 47:134-40.
  Contra Richardson 1979, a purely functional psychology is irreducible.  The
  genetics analogy is misleading; multiple realizations can't explain
  high-level laws.

Kim, J. 1989.  The myth of non-reductive materialism.  Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63(3):31-47.  Reprinted in
_Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
  Somewhat loose arguments that non-reductive physicalist realism is untenable.
  Anomalous monism makes the mental irrelevant, functionalism is compatible
  with species-specific reduction, and supervenience is weak or reductive.

Kim, J. 1992.  Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:1-26.  Reprinted in _Supervenience
and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
  Multiple realization is compatible with reductionism.  Jade (= jadeite or
  nephrite) isn't a scientific kind, and neither are multiply realizable mental
  properties.  So there's no global psychology, just lots of local reductions.

Kirk, R. 1996.  How physicalists can avoid reductionism.  Synthese 108:157-70.
  Contra Kim, physicalists can avoid reduction by embracing strict implication.

Macdonald, C. 1992.  Psychological type-type reduction via disjunction.
Southern Journal of Philosophy 30:65-69.

Marras, A. 1993.  Psychophysical supervenience and nonreductive materialism.
Synthese 95:275-304.

Melnyk, A. 1995.  Two cheers for reductionism, or, the dim prospects for
nonreductive materialism.  Philosophy of Science 62:370-88.

Menzies, P. 1988.  Against causal reductionism.  Mind 97:551-74.

Montgomery, R. 1990.  The reductionist ideal in cognitive psychology.  Synthese
85:279-314.
  Anti-reductionism needn't be ad hoc (contra Churchland).  Although evolution
  provides some pressure for 1-1 psychophysical mappings, there are significant
  countervailing forces, e.g. in vision, memory, learning, and language use.

Loar, B. 1992.  Elimination versus nonreductive physicalism.  In (D. Charles &
K. Lennon, eds) _Reduction, Explanation and Realism_.  Oxford University Press.

Nelson, A. 1985.  Physical properties.  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
66:268-82.
  Some comments on Wilson 1985: some special-science properties may be
  relevantly different in kind from his expanded physical properties.

Papineau, D. 1985.  Social facts and psychological facts.  In (G. Currie &
A. Musgrave, eds) _Popper and the Human Sciences_.  Martinus Nijhoff.
  Mind is not reducible to body, but societies reduce to individuals.  Multiple
  realization is in tension with predictability.  Natural selection resolves
  the tension for the mental, but cannot for the social.

Papineau, D. 1992.  Irreducibility and teleology.  In (D. Charles & K. Lennon,
eds) _Reduction, Explanation and Realism_.  Oxford University Press.
  Non-reductive physicalism is a mystery unless we invoke teleology.

Pereboom, D. & Kornblith, H. 1991.  The metaphysics of irreducibility.
Philosophical Studies 63:125-45.
  Explicating anti-reductionism: mental causal powers are constituted of
  physical causal powers, but aren't type- or token-identical to them.  Against
  arguments from local reduction, neuroscience, explanatory exclusion, etc.

Richardson, R.C. 1979.  Functionalism and reductionism.  Philosophy of Science
46:533-58.
  Argues that functionalism is compatible with reductionism, by analogies.
  Genetics has multiple realization and multiple function; reduction doesn't
  require biconditionals.  With remarks on the de facto autonomy of psychology.

Richardson, R.C. 1982.  How not to reduce a functional psychology.  Philosophy
of Science 49:125-37.
  Response to Kitcher 1980.  Reductions are usually domain-specific, and
  high-level regularities are indeed explained.
  
van Gulick, R. 1992.  Nonreductive materialism and the nature of
intertheoretical constraint.  In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds)
_Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter.
  On how a nonreductive materialism can handle problems about mental causation,
  psychophysical dependencies, and qualia.  A teleofunctionalist view with
  different conceptual frameworks, but mental properties physically realized.

Wilson, M. 1985.  What is this thing called `pain'? -- The philosophy of
science behind the contemporary debate.  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
66:227-67.
  Argues for type-type identities and for an expanded view of the physical, as
  properties from physics exhibit the same sort of multiple realizability as
  functional properties.  Sophisticated, with many interesting examples.

Wimsatt, W. 1976.  Reductionism, levels of organization, and the mind-body
problem.  In (G. Globus, ed) _Consciousness and the Brain_.  Plenum Press.
  Excellent coverage of the notion of level and its applicability to mind.

Zangwill, N. 1995.  Supervenience, reduction, and infinite disjunction.
Philosophia 24:321-30.

3.4 Psychophysical Relations, Misc [48]
----------------------------------

3.4a Physicalism [11] (see also 1.3, 1.6b, 1,8, 3.1b)
----------------

Crane, T. 1991.  All God has to do.  Analysis 51:235-44.
  If there are no contingent psychophysical laws, then there are no mental
  properties.  So physicalism/supervenience is false; God had extra work to do.

Crane, T. & Mellor, D.H. 1990.  There is no question of physicalism.  Mind
99:185-206.
  Physical sciences have no ontological authority over the mental.  Considers
  and dismisses arguments from laws, causation, reduction, supervenience.

Kirk, R. 1996.  Physicalism lives.  Ratio 9:85-89.
  Nothing in the arguments of Crane and Mellor 1990 count against a
  physicalism based on strict implication.

McGinn, C. 1980.  Philosophical materialism.  Synthese 44:173-206.  Reprinted
in _The Problem of Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991).

Melnyk, A. 1994.  Being a physicalist: How and (more importantly) why.
  Advocates "realization physicalism": all properties are either physical or
  functional properties realized by physical ones.  This achieves unity between
  sciences better than alternatives, and avoids overdetermination.

Melnyk, A. 1996.  Formulating physicalism: Two suggestions.  Synthese
105:381-407.
  Discusses two formulations of physicalism: requiring high-level properties to
  be disjunctions of physical states, or to be functional properties
  realized physically.  Tentatively endorses the latter.

Papineau, D. 1994.  _Philosophical Naturalism_.  Blackwell.

Pettit, P. 1993.  A definition of physicalism.  Analysis 53:213-23.
  Physicalism is the claim that (1) There are microphysical entities, (2)
  Microphysical entities constitute everything, (3) There are microphysical
  regularities, (4) Microphysical regularities govern everything.

Poland, J. 1994.  _Physicalism: The Empirical Foundations_.  Oxford University
Press.

Robinson, D. 1991.  On Crane and Mellor's argument against physicalism.  Mind
100:135-36.

Wilkes, K.V. 1973.  _Physicalism_.  Routledge and Kegan Paul.

3.4b Token Identity [6] (see also 1.8)
-------------------

Horgan, T. & Tye, M. 1985.  Against the token identity theory.  In
(B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_.  Blackwell.
  We individuate mental events by their causal role, but we can't individuate
  causes uniquely.  So each mental event has multiple physical correlates, and
  token identity doesn't hold.

Hornsby, J. 1981.  Which physical events are mental events?  Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society 55:73-92.

Haugeland, J. 1982.  Weak supervenience.  American Philosophical Quarterly
19:93-103.
  Supervenience doesn't imply token identity, and Davidson's argument for token
  identity equivocates on "event". But weak supervenience (mentally discernible
  worlds are physically discernible) is all we need.  With nice examples.

Leder, D. 1985.  Troubles with token identity.  Philosophical Studies 47:79-94.
  Physical/psychological token identity is no good: you can't individuate
  physical events without psychological predicates.

Lurie, Y. 1978.  Correlating brain states with psychological phenomena.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56:135-44.
  Can't isolate the physical token of a belief, say, as it's always accompanied
  by other beliefs.  Meaning doesn't come in discrete tokens.

Peacocke, C. 1979.  Argument for token identity.  In _Holistic Explanation_.
Oxford University Press.

3.4c Emergence [8]
--------------

Beckermann, A. 1992.  Supervenience, emergence, and reduction.  In (A.
Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for
Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter.
  On varieties of supervenience and of emergence, and of what is required for
  reduction.  Argues that reduction involves general explanatory connections,
  whereas emergence involves unique and ultimate bridge laws.

Haldane, J. 1996.  The mystery of emergence.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 96:261-67.
  A defence of radical emergence against Spencer-Smith 1995.

McLaughlin, B.P. 1992.  The rise and fall of British emergentism.    In (A.
Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for
Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter.
  A careful account of British emergentism.  Explicates their view of emergent
  causal powers and laws in terms of fundamental configurational forces, a
  coherent idea that turned out to be false.  An excellent paper.

O'Connor, T. 1994.  Emergent properties.  American Philosophical Quarterly
31:91-104.
  Argues against Alexander's and van Cleve's accounts of emergence, instead
  suggesting an account in terms of supervenience, non-structurality, and
  downward causation.

Spencer-Smith, R. 1995.  Reductionism and emergent properties.  Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society 95:113-29.
  Distinguishes radical, epistemic, and interactional emergence, favoring the
  latter.  With consideration of qualia as a radical emergent.

Stephan, A. 1992.  Emergence -- a systematic look at its historical facets.  In
(A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects
for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter.
  On different ways of understanding emergence: as nonadditivity, novelty,
  nonpredictability, nondeducibility; and on problems about qualia and
  downward causation.

Teller, P. 1992.  A contemporary look at emergence.  In (A. Beckermann,
H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive
Physicalism_. De Gruyter.
  An attempt to explicate "emergent" properties in terms of relational
  properties.  Argues that even problem cases, e.g. space-time separation
  and phenomenal properties, might be treated this way.

van Cleve, J. 1990.  Mind -- dust or magic? Panpsychism versus emergence.
Philosophical Perspectives 4:215-226.
  On Nagel 1979: emergence is more plausible than panpsychism.  A construal of
  emergence as nomological supervenience without logical supervenience.

3.4d Dualism [16] (see also 1.3d)
------------

Averill, E.W. & Keating, B. 1981.  Does interactionism violate a law of
classical physics?  Mind 90:102-7.
  Interactionism is compatible with conservation of energy and momentum: the
  mind exerts a non-physical force on the brain.

Bricke, J. 1975.  Interaction and physiology.  Mind 84:255-9.

Dilley, F.B. 1989.  Mind-brain interaction and psi.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy 26:469-80.

Evans, S. 1981.  Separable souls: A defense of minimal dualism.  Southern
Journal of Philosophy 19.

Larmer, R. 1986.  Mind-Body interactionism and the conservation of energy.
International Philosophical Quarterly 26:277-85.
  Various arguments about interactionism based on conservation of energy.  C of
  E only applies to causally isolated systems, so objections beg the question.

Lowe, E.J. 1992.  The problem of psychophysical causation.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 70:263-76.
  Argues that there can be interaction without breaking physical laws: e.g. by
  basic psychic forces, or by varying physical constants, or especially by
  arranging fractal trees of physical causation leading to behavior.

Mills, E. 1996.  Interactionism and overdetermination.  American Philosophical
Quarterly 33:105-115.
  Argues that interactionist dualism is compatible with the causal closure of
  the physical, if we allow causal overdetermination; and there is a strong
  case for the latter.

Pietroski, P.M. 1994.  Mental causation for dualists.  Mind and Language
9:336-66.

Popper, K. 1977.  Natural selection and the emergence of mind.

Sussman, A. 1981.  Reflection on the chances for a scientific dualism.  Journal
of Philosophy 78:95-118.
  Dualism is an empty hypothesis.  Everything must be matter, though we may
  have to expand the notion of matter.

Richardson, R.C. 1982.  The `scandal' of Cartesian dualism.  Mind 91:20-37.

Taliaferro, C. 1986.  A modal argument for dualism.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy 24:95-108.

van Rooijen, K. 1987.  Interactionism and evolution: A critique of Popper.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38:87-92.

Wassermann, G. 19xx.  Reply to Popper's attack on epiphenomenalism.  British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science.


3.4e Psychophysical Relations, Misc [8]
-----------------------------------

Enc, B. 1983.  In defense of the identity theory.  Journal of Philosophy
80:279-98.

Heil, J. 1992.  _The Nature of True Minds_.  Cambridge University Press.

Honderich, T. 1981.  Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems.
Inquiry 24:277-303.
  Defending lawlike connections between physical states & conscious occurrents.
  Contra anomalous monism and identity theory for occurrents.  But occurrents
  may not be causally efficacious.  Comments by Wilson/Sprigge/Mackie/Stich.

Horgan, T. 1993.  Nonreductive materialism and the explanatory autonomy of
psychology.  In (S. Wagner & R. Warner, eds) _Naturalism: A Critical
Appraisal_.  University of Notre Dame Press.
  Gives four constraints on interlevel connections, and some arguments against
  reductionism and for the autonomy of psychology.  Argues that supervenience
  fact are themselves in need of explanation.

Kernohan, A. 1988.  Non-reductive materialism and the spectrum of mind-body
identity theories.  Dialogue 27:475-88.
  Classifying psychophysical theories by the status (necessary, lawful,
  anomalous, false) of psychophysical/psychological generalizations.  Defending
  autonomous monism: nonreductive materialism with psychological laws.

McGinn, C. 1978.  Mental states, natural kinds and psychophysical laws.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:195-220.  Reprinted in _The Problem
of Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991).
  Argues that mental kinds are not natural kinds, and don't have real essences
  but nominal essences.  For this reason, there are no psychophysical laws.
  With remarks on psychological laws, and the role of behavior.

Skillen, A. 1984.  Mind and matter: a problem which refuses dissolution.  Mind
93:514-26.
  Physical completeness, mental causation, non-reductionism are inconsistent.
  Ryle and Putnam are closet dualists, and Davidson's an epiphenomenalist.

Tye, M. 1989.  _The Metaphysics of Mind_.  Cambridge University Press.


3.5 Mental Causation [43] (see also 2.2c)
--------------------

Antony, L. 1991.  The causal relevance of the mental.  Mind and Language
6:295-327.

Baker, L.R. 1993.  Metaphysics and mental causation.  In (J. Heil & A. Mele,
eds) _Mental Causation_.  Oxford University Press.
  Mental causation is incompatible with strong supervenience and causal closure
  of physics, as we can't distinguish high-level causes from non-causes.  So
  reject the metaphysics and make explanation prior to causation.

Barrett, J. 1994.  Rationalizing explanation and causally relevant mental
properties.  Philosophical Studies 74:77-102.

Blackburn, S. 1991.  Losing your mind: Physics, identity, and folk burglar
prevention.  In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_.  Cambridge
University Press.
  Arguing for the causal efficacy and scientific respectability of higher-order
  states, such as functional-role states.  To require appeal to particular
  physical states is to succumb to a "Tractarian" view of physical primacy.

Block, N. 1989.  Can the mind change the world?  In (G. Boolos, ed) _Meaning
and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Rescuing content from epiphenomenalism via functional role argument; but
  then functional roles aren't really causally efficacious (cf. dormitive
  virtue), so epi all over again?  Roles vs fillers, causation vs explanation.

Block, N. 1995.  Reply: Causation and two kinds of laws.  In (C. Macdonald & G.
Macdonald, eds) _Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological
Explanation_.  Oxford University Press.

Braun, D. 1995.  Causally relevant properties.  Philosophical Perspectives
9:447-75.

Brewer, B. 1995.  Compulsion by reason (Mental Causation II).  Aristotelian
Society Supplement 69:237-53.

Burge, T. 1993.  Mind-body causation and explanatory practice.  In (J. Heil &
A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_.  Oxford University Press.
  Mental causation is not a real worry, but the to-do shows that materialist
  metaphysics has shed little light on it.  It needs to be understood at the
  mental level.  With remarks on exclusion arguments and token identity.

Crane, T. 1990.  On an alleged analogy between numbers and propositions.
Analysis 50:224-30.
  How can a relation to a proposition (an abstract object) be causally
  efficacious?  Analogy with numbers doesn't work: weight properties are only
  pseudo-relational, depending on units, but propositions are absolute.

Crane, T. 1992.  Mental causation and mental reality.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 66:185-202.
  Argues that anomalism and causal closure don't pose problems for mental
  causation as they are false, and that functional properties can efficacious.
  States with content may be efficacious, although content itself may not be.

Crane, T. 1995.  The mental causation debate (Mental causation I).
Aristotelian Society Supplement 69:211-36.
  Argues that mental causation is a deep problem for constitutive (but not
  identity) forms of physicalism.  The only way out is to argue that it is a
  different variety of causation.  But then what motivates physicalism?

Dretske, F. 1993.  Mental events as structuring causes of behavior.  In
(J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_.  Oxford University Press.
  Mental events are structuring causes of behavior; biological events are
  triggering causes, dependent on previous mental structuring.  This allows
  extrinsic properties to play a causal role.

Fodor, J.A. 1989.  Making mind matter more.  Philosophical Topics 17:59-79.
Reprinted in _A Theory of Content and Other Essays_ (MIT Press, 1990).
  Non-strict psychological laws are compatible with the (nomologically
  sufficient) causal responsibility of mental properties.  So there's no need
  for epiphobia.  With comments on the relation between laws and mechanisms.

Heil, J. 1992.  Mentality and causality.  Topoi 11:103-110.
  On various problems with mental causation, and the relationship between
  psychology ans philosophy.

Honderich, T. 1993.  The union theory and anti-individualism.  In (J. Heil &
A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_.  Oxford University Press.
  The identity theory and psychoneural correlation can't handle mental
  causation; only the union theory can.  Anti-individualism causes problems,
  but should be rejected in any case.

Horgan, T. 1989.  Mental quausation.  Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74.
  How mental events are causally relevant qua mental: via an account of "qua"
  causation in general, using counterfactuals on "pertinently similar worlds".

Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1990.  Causation and the philosophy of mind.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Supplement 50:195-214.
  A defense of functional role as a causally efficacious property of physical
  states.  With application to connectionism & eliminativism.

Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1990.  Program explanation: A general perspective.
Analysis 50:107-17.

Jackson, F. 1995.  Essentialism, mental properties, and causation.  Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society.
  How can content properties be causes, given that content is a matter of
  functional role and that functional properties are not causes?  Defends a
  type-identity answer against various objections.

Jackson, F. 1996.  Mental causation.  Mind 105:377-413.
  A "state of the art" review paper, concentrating on problems posed by
  autonomy, functionalism, and externalism, and advocating a sort of identity
  theory.  With discussion of a "map-system" view vs. a language of thought.

Kazez, J.R. 1995.  Can counterfactuals save mental causation?  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 73:71-90.

Kim, J. 1984.  Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation.  Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 9:257-70.  Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
  Psychological causation, like all macrocausation, is supervenient
  epiphenomenal causation.

Kim, J. 1992.  The nonreductivist's trouble with mental causation.  In (J. Heil
& A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_.  Oxford University Press.  Reprinted in
_Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
  Argues that nonreductive materialism implies downward causation (as the
  mental has more causal powers than the physical alone), and that downward
  causation violates the causal closure of the physical.

Kim, J. 1992.  "Downward causation" in emergentism and nonreductive
physicalism.  In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or
Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_.  De Gruyter.
  Argues that nonreductive materialism is just like 1930s emergentism, with the
  the mental contributing new causal powers, and so implies downward causation.

Kim, J. 1993.  Mental causation in a physical world.  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Science and Knowledge_.  Ridgeview.

Kim, J. 1994.  `Second-order' properties and mental causation.  Manuscript.

Kim, J. 1995.  Mental causation: What? Me worry?  In (E. Villanueva, ed)
_Content_.  Ridgeview.

Leiter, B. & Miller, A. 1994.  Mind doesn't matter yet.  Australasian Journal
of Philosophy 72:220-28.
  Argues that the arguments of Fodor and LePore & Loewer don't succeed in
  defeating the threat of epiphenomenalism.

LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1989.  More on making mind matter.  Philosophical
Topics 17:175-91.
  On the problems that irreducibility -- multiple realizability, normativity,
  and non-supervenience -- poses for mental causation.  Criticizes Kim's
  supervenient causation and Fodor's causal powers, and looks to "quasation".

Macdonald, C. & Macdonald, G. 1986.  Mental causes and explanation of action.
Philosophical Quarterly 36:145-58.

Macdonald, C. & Macdonald, G. 1991.  Mental causation and nonreductive monism.
Analysis 51:23-32.

Macdonald, C. & Macdonald, G. 1995.  How to be psychologically relevant.  In
(C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald, eds) _Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on
Psychological Explanation_.  Oxford University Press.

Macdonald, G. 1992.  The nature of naturalism.  Aristotelian Society Supplement
66:225-44.

Marras, A. 1994.  Nonreductive materialism and mental causation.  Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 24:465-93.

McLaughlin, B.P. 1989.  Type epiphenomenalism, type dualism, and the causal
priority of the physical.  Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.
  Physical comprehensiveness and mental/physical non-reductionism don't imply
  mental inefficacy; nor does anomalous monism.  Non-physical types can still
  can be causal, though they must be accompanied by physical causation.

