History and Philosophy of Science
Eötvös University, Budapest
Philosophy of Science Colloquium
Room 6.54 (6th floor) Monday 4:00 PM

Pázmány P. sétány 1/A  Budapest Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924 Location?



March
2004


1 March  4:00 PM   6th floor 6.54   
György Geréby
Instiute for Philosophy, Eötvös University, Budapest
Department of Philosophy, CEU, Budapest
 
Mentális nyelv problémák a 14. sz. elején
(The problem of mental language in the early 14th century)



8 March  4:00 PM   6th floor 6.54   
Soós Sándor
History and Philosophy of Science, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest
 
A fajok problematikájának “interdiszciplináris mátrixa”: tudományelmélet, szemantika, pszichológia vagy ontológia?
(The “interdisciplinary matrix” of the species problem)
A species problem a XX. század második felében rendkívül szerteágazó problémarendszerré nőtte ki magát. A modern szintézis utáni biológia fogalmi–módszertani kérdései kölcsönhatni látszottak a rájuk épülő tudományfilozófiai–ismeretelméleti–ontológiai megfontolásokkal (amit többek között a “fajok–mint–individuumok” tézis megszületése, ill. a kládisztikának nevezett rendszertani iskolába való beépülése fémjelez). Mindennek dacára a problematika szívósan tartja magát. Az utóbbi évek vonatkozó irodalmának reprezentatív mintája (biológusok, filozófusok és pszichológusok/antropológusokok munkája) pedig már az “interdiszciplinaritás” védjegyével látja el a kérdéskört (Wilson, 1999)*.
A témával szemben ugyanakkor évtizedek óta fokozódik a szkepszis, és egyre erősödik az az álláspont, hogy a bajok forrása a különböző területekről származó érvek sajátos kapcsolatrendszerében (és nem pl. a fajfogalmak tökéletlenségében) keresendő: a diszciplináris kölcsönhatás torzításai okozzák. Az előadás egyrészt megkísérli szisztematikusan felvázolni azt a mátrixot (vagy annak erősen árulkodó részleteit), amely az egyes kanonikus megközelítések kapcsolatrendszerét ábrázolja, hogy azt elemezve láthatóvá váljanak a species problem felszámolásához vezető utak.

*Wilson, R.A., ed. 1999. Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press



22 March  4:00 PM   6th floor 6.54   

István A. Aranyosi

Ph.D. candidate, Philosophy, CEU, Budapest
 
The Doomsday Simulation Argument.
Or why isn’t the end nigh and you are not living in a simulation.

According to the Carter-Leslie Doomsday Argument, we should assign a high probability to the hypothesis that the human species will go extinct very soon. The argument is based on the application of Bayes’s theorem and a certain indifference principle with respect to the temporal location of our observed birth rank within the totality of birth ranks of all humans who will ever have lived.

According to Bostrom’s Simulation Argument, which appeals to a weaker indifference principle than the Doomsday Argument, at least one of the following three propositions must be true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a posthuman stage, (2) it is very unlikely that some posthuman civilization will run a significant number of ancestor simulations, (3) it is almost sure that we are living in a computer simulation.

According to my Doomsday Simulation Argument, both of the following propositions must be true: (1) it is almost sure that the human species will not go extinct before reaching a posthuman stage, (2) it is almost sure that we are not living in a computer simulation.

PDF file


29 March  4:00 PM   6th floor 6.54   

Milan M. Ćirković

Astronomical Observatory Belgrade
 
Five roads to the arrow of time
We are witnessing a great resurgence of interest—in both the domains of physics and philosophy—in the problem of the origin of the thermodynamical arrow of time (also known as the origin of the Second Law of thermodynamics or the entropy gradient or the thermodynamical temporal asymmetry, etc.). Although variations on the same theme existed since antiquity, the problem in its modern form was probably first formulated by Irish physicist Edward P. Culverwell in 1890, who concluded that the kinetic theory alone could never succeed in explaining the Second Law of thermodynamics. This has provoked Boltzmann (and his assisstant Schuetz) to formulate one of the most interesting answers to the puzzle, an answer which, we hereby attempt to show, has remained interesting, in a particular reformulation, to this day. Before engaging in such reformulation, we present a modern taxonomy of the approaches to the explanation of the thermodynamical arrow of time puzzle. There are five possible roads to be taken, depending on the exact location of the origin of the asymmetry and the nature of physical mechanisms involved: two inherent solutions (statistical and dynamical), interventionism, Acausal-Particular approach of Price, and the reformulated Boltzmann-Schuetz (also dubbed the Acausal-Anthropic). Surprisingly enough, it seems that most solutions include at least some new physics, on either micro- or macro level. The preferred alternative (which we dub the Acausal-Anthropic approach) is based on accepting Boltzmann's statistical measure at its face value, and accomodating it within the quantum-cosmological concept of the multiverse (world-ensemble). Notably, the special low-entropy initial conditions of our cosmological domain (“universe”) are best explained by embedding them in a wide spectrum of many possible initial conditions appearing among the domains of the quantum-cosmological multiverse.

Keywords: entropy, cosmology, history and philosophy of physics




The 60-minute lecture is followed by a 10-minute break. Then we hold a 30-60-minute discussion. The language of the presentation is indicated in the following way:
         English
   English, except if all participants speak Hungarian
         Hungarian
The participants may comment on the talks and are encouraged to initiate discussion through the Internet. The comments  should be written in the language of the presentation.


The organizer of the colloquium for the academic year 2003/2004: Miklós Rédei  (email: redei@hps.elte.hu)