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The Revolution That Didn't Happen
STEVEN WEINBERG
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them, in the same way that mammals turned out to be better than dinosaurs at surviving the effects of comet impacts, but when new problems arise they will be replaced by new theories that are better at solving those problems, and so on, with no overall improvement.



All this is wormwood to scientists like myself, who think the task of science is to bring us closer and closer to objective truth. But Kuhn's conclusions are delicious to those who take a more skeptical view of the pretensions of science. If scientific theories can only be judged within the context of a particular paradigm, then in this respect the scientific theories of any one paradigm are not privileged over other ways of looking at the world, such as shamanism or astrology or creationism. If the transition from one paradigm to another cannot be judged by any external standard, then perhaps it is culture rather than nature that dictates the content of scientific theories.

Kuhn himself was not always happy with those who invoked his work. In 1965 he complained that for the philosopher Paul Feyerabend to describe his arguments as a defense of irrationality in science seemed to him to be "not only absurd but vaguely obscene." In a 1991 interview with John Horgan, Kuhn sadly recalled a student in the 1960s complimenting him, "Oh, thank you, Mr. Kuhn, for telling us about paradigms. Now that we know about them, we can get rid of them." Kuhn was also uncomfortable with the so-called "strong program" in the sociology of science, which is "strong" in its uncompromisingly skeptical aim to show how political and social power and interests dominate the success or failure of scientific theories. This program is particularly associated with a group of philosophers and sociologists of science that at one time worked at the University of Edinburgh. About this, Kuhn remarked in 1991, "I am among those who have found the claims of the strong program absurd, an example of deconstruction gone mad."

But even when we put aside the excesses of Kuhn's admirers, the radical part of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is radical enough. And I think it is quite wrong.

It is not true that scientists are unable to "switch back and forth between ways of seeing," and that after a scientific revolution they become incapable of understanding the science that went before it. One of the paradigm shifts to which Kuhn gives much attention in Structure is the replacement at the beginning of this century of Newtonian mechanics by the relativistic mechanics of Einstein. But in fact in educating new physicists the first thing that we teach them is still good old Newtonian mechanics, and they never forget how to think in Newtonian terms, even after they learn about Einstein's theory of relativity. Kuhn himself as an instructor at Harvard must have taught Newtonian mechanics to undergraduates.



In defending his position, Kuhn argued that the words we use and the symbols in our equations mean different things before and after a scientific revolution; for instance, physicists meant different things by mass before and after the advent of relativity. It is true that there was a good deal of uncertainty about the concept of mass during the Einsteinian revolution. For a while there was talk of "longitudinal" and "transverse" masses, which were supposed to depend on a particle's speed and to resist accelerations along the direction of motion and perpendicular to it. But this has all been resolved. No one today talks of longitudinal or transverse mass, and in fact the term "mass" today is most frequently understood as "rest mass," an intrinsic property of a body that is not changed by motion, which is much the way that mass was understood before Einstein. Meanings can change, but generally they do so in the direction of an increased richness and precision of definition, so that we do not lose the ability to understand the theories of past periods of normal science.

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