Pettit, P. 1992.  The nature of naturalism.  Aristotelian Society Supplement
66:245-66.
  On making sense of the causal efficacy of higher-level properties under
  naturalism.  They're relevant at the program level, not quite in the way that
  basic properies are.  With remarks on Macdonald's objections.

Robinson, W.S. 1979.  Do pains make a difference to our behavior?  American
Philosophical Quarterly 16:327-34.
  On Goldman's (1969) argument that dualism and causal closure are compatible
  with mental causation.  Goldman establishes only hypothetical necessity,
  not causal necessity

Searle, J.R. 1984.  Intentionality and its place in nature.  Synthese 61:3-16.
  Intentionality is caused by the physical, and causes.  More a 1P emphasis.

Sosa, E. 1984.  Mind-body interaction and supervenient causation.  Midwest
Studies in Philosophy 9:271-81.
  Interactionist dualism is out, supervenient causation is in.  But there are
  problems with mental events' causal relevance qua mental, especially for
  anomalous monism.  Cf: a loud shot causes death, but loudness isn't relevant.

van Gulick, R. 1993.  Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work?  In
(J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_.  Oxford University Press.
  On three arguments against mental causation, from strict laws, non-local
  supervenience, and especially exclusion.  Mental properties are stable,
  recurring high-level patterns with their own causal relevance.

Yablo, S. 1992.  Mental causation.  Philosophical Review 101:245-280.
  Argues that mental events/properties stand to physical events/properties as
  determinable to determinates, solving the exclusion problem.  Some mental
  events are *better* candidates for the cause of action than physical events.

Zangwill, N. 1996.  Good old supervenience: Mental causation on the cheap.
Synthese 106:67-101.
  Argues that anomalous monism is compatible with mental causation:
  supervenience is necessary and sufficient for causal efficacy.

3.6 Functionalism [59] (see also 1.4, 1.7, 4.8)
-----------------

3.6a Causal Role Functionalism (Armstrong/Lewis) [15]
------------------------------------------------

Armstrong, D.M. 1968.  _A Materialist Theory of the Mind_.  Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
  Mental states should be analyzed as states that are apt to bring about
  certain kinds of behavior.  Analysis of all kinds of mental states as such.
  With comments on dualism, behaviorism, identity theory, and consciousness.

Armstrong, D.M. 1970.  The nature of mind.  In (C. Borst, ed) _The Mind/Brain
Identity Theory_.  Macmillan.  Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the
Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980).
  Mental states are internal states that are apt to cause certain behaviors.
  A synthesis between the "thesis" of idealism and the "antithesis" of
  behaviorism.  With defense against objections from consciousness.

Clark, A. 1986.  Psychofunctionalism and chauvinism.  Philosophy of Science
53:535-59.
  Psychofunctionalism can evade chauvinism by specifying different functional
  identifications within each species.  Applying same mental terms to each is
  justified by theory similarity; but it still isn't analytic functionalism.

Goldstein, I. 1994.  Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis
refuted.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:46-62.
  Against functionalism: experiences have intrinsic introspectible acausal
  properties, such as duration, felt location, and unpleasantness.  Both
  analytic and empirical functionalism fail.

Horgan, T. 1984.  Functionalism and token physicalism.  Synthese 59:321-38.
  Formalizing versions of functionalism, and seeing which entail token
  physicalism and/or type physicalism.  On the most plausible versions, we have
  token physicalism without type physicalism.

Hornsby, J. 1984.  On functionalism, and on Jackson, Pargetter, and Prior on
functionalism.  Philosophical Studies 46:75-96.

Jackson, F., Pargetter, R. & Prior, E.W. 1982.  Functionalism and type-type
identity theories.  Philosophical Studies 42:209-25.
  Functionalism is compatible with type identity, as e.g. "pain" designates the
  state-type that fills the right functional role in an organism at a given
  time, i.e. a brain state.  Contra Kripke, pain is not a rigid designator.

Kernohan, A. 1990.  Lewis's functionalism and reductive materialism.
Philosophical Psychology 3:235-46.
  Argues that Lewis's functionalism founders on the specification of behavior.
  Described intentionally => non-materialist; physically => chauvinist.

Lewis, D. 1966.  An argument for the identity theory.  Journal of Philosophy
63:17-25.  Reprinted in _Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1_ (Oxford University
Press, 1980).
  Causal roles are definitive of mental states.  Since physical states fill
  these causal roles (by the explanatory adequacy of physics), mental states
  are physical states.

Lewis, D. 1972.  Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 50:249-58.  Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the
Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980).
  Mental states can be defined, via a Ramsey-sentence analysis of the
  platitudes of folk psychology, as entities that fill causal roles specified
  by the analysis.  These fillers turn out to be physical.

Lewis, D. 1978.  Mad pain and martian pain.  In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the
Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol. 1.  MIT Press.
  Accounting for both pains that don't play the usual causal role and for pains
  that are realized in different substances, by a mixed theory: pain is the
  physical state that typically occupies a certain causal role in a population.

McGinn, C. 1980.  Functionalism and phenomenalism: A critical note.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58:35-46.  Reprinted in _The Problem of
Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991).
  Functionalism (reducing the mental to its effects on the physical) is no more
  plausible than phenomenalism (reducing the physical to its effects on the
  mental).

Owens, J. 1982.  The failure of Lewis's functionalism.  Philosophical Quarterly
36:159-73.
  Lewis's original theory leads to Kripkean reference-fixing, so chauvinism.
  Token functionalism can't deal with paralytics.  Species-relative
  functionalism fails as pain is intrinsic, not extrinsic.

Shoemaker, S. 1981.  Some varieties of functionalism.  Philosophical Topics
12:93-119.  Reprinted in _Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University
Press, 1984).
  Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed
  theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties.  Empirical
  functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false.  A terrific, in-depth paper.

Tye, M. 1983.  Functionalism and type physicalism.  Philosophical Studies
44:161-74.
  Contra Lewis: Functionalism isn't compatible with type physicalism.  There
  are intra-population difficulties with species-relative construals, and
  individual-relative construals can still have multiple fillers.

3.6b Machine Functionalism (Putnam) [15] (see also 4.8)
-----------------------------------

Putnam, H. 1960.  Minds and machines.  In (S. Hook, ed) _Dimensions of Mind_.
New York University Press.  Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_
(Cambridge University Press, 1975).
  The relationship between mental and physical states is just like that between
  logical and structural states of Turing Machines, so no great mystery.  With
  comments on privacy and semantic analysis.

Putnam, H. 1967.  The nature of mental states.  In (Capitan & Merrill, eds)
_Art, Mind, and Religion_.  Pittsburgh University Press.  Reprinted in _Mind,
Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975).
  Why mental states are more likely to be functional states (in probabilistic
  automata) than brain states or behavioral dispositions.

Putnam, H. 1967.  The mental life of some machines.  In (H. Castaneda, ed)
_Intentionality, Minds and Perception_.  Wayne State University Press.
Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975).
  On explaining behavior via TM states, e.g. explaining preference via
  utility functions.  Logical behaviorism assumes rational preference
  functions.  Functional organization is what matters, not physical make-up.

Putnam, H. 1975.  Philosophy and our mental life.  In _Mind, Language, and
Reality_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Psychological states aren't TM states after all: we have lots of psych states
  at once; they depend on learning/memory; disjunctions of TM states are no
  good.  But functional organization rather than physics is still what counts.

Putnam, H. 1987.  _Representation and Reality_.  MIT Press.
  Type functionalism isn't any better than type physicalism, as mental states
  can be multiply realized as functional states.  With what in common?

Lycan, W.G. 1974.  Mental states and Putnam's functionalist hypothesis.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52:48-62.
  On abstract vs. physical TMs: Putnam should say that mental states are
  physical TM states.  But then functionalism is compatible with physicalism.
  On the relation between Putnam's and Armstrong's functionalism.

Lycan, W.G. 1979.  A New Lilliputian argument against machine functionalism.
Philosophical Studies 35:279-87.
  If machine functionalism were true, a homunculus-head would have all the
  mental states of its homunculus (by the definition of "realization"), which
  is absurd.

Lycan, W.G. 1983.  The moral of the New Lilliputian argument.  Philosophical
Studies 43:277-80.
  Reply to Elugardo 1983: so how do you specify what count as inputs/outputs?

Elugardo, R. 1981.  Machine functionalism and the New Lilliputian argument.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62:256-61.
  Criticism of Lycan 1979, and a re-making of the argument.

Elugardo, R. 1983.  Machine realization and the New Lilliputian argument.
Philosophical Studies 43:267-75.
  Lycan's New Lilliputian argument fails as inputs/outputs for the homunculus
  are not the same as inputs/outputs for the full system.

Kane, R.H. 1966.  Turing machines and mental objects

Nelson, R. 1974.  Mechanism, functionalism, and the identity theory.  Journal
of Philosophy 73:365-86.
  Argues for mechanism rather than functionalism.  Criticizes Putnam for
  hypostasizing mental states, which are disanalogous to mental states.
  Defending mechanism against Kalke's & Rorty's objections.

Rorty, R. 1972.  Functionalism, machines and incorrigibility.  Journal of
Philosophy 69:203-20.
  Logical states don't give us any understanding of mind over and above what
  the function/structure distinction gives us.  In particular, it doesn't help
  with the understanding of privacy and incorrigibility.

Tomberlin, J. 1965.  About the identity theory.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 43:295-99.
  Contra Putnam: logical states are not physical states, and utterances about
  them are not about physical states.

Wagner, S.J. 1988.  The liberal and the lycanthrope.  Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 69:165-74.
  Contra Lycan: machine functionalism can handle Bolivia and CRT cases by a
  causal/counterfactual account, and Lilliputian case by assigning mental
  states to minds, not bodies.

3.6c Functionalism, Miscellaneous [29]
---------------------------------

Adams, F. 1979.  Properties, functionalism, and the identity theory.  Eidos
1:153-79.

Bealer, G. 1978.  An inconsistency in functionalism.  Synthese.
  A formal argument showing that functional definitions are equivalent to
  behavioral definitions.

Bealer, G. 1985.  Mind and anti-mind: Why thinking has no functional
definition.  Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:283-328.

Bechtel, W. 1984.  Autonomous psychology: What it should and should not entail.
Philosophy of Science Association 1984, 1:43-55.
  The functional level is the appropriate level for psychology, but
  neurophysiological facts constrain this level and are thus relevant.

Biro, J.I. & Shahan, R.W. (eds) 1982.  _Mind, Brain and Function_.  Oklahoma
University Press.
  Ten papers on functionalism.  Originally was Philosophical Topics, volume 12.

Block, N. 1980.  Functionalism.  In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy
of Psychology_, Vol. 1.  MIT Press.
  Distinguishes varieties of functionalism, e.g. machine and Ramsey-sentence
  functionalism; and compares to behaviorism.  With a historical overview, and
  arguments for why functionalism is incompatible with physicalism.

Block, N. 1978.  Troubles with functionalism.  Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.  Reprinted in _Readings in the Philosophy of
Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980).
  Distinguishes analytic and empirical functionalism.  Both have problems with
  absent qualia, and inputs/outputs.  Analytic functionalism has problems with
  paralytics, etc; empirical functionalism has problems with Martians.

Block, N. & Fodor, J.A. 1972.  What psychological states are not.
Philosophical Review 81:159-81.  Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the
Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980).
  Mental states are not physical or behavioral states; could they be
  functional states?  With various arguments against type identity, and against
  machine-table functionalism.

Cummins, R. 1975.  Functional analysis.  Journal of Philosophy 72:741-64.
Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT
Press, 1980).
  On the role of functional explanation versus other kinds of explanation.
  Functionalism applies an analytic, not subsumptive strategy.

Fischer, J. 1985.  Functionalism and propositions.  Philosophical Studies
48:295-311.

Fodor, J.A. 1968.  Materialism.  In _Psychological Explanation_.  Random House.
  On mental state as inferred theoretical entities, individuated according to
  their function (cf. valve-lifters).  Psychology and neuroscience will
  mutually constrain each other, giving a relation more complex than reduction.

Gendron, B. 1970.  On the relation of neurological and psychological theories:
A critique of the hardware thesis.  Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science
8:483-95.
  Argues that functional explanation are reducible to structural explanations.

Hornsby, J. 1986.  Physicalist thinking and conceptions of behaviour.  In
(P. Pettit & J. McDowell, eds) _Subject, Thought, and Context_.  Oxford
University Press.

Hoy, R.C. 1980.  Dispositions, logical states, and mental occurrents.  Synthese
44:207-40.n

Kalke, W. 1969.  What's wrong with Fodor's and Putnam's functionalism.  Nous
3:83-93.
  There's no absolute functional/structural distinction, as it depends on
  how you choose boundaries and levels of abstraction.

Lycan, W.G. 1981.  Form, function and feel.  Journal of Philosophy 78:24-50.
  Pursue a multi-leveled homuncular functionalism, with mental states
  characterized as states of teleologically identified subsystems.  Even the
  identity theorist is a functionalist at a low level.

Malcolm, N. 1980.  `Functionalism' in philosophical psychology.  Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society 80:211-30.

Pereboom, D. 1991.  Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist.
Synthese 88:341-58.
  Scientific realism requires dispositions of kinds be explained by intrinsic
  properties.  Neural/functional properties won't work, because of reductionism
  and circularity.  Use intrinsic psychological properties instead.

Richardson, R.C. 1979.  Functionalism and reductionism.  Philosophy of Science
46:533-58.
  Argues that functionalism is compatible with reductionism, by analogies.
  Genetics has multiple realization and multiple function; reduction doesn't
  require biconditionals.  With remarks on the de facto autonomy of psychology.

Schiffer, S. 1986.  Functionalism and belief.  In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, eds)
_The Representation of Knowledge and Belief_.  University of Arizona Press.
  Against functionalism for beliefs.  Both common-sense functionalism and
  psychofunctionalism have problems with finding the right functional theory,
  distinguishing beliefs, perceptual input conditions, Twin Earth, etc.

Shope, R.K. 1973.  Functional equivalence and the defense of materialism.
Philosophical Forum 4:500-12.

Sober, E. 1990.  Putting the function back into functionalism.  In (W. Lycan,
ed) _Mind and Cognition_.  Blackwell.
  Need teleological functionalism, not Turing Machine functionalism.

Sober, E. 1985.  Panglossian functionalism and the philosophy of mind.
Synthese 64:165-93.

van Gulick, R. 1982.  Functionalism as a theory of mind.  Philosophy Research
Archives 185-204.
  The structure/function distinction is level-relative, so physiology might be
  relevant even under functionalism.  Problems with automata, and with causal
  connections to nonintentionally characterized behavior.

van Gulick, R. 1980.  Functionalism, information and content.  Nature and
System 2:139-62.  Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell,
1990).

Ward, A. 1989.  Philosophical functionalism.  Behaviorism 17:155-8.

Weckert, J. 1990.  Functionalism's impotence.  Philosophical Inquiry 32-43.

Wilkes, K.V. 1981.  Functionalism, psychology and the philosophy of mind.
Philosophical Topics 12:147-67.
  Functionalism may be appropriate for cognitive psychology but not for folk
  psychology, due to differing goals.  Neuroscience will play an important
  role in developing functional theories.

Zangwill, N. 1992.  Functionalism and variable realization.  Philosophical
Quarterly 42:214-19.
  Argues that the possibility of multiple realization has not been established,
  whether by arguments from imagination, concepts, or empirical facts.

3.7 Psychology and Neuroscience [27]
-------------------------------

Bealer, G. 1987.  The boundary between philosophy and cognitive science.
Journal of Philosophy 86:553-55.
  Philosophy is autonomous: empirical considerations can't affect it.

Bechtel, W. 1983.  A bridge between cognitive science and neuroscience: The
functional architecture of mind.  Philosophical Studies 44:319-30.
  Arguing for the notion of functional architecture as a bridge whereby
  neural components can be components of cognitive processes.

Bub, J. 1994.  Testing models of cognition through the analysis of
brain-damaged patients.  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
45:837-55.

Butler, K. 1994.  Neural constraints in cognitive science.  Minds and Machines
4:129-62.

Cherniak, C. 1994.  Philosophy and computational neuroanatomy. Philosophical
Studies 73:89-107.
  Argues that we can understand the brain under the hypothesis that it is
  optimized to "save wire", due to bounded resources: organization predicts
  placement.  With remarks on the relation between cognitive and neural levels.

Churchland, P.M. 1986.  Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology.
Mind 95:279-309.  Reprinted in _A Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press,
1989).
  Some cute examples of neurophysiological reductions using state-spaces.

Churchland, P.M. 1995.  _The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A
Philosophical Journey into the Brain_.  MIT Press.

Churchland, P.S. 1980.  A perspective on mind-brain research.  Journal of
Philosophy 77:185-207.
  The brain can tell us a lot about the mind.  With examples.

Churchland, P.S. 1982.  Mind-brain reduction: New light from philosophy of
science.  Neuroscience 7:1041-7.

Churchland, P.S. 1986.  _Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the
Mind-Brain_.  MIT Press.
  All about neuroscience, philosophy and prospects for their interaction.

Churchland, P.S. & Sejnowski, T. 1989.  Neural representation and neural
computation.  In (L. Nadel, ed) _Neural Connections, Mental Computations_.
MIT Press.
  About how neuroscience and connectionism affect our conception of mind.

Churchland, P.S. 1987.  Epistemology in the age of neuroscience.  Journal of
Philosophy 84:546-53.
  On paradigm shifts, biology, evolution, connectionism, etc.

Clark, A. 1980.  _Psychological Models and Neural Mechanisms: An Examination of
Reductionism in Psychology_.  Oxford University Press.

Glymour, C. 1994.  On the methods of cognitive neuropsychology.  British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45:815-35.

Hardcastle, V.G. 1992.  Reduction, explanatory extension, and the mind/brain
sciences.  _Philosophy of Science_ 59:408-28.
  The relationship between psychology and neuroscience is best characterized
  not by reduction but by explanatory extension, where each field is enriched
  by the other.  With a number of examples from recent empirical work.

Hatfield, G. 1988.  Neurophilosophy meets psychology: Reduction, autonomy, and
empirical constraints.  Cognitive Neuropsychology 5:723-46.

Klagge, J.C. 1989.  Wittgenstein and neuroscience.  Synthese 78:319-43.
  Wittgenstein wouldn't have liked the Churchlands, as neuro might be chaos,
  and too much neuro might undermine our self-conception nihilistically.

Kobes, B. 1991.  On a model for psycho-neural correlation.  Behavior and
Philosophy 19:1-17.

Madell, G. 1986.  Neurophilosophy: A principled skeptic's response.  Inquiry.

Manier, E. 1986.  Problems in the development of cognitive neuroscience:
Effective communication between scientific domains.  Philosophy of Science
Association 1986, 1:183-97.

McCauley, R. 1986.  Intertheoretic relations and the future of psychology.
Philosophy of Science 53:179-99.
  Incommensurable theories don't necessarily require elimination, if their
  relationship is synchronic/interlevel, rather than diachronic/intralevel.

Mucciolo, L. 1974.  The identity thesis and neuropsychology.  Nous 8:327-42.
  Argues contra Fodor and Block that neurological equipotentiality doesn't
  refute type materialism.  Mental states may not be anatomically defined
  neural states, but they may be more abstract neural holograms.

Rockwell, W.T. 1994.  On what the mind is identical with.  Philosophical
Psychology 7:307-23.
  Argues that the mind is not identical with the brain -- at the very least,
  it's the central nervous system, and perhaps more.  "Brain" does not denote a
  natural kind in neurophysiology.

Smith, A. 1986.  Brain-mind philosophy.  Inquiry 29:203-15.

Skarda, S. 1986.  Explaining behavior: Bringing the brain back in.  Inquiry
29:187-201.

Stone, T. & Davies, M. 1993.  Cognitive neuropsychology and the philosophy of
mind.  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44:589-622.

von Eckardt, B. 1984.  Cognitive psychology and principled skepticism.  Journal
of Philosophy 81:67-88.
  Cognitive psychology can transmogrify itself, who needs neuroscience?

3.8 Psychological Laws [7] (see also 3.2)
----------------------

Antony, L. 1995.  Law and order in psychology.  Philosophical Perspectives
9:429-46.

Fodor, J.A. 1991.  You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything
else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation.  Mind 100:19-34.
  Ceteris paribus means that every realizing state has completing conditions.
  Even absolute exceptions are OK, as long as they're not across-the-board.

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 1990.  Soft laws.  Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15.
  Argues that any laws in intentional psychology have ineliminable same-level
  exceptions; the Kuhnian crisis in cognitive science gives evidence for this.
  But ceteris paribus laws provide perfectly good theoretical explanation.

