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Department of HISTORY
AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Eötvös University, Budapest
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Pázmány P. sétány
1/A
Budapest, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924
Location?
The web site of the seminar:
http://hps.elte.hu/seminar |
Philosophy of Science
Seminar
Room 6.54 (6th floor)
Monday 4:00 PM
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7
May
4:00 PM
6th floor 6.54 |
| Katalin
Farkas |
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Philosophy, Central European
University, Budapest
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The limits of knowledge
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This is a critical introduction into the ideas of Timothy
Williamson's Knowledge and its limits (Oxford Univ. Press,
2000), a book which is considered by many as the most original
and significant contribution to epistemology in the last few decades.
Working on theories of knowledge has been a flourishing
enterprise in the twentieth century. Various versions of foundationalism,
coherentism, causal theories, reliabilism, subjunctive theories, contextualist
theories - and no doubt other theories - have been defended and criticised
with great erudition.
Williamson's book breaks a new path in approaching questions
of knowledge. Here are some of the main claims of the book:
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knowing is - contrary to what most contemporary theories
of knowledge hold - a state of mind
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the state of knowing is unanalysable to further constituents
- it is, to use Williamson's terminology, a prime condition
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hence it is not possible to give necessary and sufficient
conditions for knowing - Gettierology was a waste of time
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the state of knowing is explanatory in actions just like
states of beliefs and desires are
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14
May
4:00 PM
6th floor 6.54 |
| Péter
Gnädig |
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Atomic Physics, Eötvös University, Budapest
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Ki lehetett volna ,,találni''
a speciális
relativitáselméletet
50 évvel Einstein elõtt?
(Could special relativity have been "figured
out" 50 years before Einstein?)
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Közismert, hogy az elektrodinamika
törvényei teljes összhangban állnak a specialis
relativitáselmelettel, sõt, Einstein éppen a ,,mozgó
testek elektrodinamikájából'' jött rá
a tér és idõ újszerû viszonyára.
Meglepõ azonban, hogy ezt a kapcsolatot
már az elektrosztatika (Coulomb-törvény) és az
egyenáramok (pl. egy hosszú, egyenes vezetõ) Ampere-féle
mágneses tere magában rejti, s ez a kapcsolat elemi lépésekkel
(az eltolási áramra, vagy az elektromágneses hullámokra
való hivatkozás nélkül, s felsõbb matematikai
apparátust mellõzve) felszinre hozható.
Megfelelõ töltéselrendezést
választva néhány egyszerû lépés
után eljuthatunk a Lorentz-kontrakciót, az idõdilatációt,
az egyidejûség relativitását, az általános
Lorentz-transzformációt és az elektromágneses
térerõsségek transzformációs képleteit
megadó formulákhoz.
Érdekes tudományfilozófiai
kérdés, hogy ha mindez ennyire készen állt
már az 1800-as évek közepén, akkor mi volt az
a mozzanat, ami egy fél évszázadon keresztül
még hiányzott a relativitáselmelet megfogalmazásához.
Az elõadó véleménye szerint, a töltések
,,darabosságának'' felismerésére, az atomi
részecskék felfedezésére kellett várni. |
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| 21
May4:00
PM
6th floor 6.54 |
| Panel
Discussion |
Panelists:
Balázs Gyenis*
Gábor Hofer-Szabó*
György Kampis*
Miklós Rédei*
László E. Szabó*
Péter Szegedi*
Moderator:
Márta Fehér**
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* HPS,
Eötvös University, Budapest
** Philosophy,
Technical University, Budapest |
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Reichenbach's Common Cause
Principle
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No correlation without causation. This is,
in its most compact and general formulation, the essence of what became
called the Common Cause Principle (CCP). If two events A and B are
(positively) correlated, p(A&B)>p(A)p(B), then either there is a causal
connection between A and B that brings about the correlation or there is
a third event C (common cause) that stands in a causal connection with
A and B, and it is this C that causes the correlation, that is,
(1) p(A&B|C)=p(A|C)p(B|C)
(2) p(A&B|notC)=p(A|notC)p(B|notC)
(3) p(A&C)>p(A)p(C)
(4) p(B&C)>p(B)p(C)
A part of the panelists believe that - although
some slight modifications of the original Reichenbachian conception seem
necessary - (1)-(4) express the proper mathematical formulation of our
causal intuition, and are never violated in reality. Some others argue
that Reichenbach's concept of common cause is completely pointless and
does not apply for many correlations in our world. |
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Suggested readings:
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H. Reichenbach: The Direction of
Time, University of California Press, Los Angeles,1956, pp. 157-167.
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G. Hofer-Szabó, M. Rédei
and L. E. Szabó: Reichenbach's
Common Cause Principle: Recent Results and Open Questions, Reports
on Philosophy, No. 20. (2001)
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E. Sober: The principle of the common
cause, in J. H. Fetzer (ed.), Probability and Causality, Reidel
Pub. Co., Boston,1988.
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E. Sober: Common cause explanation,
Philosophy
of Science, 51 (1984) 212-241.
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H. Chang and N. Cartwright: Causality
and realism in the EPR experiment, Erkenntnis, 38 (1993),
pp. 169-190.
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Hofer-Szabó, G., Rédei, M., Szabó, L.
E., On Reichenbach's common cause principle and Reichenbach's notion of
common cause, The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50 (1999), 377-399.
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| 28
May
4:00 PM
6th floor 6.54 |
| Márta
Újvári |
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Philosophy, Budapest University of Economic Sciences
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Time, Tense and the 'Indexical
Fallacy' in McTaggart's Argument
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The tenser-detenser debate has got impetus
from the new indexical, token reflexive analysis of tensed language which
renders the truth conditions of tensed sentences in tenseless terms. According
to detensers like Mellor and Poidevin what Taggart's argument shows is
that the A-series account of time is a misconstrual leading to regress.
Tenser E.J. Lowe, however, argues that the A-regress cannot even
have a start since it rests on the indexical fallacy
of using compound tenses. His claim, roughly, is that temporal indexicals
just like any other indexicals cannot be iterated without violating the
contextual constraints on the use, as opposed to the mention, of indexicals.
Further, Lowe claims that extending Taggart's fallacious argument to space
and personality one could equally argue for the irreality of places and
persons.
I will show that Lowe's argument is incoherent.
When introducing the indexical fallacy he makes appeal to the analogy between
temporal and other indexicals. But when he defends the tensed view he makes
appeal to Taggart's first two premises ( 1. time involves change essentially;
2.change can be explained only in terms of the A-series) which invite a
disanalogy between temporal and other indexicals. So, the indexical fallacy
cannot be repeated, pace Lowe, for space and person within the context
of McTaggart's argument. Consequently, the threat of the irreality of places
and persons does not arise along taggartian lines.
The other conclusion with broader implications
is that even the indexical analysis shows the specific metaphysical character
of time in consonance with the metaphysical tradition. |
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The 60-minute lecture is followed by a 10-minute break. Then
we hold a 30-60-minute discussion. The language of the presentation is indicated
in the following way:
English
English, except if all participants speak Hungarian
Hungarian
The participants
may comment on the talks and are encouraged to initiate discussion through the
Internet. The comments should be written in the language of the presentation.
The organizer of the seminar: László
E. Szabó (email: leszabo@hps.elte.hu) |
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