Mott, P. 1992.  Fodor and ceteris paribus laws.  Mind 101:335-46.

Pietroski, P. & Rey, G. 1995.  When other things aren't equal: Saving ceteris
paribus laws from vacuity.  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
46:81-110.

Schiffer, S. 1991.  Ceteris paribus laws.  Mind 100:1-17.
  There are no ceteris paribus laws, as there's no satisfactory way to cash
  the "unless" cause.  But psychology doesn't need laws, anyway.

Warfield, T.A. 1993.  Folk-psychological ceteris-paribus laws.  Philosophical
Studies 71:99-112.


3.9 Psychological Explanation, Misc [13]
------------------------------------

Cummins, R. 1982.  The internal manual model of psychological explanation.
Cognition and Brain Theory 5:257-68.

Cummins, R. 1983.  _The Nature of Psychological Explanation_.  MIT Press.
  Psychological explanation is typically via functional analysis, not causal
  subsumption.  On interpretation, computation, and an analysis of cognition
  and intentionality.  With remarks on Dretske, Searle, Titchener, Hull, Freud.

Fodor, J.A. 1968.  _Psychological Explanation_.  Random House.

Fodor, J.A. 1968.  The appeal to tacit knowledge in psychological explanation.
Journal of Philosophy 65:627-40.  Reprinted in _RePresentations_ (MIT Press,
1980).

Franks, B. 1995.  On explanation in cognitive science: competence,
idealization, and the failure of the classical cascade.  British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 46.

Haugeland, J. 1978.  The nature and plausibility of cognitivism.  Behavioral
and Brain Sciences 1:215-26.

Heil, J. 1986.  Formalism and psychological explanation.  Journal of Mind and
Behavior 7:1-10.
  On the tension between formal explanation and representational explanation.

Kim, J. 1989.  Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion.  *Philosophical
Perspectives* 3:77-108.  Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
  Discusses the principle: there cannot be two independent explanations of the
  same phenomena.  With application to purposive explanation of behavior,
  theory reduction, and eliminativism, and a discussion of explanatory realism.

Kim, J. 1990.  Explanatory exclusion and the problem of mental causation.  In
(E. Villanueva, ed) _Information, Semantics, and Epistemology_.  Blackwell.
  On the problems posed by explanatory exclusion, and possible solutions.  With
  focus on the problems as they arise for Dretske's and Davidson's theories.

Montgomery, R. 1995.  Explanation and evaluation in cognitive science.
Philosophy of Science 62:261-82.

Morris, M. 1986.  Causes of behavior.  Philosophical Quarterly 36:123-44.

Moser, P. 1994.  Naturalism and psychological explanation.  Philosophical
Psychology 7:63-84.

Sober, E. 1978.  Psychologism.  Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior
8:165-91.

3.10 Philosophy of Mind, General [23]
--------------------------------

Baker, L.R. 1989.  Recent work in the philosophy of mind.  Philosophical Books
30:1-9.
  A general overview.

Bealer, G. 1986.  The logical status of mind.  Midwest Studies in Philosophy
10.

Bechtel, W. 1988.  _Philosophy of Mind: An Overview for Cognitive Science_.
Lawrence Erlbaum.

Burge, T. 1992.  Philosophy of language and mind: 1950-1990.  Philosophical
Review 100:3-52.
  An overview of the last 40 years of the philosophy of language and the
  philosophy of mind, covering many issues and trends.

Carruthers, P. 1986.  _Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the
Philosophy of Mind_.  SUNY Press.

Churchland, P.M. 1984.  _Matter and Consciousness_.  MIT Press.

Dennett, D.C. 1978.  Current issues in the philosophy of mind.  American
Philosophical Quarterly 15:249-261.
  An overview of everything, circa 1978: logical behaviorism, functionalism,
  the identity theory, qualia, meaning, and so on, with bibliography.

Dennett, D.C. 1990.  Granny's campaign for safe science.  In (B. Loewer &
G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.  Blackwell.
  A general treatment of Fodor, identifying him as arch-conservative mentalist.

Dennett, D.C. 1982.  Why we think what we do about why we think what we do.
Cognition.
  Commentary on Goodman 1982.

Goodman, N. 1982.  On thoughts without words.  Cognition 12:211-17.
  Speculation on relationship between thoughts and words.

Graham, G. 1993.  _Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction_.  Blackwell.

Hannay, B. 1994.  _Subjectivity and Reduction: An Introduction to the Mind-Body
Problem_.  Westview Press.

Harman, G. 1989.  Some philosophical issues in cognitive science.  In
(M. Posner, ed) _Foundations of Cognitive Science_.  MIT Press.

Haugeland, J. 1993.  Mind embodied and embedded.  Manuscript.
  Argues that the mind is not just embedded but intimately intermingled with
  the world.  With some systems-theoretic arguments arguing against a
  determinate interface.  Mind is not an inner realm.

Kim, J. 1996.  _Philosophy of Mind_.  Westview Press.

McGinn, C. 1982.  _The Character of Mind_.  Oxford University Press.

Quine, W.V. 1985.  States of mind.  Journal of Philosophy 82:5-8.

Rorty, R. 1982.  Contemporary philosophy of mind.  Synthese 53:323-48.
  In praise of the "Ryle-Dennett" tradition, and the elimination of dualism
  from the philosophy of mind.

Rorty, R. 1993.  Consciousness, intentionality, and pragmatism.  In (S.
Christensen & D. Turner, eds) _Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind_.
Lawrence Erlbaum.
  A pragmatist perspective on the recent history of the philosophy of mind,
  focusing on consciousness, intentionality, and mental representation, and on
  debates between Fodor, Dennett, Searle, Putnam, and Davidson.

Ryle, G. 1949.  _The Concept of Mind_.  Hutchinson and Co.
  The ancestor of most contemporary philosophy of mind.  Among other things,
  argues that the standard "ghost in the machine" view of mind is a category
  mistake, and presents dispositional analyses of many mental concepts.

Shaffer, J.A. 1964.  _Philosophy of Mind_.  Prentice-Hall.

Smith, P. & Jones, O. 1986.  _The Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction_.
Cambridge University Press.

van Gelder, T. 1993.  The distinction between mind and cognition.  Manuscript.
  Argues against the contemporary "Cartesian" view of mind as an ontologically
  homogeneous inner representational realm that causes behavior, arguing for
  a holistic embodied view instead.  Mind is therefore safe from elimination.

--
Compiled by David Chalmers, Department of Philosophy, University of California,
Santa Cruz.  (c) 1996 David J. Chalmers.

Part 4: Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence [457]
=============================================

Contents
--------
4.1  The Turing Test [32]
4.2  Godelian Arguments (Lucas, Penrose) [55]
4.3  The Chinese Room (Searle) [55]
4.4  Machine Consciousness, Misc [34]
4.5  Philosophy of Connectionism [125]
4.5a    Connectionism and Compositionality (Fodor/Pylyshyn) [27]
4.5b    Representation in Connectionism [13]
4.5c    Connectionism and Eliminativism [15]
4.5d    The Connectionist/Classical Debate [19]
4.5e    Subsymbolic Computation (Smolensky) [6]
4.5f    Philosophy of Connectionism, Misc [33]
4.5g    Foundational Empirical Issues [12]
4.6  Dynamic Systems [7]
4.7  Computation and Representation [41]
4.7a    Symbols and Symbol Systems [6]
4.7b    Computational Semantics [16]
4.7c    Implicit/Explicit Representation [8]
4.7d    AI without Representation? [5]
4.7e    Miscellaneous [6]
4.8  Computationalism in Cognitive Science [27]
4.9  Computation and Physical Systems [14]
4.10 Methodological Foundations of AI [14]
4.11 The Frame Problem [11]
4.12 Levels of Analysis (Marr, etc) [10]
4.13 Philosophy of AI, Misc [32]

4.1 The Turing Test [32]
-------------------

Turing, A. 1950.  Computing machinery and intelligence.  Mind 59:433-60.
  Proposes the Imitation game (Turing test) as a test for intelligence: If a
  machine can't be told apart from a human in a conversation over a teletype,
  then that's good enough.  With responses to various objections.

Alper, G. 1990.  A psychoanalyst takes the Turing test.  Psychoanalytic Review
77:59-68.

Barresi, J. 1987.  Prospects for the Cyberiad: Certain limits on human
self-knowledge in the cybernetic age.  Journal for the Theory of Social
Behavior 17:19-46.

Block, N. 1981.  Psychologism and behaviorism.  Philosophical Review 90:5-43.
  A look-up table could pass the Turing test, and surely isn't intelligent.
  The TT errs in testing behavior and not mechanisms.  A nice, thorough paper.


Clark, T. 1992.  The Turing test as a novel form of hermeneutics.
International Studies in Philosophy 24:17-31.

Crawford, C. 1994.  Notes on the Turing test.  Communications of the
Association for Computing Machinery 37:13-15.

Crockett, L. 1994.  _The Turing Test and the Frame Problem: AI's Mistaken
Understanding of Intelligence_.  Ablex.

Davidson, D. 1990.  Turing's test.  In (K. Said, ed.) _Modelling the Mind_.
Oxford University Press.

Dennett, D.C. 1984.  Can machines think?  In (M. Shafto, ed) _How We Know_.
Harper & Row.
  Defending the Turing test as a good test for intelligence.

French, R.M. 1990.  Subcognition and the limits of the Turing test.  Mind
99:53-66.
  The Turing Test is too hard, as it requires not intelligence but human
  intelligence.  Any machine could be unmasked through careful questioning, but
  this wouldn't mean that the machine was unintelligent.

French, R.M. 1995.  Refocusing the debate on the Turing Test: A response.
Behavior and Philosophy 23:59-60.
  Response to Jacquette 1993.

Gunderson, K. 1964.  The imitation game.  Mind 73:234-45.
  The Turing test is not broad enough: there's much more to thought than the
  ability to play the imitation game.

Harnad, S. 1991.  Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old
philosophical problem.  Minds and Machines 1:43-54.
  On the Total Turing Test (full behavioral equivalence) as a test for mind.

Hauser, L. 1993.  Reaping the whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's "Other bodies, other
minds".  Minds and Machines.

Hofstadter, D.R. 1981.  A coffee-house conversation on the Turing test.
Scientific American.
  A dialogue on the Turing test.

Jacquette, D. 1993.  Who's afraid of the Turing test?  Behavior and Philosophy
20:63-74.
  Defending the Turing test against French 1990.  Turing did not intend the
  test to provide a *necessary* condition for intelligence.

Jacquette. D. 1993.  A Turing test conversation.  Philosophy 68:231-33.

Karelis, C. 1986.  Reflections on the Turing test.  Journal for the Theory of
Social Behavior 16:161-72.

Lee, E.T. 1996.  On the Turing test for artificial intelligence.  Kybernetes
25:61.

Leiber, J. 1989.  Shanon on the Turing test.  Journal of Social Behavior.

Leiber, J. 1995.  On Turing's Turing Test and why the matter matters.  Synthese
104:59-69.
  Turing's test is neutral about the structure of the machine that passes it,
  but it must be practical and reliable (thus excluding Searle's and Block's
  counterexamples).

Mays, W. 1952.  Can machines think?  Philosophy 27:148-62.

Michie, D. 1993.  Turing test and conscious thought.  Artificial Intelligence
60:1-22.

Moor, J.H. 1976.  An analysis of Turing's test.  Philosophical Studies
30:249-257.
  The basis of the Turing test is not an operational definition of thinking,
  but rather an inference to the best explanation.

Moor, J.H. 1978.  Explaining computer behavior.  Philosophical Studies
34:325-7.
  Reply to Stalker 1978: Mechanistic and mentalistic explanations are no more
  incompatible than program-based and physical explanations.

Rankin, T.L. 1987.  The Turing paradigm: A critical assessment.  Dialogue
29:50-55.
  Some obscure remarks on lying, imitation, and the Turing test.

Richardson, R.C. 1982.  Turing tests for intelligence: Ned Block's defense of
psychologism.  Philosophical Studies 41:421-6.
  A weak argument against Block: input/output function doesn't guarantee a
  capacity to respond sensibly.

Rosenberg, J. 1982.  Conversation and intelligence.  In (B. de Gelder, ed)
_Knowledge and Representation_.  Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Shanon, B. 1989.  A simple comment regarding the Turing test.  Journal for the
Theory of Social Behavior 19:249-56.
  The Turing test presupposes a representational/computational framework for
  cognition.  Not all phenomena can be captured in teletype communication.

Shieber, S.M. 1994.  Lessons from a restricted Turing test.  Communications of
the Association for Computing Machinery 37:70-82.

Stalker, D.F. 1978.  Why machines can't think: A reply to James Moor.
Philosophical Studies 34:317-20.
  Contra Moor 1976: The best explanation of computer behavior is mechanistic,
  not mentalistic.

Stevenson, J.G. 1976.  On the imitation game.  Philosophia 6:131-33.

4.2 Godelian arguments (Lucas, Penrose) [55]
---------------------------------------

Benacerraf, P. 1967.  God, the Devil, and Godel.  Monist 51:9-32.
  Discusses and sharpens Lucas's arguments.  Argues that the real consequence
  is that if we are Turing machines, we can't know which.

Bowie, G. 1982.  Lucas' number is finally up.  Journal of Philosophy Logic,
11:279-85.
  Lucas's very Godelization procedure makes him inconsistent, unless he has an
  independent way to see if any TM is consistent, which he doesn't.  Right.

Boyer, D. 1983.  J.R. Lucas, Kurt Godel, and Fred Astaire.  Philosophical
Quarterly 33:147-59.
  Remarks on the various ways in which Lucas and a machine might be said to
  "prove" anything, and the ways in which a machine might simulate Lucas.
  The argument has all sorts of level confusions, and a bit of circularity.

Chari, C. 1963.  Further comments on minds, machines and Godel.  Philosophy
38:175-8.
  Can't reduce the lawless creative process to computation.

Chalmers, D.J. 1996.  Minds, machines, and mathematics.  Psyche 2:11-20.

Chihara, C. 1972.  On alleged refutations of mechanism using Godel's
incompleteness results.  Journal of Philosophy 64:507-26.
  An analysis of the Lucas/Benacerraf argument.  On various senses in which a
  machine might come to know its own program.

Coder, D. 1969.  Godel's theorem and mechanism.  Philosophy 44:234-7.
  Only mathematicians understand Godel, so Lucas's argument isn't general; and
  Turing machines can go wrong.  Weak.

Dennett, D.C. 1978.  The abilities of men and machines.  In _Brainstorms_.  MIT
Press.
  There is no unique TM which we are -- there could be many.

Feferman, S. 1996.  Penrose's Godelian argument.  Psyche 2:21-32.

George, F. 1962.  Minds, machines and Godel: Another reply to Mr. Lucas.
Philosophy 37:62-63.
  Lucas's argument applies only to deductive machines, not inductive ones.

Good, I.J. 1967.  Human and machine logic.  British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science 18:145-6.
  Even humans can't Godelize forever.  On ordinals and transfinite counting.

Good, I.J. 1969.  Godel's theorem is a red herring.  British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 19:357-8.
  Rejoinder to Lucas 1967: the role of consistency; non-constructible ordinals.

Grush, R. & Churchland, P. 1995.  Gaps in Penrose's toiling.  In (T. Metzinger,
ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.

Hanson, W. 1971.  Mechanism and Godel's theorem.  British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 22:9-16.
  An analysis of Benacerraf 1967.  Benacerraf's "paradox" is illusory; there
  are no strong consequences of Godel's theorem for mechanism.  

Hofstadter, D.R. 1979.  _Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid_.  Basic
Books.
  Contra Lucas: we can't Godelize forever; and we're not formal on top level.

Hutton, A. 1976.  This Godel is killing me.  Philosophia 3:135-44.
  Gives a statistical argument to the effect that we cannot know that we are
  consistent; so the Lucas argument cannot go through.

Irvine, A.D. 1983.  Lucas, Lewis, and mechanism -- one more time.  Analysis
43:94-98.
  Contra Lewis 1979, Lucas can derive the consistency of M even without the
  premise that he is M.  (Begs the question.)

Hadley, R.F. 1987.  Godel, Lucas, and mechanical models of mind.  Computational
Intelligence 3:57-63.
  A nice analysis of Lucas's argument and the circumstances under which a
  machine might prove another's Godel sentences.  There's no reason to believe
  that machines and humans are different here.

Jacquette, D. 1987.  Metamathematical criteria for minds and machines.
Erkenntnis 27:1-16.
  A machine will fail a Turing test if it's asked about Godel sentences.

King, D. 1996.  Is the human mind a Turing machine?  Synthese 108:379-89.

Kirk, R. 1986.  Mental machinery and Godel.  Synthese.
  Lucas's argument fails, as theorems by humans don't correspond to outputs of
  their formal systems.

Lewis, D. 1969.  Lucas against mechanism.  Philosophy 44:231-3.
  Lucas needs a rule of inference from sentences to their consistency, yielding
  Lucas arithmetic.  No machine can prove all of Lucas arithmetic, but there's
  no reason to suppose humans can either, as the rule is infinitary.

Lewis, D. 1979.  Lucas against mechanism II.  Canadian Journal of Philosophy
9:373-6.
  Reply to Lucas 1970: the dialectical argument fails, as the human's output
  depends on the premise that it is the machine (to derive M's consistency).
  With a similar premise, the machine itself can do equally well.  

Lucas, J.R. 1961.  Minds, machines and Godel.  Philosophy 36:112-127.
  Humans can Godelize any given machine, so we're not a machine.

Lucas, J.R. 1967.  Human and machine logic: a rejoinder.  British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 19:155-6.
  Reply to Good 1967: a human can trump any given machine, so the human is not
  the machine, whether or not the human is superior across the board.

Lucas, J.R. 1968.  Satan stultified: A rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf.  Monist
52:145-58.
  Benacerraf 1967 is empty and omega-inconsistent.  Reply to arguments based on
  difficulty of seeing consistency (e.g. Putnam).  Fallacious but engaging.

Lucas, J.R. 1971.  Metamathematics and the philosophy of mind: A rejoinder.
Philosophy of Science 38:310-13.

Lucas, J.R. 1970.  Mechanism: A rejoinder.  Philosophy 45:149-51.
  Response to Lewis 1969 and Coder 1969.  Lewis misses the dialectical nature
  of the argument.

Lucas, J.R. 1970.  _The Freedom of the Will_.  Oxford University Press.

Lucas, J.R. 1976.  This Godel is killing me: A rejoinder.  Philosophia 6:145-8.
  Contra Hutton, we know -- even if fallibly -- that we are consistent.

Lucas, J.R. 1984.  Lucas against mechanism II: A rejoinder.  Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 14:189-91.
  Reply to Lewis 1979.

Lucas, J.R. 1990.  Mind, machines and Godel: A retrospect.  Manuscript.
  Addresses all the counterarguments.  Fun.

Lyngzeidetson, A.E. & Solomon, M.K. 1994.  Abstract complexity theory and the
mind-machine problem.  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45:549-54.

Lyngzeidetson, A. 1990.  Massively parallel distributed processing and a
computationalist foundation for cognitive science.  British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 41.
  A Connection Machine might escape the Lucas argument.  Bizarre.

Martin, J. & Engleman, K. 1990.  The mind's I has two eyes.  Philosophy 510-16.
  Contra Hofstadter: Lucas can believe his Whitely sentence.

Maudlin, T. 1996.  Between the motion and the act...  Psyche 2:40-51.

McCullough, D. 1996.  Can humans escape Godel?  Psyche 2:57-65.

McDermott, D. 1996.  [Star] Penrose is wrong.  Psyche 2:66-82.

Penrose, R. 1989.  _The Emperor's New Mind_.  Oxford University Press.
  We are non-algorithmic as we can see Godel sentences of any algorithm.

Penrose, R. 1990.  Precis of _The Emperor's New Mind_.  Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 13:643-705.
  Much debate over the "non-algorithmic insight" in seeing Godel sentences.

Penrose, R. 1992.  Setting the scene: The claim and the issues.  In (D.
Broadbent, ed) _The Simulation of Human Intelligence_.  Blackwell.
  An argument from the halting problem to the nonalgorithmicity of mathematical
  thought.  Addresses objections: that the algorithm is unknowable, unsound,
  everchanging, environmental, or random.  New physical laws may be involved.

Penrose, R. 1994.  _Shadows of the Mind_.  Oxford University Press.

Penrose, R. 1996.  Beyond the doubting of a shadow.  Psyche 2:89-129.
  A reply to Chalmers, Feferman, Maudlin, McDermott, etc.

Priest, G. 1994.  Godel's theorem and the mind... again.  In (M. Michael & J.
O'Leary-Hawthorne, eds) _Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the
Study of Mind_.  Kluwer.

Putnam, H. 1985.  Reflexive reflections.  Erkenntnis 22:143-153.
  A generalized Godelian argument: if our prescriptive inductive competence is
  formalizable, then we could not know that such a formalization is correct.

Robinson, W.S. 1992.  Penrose and mathematical ability.  Analysis 52:80-88.
  Penrose's argument depends on our knowledge of the validity of the algorithm
  we use, and here he equivocates between conscious and unconscious algorithms.

Slezak, P. 1982.  Godel's theorem and the mind.  British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 33:41-52.
  General analysis; Lucas commits type/token error; self-ref paradoxes.

Slezak, P. 1983.  Descartes's diagonal deduction.  British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 34:13-36.
  Cogito was a diagonal argument; connection to Godel, Lucas, Minsky, Nagel.

Smart, J.J.C. 1961.  Godel's theorem, Church's theorem, and mechanism.
Synthese 13:105-10.
  A machine could escape the Godelian argument by inductively ascertaining its
  own syntax.  With comments on the relevance of ingenuity.

Tymoczko, T. 1991.  Why I am not a Turing Machine: Godel's theorem and the
philosophy of mind.  In (J. Garfield, ed) _Foundations of Cognitive Science_.
Paragon House.
  Weak defense of Lucas; response to Putnam, Bowie, Dennett.

Wang, H. 1974.  _From Mathematics to Philosophy_.  London.

Webb, J. 1968.  Metamathematics and the philosophy of mind.  Philosophy of
Science 35:156-78.

Webb, J. 1980.  _Mechanism, Mentalism and Metamathematics_.  Kluwer.

Whitely, C. 1962.  Minds, machines and Godel: A reply to Mr. Lucas.
Philosophy 37:61-62.
  Humans get trapped too: "Lucas cannot consistently assert this formula".

Yu, Q. 1992.  Consistency, mechanicalness, and the logic of the mind.  Synthese
90:145-79.

4.3 The Chinese Room (Searle) [55]
-----------------------------

Searle, J.R. 1980.  Minds, brains and programs.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences
3:417-57.
  Implementing a program is not sufficient for mentality, as someone could e.g.
  implement a "Chinese-speaking" program without understanding Chinese.  So
  strong AI is false, and no program is sufficient for consciousness.

Searle, J.R. 1984.  _Minds, Brains and Science_.  Harvard University Press.
  Axiomatizes the argument: Syntax isn't sufficient for semantics, programs are
  syntactic, minds are semantic, so no program is sufficient for mind.

Searle, J.R. 1987.  Minds and brains without programs.  In (C. Blakemore, ed)
_Mindwaves_.  Blackwell.
  More on the arguments against AI, e.g. the Chinese room and considerations
  about syntax and semantics.  Mind is a high-level physical property of brain.

Searle, J.R. 1990.  Is the brain's mind a computer program?  Scientific
American 262(1):26-31.
  On the status of the Chinese Room argument, ten years on.

Anderson, D. 1987.  Is the Chinese room the real thing?  Philosophy 62:389-93.

Boden, M. 1988.  Escaping from the Chinese Room.  In _Computer Models of Mind_.
Cambridge University Press.
  A procedural account of how computers might have understanding and semantics.

Ben-Yami, H. 1993.  A note on the Chinese room.  Synthese 95:169-72.
  A fully functional Chinese room is impossible, as it (for instance) could not
  say what the time is.

Bynum, T.W. 1985.  Artificial intelligence, biology, and intentional states.
Metaphilosophy 16:355-77.
  A chess-playing machine embodied as a robot could have intentional states.
  Reference requires input/output, computation, and context.

Cam, P. 1990.  Searle on strong AI.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy
68:103-8.
  Criticizes Searle's "conclusion" that brains are needed for intentionality,
  notes that even a homunculus has intentional states.  A misinterpretation.

Carleton, L. 1984.  Programs, language understanding, and Searle.  Synthese
59:219-30.
  Arguing against Searle on a number of fronts, somewhat unconvincingly.

Chalmers, D.J. 1992.  Subsymbolic computation and the Chinese Room.  In
(J. Dinsmore, ed) _The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap_.
Lawrence Erlbaum.
  Gives an account of symbolic vs. subsymbolic computation, and argues that the
  latter is less vulnerable to the Chinese-room intuition, as representations
  there are not computational tokens.

Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. 1990.  Could a machine think?  Scientific
American 262(1):32-37.
  Artificial mentality is possible, not through classical AI but through
  brain-like AI.  Argues the syntax/semantics point using an analogy with
  electromagnetism and luminance.

Cohen, L.J. 1986.  What sorts of machines can understand the symbols they use?
Aristotelian Society Supplement 60:81-96.

Cole, D.J. 1984.  Thought and thought experiments.  Philosophical Studies
45:431-44.
  Lots of thought experiments like Searle's, against Searle.  Searle's argument
  is like Leibniz's "mill" argument, with similar level confusions.  Nice but
  patchy.

Cole, D.J. 1991.  Artificial intelligence and personal identity.  Synthese
88:399-417.
  In the Chinese room, neither the person nor the system understands: a virtual
  person does.  This person isn't the system, just as a normal person isn't a
  body.  Follows from the "Kornese" room, which has two distinct understanders.

Cole, D.J. 1991.  Artificial minds: Cam on Searle.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 69:329-33.

Cole, D.J. 1994.  The causal powers of CPUs.  In (E. Dietrich, ed) _Thinking
Computers and Virtual Persons_.  Academic Press.

Copeland, B.J. 1993.  The curious case of the Chinese gym.  Synthese 95:173-86.
  Advocates the systems reply, and criticizes Searle's "Chinese Gym" response
  to connectionism: Searle (like those he accuses) confuses a simulation
  with the thing being simulated.  Nice.

Dennett, D.C. 1987.  Fast thinking.  In _The Intentional Stance_.  MIT Press.
  Argues with Searle on many points.  A little weak.

Double, R. 1983.  Searle, programs and functionalism.  Nature and System
5:107-14.
  The homunculus doesn't have access to the system's intentionality.  The
  syntax/semantics relation is like the neurophysiology/mind relation.

Dyer, M. 1990.  Intentionality and computationalism: minds, machines, Searle
and Harnad.  Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence
2:303-19.
  Reply to Searle/Harnad: systems reply, level confusions, etc.

Dyer, M. 1990.  Finding lost minds.  Journal of Experimental and Theoretical
Artificial Intelligence 2:329-39.
  Reply to Harnad 1990: symbols, other minds, physically embodied algorithms.

Fields, C. 1984.  Double on Searle's Chinese Room.  Nature and System 6:51-54.
  Double's argument implies that the brain isn't the basis of intentionality.

Fisher, J. 1988.  The wrong stuff: Chinese rooms and the nature of
understanding.  Philosophical Investigations 11:279-99.

Fodor, J.A. 1991.  Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room.  In (D. Rosenthal, ed)
_The Nature of Mind_.  Oxford University Press.
  The Chinese room isn't even implementing a Turing machine, because it doesn't
  use proximal causation.  With a reply by Searle.

Globus, G. 1991.  Deconstructing the Chinese room.  Journal of Mind and
Behavior 12:377-91.

Hanna, P. 1985.  Causal powers and cognition.  Mind 94:53-63.
  Argues that Searle is confused, and underestimates computers.  Weak.

Harnad, S. 1989.  Minds, machines and Searle.  Journal of Experimental and
Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1:5-25.
  Non-symbolic function is necessary for mentality.  Trying hard to work out a
  theory of why the Chinese Room shows what it does.  Nice but wrong.

Harnad, S. 1990.  Lost in the hermeneutical hall of mirrors.  Journal of
Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 2:321-27.
  Reply to Dyer 1990: on the differences between real and as-if intentionality.

Hayes, P., Harnad, S., Perlis, D. & Block, N. 1992.  Virtual symposium on
virtual mind.  Minds and Machines 2.
  A discussion about the Chinese room, symbol grounding, and so on.

Hofstadter, D.R. 1981.  Reflections on Searle.  In (D. Hofstadter & D. Dennett,
eds) _The Mind's I_, pp. 373-382.  Basic Books.
  Searle is committing a level confusion, and understates the complexity of the
  case.  We can move from the CR to a brain (with a demon) by twiddling knobs,
  and the systems reply should work equally well in both cases.

Jacquette, D. 1989.  Searle's intentionality thesis.  Synthese 80:267-75.
  Searle's view implies that intentional causation is not efficient causation.

Jacquette, D. 1989.  Adventures in the Chinese Room.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 49:605-23.
  If we had microfunctional correspondence, the CR argument would fail.  With
  points about the status of abstract/biological intentionality.  A bit weak.

Searle, J.R. 1989.  Reply to Jacquette.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 49:701-8.
  Jacquette misses the point of the argument.  Also, biological and abstract
  intentionality are quite compatible.

Jacquette, D. 1990.  Fear and loathing (and other intentional states) in
Searle's Chinese Room.  Philosophical Psychology 3:287-304.
  Reply to Searle on CR, central control, biological intentionality & dualism.

Jahren, N. 1990.  Can semantics be syntactic?  Synthese 82:309-28.
  Against Rapaport's Korean Room argument -- syntax isn't enough.

Korb, K. 1991.  Searle's AI program.  Journal of Experimental and Theoretical
Artificial Intelligence 3:283-96.
  The Chinese room doesn't succeed as an argument about semantics.  At best it
  might succeed as an argument about consciousness.

Maloney, J.C. 1987.  The right stuff.  Synthese 70:349-72.
  Defends Searle against all kinds of objections.  Exhaustive but flawed.

Melnyk, A. 1996.  Searle's abstract argument against strong AI.  Synthese
108:391-419.

Moor, J.H. 1988.  The pseudorealization fallacy and the Chinese Room argument.
In (J. Fetzer, ed) _Aspects of AI_.  D. Reidel.
  Computational systems must also meet performance criteria.

Newton, N. 1989.  Machine understanding and the Chinese Room.  Philosophical
Psychology 2:207-15.
  A program can possess intentionality, even if not consciousness.

Obermeier, K.K. 1983.  Wittgenstein on language and artificial intelligence:
The Chinese-room thought-experiment revisited.  Synthese 56:339-50.

Pfeifer, K. 1992.  Searle, strong AI, and two ways of sorting cucumbers.
Journal of Philosophical Research 17:347-50.

Rapaport, W. 1984.  Searle's experiments with thought.  Philosophy of Science
53:271-9.
  Comments on Cole, and some general material on syntax and semantics.

Rey, G. 1986.  What's really going on in Searle's `Chinese Room'.
Philosophical Studies 50:169-85.
  Recommends the systems reply, and a causal account of semantics.  Discusses
  the relevance of wide and narrow notions of content, and the tension
  between Searle's positive and negative proposals.

Roberts, L. 1990.  Searle's extension of the Chinese Room to connectionist
machines.  Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence
2:185-7.
  In arguing against the relevance of the serial/parallel distinction to mental
  states, Searle becomes a formalist.  A nice point.

Russow, L-M. 1984.  Unlocking the Chinese Room.  Nature and System 6:221-8.
  Searle's presence in the room destroys the integrity of the system, so that
  it is no longer a proper implementation of the program.

Seidel, A. 1988.  Searle on the biological basis of cognition.  Analysis
48:26-28.

Seidel, A. 1989.  Chinese Rooms A, B and C.  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
20:167-73.
  A person running the program, with interpretations at hand, would understand.
  Point-missing.

Sharvy, R. 1985.  Searle on programs and intentionality.  Canadian Journal of
Philosophy Supplement 11:39-54.
  Argues against Searle, but misses the point for the most part.

Sloman, A. 1986.  Did Searle attack Strong Strong AI or Weak Strong AI?  In
(Cohn & Thomas, eds) _Artificial Intelligence and its Applications_.
Chichester.

Suits, D. 1989.  Out of the Chinese Room.  Computing and Philosophy Newsletter
4:1-7.
  Story about homunculi within homunculi.  Fun.

Thagard, P. 1986.  The emergence of meaning: An escape from Searle's Chinese
Room.  Behaviorism 14:139-46.
  Get semantics computationally via induction and functional roles.

Weiss, T. 1991.  Closing the Chinese room.  Ratio 3:165-81.
  Searle-in-the-room isn't in a position to know about the system's
  first-person states.  Intrinsic intentionality is an incoherent notion.

Whitmer, J.M. 1983.  Intentionality, artificial intelligence, and the causal
powers of the brain.  Auslegung 10:194-210.
  Defending Searle's position, with remarks on the "causal powers" argument.

4.4 Machine Consciousness, Misc [34]
-------------------------------

Angel, L. 1989.  _How to Build a Conscious Machine_.  Westview Press.

Angel, L. 1994.  Am I a computer?  In (E. Dietrich, ed) _Thinking Computers and
Virtual Persons_.  Academic Press.

Barnes, E. 1991.  The causal history of computational activity: Maudlin and
Olympia.  Journal of Philosophy 88:304-16.
  Response to Maudlin 1989.  True computation needs active, not passive
  causation, so Maudlin's machine isn't really computing.

Birnbacher, D. 1995.  Artificial consciousness.  In (T. Metzinger, ed)
_Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.

Bringsjord, S. 1992.  _What Robots Can and Can't Be_.  Kluwer.

Bringsjord, S. 1994.  Could, how could we tell if, and should -- androids have
inner lives?  In (K.M. Ford, C. Glymour, & P. Hayes, eds) _Android
Epistemology_.  MIT Press.

Cohen, L.J. 1955.  Can there be artificial minds?  Analysis 16:36-41.
  Subservience to known or knowable rules is incompatible with mentality.

Dennett, D.C. 1985.  Can machines think?  In _How We Know_ (Shafto).
  Defends the Turing Test, among other things.

Dennett, D.C. 1994.  The practical requirements for making a conscious robot.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 349:133-46.

Dennett, D.C. 1995.  Cog: Steps toward consciousness in robots.  In (T.
Metzinger, ed) _Conscious Experience_.  Ferdinand Schoningh.

Glennan, S.S. 1995.  Computationalism and the problem of other minds.
Philosophical Psychology 8:375-88.

Gunderson, K. 1968.  Robots, consciousness and programmed behaviour.  British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19:109-22.

Gunderson, K. 1969.  Cybernetics and mind-body problems.  Inquiry 12:406-19.

Gunderson, K. 1971.  _Mentality and Machines_.  Doubleday.

Hauser, L. 1993.  Why isn't my pocket calculator a thinking thing?  Minds and
Machines 3.

Kirk, R. 1986.  Sentience, causation and some robots.  Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 64:308-21.
  One could model brain states with monadic states and appropriate connections.
  But surely that's not intelligent -- the causation has the wrong form.  Nice.

Mackay, D. 1951.  Mind-life behavior in artifacts.  British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 2:105-21.

Maudlin, T. 1989.  Computation and consciousness.  Journal of Philosophy
86:407-32.
  Computational state is not sufficient for consciousness, as it can be
  instantiated by a mostly inert object.  A very nice thought-experiment,
  raising questions about the relevance of counterfactuals to consciousness.

Mays, W. 1952.  Can machines think?  Philosophy 27:148-62.

McCarthy, J. 1996.  Making robots conscious of their mental states.  In (S.
Muggleton, ed) _Machine Intelligence 15_.  Oxford University Press.

McGinn, C. 1987.  Could a machine be conscious?  In (C. Blakemore & S.
Greenfield, ed) _Mindwaves_.  Blackwell.  Reprinted in _The Problem of
Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1980).
  Of course, as we are machines.  But what *sort* of machines are conscious,
  and in virtue of what properties?  Remarks on artefacts, life, functionalism,
  and computationalism.  So far, we don't know what makes the brain conscious.

Negley, G. 1951.  Cybernetics and theories of mind.  Journal of Philosophy
48:574-82.

Puccetti, R. 1966.  Can humans think?  Analysis.

Puccetti, R. 1967.  On thinking machines and feeling machines.  British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 18:39-51.
  Machines can think but can't feel, so aren't persons.

Putnam, H. 1960.  Minds and machines.  In (S. Hook, ed) _Dimensions of Mind_.
New York University Press.  Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_
(Cambridge University Press, 1975).
  Suggests that the mind-body problem is precisely analogous to the
  relationship between logical and structural states of a Turing Machine,

Putnam, H. 1964.  Robots: machines or artificially created life?  Journal of
Philosophy 61:668-91.  Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge
University Press, 1975).
  Various arguments and counter-arguments re machine consciousness and civil
  liberties.  Problems of machine consciousness are analogous to problems of
  human consciousness.  The structural basis of the two may well be the same.

Putnam, H. 1967.  The mental life of some machines.  In (H. Castaneda, ed)
_Intentionality, Minds and Perception_.  Wayne State University Press.
Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975).
  More on TMs: explaining their psychology via preference functions.

Scriven, M. 1953.  The mechanical concept of mind.  Mind.
  To speak of a conscious machine is to commit a semantic mistake.
  Consciousness presupposes life and non-mechanism.  Later retracted.

Scriven, M. 1960.  The compleat robot: A prolegomena to androidology.  In
(S. Hook, ed) _Dimensions of Mind_.  New York University Press.
  A machine could possess every characteristic of human thought: e.g. freedom,
  creativity, learning, understanding, perceiving, feeling.

Stubenberg, L. 1992.  What is it like to be Oscar?  Synthese 90:1-26.
  Argues that AI systems like Pollock's Oscar needn't be conscious.  Blindsight
  tells us that complex perceptual processing can go on unconsciously.

Thompson, D. 1965.  Can a machine be conscious?  British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 16:36.
  Accepting machine consciousness would have few philosophical consequences,
  whereas rejecting it would tend to commit one to epiphenomenalism.

Turing, A. 1950.  Computing machinery and intelligence.  Mind 59:433-60.
  Proposing an operational criterion (the "Turing test") for whether a machine
  could think: indistinguishability from humans in conversation over teletype.
  With replies to objections (consciousness, theology, originality, etc).

van de Vete, D. 1971.  The problem of robot consciousness.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 32:149-65.

Ziff, P. 1959.  The feelings of robots.  Analysis.
  Of course robots can't think: they're not alive, so this gives us good reason
  not to rely on behavior.  With replies by J.J.C. Smart, N. Smart.

4.5 Philosophy of Connectionism [125]
-------------------------------

4.5a Connectionism and Compositionality (Fodor/Pylyshyn) [27]
--------------------------------------------------------

Fodor, J.A. & Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1988.  Connectionism and cognitive architecture.
Cognition 28:3-71.
  Connectionist models can't explain cognitive systematicity and productivity,
  as their representations lack compositional structure.  The allures of
  connectionism are illusory; it's best used as an implementation strategy.

Antony, M. 1991.  Fodor and Pylyshyn on connectionism.  Minds and Machines
1:321-41.
  Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument is an invalid instance of inference to the best
  explanation, as there is much to explain than systematicity.  Connectionism
  and classicism may be compatible even without implementation, in any case.

Butler, K. 1991.  Towards a connectionist cognitive architecture.  Mind and
Language 6:252-72.
  Connectionism can make do with unstructured representations, as long have
  they have the right causal relations between them.

Butler, K. 1993.  Connectionism, classical cognitivism, and the relation
between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis.  Philosophical
Psychology 6:321-33.
  Contra Chalmers 1993, F&P's argument doesn't apply at the implementational
  level.  Contra Chater and Oaksford 1990, connectionism can't be purely
  implementational, but some implementational details can be relevant.

Butler, K. 1993.  On Clark on systematicity and connectionism.  British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44:37-44.
  Argues against Clark on holism and the conceptual truth of systematicity.

Butler, K. 1995.  Compositionality in cognitive models: The real issue.
Philosophical Studies 78:153-62.

Chalmers, D.J. 1990.  Syntactic transformations on distributed representations.
Connection Science 2:53-62.
  An experimental demonstration that connectionist models can handle
  structure-sensitive operations in a non-classical way, transforming
  structured representations of active sentences to passive sentences.

Chalmers, D.J. 1993.  Connectionism and compositionality: Why Fodor and
Pylyshyn were wrong.  Philosophical Psychology 6:305-319.
  Points out a structural flaw in F&P's argument, and traces the problem to
  a lack of appreciation of distributed representation.  With some empirical
  results on structure sensitive processing, and some remarks on explanation.

Chater, N. & Oaksford, M. 1990.  Autonomy, implementation and cognitive
architecture: A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn.  Cognition 34:93-107.
  Implementation can make a difference at the algorithmic level.

Christiansen, M.H. & Chater, N. 1994.  Generalization and connectionist
language learning.  Mind and Language 9:273-87.

Fodor, J.A. & McLaughlin, B.P. 1990.  Connectionism and the problem of
systematicity: Why Smolensky's solution doesn't work.  Cognition 35:183-205.
  Smolensky's weak compositionality is useless; and tensor product architecture
  can't support systematicity, as nonexistent tokens can't play a causal role.

Hadley, R.F. 1994.  Systematicity in connectionist language learning.  Mind and
Language 9:247-72.
  Argues that existing connectionist models do not achieve an adequate
  systematicity in learning; they fail to generalize to handle structures with
  novel constituents.

Hadley, R.F. 1994.  Systematicity revisited.  Mind and Language 9:431-44.

Hawthorne, J. 1989.  On the compatibility of connectionist and classical
models.  Philosophical Psychology 2:5-16.
  Localist connectionist models may not be able to handle structured
  presentation, but appropriate distributed models can.

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 1991.  Structured representations in connectionist
systems?  In (Davis, ed) _Connectionism: Theory and Practice_.
  A discussion of how connectionism might achieve "effective syntax" without
  implementing a classical system.

Matthews, R.J. 1994.  Three-concept monte: Explanation, implementation, and
systematicity.  Synthese 101:347-63.
  F&P deal a sucker bet: on their terms, connectionism could never give a
  a non-implementational explanation of systematicity, as the notions are
  construed in a manner specific to classical architectures.

McLaughlin, B.P. 1992.  Systematicity, conceptual truth, and evolution.
In _Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences_.
  Against responses to Fodor and Pylyshyn claiming that cognitive theories
  needn't explain systematicity.  Contra Clark, the conceptual truth of
  systematicity won't help.  Contra others, nor will evolution.

McLaughlin, B.P. 1993.  The connectionism/classicism battle to win souls.
Philosophical Studies 71.
  Argues that no connectionist model so far has come close to explaining
  systematicity.  Considers the models of Elman, Chalmers, and Smolensky.

Niklasson, L.F. & van Gelder, T. 1994.  On being systematically connectionist.
Mind and Language 9:288-302.

Pollack, J.B. 1990.  Recursive distributed representations.  Artificial
Intelligence 46:77-105.
  Develops a connectionist architecture -- recursive auto-associative memory --
  that can recursively represent compositional structures in distributed form.

Rowlands, M. 1994.  Connectionism and the language of thought.  British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45:485-503.
  F&P's argument confuses constituent structure with logical/sentential
  structure.  Connectionism is a psychotechtonic project, whereas propositional
  description is a psychosemantic project.

Smolensky, P. 1987.  The constituent structure of connectionist mental states.
Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26:137-60.
  F&P ignore distributed representation and interaction effects.

Smolensky, P. 1990.  Tensor product variable binding and the representation of
symbolic structures in connectionist systems.  Artificial Intelligence
46:159-216.
  Develops a connectionist architecture that represents compositional
  structures as tensor products of distributed representations.

Smolensky, P. 1991.  Connectionism, constituency and the language of thought.
In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_.
Blackwell.
  Connectionism can do compositionality its own way, including both weak
  compositionality (with context effects) or strong compositionality (via
  tensor products).

Smolensky, P. 1995.  Constituent structure and explanation in an integrated
connectionist/symbolic cognitive architecture.  In (C. Macdonald, ed)
_Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation_.  Blackwell.

van Gelder, T. 1990.  Compositionality: A connectionist variation on a
classical theme.  Cognitive Science 14:355-84.
  Connectionism can do compositionality functionally.  All one needs is the
  right functional relation between representations; physical concatenation is
  not necessary.

van Gelder, T. 1991.  Classical questions, radical answers.  In (T. Horgan &
J. Tienson, eds) _Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind_.  Kluwer.
  On connectionism as a Kuhnian paradigm shift in cognitive science, with
  emphasis on the implications of functional compositionality and distributed
  representations.


4.5b Representation in Connectionism [13]
------------------------------------

Butler, K. 1995.  Representation and computation in a deflationary assessment
of connectionist cognitive science.  Synthese 104:71-97.

Clark, A. 1989.  Connectionism, non-conceptual content, and representational
redescription.  Manuscript.
  On some troubles connectionism has with higher-order knowledge.  Contrasts
  Cussins, Karmiloff-Smith on development.  Subsymbols without symbols are
  blind.

Clark, A. 1993.  _Associative Engines: Connectionism, Concepts, and
Representational Change_.  MIT Press.

Clark, A. & Karmiloff-Smith, A. 1994.  The cognizer's innards: A psychological
and philosophical perspective on the development of thought.  Mind and
Language 8:487-519.
  On the importance of representational redescription, and on the limits of
  connectionist networks in cross-domain knowledge transfer.  What does a true
  believer need, above behavior: conceptual combination, real-world fluency?

Cummins, R. 1991.  The role of representation in connectionist explanation of
cognitive capacities.  In (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds)
_Philosophy and Connectionist Theory_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.
  Connectionism isn't really radical.  There's no new concept of representation
  or of learning, and cognition can still be the manipulation of semantically
  structured representations.

Cussins, A. 1990.  The connectionist construction of concepts.  In (M. Boden,
ed) _The Philosophy of AI_.  Oxford University Press.
  Connectionism builds up concepts from the nonconceptual level.  From
  nonconceptual content (e.g. perceptual experiences) to the emergence of
  objectivity.

Goschke, T. & Koppelberg, D. 1990.  Connectionism and the semantic content of
internal representation.  Review of International Philosophy 44:87-103.

Goschke, T. & Koppelberg, D. 1991.  The concept of representation and the
representation of concepts in connectionist models.  In (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, &
D. Rumelhart, eds) _Philosophy and Connectionist Theory_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.
  On correlational semantics and context-dependent representations.

Hatfield, G. 1991.  Representation and rule-instantiation in connectionist
systems.  In (T. Horgan & J. Tienson, eds) _Connectionism and the Philosophy of
Mind_.  Kluwer.  
  Some remarks on psychology & physiology.  Even connectionism uses
  psychological concepts.

Hatfield, G. 1991.  Representation in perception and cognition: Connectionist
affordances.  In (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds) _Philosophy and
Connectionist Theory_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Ramsey, W. 1994.  Do connectionist representations earn their explanatory
keep?  Manuscript.
  Argues that talk of representations has no explanatory role in connectionist
  theory, and can be discarded.  It can't be understood along the lines of the
  teleo-informational or classical frameworks.

Tye, M. 1987.  Representation in pictorialism and connectionism.  Southern
Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26:163-184.
  Pictorialism isn't compatible with language of thought, but connectionism
  might be.

van Gelder, T. 1991.  What is the D in PDP?  In (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, &
D. Rumelhart, eds) _Philosophy and Connectionist Theory_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.
  Argues that distributed representation is best analyzed in terms of
  superposition of representation, not in terms of extendedness.

4.5c Connectionism and Eliminativism [15]
------------------------------------

Ramsey, W., Stich, S.P. & Garon, J. 1991.  Connectionism, eliminativism and the
future of folk psychology.  In (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds)
_Philosophy and Connectionist Theory_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.
  Connectionism implies eliminativism, as connectionist systems do not have
  functionally discrete contentful states, and folk psychology is committed to
  functional discreteness of propositional attitudes.

Bickle, J. 1993.  Connectionism, eliminativism, and the semantic view of
theories.  Erkenntnis.
  Outlines the semantic view of scientific theories, and applies it to the
  connectionism/eliminativism debate.  There's no reason why folk psychology
  shouldn't be reducible, in a homogeneous or heterogeneous way.

Botterill, G. 1994.  Beliefs, functionally discrete states, and connectionist
networks.  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45:899-906.
  Distinguishes active from dispositional beliefs: the former are realized
  discretely in activation patterns, the latter nondiscretely in weights,
  which is all that folk psychology needs.

Clapin, H. 1991.  Connectionism isn't magic.  Minds and Machines 1:167-84.
  Commentary on Ramsey/Stich/Garon.  Connectionism has symbols that interact,
  and has propositional modularity in processing if not in storage.

Clark, A. 1989.  Beyond eliminativism.  Mind and Language 4:251-79.
  Connectionism needn't imply eliminativism, as higher levels may have a causal
  role, if not causal completeness.  Also, it may not tell the whole story.

Clark, A. 1990.  Connectionist minds.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
90:83-102.
  Responding to eliminativist challenge via cluster analysis and recurrence.

Davies, M. 1991.  Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought.
(W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds) _Philosophy and Connectionist
Theory_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.
  Argues that our conception of thought requires causal systematicity, which
  requires a language of thought.  Connectionist systems are not causally
  systematic, so connectionism leads to eliminativism.

Egan, F. 1995.  Folk psychology and cognitive architecture.  Philosophy of
Science 62:179-96.

Forster, M. & Saidel, E. 1994.  Connectionism and the fate of folk psychology.
Philosophical Psychology 7:437-52.
  Contra Ramsey, Stich, and Garon, connectionist representations can be seen
  to be functionally discrete on an appropriate analysis of causal relevance.

Horgan, T., and Tienson, J. 1995.  Connectionism and the commitments of folk
psychology.  Philosophical Perspectives 9:127-52.

O'Brien, G. 1991.  Is connectionism commonsense?  Philosophical Psychology
4:165-78.

O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. 1994.  On the threat of eliminativism.  Philosophical
Studies 74:325-46.
  A dispositional construal of beliefs and desires can distinguish the relevant
  active states (via counterfactuals) and is compatible with FP, so internals
  can't threaten FP.  With remarks on Davidson, overdetermination, etc.

Ramsey, W. 1994.  Distributed representation and causal modularity: A rejoinder
to Forster and Saidel.  Philosophical Psychology 7:453-61.
  Upon examination, the model of Forster and Saidel 1994 does not exhibit
  features that are both distributed and causally discrete.

Smolensky, P. 1995.  On the projectable predicates of connectionist psychology:
A case for belief.  In (C. Macdonald, ed) _Connectionism: Debates on
Psychological Explanation_.  Blackwell.

Stich, S. & Warfield, T. 1995.  Reply to Clark and Smolensky: Do connectionist
minds have beliefs?  In (C. Macdonald, ed) _Connectionism: Debates on
Psychological Explanation_.  Blackwell.

4.5d The Connectionist/Classical Debate [19]
---------------------------------------

Adams, F., Aizawa, K. & Fuller, G. 1992.  Rules in programming languages and
networks.  In (J. Dinsmore, ed) _The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms:
Closing the Gap_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.
  The distinction between programming languages and networks is neutral on
  rule-following, etc, so there's nothing really new about connectionism.

Aizawa, K. 1994.  Representations without rules, connectionism, and the
syntactic argument.  Synthese 101:465-92.

Bringsjord, S. 1991.  Is the connectionist-logicist debate one of AI's
wonderful red herrings?  Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial
Intelligence 3:319-49.
  A detailed analysis purporting to show that connectionism and "logicism" are
  compatible, as Turing machines can do everything a neural network can.
  Entertaining, but misunderstands subsymbolic processing.

Broadbent, D. 1985.  A question of levels: Comment on McClelland and Rumelhart.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 114:189-92.
  Distributed models are at the implementational, not computational, level.

Chandrasekaran, B., Goel, A. & Allemang, D. 1988.  Connectionism and
information-processing abstractions.  AI Magazine 24-34.
  Connectionism won't affect AI too much, as AI is concerned with the
  information-processing (task) level.  With greater modularity, connectionism
  will look more like traditional AI.

Corbi, J.E. 1993.  Classical and connectionist models: Levels of description.
Synthese 95: 141-68.

Dennett, D.C. 1986.  The logical geography of computational approaches: A view
from the east pole.  In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, eds) _The Representation of
Knowledge and Belief_.  University of Arizona Press.
  Drawing the battle-lines: High Church Computationalism at the "East Pole",
  New Connectionism, Zen Holism, etc, at various locations on the "West Coast".
  With remarks on connectionism, and on AI as thought-experimentation.

Dennett, D.C. 1991.  Mother Nature versus the walking encyclopedia.  In
(W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds) _Philosophy and Connectionist
Theory_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.
  Reiterating the value of connectionism, especially biological plausibility.

Dinsmore, J. (ed) 1992.  _The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the
Gap_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Dyer, M. 1991.  Connectionism versus symbolism in high-level cognition.  In
(T. Horgan & J. Tienson, eds) _Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind_.
Kluwer.

Garson, J.W. 1991.  What connectionists cannot do: The threat to Classical AI.
In (T. Horgan & J. Tienson, eds) _Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind_.
Kluwer.
  Connectionism and classicism aren't necessarily incompatible on symbolic
  discreteness, causal role, functional discreteness, constituency,
  representation of rules.

Garson, J.W. 1994.  No representations without rules: The prospects for a
compromise between paradigms in cognitive science.  Mind and Language 9:25-37.

Garson, J.W. 1994.  Cognition without classical architecture.  Synthese
100:291-306.

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 1987.  Settling into a new paradigm.  Southern Journal
of Philosophy Supplement 26:97-113.
  On connectionism, basketball, and representation without rules.  Responses
  to the "syntactic" and "semantic" arguments against connectionism.  Nice.

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 1989.  Representation without rules.  Philosophical
Perspectives 17:147-74.
  Cognition uses structured representations without high-level rules, and
  connectionism is better at accounting for this.  With remarks on exceptions
  to psychological laws, and the crisis in traditional AI.

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 1994.  Representations don't need rules: Reply to
James Garson.  Mind and Language 9:1-24.

McClelland, J.L. & Rumelhart, D.E. 1985.  Levels indeed!  A response to
Broadbent.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 114:193-7.
  Response to Broadbent 1985: Distributed models are at the algorithmic level.
  Elucidating the low-level/high-level relation via various analogies.

McLaughlin, B.P. & Warfield, F. 1994.  The allure of connectionism reexamined.
Synthese 101:365-400.
  Argues that symbolic systems such as decision trees are as good at learning
  and pattern recognition as connectionist networks, and it is just as
  plausible that they are implemented in the brain.

Rey, G. 1991.  An explanatory budget for connectionism and eliminativism.  In
(T. Horgan & J. Tienson, eds) _Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind_.
Kluwer.
  Challenges connectionism to explain things that the classical approach seems
  to handle better: the structure, systematicity, causal role, and grain of
  propositional attitudes, their rational relations, and conceptual stability.

4.5e Subsymbolic Computation (Smolensky) [6]
----------------------------------------

Smolensky, P. 1988.  On the proper treatment of connectionism.  Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 11:1-23.
  Connectionism offers a complete account at the subsymbolic level, rather
  than an approximate account at the symbolic level.

Chalmers, D.J. 1992.  Subsymbolic computation and the Chinese Room.  In
(J. Dinsmore, ed) _The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap_.
Lawrence Erlbaum.
  Explicates the distinction between symbolic and subsymbolic computation, and
  argues that connectionism can better handle the emergence of semantics from
  syntax, doe to the non-atomic nature of its representations.

Hofstadter, D.R. 1983.  Artificial intelligence: Subcognition as computation.
In (F. Machlup, ed) _The Study of Information: Interdisciplinary Messages_.
Wiley.  Reprinted as "Waking up from the Boolean dream" in _Metamagical
Themas_.  Basic Books.
  AI needs statistical emergence.  For real semantics, symbols must be
  decomposable, complex, autonomous -- i.e. active.

Marinov, M. 1993.  On the spuriousness of the symbolic/subsymbolic distinction.
Minds and Machines 3:253-70.
  Argues with Smolensky: symbolic systems such as decision trees have all the
  positive features of neural networks (flexibility, lack of brittleness), and
  can represent concepts as sets of subconcepts.  With a reply by Clark.

Rosenberg, J. 1990.  Treating connectionism properly: Reflections on Smolensky.
Psychological Research 52:163.
  Rejects Smolensky's PTC, as the proper interaction of the microscopic and
  macroscopic levels would take a "miracle".

Smolensky, P. 1987.  Connectionist AI, symbolic AI, and the brain.  AI Review
1:95-109.
  On connectionist networks as subsymbolic dynamic systems.

4.5f Philosophy of Connectionism, Misc. [33]
---------------------------------------

Bechtel, W. 1985.  Are the new PDP models of cognition cognitivist or
associationist?  Behaviorism 13:53-61.

Bechtel, W. 1986.  What happens to accounts of mind-brain relations if we forgo
an architecture of rules and representations?  Philosophy of Science
Association 1986, 159-71.
  On the relationship between connectionism, symbol processing, psychology and
  neuroscience.

Bechtel, W. 1987.  Connectionism and the philosophy of mind.  Southern Journal
of Philosophy Supplement 26:17-41.  Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and
Cognition (Blackwell, 1990).
  Lots of questions about connectionism.

Bechtel, W. 1988.  Connectionism and rules and representation systems: Are they
compatible?  Philosophical Psychology 1:5-16.
  There's room for both styles within a single mind.  The rule-based level
  needn't be autonomous; the connectionist level plays a role in pattern
  recognition, concepts, and so on.

Bechtel, W. & Abrahamson, A. 1990.  Beyond the exclusively propositional era.
Synthese 82:223-53.
  An account of the shift from propositions to pattern recognition in the study
  of cognition: knowing-how, imagery, categorization, connectionism.

Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A.A. 1992.  Connectionism and the future of folk
psychology.  In (R. Burton, ed) _Minds: Natural and Artificial_.  SUNY Press.

Bechtel, W. 1993.  The case for connectionism.  Philosophical Studies
71:119-54.

Bradshaw, D.E. 1991.  Connectionism and the specter of representationalism.
In (T. Horgan & J. Tienson, eds) _Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind_.
Kluwer.
  Argues that connectionism allows for a more plausible epistemology of
  perception, compatible with direct realism rather than representationalism.
  With remarks on Fodor and Pylshyn's argument against Gibson.

Churchland, P.M. 1989.  On the nature of theories: A neurocomputational
perspective.  Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14.  Reprinted in
_A Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989).
  Connectionism will revolutionize our review of scientific theories: From the
  deductive-nomological view to descent in weight-space.  Some cute analogies.

Churchland, P.M. 1989.  On the nature of explanation: A PDP approach.  In _A
Neurocomputational Perspective_.  MIT Press.
  We achieve explanatory understanding not through the manipulation of
  propositions but through the activation of prototypes.

Churchland, P.S. & Sejnowski, T. 1989.  Neural representation and neural
computation.  In (L. Nadel, ed) _Neural Connections, Mental Computations_.  MIT
Press.
  Implications of connectionism and neuroscience for our concept of mind.

Clark, A. 1989.  _Microcognition_.  MIT Press.
  All kinds of stuff on connectionism and philosophy.

Clark, A. 1990.  Connectionism, competence and explanation.  British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 41:195-222.
  Connectionism separates processing from competence.  Instead of hopping down
  Marr's levels (theory->process), connectionism goes (1) task (2) low-level
  performance (3) extract theory from process.  Cute.

Cummins, R. & Schwarz, G. 1987.  Radical connectionism.  Southern Journal of
Philosophy Supplement 26:43-61.
  On computation and representation in AI and connectionism, and on problems
  for radical connectionism in reconciling these without denying representation
  or embracing mystery.

Cummins, R. & Schwarz, G. 1991.  Connectionism, computation, and cognition.
In (T. Horgan & J. Tienson, eds) _Connectionism and the Philosophy of
Mind_.  Kluwer.
  Explicates computationalism, and discusses ways in which connectionism might
  end up non-computational: if causal states cross-classify representational
  states, or if transitions between representations aren't computable.

Cummins, R. 1995.  Connectionist and the rationale constraint on cognitive
explanations.  Philosophical Perspectives 9:105-25.
 
Davies, M. 1989.  Connectionism, modularity and tacit knowledge.  British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40:541-55.
  Argues that connectionist networks don't have tacit knowledge of modular
  theories (as representations lack the appropriate structure, etc.).

Globus, G.G. 1992.  Derrida and connectionism: Differance in neural nets.
Philosophical Psychology 5:183-97.

Hatfield, G. 1990.  Gibsonian representations and connectionist
symbol-processing: prospects for unification.  Psychological Research
52:243-52.
  Gibson is compatible with connectionism.  In both, we can have
  rule-instantiation without rule-following.

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. (eds) 1991.  _Connectionism and the Philosophy of
Mind_.  Kluwer.

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 1996.  _Connectionism and the Philosophy of
Psychology_.  MIT Press.

Humphreys, G.W. 1986.  Information-processing systems which embody
computational rules: The connectionist approach.  Mind and Language 1:201-12.

Legg, C.R. 1988.  Connectionism and physiological psychology: A marriage made
in heaven?  Philosophical Psychology 1:263-78.

Lloyd, D. 1989.  Parallel distributed processing and cognition: Only connect?
In _Simple Minds_.  MIT Press.
  An overview: local/distributed/featural representations; explanation in
  connectionism (how to avoid big mush); relation to neuroscience; explicit
  representations of rules vs weight matrices.

Lycan, W.G. 1991.  Homuncular functionalism meets PDP.  In (W. Ramsey,
S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds) _Philosophy and Connectionist Theory_.
Lawrence Erlbaum.
  On various ways in which connectionism relates to representational homuncular
  functionalism, e.g. on implementation, eliminativism, and explanation.

Macdonald, C. 1995.  _Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation_.
Blackwell.
 
Ramsey, W. & Stich, S.P. 1990.  Connectionism and three levels of nativism.
Synthese 82:177-205.
  How connectionism bears on the nativism debate.  Conclusion: not too much.

Ramsey, W., Stich, S.P. & Rumelhart, D. (eds) 1991.  _Philosophy and
Connectionist Theory_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Rosenberg, J. 1989.  Connectionism and cognition.  Bielefeld Report.
  Criticism of Churchland's connectionist epistemology.

Shanon, B. 1992.  Are connectionist models cognitive?  Philosophical
Psychology.
  In some senses of "cognitive", yes; in other senses, no.  Phenomenological,
  theoretical, and sociological perspectives.  Toward meaning-laden models.

Sterelny, K. 1990.  Connectionism.  In _The Representational Theory of Mind_.
Blackwell.

4.5g Foundational Empirical Issues [12]
----------------------------------

Clark, A. 1994.  Representational trajectories in connectionist learning.
Minds and Machines 4:317-32.
  On how to get connectionist networks to learn about structured task domains.
  Concentrates on incremental learning, and other developmental/scaffolding
  strategies.  With remarks on systematicity.

Cliff, D. 1990.  Computational neuroethology: A provisional manifesto.
Manuscript.
  Criticizes connectionism for not being sufficiently rooted in neuroscience,
  and for not being grounded in the world.

Dawson, M.R.W., & Schopflocher, D.P. 1992.  Autonomous processing in parallel
distributed processing networks.  Philosophical Psychology 5:199-219.

Hanson, S. & Burr, D. 1990.  What connectionist models learn.  Behavioral and
Brain Sciences.
  What's new to connectionism is not learning or representation but the way
  that learning and representation interact.

Kaplan, S., Weaver, M. & French, R.M. 1990.  Active symbols and internal
models: Towards a cognitive connectionism.  AI and Society.
  Addresses behaviorist/associationist charges.  Connectionism needs recurrent
  circuits to support active symbols.

Kirsh, D. 1987.  Putting a price on cognition.  Southern Journal of Philosophy
Supplement 26:119-35.
  On the importance of variable binding, and why it's hard with connectionism.

Lachter, J. & Bever, T. 1988.  The relation between linguistic structure and
associative theories of language learning.  Cognition 28:195-247.
  Criticism of connectionist language models.  They build in too much.

Mills, S. 1989.  Connectionism, the classical theory of cognition, and the
hundred step constraint.  Acta Analytica 4:5-38.

Nelson, R. 1989.  Philosophical issues in Edelman's neural darwinism.  Journal
of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1:195-208.
  On the relationship between ND, PDP and AI.  All are computational.

Oaksford, M., Chater, N. & Stenning, K. 1990.  Connectionism, classical
cognitive science and experimental psychology.  AI and Society.
  Connectionism is better at explaining empirical findings about mind.

Pinker, S. & Prince, A. 1988.  On language and connectionism.  Cognition
28:73-193.
  Extremely thorough criticism of the R&M past-tense-learning model, with
  arguments on why connectionism can't handle linguistic rules.

4.6 Dynamic Systems [7]
-------------------

Foss, J.E. 1992.  Introduction to the epistemology of the brain: Indeterminacy,
micro-specificity, chaos, and openness.  Topoi 11:45-57.
  On the brain as a vector-processing system, and the problems raised by
  indeterminacy, chaos, and so on.  With morals for cognitive science.

Garson, J.W. 1995.  Chaos and free will.  Philosophical Psychology 8:365-74.

Giunti, M. 1995.  Dynamic models of cognition.  In (T. van Gelder & R. Port,
eds) _Mind as Motion_.  MIT Press.

Giunti, M. 1996.  _Computers, Dynamical Systems, and the Mind_.  Oxford
University Press.

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 1992.  Cognitive systems as dynamic systems.  Topoi
11:27-43.

van Gelder, T. & Port, R. 1995.  _Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics
of Cognition_.  MIT Press.

van Gelder, T. 1995.  What might cognition be if not computation?  Journal of
Philosophy 92:345-81.
  Argues for a dynamic-systems conception of the mind that is non-computational
  and non-representational.  Uses an analogy with the Watt steam governor to
  argue for a new kind of dynamic explanation.

4.7 Computation and Representation [41]
----------------------------------

4.7a Symbols and Symbol Systems [6]
-------------------------------

Harnad, S. 1990.  The symbol grounding problem.  Physica D 42:335-346.
  AI symbols are empty and meaningless.  They need to be "grounded" in
  something, e.g. sensory projection.  Maybe connectionism can do the trick?

Harnad, S. 1992.  Connecting object to symbol in modeling cognition.  In
(A. Clark & R. Lutz, eds) _Connectionism in Context_.  Springer-Verlag.
  On the limitations of symbol systems, and the potential for grounding symbols
  in sensory icons and categorical perception, e.g. with neural networks.

Kosslyn, S.M. & Hatfield, G. 1984.  Representation without symbol systems.
Social Research 51:1019-1045.

Newell, A. 1980.  Physical symbol systems.  Cognitive Science 4:135-83.

Newell, A. & Simon, H.A. 1981.  Computer science as empirical inquiry: Symbols
and search.  Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery
19:113-26.  Reprinted in (J. Haugeland, ed) _Mind Design_.  MIT Press.
  On computer science, AI, & the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis.

Robinson, W.S. 1995.  Brain symbols and computationalist explanation.  Minds
and Machines 5.

4.7b Computational Semantics [16]
----------------------------

Fodor, J.A. 1978.  Tom Swift and his procedural grandmother.  Cognition
6:229-47.  Reprinted in _RePresentations_ (MIT Press, 1980).
  Against procedural semantics; it's a rerun of verificationism.

Hadley, R.F. 1990.  Truth conditions and procedural semantics.  In (P. Hanson,
ed) _Information, Language and Cognition_.  University of British Columbia
Press.

Johnson-Laird, P. 1977.  Procedural semantics.  Cognition 5:189-214.

Johnson-Laird, P. 1978.  What's wrong with Grandma's guide to procedural
semantics: A reply to Jerry Fodor.  Cognition 9:249-61.

McDermott, D. 1978.  Tarskian semantics, or no notation without denotation.
Cognitive Science 2:277-82.
  On the virtues of denotational semantics for AI.  Notation without
  denotation, as found in many AI systems, leads to castles in the air.

Perlis, D. 1991.  Putting one's foot in one's head -- Part 1: Why.  Nous
25:435-55.

Perlis, D. 1994.  Putting one's foot in one's head -- Part 2: How.  In (E.
Dietrich, ed) _Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons_.  Academic Press.

Rapaport, W.J. 1988.  Syntactic semantics: Foundations of computational natural
language understanding.  In (J. Fetzer, ed) _Aspects of AI_.  Kluwer.

Rapaport, W.J. 1995.  Understanding understanding: Syntactic semantics and
computational cognition.  Philosophical Perspectives 9:49-88.

Smith, B. 1988.  On the semantics of clocks.  In (J. Fetzer, ed) _Aspects of
AI_.  Kluwer.

Smith, B. 1987.  The correspondence continuum.  CSLI-87-71.

Wilks, Y. 1982.  Some thoughts on procedural semantics.  In (W. Lehnert, ed)
_Strategies for Natural Language Processing_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Wilks, Y. 1990.  Form and content in semantics.  Synthese 82:329-51.
  Criticism of McDermott's views on semantics, logic and natural language.

Winograd, T. 1985.  Moving the semantic fulcrum.  Linguistics and Philosophy
8:91-104.

Woods, W. 1981.  Procedural semantics as a theory of meaning.  In (A. Joshi,
B. Weber, & I. Sag) _Elements of Discourse Understanding_.  Cambridge
University Press.

Woods, W. 1986.  Problems in procedural semantics.  In (Z. Pylyshyn &
W. Demopolous, eds) _Meaning and Cognitive Structure_.  Ablex.
  With commentaries by Haugeland, J.D. Fodor.

4.7c Implicit/Explicit Rules and Representations [8]
------------------------------------------------

Clark, A. 1991.  In defense of explicit rules.  In (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, &
D. Rumelhart, eds) _Philosophy and Connectionist Theory_. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  Argues that we need explicit rules for flexibility, adaptibility, and
  representational redescription.  With remarks on eliminativism.

Cummins, R. 1986.  Inexplicit information.  In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, eds)
_The Representation of Knowledge and Belief_.  University of Arizona Press.
  On various kinds of representation of knowledge or belief without explicit
  tokens: control-implicit, domain-implicit, and procedural information.
  The key distinction is representation vs. execution of a rule.

Davies, M. 1995.  Two notions of implicit rules.  Philosophical Perspectives
9:153-83.

Hadley, R.F. 1990.  Connectionism, rule-following, and symbolic manipulation.
Proc AAAI.
  Some rules are learnt so quickly that representation must be explicit.

Hadley, R.F. 1993.  Connectionism, explicit rules, and symbolic manipulation.
Minds and Machines 3.

Hadley, R.F. 1995.  The `explicit-implicit' distinction.  Minds and Machines 5.

Kirsh, D. 1990.  When is information explicitly represented?  In (P. Hanson,
ed) _Information, Language and Cognition_.  University of British Columbia
Press.

Skokowski, P.G. 1994.  Can computers carry content "inexplicitly"?  Minds and
Machines 4:333-44.
  Cummins' account of inexplicit information fails, as even "executed" rules
  must be represented in the system.  With remarks on the Chinese room.

4.7d AI without Representation? [5]
-------------------------------

Bechtel, W. 1996. Yet another revolution?  Defusing the dynamical system
theorists' attack on mental representations.  Manuscript.

Brooks, R. 1991.  Intelligence without representation.  Artificial Intelligence
47:139-159.
  We don't need explicit representation; the world can do the job instead.
  Use embodied, complete systems, starting simple and working incrementally.

Clark, A. and Toribio, J. 1994.  Doing without representing.  Synthese
101:401-31.
  A discussion of anti-representationalism in situated robotics and the
  dynamic systems movement (Brooks, Beer, van Gelder).  These arguments appeal
  to overly simple domains, and a modest notion of representation survives.

Kirsh, D. 1991.  Today the earwig, tomorrow man?  Artificial Intelligence
47:161-184.

van Gelder, T. 1995.  What might cognition be if not computation?  Journal of
Philosophy 92:345-81.
  Argues for a dynamic-systems conception of the mind that is non-computational
  and non-representational.  Uses an analogy with the Watt steam governor to
  argue for a new kind of dynamic explanation.


4.7e Miscellaneous [6]
------------------

Chrisley, R.L. 1994.  Taking embodiment seriously: Nonconceptual content and
robotics.  In (K.M. Ford, C. Glymour, & P. Hayes, eds) _Android Epistemology_.
MIT Press.

Dietrich, E. 1988.  Computers, intentionality, and the new dualism.
Manuscript.

Dreyfus, H.L. 1979.  A framework for misrepresenting knowledge.  In (M. Ringle,
ed) _Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence_.  Humanities Press.
  On the problems with context-free symbolic representation.

Fields, C. 1994.  Real machines and virtual intentionality: An experimentalist
takes on the problem of representational content.  In (E. Dietrich, ed)
_Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons_.  Academic Press.

Haugeland, J. 1981.  Semantic engines: An introduction to mind design.  In
(J. Haugeland, ed) _Mind Design_.  MIT Press.

Robinson, W.S. 1995.  Direct representation.  Philosophical Studies 80:305-22.
  On Searle's critique of computational explanation, contrasted with
  Gallistel's use thereof.  The real issue is computation on indirect vs.
  direct representations; direct computationalism is an attractive view.


4.8 Computationalism in Cognitive Science [27]
-----------------------------------------

Block, N. 1990.  The computer model of mind.  In (D. Osherson & E. Smith, eds)
_An Invitation to Cognitive Science_, Vol. 3.  MIT Press.
  Overview of computationalism.  Relationship to intentionality, LOT, etc.

Boden, M. 1984.  What is computational psychology?  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 58:17-35.

Bringsjord, S. 1994.  Computation, among other things, is beneath us.  Minds
and Machines 4:469-88.

Chalmers, D.J. 1994.  A computational foundation for the study of cognition.
Manuscript.
  Argues for theses of computational sufficiency and computational explanation,
  resting on the fact that computation provides an abstract specification of
  causal organization.  With replies to many anti-computationalist worries.

Clarke, J. 1972.  Turing machines and the mind-body problem.  British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 23:1-12.

Cummins, R. 1977.  Programs in the explanation of behavior.  Philosophy of
Science 44:269-87.

Demopoulos, W. 1987.  On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism.
Synthese 70:79-96.
  On analog/digital, representational/nonrepresentational, direct/indirect.

Dietrich, E. 1990.  Computationalism.  Social Epistemology.
  What computationalism is, as opposed to computerism & cognitivism.  Implies:
  intentionality isn't special, and we don't make decisions.  With commentary.

Dietrich, E. 1989.  Semantics and the computational paradigm in computational
psychology.  Synthese 79:119-41.
  Argues that computational explanation requires the attribution of semantic
  content.  Addresses Stich's arguments against content, and argues that
  computers are not formal symbol manipulators.

Double, R. 1987.  The computational model of the mind and philosophical
functionalism.  Behaviorism 15:131-39.

Dretske, F. 1985.  Machines and the mental.  Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 59:23-33.
  Machines can't even add, let alone think, as the symbols they use aren't
  meaningful to them.  They would need real information based on perceptual
  embodiment, and conceptual capacities, for meaning to play a real role.

Fetzer, J.H. 1994.  Mental algorithms: Are minds computational systems?
Pragmatics and Cognition 21:1-29.

Fodor, J.A. 1978.  Computation and reduction.  Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 9.  Reprinted in _RePresentations_ (MIT Press, 1980).

Garson, J.W. 1993.  Mice in mirrored mazes and the mind.  Philosophical
Psychology 6:123-34.
  Computationalism is false, as it can't distinguish the ability to solve a
  maxe for the ability to solve it's mirror image.  An embodied computational
  taxonomy is needed, rather than software alone.

Harnad, S. 1996.  Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation:
Cognition isn't.  Minds and Machines 4:379-90.

Horst, S. 1996.  _Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the
Computational Theory of Mind_.  University of California Press.

Mellor, D.H. 1984.  What is computational psychology? II.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 58:37-53.

Mellor, D.H. 1989.  How much of the mind is a computer.  In (P. Slezak, ed)
_Computers, Brains and Minds_.  Kluwer.
  Only belief is computational: rest of mind is not.

Nelson, R. 1987.  Machine models for cognitive science.  Philosophy of Science
  Argues contra Pylyshyn 1984 that finite state automata are good models for
  cognitive science: they are semantically interpretable and process symbols.

Pollock, J. 1989.  _How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon_.  MIT Press.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1980.  Computation and cognition: Issues in the foundation of
cognitive science.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:111-32.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1984.  _Computation and Cognition_.  MIT Press.
  A thorough account of the symbolic/computational view of cognition.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1978.  Computational models and empirical constraints.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1:98-128.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1989.  Computing and cognitive science.  In (M. Posner, ed)
_Foundations of Cognitive Science_.  MIT Press.
  An overview of the computational view of mind.  On symbols, levels, control
  structures, levels of correspondence for computational models, and empirical
  methods for determining degrees of equivalence.

Shapiro, S.C. 1995.  Computationalism.  Minds and Machines 5.

Sterelny, K. 1989.  Computational functional psychology: problems and
prospects.  In (P. Slezak, ed) _Computers, Brains and Minds_.  Kluwer.
  Various points on pros and cons of computational psychology.

Tibbetts, P. 1996.  Residual dualism in computational theories of mind.
Dialectica 50:37-52.


4.9 Computation and Physical Systems [14]
------------------------------------

Boyle, C.F. 1994.  Computation as an intrinsic property.  Minds and Machines
4:451-67.

Chalmers, D.J. 1994.  On implementing a computation.  Minds and Machines
  Gives an account of what it is for a physical system to implement a
  computation: the causal structure of the system must mirror the formal
  structure of the computation.  Answers objections by Searle and others.

Chalmers, D.J. 1996.  Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton?
Synthese 108:309-33.
  Argues that Putnam's "proof" that every ordinary open system implements
  every finite automaton is fallacious.  It can be patched up, but an
  appropriate account of implementation resists these difficulties.

Chrisley, R.L. 1994.  Why everything doesn't realize every computation.  Minds
and Machines 4:403-20.

Cleland, C. 1993.  Is the Church-Turing thesis true?  Minds and Machines
3:283-312.
  Many physically realized functions can't be computeted by Turing machines:
  e.g. "mundane procedures" and continuous functions.  So the C-T thesis is
  false of these, and maybe even of number-theoretic functions.

Copeland, B.J. 1996.  What is computation?  Synthese 108:335-59.

Endicott, R.P. 1996.  Searle, syntax, and observer-relativity.  Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 26:101-22.

Goel, V. 1991.  Notationality and the information processing mind.  Minds and
Machines 1:129-166.
  Adapts Goodman's notational systems to explicate computational information
  processing.  What is/isn't a physical notational system (e.g. LOT, symbol
  systems, connectionism) and why.  How to reconcile notational/mental content?

Hardcastle, V.G. 1995.  Computationalism.  Synthese 105:303-17.
  Pragmatic factors are vital in connecting the theory of computation with
  empirical theory, and particularly in determining whether a given system
  counts as performing a given computation.

Maclennan, B. 1994.  "Words lie in our way".  Minds and Machines 4:421-37.

Miscevic, N. 1996.  Computationalism and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:215-29.

Searle, J.R. 1990.  Is the brain a digital computer?  Proceedings and Addresses
of the American Philosophical Association 64:21-37.
  Syntax isn't intrinsic to physics, so computational ascriptions are assigned
  by observer.  Syntax has no causal powers. Brain doesn't process information.

Stabler, E. 1987.  Kripke on functionalism and automata.  Synthese 70:1-22.
  Disputes Kripke's argument that there is no objective way of determining
  when a system computes a given function, due to infinite domains and
  unreliability.  Stipulating normal background conditions is sufficient.

Suber, P. 1988.  What is software?  Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2:89-119.


4.10 Methodological Foundations of AI [14]
-------------------------------------

Chalmers, D.J., French, R.M. & Hofstadter, D.R. 1992.  High-level perception,
representation, and analogy: A critique of AI methodology.  Journal of
Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence.
  AI must integrate perception and cognition in the interest of flexible
  representation.  Current models ignore perception and the development of
  representation, but this cannot be separated from later cognitive processes.

Clark, A. 1986.  A biological metaphor.  Mind and Language 1:45-64.
  AI should look at biology.

Clark, A. 1987.  The kludge in the machine.  Mind and Language 2:277-300.

Dreyfus, H.L. 1981.  From micro-worlds to knowledge: AI at an impasse.  In
(J. Haugeland, ed) _Mind Design_.  MIT Press.
  Micro-worlds don't test true understanding, and frames and scripts are doomed
  to leave out too much.  Explicit representation can't capture intelligence.

Hadley, R.F. 1991.  The many uses of `belief' in AI.  Minds and Machines
1:55-74.
  Various AI approaches to belief: syntactic, propositional/meaning-based,
  information, tractability, discoverability, and degree of confidence.

Kirsh, D. 1991.  Foundations of AI: The big issues.  Artificial Intelligence
47:3-30.
  Identifying the dividing lines: pre-eminence of knowledge, embodiment,
  language-like kinematics, role of learning, uniformity of architecture.

Marr, D. 1977.  Artificial intelligence: A personal view.  Artificial
Intelligence 9:37-48.
  AI usually comes up with Type 2 (algorithmic) theories, when Type 1 (info
  processing) theories might be more useful -- at least if they exist.

McDermott, D. 1981.  Artificial intelligence meets natural stupidity.  In
(J. Haugeland, ed) _Mind Design_.  MIT Press.
  Problems in AI methodology: wishful mnemonics, oversimplifying natural
  language concepts, and never implementing programs.  Entertaining.

McDermott, D. 1987.  A critique of pure reason.  Computational Intelligence
3:151-60.
  Criticism of logicism (i.e. reliance on deduction) in AI.

Nilsson, N. 1991.  Logic and artificial intelligence.  Artificial Intelligence
47:31-56.

Birnbaum, L. 1991.  Rigor mortis: A response to Nilsson's `Logic and artificial
intelligence'.  Artificial Intelligence 47:57-78.

Partridge, D. & Wilks, Y. (eds) 1990.  _The Foundations of Artificial
Intelligence: A Sourcebook_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Lots of papers on various aspects of AI methodology.  Quite thorough.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1979.  Complexity and the study of artificial and human
intelligence.  In (M. Ringle, ed) _Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial
Intelligence_.  Humanities Press.

Ringle, M. (ed) 1979.  _Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence_.
Humanities Press.
  10 papers on philosophy of AI, psychology and knowledge representation.

4.11 The Frame Problem [11]
-----------------------

Dennett, D.C. 1984.  Cognitive wheels: The frame problem of AI.  In (Hookaway,
ed) _Minds, Machines and Evolution_.  Cambridge University Press.
  General overview.

Dreyfus, H.L. & Dreyfus, S. 1987.  How to stop worrying about the frame problem
even though it's computationally insoluble.  In (Z. Pylyshyn, ed) _The Robot's
Dilemma_.  Ablex.
  FP is an artifact of computational explicitness.  Contrast human commonsense
  know-how, with relevance built in.  Comparison to expert/novice distinction.

Fodor, J.A. 1987.  Modules, frames, fridgeons, sleeping dogs, and the music of
the spheres.  In (Z. Pylyshyn, ed) _The Robot's Dilemma_.  Ablex.
  FP is Hamlet's problem: when to stop thinking.  It's equivalent to the
  general problem of non-demonstrative inference.

Haugeland, J. 1987.  An overview of the frame problem.  In (Z. Pylyshyn, ed)
_The Robot's Dilemma_.  Ablex.
  The FP may be a consequence of the explicit/implicit rep distinction.  Use
  "complicit" reps instead, and changes will be carried along intrinsically.

Hayes, P. 1987.  What the frame problem is and isn't.  In (Z. Pylyshyn, ed)
_The Robot's Dilemma_.  Ablex.
  FP is a relatively narrow problem,  Some, e.g. Fodor, wrongly equate FP with
  the "Generalized AI Problem".

Janlert, L. 1987.  Modeling change: The frame problem.  In (Z. Pylyshyn, ed)
_The Robot's Dilemma_.  Ablex.

Lormand, E. 1990.  Framing the frame problem.  Synthese 82:353-74.
  Criticizes Dennett's, Haugeland's and Fodor's construals of the FP.

Maloney, J.C. 1988.  In praise of narrow minds.  In (J. Fetzer, ed) _Aspects of
AI_.  D. Reidel.

McCarthy, J. & Hayes, P. 1969.  Some philosophical problems from the standpoint
of artificial intelligence.  In (Meltzer & Michie, eds) _Machine Intelligence
4_.  Edinburgh University Press.

McDermott, D. 1987.  We've been framed: Or, Why AI is innocent of the frame
problem.  In (Z. Pylyshyn, ed) _The Robot's Dilemma_.  Ablex.
  Solve frame problem by using the sleeping-dog strategy -- keeping things
  fixed unless there's a reason to suppose otherwise.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. (ed) 1987.  _The Robot's Dilemma_.  Ablex.
  Lots of papers on the frame problem.

4.12 Levels of Analysis (Marr, etc) [10]
-----------------------------------

Bechtel, W. 1994.  Levels of description and explanation in cognitive science.
Minds and Machines 4:1-25.

Foster, C. 1990.  _Algorithms, abstraction and implementation_.  Academic
Press.
  Outlines a theory of the equivalence of algorithms.

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 1992.  Levels of description in nonclassical cognitive
science.  Philosophy 34, Supplement.
  Generalizes Marr's levels to: cognitive state-transitions, mathematical
  state-transitions, implementation.  Discusses these with respect to
  connectionism, dynamical systems, and computation below the cognitive level.

Houng, Y. 1990.  Classicism, connectionism and the concept of level.
Dissertation, Indiana University.
  On levels of organization vs. levels of analysis.

Marr, D. 1982.  _Vision_.  Freeman.
  Defines computational, algorithmic and implementational levels.

McClamrock, R. 1990.  Marr's three levels: a re-evaluation.  Minds and Machines
1:185-196.
  On different kinds of level-shifts: organizational and contextual changes.
  There are more than three levels available.

Newell, A. 1982.  The knowledge level.  Artificial Intelligence 18:81-132.

Newell, A. 1986.  The symbol level and the knowledge level.  In (Z. Pylyshyn &
W. Demopolous, eds) _Meaning and Cognitive Structure_.  Ablex.
  With commentaries by Smith, Dennett.

Peacocke, C. 1986.  Explanation in computational psychology: Language,
perception and level 1.5.  Mind and Language 1:101-23.
  Psychological explanation is typically somewhere *between* the computational
  and algorithmic levels.

Sticklen, J. 1989.  Problem-solving architectures at the knowledge level.
Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1:233-247.

4.13 Philosophy of AI, Misc [32]
---------------------------

Buchanan, B. 1988.  AI as an experimental science.  In (J. Fetzer, ed) _Aspects
of AI_.  D. Reidel.

Burks, A.W. 1973.  Logic, computers, and men.  Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 46:39-57.
  Arguing that a finite deterministic automaton can perform all natural human
  functions.  With remarks on the logical organization of computers.

Bundy, A. 1990.  What kind of field is AI?  In (D. Partridge & Y. Wilks, eds.)
_The Foundations of Artificial Intelligence: A Sourcebook_.  Cambridge
University Press.

Dennett, D.C. 1978.  AI as philosophy and as psychology.  In (M. Ringle, ed)
_Philosophical Perspectives on Artificial Intelligence_.  Humanities Press.
Reprinted in _Brainstorms_ (MIT Press, 1978).
  AI as detailed armchair psychology and as thought-experimental epistemology.
  Implications for mind: e.g. a solution to the problem of homuncular regress.

Dretske, F. 1985.  Machines and the mental.  Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 59:23-33.

Dretske, F. 1993.  Can intelligence be artificial?  Philosophical Studies
71:201-16.
  Intelligence requires not just action or thought, but the governance of
  action by thought, which requires a history.  "Wired-up" systems lack the
  explanatory connection between thought and action, so are not intelligent.

Dreyfus, H.L. 1972.  _What Computers Can't Do_.  Harper and Row.
  Computers follow rules, people don't.

Dreyfus, H.L. & Dreyfus, S.E. 1988.  Making a mind versus modeling the brain:
AI at a crossroads.  Daedalus.
  History of AI (boo) and connectionism (qualified hooray).  And Husserl/
  Heidegger/Wittgenstein, of course.  Quite nice.

Gips, J. 1994.  Toward the ethical robot.  In (K.M. Ford, C. Glymour, &
P. Hayes, eds) _Android Epistemology_.  MIT Press.

Glymour, C. 1988.  AI is philosophy.  In (J. Fetzer, ed) _Aspects of AI_.
D. Reidel.

Haugeland, J. 1979.  Understanding natural language.  Journal of Philosophy
76:619-32.  Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990).
  AI will need holism: interpretational, common-sense, situational,
  existential.

Haugeland, J. (ed) 1981.  _Mind Design_.  MIT Press.
  12 papers on the foundations of AI and cognitive science.

Hayes, P.J., Ford, K.M., & Adams-Webber, J.R. 1994.  Human reasoning about
artificial intelligence.  Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial
Intelligence 4:247-63.  Reprinted in (E. Dietrich, ed) _Thinking Computers and
Virtual Persons_.  Academic Press.

Henley, T.B. 1990.  Natural problems and artificial intelligence.  Behavior and
Philosophy 18:43-55.
  On the philosophical importance of criteria for intelligence.  With remarks
  on Searle, the Turing test, attitudes to AI, and ethical considerations.

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 1994.  A nonclassical framework for cognitive science.
Synthese 101:305-45.

Krellenstein, M. 1987.  A reply to `Parallel computation and the mind-body
problem'.  Cognitive Science 11:155-7.
  Thagard 1986 is wrong: speed and the like make no fundamental difference.
  With Thagard's reply: it makes a difference in practice, if not in principle.

Kukla, A. 1989.  Is AI an empirical science?  Analysis 49:56-60.
  No, AI is an a priori science that uses empirical methods; its status is
  similar to that of mathematics.

Kukla, A. 1994.  Medium AI and experimental science.  Philosophical Psychology
7:493-5012.
  On the status of "medium AI", the study of intelligence in computational
  systems (not just humans).  Contra to many, this is not an empirical science,
  bu a combination of (experimental) mathematics and engineering.

Manning, R.C. 1987.  Why Sherlock Holmes can't be replaced by an expert system.
Philosophical Studies 51:19-28.
  An expert system would lack Holmes' ability to raise the right questions,
  sort out relevant data, and determine what data are in need of explanation.

McCarthy, J. 1979.  Ascribing mental qualities to machines.  In (M. Ringle, ed)
_Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence_.  Humanities Press.

Moody, T.C. 1993.  _Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence_.  Prentice-Hall.

Preston, B. 1993.  Heidegger and artificial intelligence.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 53:43-69.
  On the non-represented background to everyday activity, and environmental
  interaction in cognition.  Criticizes cognitivism, connectionism, looks
  at Agre/Chapman/Brooks, ethology, anthropology for support.

Preston, B. 1995.  The ontological argument against the mind-machine
hypothesis.  Philosophical Studies 80:131-57.
  Lucas, Searle, and Penrose all fall prey to "dual-description" fallacies.

Robinson, W.S. 1991.  Rationalism, expertise, and the Dreyfuses' critique
of AI research.  Southern Journal of Philosophy 29:271-90.
  Defending limited rationalism: i.e. a theory of intelligence below the
  conceptual level but above the neuronal level.

Robinson, W.S. 1992.  _Computers, Minds, and Robots_.  Temple University
Press.

Russell, S. 1991.  Inductive learning by machines.  Philosophical Studies
64:37-64.
  A nice paper on the relationship between techniques of theory formation from
  machine learning and philosophical problems of induction and knowledge.

Rychlak, J.F. 1991.  _Artificial Intelligence and Human Reason_.  Columbia
University Press.

Sloman, A. 1978.  _The Computer Revolution in Philosophy_.  Harvester.
  All about how the computer should change the way we think about the mind.

Thagard, P. 1986.  Parallel computation and the mind-body problem.  Cognitive
Science 10:301-18.
  Parallelism does make a difference.  Some somewhat anti-functionalist points.

Thagard, P. 1990.  Philosophy and machine learning.  Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 20:261-76.

Thagard, P. 1991.  Philosophical and computational models of explanation.
Philosophical Studies 64:87-104.
  A comparison of philosophical and AI approaches to explanation: deductive,
  statistical, schematic, analogical, causal, and linguistic.

Winograd, T. & Flores, F. 1987.  _Understanding Computers and Cognition_.
Addison-Wesley.

--
Compiled by David Chalmers, Department of Philosophy, University of California,
Santa Cruz.  (c) 1996 David J. Chalmers.

Part 5: Miscellaneous Topics [220]
============================

Contents
--------
5.1  Nativism (Chomsky, etc) [29]
5.2  Modularity/Perceptual Plasticity (Fodor, Churchland) [20]
5.3  Mental Images (Pylyshyn, Kosslyn) [25]
5.4  Rationality [16]
5.5  Animal Cognition [20]
5.6  Color, General [20]
5.7  Pain and Pleasure [20]
5.8  Emotions, etc [10]
5.9  Dreaming [8]
5.10 Free Will (tiny selection) [15]
5.11 Split Brains [12]
5.12 Personal Identity (tiny selection) [16]
5.13 Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Misc [10]


5.1 Nativism (Chomsky, etc) [29]
---------------------------

Atherton, M. & Schwarz, R. 1974.  Linguistic innateness and its evidence.
Journal of Philosophy 71:6.

Chomsky, N. 1967.  Recent contributions to the theory of innate ideas.
Synthese 17:2-11.

Chomsky, N. 1969.  Linguistics and philosophy.  In (S. Hook, ed) _Language and
Philosophy_.  New York University Press.
  Reply to Putnam 1967: Putnam underestimates complexity of grammar, etc.

Chomsky, N. 1975.  On cognitive capacity.  In _Reflections on Language_.
Pantheon Books.

Chomsky, N. 1980.  Discussion of Putnam's comments.  In
(M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) _Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean
Piaget and Noam Chomsky_.  Harvard University Press.

Chomsky, N. & Fodor, J.A. 1980.  The inductivist fallacy.  In
(M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) _Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean
Piaget and Noam Chomsky_.  Harvard University Press.

Harman, G. 1969.  Linguistic competence and empiricism.  In (S. Hook, ed)
_Language and Philosophy_.  New York University Press.

Fodor, J.A., Bever, T. & Garrett, M. 1974.  The specificity of language skills.
In _The Psychology of Language_.  McGraw-Hill.

Fodor, J.A. 1980.  Reply to Putnam.  In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) _Language
and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky_.  Harvard
University Press.

Katz, J. 1966.  Innate ideas.  In _The Philosophy of Language_.  Harper & Row.
  Overview; poverty of stimulus, unobservable features => rationalism.

Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (ed) 1980.  _Language and Learning: The Debate Between
Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky_.  Harvard University Press.
  An excellent collection of papers & responses by Piaget, Chomsky and others.

Putnam, H. 1967.  The `Innateness Hypothesis' and explanatory models in
linguistics.  Synthese 17:12-22.  Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_
(Cambridge University Press, 1975).
  Contra nativism: disputes (1) surprising universals (2) explanation of
  universals (3) ease of learning (4) relevance of IQ-independence.

Putnam, H. 1980.  What is innate and why.  In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed)
_Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky_.
Harvard University Press.

Putnam, H. 1980.  Comments on Chomsky's and Fodor's replies.  In
(M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) _Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean
Piaget and Noam Chomsky_.  Harvard University Press.

Sampson, G. 1978.  Linguistic universals as evidence for empiricism.  Journal
of Linguistics.
  Explain universals via Popper/Simon empirical model.

Stich, S.P. (ed) 1975.  _Innate Ideas_.  University of California Press.

Stich, S.P. 1979.  Between Chomskian rationalism and Popperian empiricism.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30:329-47.
  Can take middle ground.  Anti-empiricism doesn't imply rationalism.

Churchland, P.S. 1978.  Fodor on language learning.  Synthese 38:149-59.

Fodor, J.A. 1981.  The present status of the innateness controversy.  In
_Representations_.  MIT Press.
  Concepts are undefinable, so primitive, so innate (plus gloss).

Fodor, J.A. 1980.  On the impossibility of acquiring `more powerful'
structures.  In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) _Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky_.  Harvard University Press.

Kaye, L.J. 1993.  Are most of our concepts innate?  Synthese 2:187-217.

Mehler, J. & Fox, R. (eds) 1985.  _Neonate Cognition: Beyond the Blooming
Buzzing Confusion_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Piattelli-Palmarini, M. 1986.  The rise of selective theories: A case study and
some lessons from immunology.  In (W. Demopoulos, ed) _Language Learning and
Concept Acquisition_.  Ablex.

Piattelli-Palmarini, M. 1989.  Evolution, selection, and cognition: From
learning to parameter setting in biology and in the study of language.
Cognition 31:1-44.
  Why learning is selective and not instructive.  Biological analogies,
  linguistic evidence.  Dispense with "learning" as a scientific term.

Ramsey, W. & Stich, S.P. 1990.  Connectionism and three levels of nativism.
Synthese 82:177-205.
  Identifies minimal nativism vs anti-empiricism vs rationalism.  Considers the
  relevance of connectionist networks.  Some nativist arguments may survive.

Samet, J. 1986.  Troubles with Fodor's nativism.  Midwest Studies in Philosophy
10:575-594.
  Concepts can be acquired without being learned by symbol-manipulation.

Samet, J. & Flanagan, O.J. 1989.  Innate representations.  In (S. Silvers, ed)
_Rerepresentation_.  Kluwer.

Sterelny, K. 1989.  Fodor's nativism.  Philosophical Studies 55:119-41.
  Fodor is wrong and silly too.

5.2 Modularity/Perceptual Plasticity (Fodor, Churchland) [20]
--------------------------------------------------------

Arbib, M. 1989.  Modularity, schemas and neurons: A critique of Fodor.  In
(P. Slezak, ed) _Computers, Brains and Minds_.  Kluwer.
  Against Fodor: modules are smaller, interact strongly, not domain-specific.

Bennett, L.J. 1990.  Modularity of mind revisited.  British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 41:429-36.
  Remarks on Shanon and Fodor.

Bruner, J. 1957.  On perceptual readiness.  Psychological Review 65:14-21.
  Overview of the original studies on top-down effects in perception.

Cam, P. 1990.  Insularity and the persistence of perceptual illusion.  Analysis
50:231-5.

Churchland, P.M. 1979.  _Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind_.
Cambridge University Press.
  Our perception is deeply theory-laden, and potentially very plastic.

Churchland, P.M. 1988.  Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A
reply to  Jerry Fodor.  Philosophy of Science 55:167-87.  Reprinted in _A
Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989).
  Contra Fodor 1984: observation is theory-laden (built-in or not); supported
  by neurophysiological evidence; perceptual systems have long-term plasticity.

DesAutels, P. 1995.  Two types of theories: The impact of Churchland's
perceptual plasticity.  Philosophical Psychology 8:25-33.

Fodor, J.A. 1983.  _The Modularity of Mind_.  MIT Press.
  Perception happens in informationally encapsulated, domain-specific modules.
  Central systems aren't encapsulated, and so may be impossible to understand.

Fodor, J.A. 1985.  Precis of _The modularity of mind_.  Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 8:1-42.  Reprinted in _A Theory of Content and Other Essays_ (MIT
Press, 1990).
  Summary of MOM (with commentary and reply in the BBS printing).

Fodor, J.A. 1986.  The modularity of mind.  In (Z. Pylyshyn, ed) _Meaning and
Cognitive Structure_.  Ablex.
  Informal discussion of modularity.  With commentaries by Fahlman, Caplan.

Fodor, J.A. 1984.  Observation reconsidered.  Philosophy of Science 51:23-43.
Reprinted in _A Theory of Content and Other Essays_ (MIT Press, 1990).
  Argues for an observation/theory distinction, and against belief affecting
  perception.

Fodor, J.A. 1988.  A reply to Churchland's `Perceptual plasticity and
theoretical neutrality'.  Philosophy of Science 55:188-98.  Reprinted in
_A Theory of Content and Other Essays_ (MIT Press, 1990).
  Churchland is up the creek without a paddle.

Fodor, J.A. 1989.  Why should the mind be modular?  In (A. George, ed)
_Reflections on Chomsky_.  Blackwell.  Reprinted in _A Theory of Content and
Other Essays_ (MIT Press, 1990).

Garfield, J. (ed) 1987.  _Modularity in Knowledge Representation and
Natural-Language Understanding_.  MIT Press.
  A collection of papers on modularity in language and vision.

Rollins, M. 1994.  Deep plasticity: The encoding approach to perceptual change.
Philosophy of Science 61:39-54.

Ross, J. 1990.  Against postulating central systems in the mind.  Philosophy of
Science 57:297-312.
  Fodor's arguments for unencapsulated central systems are no good; AI is
  possible after all.

Shanon, B. 1988.  Remarks on the modularity of mind.  British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 39:331-52.
  Criticism of Fodor.  Modularity is dynamic, and can be central.

Fodor, J.A. & Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1981.  How direct is visual perception?: Some
reflections on Gibson's `ecological approach'.  Cognition 9:139-96.
  `Direct perception' can't correspond to anything.  Perception is inferential.

Turvey, M.T., Shaw, R.E., Reed, E.S., & Mace, W.M. 1981.  Ecological laws of
perceiving and acting: In Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn.  Cognition 9:237-304.

Ullman, S. 1980.  Against direct perception.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences
3:333-81.

5.3 Mental Imagery [25]
------------------

Block, N. (ed) 1981.  _Imagery_.  MIT Press.

Block, N. 1983.  Mental pictures and cognitive science.  Philosophical Review
93:499-542.  Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell,
1990).

Block, N. 1983.  The photographic fallacy in the debate about mental imagery.
Nous 17:651-62.

Brown, R. & Herrstein, R. 1981.  Icons and images.  In (N. Block, ed)
_Imagery_.  MIT Press.

Cam, P. 1987.  Propositions about images.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 48:335-8.

Dennett, D.C. 1978.  Two approaches to mental images.  In _Brainstorms_.  MIT
Press.

Dennett, D.C. 1968.  The nature of images and the introspective trap.  In
_Content and Consciousness_.  Routledge and Kegan Paul.  Reprinted in (N.
Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980).

Fodor, J.A. 1975.  Imagistic representation.  In _The Language of Thought_.
Harvard University Press.

Kosslyn, S.M. & Pomerantz, J. 1977.  Imagery, propositions and the form of
internal representations.  Cognitive Psychology 9:52-76.  Reprinted in (N.
Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980).

Kosslyn, S.M. 1981.  The medium and the message in mental imagery: A theory.
In (N. Block, ed) _Imagery_.  MIT Press.

Kosslyn, S.M., Pinker, S., Schwartz, S. & Smith, G. 1979.  On the
demystification of mental imagery.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2:535-81.

Kosslyn, S.M. 1980.  _Image and Mind_.  Harvard University Press.

Maloney, J.C. 1984.  Mental images and cognitive theory.  American
Philosophical Quarterly 21:237-47.

Mortensen, C. 1989.  Mental images: Should cognitive science learn from
neurophysiology?  In (P. Slezak, ed) _Computers, Brains and Minds_.  Kluwer.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1973.  What the mind's eye tells the mind's brain: A critique of
mental imagery.  Psych Bull 80:1-24.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1978.  Imagery and artificial intelligence.  In (W. Savage, ed)
_Perception and Cognition_.  University of Minnesota Press.  Reprinted in
(N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980).

Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1981.  The imagery debate: Analog media vs. tacit knowledge.
In (N. Block, ed) _Imagery_.  MIT Press.

Rey, G. 1981.  What are mental images?  In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the
Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol. 2.  Harvard University Press.

Russow, L. 1985.  Dennett, mental images and images in context.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 45:581-94.

Schwartz, R. 1980.  Imagery: There is more to it than meets the eye.
Philosophy of Science Association 1980.

Shepard, R. & Cooper, L. 1982.  _Mental Images and their Transformations_.
MIT Press.

Sterelny, K. 1986.  The imagery debate.  Philosophy of Science 53:560-83.
Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990).

Tye, M. 1984.  The debate about mental imagery.  Journal of Philosophy
81:678-91.

Tye, M. 1988.  The picture theory of images.  Philosophical Review.

Tye, M. 1991.  _The Imagery Debate_.  MIT Press,

5.4 Rationality [16]
---------------

Cherniak, C. 1986.  _Minimal Rationality_.  MIT Press.
  People are not perfectly rational, but just rational enough to get by.

Cherniak, C. 1981.  Minimal rationality.  Mind 90:161-83.

Cherniak, C. 1983.  Rationality and the structure of memory.  Synthese
57:163-86.

Cohen, L. 1979.  On the psychology of prediction: Whose is the fallacy?
Cognition 7:385-407.

Cohen, L. 1980.  Whose is the fallacy?  A rejoinder to Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky.  Cognition 8:89-92.

Cohen, L. 1981.  Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
  There's no irrationality, just performance errors in a rational competence.
  Experimental results are either (1) cognitive illusions; (2) insufficient
  education; or (3) experimenter error.  With commentaries (mostly negative).

Cohen, L. 1986.  _The Dialogue of Reason_.  Cambridge University Press.

Fetzer, J. 1990.  Evolution, rationality and testability.  Synthese 82:423-39.

Harman, G. 1986.  _Change in View_.  MIT Press.
  On how people update their beliefs.

Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (eds) 1982.  _Judgment under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases_.  Cambridge University Press.
  Empirical evidence on imperfect reasoning; 35 papers.

Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. 1979.  On the interpretation of intuitive
probability: A reply to Jonathan Cohen.  Cognition 7:409-11.

Manktelow, K. & Over, D. 1987.  Reasoning and rationality.  Mind and Language
2:199-219.

Nisbett, R. & Ross, L. 1980.  _Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of
Social Judgment_.  Prentice-Hall.

Rust, J. 1990.  Delusions, irrationality, and cognitive science.  Philosophical
Psychology.
  Implications of psychiatric delusions for cognitive science.

Stich, S.P. 1985.  Could man be an irrational animal?  Synthese 64:115-35.

Wason, P. 1966.  Reasoning.  In (Foss, ed) _New Horizons in Psychology_.
Penguin.
  On the Wason four-card selection task.

5.5 Animal Cognition [20]
--------------------

Allen, C. & Hauser, M. 1996.  Concept atribution in nonhuman animals:
Theoretical and methodological problems in ascribing complex mental processes.
Philosophy of Science 58:221-40.

Bekoff, M. &  Jamieson, D. (eds) 1996.   _Readings in Animal Cognition_.  MIT
Press.

Carruthers, P. 1989.  Brute experience.  Journal of Philosophy 258-69.

Crisp, R. 1996.  Evolution and psychological unity.  In (M. Bekoff & D.
Jamieson, eds) _Readings in Animal Cognition_.  MIT Press.

Davidson, D. 1982.  Rational animals.  Dialectica 36:317-28.

Dennett, D.C. 1983.  Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The
`Panglossian paradigm' defended.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6:343-90.
Reprinted in _The Intentional Stance_ (MIT Press, 1987).
  Can we attribute higher-order beliefs etc to animals?  Use the experimental
  method.  With some remarks on adaptationism.

Dennett, D.C. 1989.  Cognitive ethology: Hunting for bargains or a wild goose
chase?  In (Montefiore, ed) _Goals, No-Goals and Own Goals_.  Unwin Hyman.
  More on vervet monkeys.  Links between ethology and AI.

Dupre, J. 1996.  The mental lives of nonhuman animals.  In (M. Bekoff &
D. Jamieson, eds) _Readings in Animal Cognition_.  MIT Press.

Gaita, R. 1992.  Animal thoughts.  Philosophical Investigations 15:227-44.

Gauker, C. 1990.  How to learn language like a chimpanzee.  Philosophical
Psychology 4:139-46.

Harrison, P. 1991.  Do animals feel pain?  Philosophy 66:25-40.

Jolley, N. 1995.  Sensation, intentionality, and animal consciousness.  Ratio
8:128-42.

Jolly, A. 1991.  Conscious chimpanzees?  A review of recent literature.  In
(C. Ristau, ed) _Cognitive Ethology_.  Lawrence Erlbaum.

Nelson, J. 1983.  Do animals propositionally know? Do they propositionally
believe?  American Philosophical Quarterly 20:149-60.

Premack, D. & Woodruff, G. 1978.  Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4:515-629.

Routley, R. 1982.  Alleged problems in attributing beliefs, and intentionality,
to animals.  Inquiry 24:385-417.

Sorabji, R. 1992.  Animal minds.  Southern Journal of Philosophy 31:1-18.

Sterelny, K. 1990.  Animals and individualism.  In (P. Hanson, ed)
_Information, Language and Cognition_.  University of British Columbia Press.

Sterelny, K. 1995.  Basic minds.  Philosophical Perspectives 9:251-70.

Stich, S.P. 1978.  Do animals have beliefs?  Australasian Journal of Philosophy
57:15-28.
  If they do, we can't ascribe content to them.

5.6 Color, General [20]
------------------

Hardin, C.L. 1988.  _Color for Philosophers_.  Hackett.
  Everything about brain-processing of color, and how it bears on
  philosophical problems.

Armstrong, D.M. 1969.  Colour realism and the argument from microscopes.  In
(R. Brown & C. Rollins, eds) _Contemporary Philosophy in Australia_.
Humanities Press.

Averill, E.W. 1985.  Color and the anthropocentric problem.  Journal of
Philosophy 82:281-303.
  Variation in shade distinctions under lights forces hard choices re color.

Boghossian, P. & Velleman, J.D. 1991.  Physicalist theories of color.
Philosophical Review 100:67-106.

Campbell, K. 1969.  Colours.  In (R. Brown & C. Rollins, eds) _Contemporary
Philosophy in Australia_.  Humanities Press.

Campbell, K. 1982.  The implications of Land's theory of colour vision.  In
(L. Cohen, ed) _Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science_, Vol. 6.
North-Holland.

Hardin, C.L. 1983.  Colors, normal observers and standard conditions.  Journal
of Philosophy 80:806-13.
  Appeal to standard conditions doesn't work as a definition of color terms.

Hardin, C.L. 1984.  A new look at color.  American Philosophical Quarterly
21:125-33.

Hardin, C.L. 1984.  Are scientific objects colored?  Mind 93:491-500.

Hardin, C.L. 1985.  The resemblances of colors.  Philosophical Studies
48:35-47.
  Color is analyzable, in hue circle terms.  Contra Armstrong.

Hardin, C.L. 1985.  Frank talk about the colors of sense-data.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 63:485-93.

Hardin, C.L. 1989.  Could white be green?  Mind 390:285-8.

Hilbert, D. 1987.  _Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric
Realism_.  CSLI.

Johnston, M. 1992.  How to speak of the colors.  Philosophical Studies
68:221-263.
  Argues that various competing positions about color are all true, but some
  are better than others.  In particular, defends a dispositional secondary
  quality view against primary quality views.  Nice.

McGilvray, J. 1983.  To color.  Synthese 54:37-70.

Smith, P. 1987.  Subjectivity and colour vision.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 61:245-81.
  On colors as dispositions to produce certain internal states.  Against a
  Nagelian conception of color, pro a scientific realist one.

Thompson, E., Palacios, A., & Varela, F.J. 1992.  Ways of coloring.  Behavioral
and Brain Sciences.

Westphal, J. 1987.  _Colour: Some Philosophical Problems from Wittgenstein_.
Blackwell.

Westphal, J. 1988.  White.  Mind 97:310-28.

Wittgenstein, L. 1977.  _Remarks on Colour_.  University of California Press.


5.7 Pain and Pleasure [20]
---------------------

Conee, E. 1984.  A defense of pain.  Philosophical Studies 46:239-48.

Cowan, J. 1968.  _Pleasure and Pain: A Study in Philosophical Psychology_.
Macmillan.

Dennett, D.C. 1978.  Why you can't make a computer that feels pain.  Synthese
38.  Reprinted in _Brainstorms_ (MIT Press, 1978).

Edwards, R. 1975.  Do pleasures and pains differ qualitatively?  Journal of
Value Inquiry 9:270-81.

Gillett, G. 1991.  The neurophilosophy of pain.  Philosophy 66:191-206.
  Relating the neurophysiology of pain to a Wittgensteinian account.  Pain
  is a complex of reactions, not inner information.

Goldstein, I. 1989.  Pleasure and pain: unconditional intrinsic values.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Graham, G. & Stephens, G. 1987.  Minding your P's and Q's: Pain and sensible
qualities.  Nous 21:395-405.

Grahek, N. 1991.  Objective and subjective aspects of pain.  Philosophical
Psychology 4:249-66.

Grahek, N. 1995.  The sensory dimension of pain.  Philosophical Studies
79:167-84.
  A critique of Nelkin 1986: he has misinterpreted the empirical results,
  so there's no reason to believe that sensation is irrelevant to pain.

Gustafson, D. 1995.  Belief in pain.  Consciousness and Cognition 4:323-45.

Hall, R.J. 1989.  Are pains necessarily unpleasant?  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 49:643-59.

Kaufman, R. 1985.  Is the concept of pain incoherent?  Southern Journal of
Philosophy 23:279-84.

Langsam, H. 1995.  Why pains are mental objects.  Journal of Philosophy
6:303-13.

Momeyer, R. 1975.  Is pleasure a sensation?  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 36:113-21.

Nelkin, N. 1986.  Pains and pain sensations.  Journal of Philosophy 83:129-48.
  Pain sensation is not pain.  Pain is an attitude.  Empirical studies, etc.

Nelkin, N. 1994.  Reconsidering pain.  Philosophical Psychology 7:325-43.
  Argues that pains are a combination of a phenomenal state with an
  immediate evaluation of that state as harmful; no *particular* phenomenal
  type is required.  With application to empirical cases.

Newton, N. 1989.  On viewing pain as a secondary quality.  Nous 23:569-98.

Pitcher, G. 1970.  The awfulness of pain.  Journal of Philosophy 48.

Quinn, W. 1968.  Pleasure -- disposition or episode?  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 28:578-86.

Rachlin, H. 1985.  Pain and behavior.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:43-83.

5.8 Emotions, etc [10]
-----------------

Ben-Ze'ev, A. 1987.  The nature of emotions.  Philosophical Studies 52:393-409.

Ben-Ze'ev, A. 1990.  Describing the emotions.  Philosophical Psychology
3:305-17.

Davis, W. 1981.  A theory of happiness.  American Philosophical Quarterly
18:111-20.

de Sousa, R. 1987.  _The Rationality of Emotion_.  MIT Press.

Gordon, R.M. 1987.  _The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive
Philosophy_.  Cambridge University Press.

Griffiths, P. 1989.  Folk, functional and neurochemical aspects of mood.
Philosophical Psychology 2:17-32.

Lormand, E. 1985.  Toward a theory of moods.  Philosophical Studies 47:385-407.
  Moods are not intentional states, but rather modulate the activity of
  intentional states such as beliefs and desires.  Criticizes other theories.

Marks, J. 1982.  A theory of emotion.  Philosophical Studies 42:227-42.

Rey, G. 1980.  Functionalism and emotion.  In (A. Rorty, ed), _Explaining the
Emotions_.  University of California Press.

Rorty, A. (ed) 1980.  _Explaining the Emotions_.  University of California
Press.

5.9 Dreaming [8]
------------

Ayer, A. 1960.  Professor Malcolm on dreams.  Journal of Philosophy.

Dennett, D.C. 1976.  Are dreams experiences?  Philosophical Review 73:151-71.
Reprinted in _Brainstorms_ (MIT Press, 1978).

Flanagan, O. 1995.  Deconstructing dreams: The spandrels of sleep.  Journal of
Philosophy 92:5-27.

Hunter, J. 1983.  The difference between dreaming and being awake.  Mind
92:80-93.

Malcolm, N. 1962.  _Dreaming_.  Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Putnam, H. 1962.  Dreaming and `depth grammar'.  In (R. Butler, ed) _Analytical
Philosophy: First Series_.  Oxford University Press.  Reprinted in _Mind,
Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975).

Revonsuo, A. 1995.  Consciousness, dreams, and virtual realities.
Philosophical Psychology 8:35-58.

Shanon, B. 1983.  Descartes' puzzle -- An organismic approach.  Cognition and
Brain Theory 6:185-95.

5.10 Free Will (a tiny selection) [15]
---------------------------------

Churchland, P.S. 1981.  Is determinism self-refuting?  Mind 90:99-101.
  Argues with Popper/Eccles.  Determinism isn't self-refuting any more than
  anti-vitalism is self-refuting on the grounds that proponents must be dead.

Dennett, D.C. 1984.  _Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting_.
MIT Press.
  Nice analysis of the various `bugbears' of determinism; stuff on "control",
  "could have done otherwise", and "self-made selves".

Eccles, J. 1976.  Brain and free will.  In (G. Globus, ed) _Consciousness and
the Brain_.  Plenum Press.
  If opinions are not free but forced, then they are not worth taking
  seriously.  Thus determinism undermines itself.

Frankfurt, H. 1969.  Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility.  Journal
of Philosophy 65:829-39.

Ginet, C. 1983.  In defense of incompatibilism.  Philosophical Studies
44:391-400.

Goldman, A. 1968.  Actions, predictions, and books of life.  American
Philosophical Quarterly.

Honderich, T. (ed) 1973.  _Essays on Freedom of Action_.  Routledge and Kegan
Paul.

Morden, M. 1990.  Free will, self-causation, and strange loops.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 68:59-73.
  Uses Hofstadter's strange loops to support a thesis about free will: I am
  free (enough) when I am a cause of my own behavior.

Popper, K. 1983.  Is determinism self-refuting?  Mind 92:103-4.
  Churchland misstates the case.

Slote, M. 1980.  Understanding free will.  Journal of Philosophy 77:136-51.

Slote, M. 1982.  Selective necessity and free will.  Journal of Philosophy
74:5-24.

van Inwagen, P. 1983.  _An Essay on Free Will_.  Oxford University Press.

Watson, G. (ed) 1982.  _Free Will_.  Oxford University Press.

Wolf, S. 1980.  Asymmetrical freedom.  Journal of Philosophy 77:151-66.

Wolf, S. 1981.  The importance of free will.  Mind 90:366-78.

5.11 Split Brains [12]
-----------------

Gazzaniga, M. 1977.  On dividing the self: Speculations from brain research.
Excerpta Medica: Neurology 434:233-44.

Gillett, G. 1986.  Brain bisection and personal identity.  Mind 95:224-9.
  Argues using neurophysiological facts and a Wittgensteinian analysis that
  Parfit's conclusions are not secure.

Hirsch, E. 1991.  Divided minds.  Philosophical Review 1:3-30.
  Dividing a brain doesn't give stream-reflexive knowledge and control (so,
  contra Parfit, couldn't have one half doing algebra and the other geometry).

Johnston, M. 1989.  Fission and the facts.  Philosophical Perspectives
3:369-97.

Marks, C. 1980.  Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and Unity of Mind_.  MIT Press.

Nagel, T. 1971.  Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness.  Synthese
22:396-413.  Reprinted in _Mortal Questions_ (Cambridge University Press,
1979).

Puccetti, R. 1973.  Brain bisection and personal identity.  British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 24:339-55.

Puccetti, R. 1981.  The case for mental duality: Evidence from split-brain data
and other considerations.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4:93-123.

Puccetti, R. 1993.  Mind with a double brain.  British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 44:675-92.

Robinson, D. 1976.  What sort of persons are hemispheres? Another look at
split-brain man.  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27:73-8.

Sperry, R. 1984.  Consciousness, personal identity and the divided brain.
Neuropsychologia 22:611-73.

Wilkes, K.V. 1978.  Consciousness and commissurotomy.  Philosophy 53:185-99.

5.12 Personal Identity (a tiny random selection) [16]
------------------------------------------------

Baillie, J. 1993.  Recent work on personal identity.  Philosophical Books
34:193-206.

Biro, J.I. 1981.  Persons as corporate entities and corporations as persons.
Nature and System 3:173-80.

Brooks, D. 1986.  Group minds.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:456-70.
  Lots of fun speculation on group minds.

Lewis, D. 1976.  Survival and identity.  In (A. Rorty, ed) _The Identities of
Persons_.  University of California Press.

Noonan, H. 1989.  _Personal Identity_.  Routledge.

Nozick, R. 1981.  The identity of the self.  In _Philosophical Explanations_.
Harvard University Press.
  Lots of puzzle cases; defense of the closest-continuer theory; and the role
  of reflexivity and self-synthesis.

Parfit, D. 1971.  Personal identity.  Philosophical Review 80:3-27.

Parfit, D. 1984.  _Reasons and Persons_.  Oxford University Press.
  Exhaustive analysis toward a reductionist conclusion.

Perry, J. 1975.  _Personal Identity_.  University of California Press.

Rorty, A. (ed) 1976.  _The Identities of Persons_.  University of California
Press.

Shoemaker, S. & Swinburne, S. 1984.  _Personal Identity: Great Debates in
Philosophy_.  Blackwell.

Unger, P. 1990.  _Identity, Consciousness, and Value_.  Oxford University
Press.

Wilkes, K.V. 1988.  _Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought
Experiments_.  Oxford University Press.
  Analysis of real cases, e.g. multiple personality & split brains, as thought
  experiments are too misleading.

Williams, B. 1973.  _Problems of the Self_.  Cambridge University Press.

Zuboff, A. 1978.  Moment universals and personal identity.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 52:141-55.
  We are connected to infinitely many pasts and futures.  Depressing?

Zuboff, A. 1990.  One self: The logic of experience.  Inquiry 33:39-68.
  We are all the same person.  A statistical argument for first universalizing
  across tokens, and then across types.  Autobiographical and entertaining.

5.13 Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Misc [10]
------------------------------------------

Clark, A. 1987.  Being there: Why implementation matters to cognitive science.
AI Review 1:231-44.
  On the importance of embodiment of systems in cognition.

Fetzer, J.H. 1991.  _Philosophy and Cognitive Science_.  Paragon House.

Flanagan, O.J. 1984.  _The Science of the Mind_.  MIT Press.

Gilman, D. 1993.  Optimization and simplicity: Marr's theory of vision and
biological explanation.  Manuscript.
  Contra Kitcher 1988, much of Marr's theory doesn't depend on optimization; in
  any case, optimization isn't so bad.  With remarks on interdisciplinarity.

Harnad, S. 1990.  Neoconstructivism: A unifying constraint for cognitive
science.

Kukla, A. 1989.  Non-empirical issues in psychology.  American Psychologist
44:485-94.
  On the role of non-empirical advances in psychology: e.g. in theory
  construction, coherence analysis, conceptual innovation, with the aid of
  logically necessary truths and the contingent/pragmatic a priori.

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Compiled by David Chalmers, Department of Philosophy, University of California,
Santa Cruz.  (c) 1996 David J. Chalmers.