
The Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox and conditional expectations

Zalán Gyenis Rényi Institute of Mathematics, Budapest Gábor Hofer-Szabó Research Centre for the Humanities, Budapest Miklós Rédei London School of Economics What is the conditional probability that a randomly chosen point is on an arc of a great circle of the sphere on the condition that it lies on that great circle?

Tension:

- Intuition: the conditional probability is proportional to the length of the arc.
- Fact: since a great circle has surface measure zero, Bayes' formula cannot be used to calculate the conditional probability.



- **1** Use **conditional expectation** to conditionalize.
- This will allow for conditionalizing on probability zero events, as in case of the Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox.
- Using conditional expectation the Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox is not paradoxical.

- The Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox was formulated by Borel in 1909 before Kolmogorov's (1933) measure-theoretic probability theory.
- Kolmogorov's own resolution of the Paradox is based on the theory of conditional expectation.
- Since Kolmogorov's work, conditional expectation is the standard device for conditionalization in probability theory.

1 Conditioning using conditional expectation

2 The Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox



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Conditioning using conditional expectation

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
• Conditional expectation is a coarse-graining.

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- Conditional expectation is a coarse-graining.
- (X, S, p): probability measure space




• $\mathcal{L}^1(X, \mathcal{S}, p)$: set of *p*-integrable functions




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- $\mathcal{L}^1(X, \mathcal{S}, p)$: set of *p*-integrable functions
- p defines a functional $\phi_p(f) \doteq \int_X f \, dp, \qquad f \in \mathcal{L}^1(X, \mathcal{S}, p)$




• (X, A, p_A) : coarse-grained probability measure space



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• $\mathscr{E}(\cdot|\mathcal{A}): \mathcal{L}^1(X, \mathcal{S}, p) \to \mathcal{L}^1(X, \mathcal{A}, p_{\mathcal{A}})$: conditional expectation



Definition

A map

$$\mathscr{E}(\cdot|\mathcal{A})\colon \mathcal{L}^1(X,\mathcal{S},p) \to \mathcal{L}^1(X,\mathcal{A},p_{\mathcal{A}})$$

is called an \mathcal{A} -conditional expectation if:

- (i) $\mathscr{E}(f|\mathcal{A})$ is \mathcal{A} -measurable for all $f \in \mathcal{L}^1(X, \mathcal{S}, p)$;
- (ii) $\mathscr{E}(\cdot|\mathcal{A})$ preserves the integration on elements of \mathcal{A} :

$$\int_Z \mathscr{E}(f|\mathcal{A})dp_\mathcal{A} = \int_Z fdp \qquad orall Z \in \mathcal{A}.$$

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Given a continuous linear functional $\phi'_{\mathcal{A}}$ on $\mathcal{L}^1(X, \mathcal{A}, p_{\mathcal{A}})$, what is its **extension** to $\mathcal{L}^1(X, \mathcal{S}, p)$?

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There is no unique answer, but:

Bayesian statistical inference

Let the **extension** ϕ' be:

$$\phi'(f) \doteq \phi'_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathscr{E}(f|\mathcal{A})) \qquad \forall f \in \mathcal{L}^1(X, \mathcal{S}, p)$$

Definition

The conditional probability p'(B) is simply the application of the Bayesian statistical inference to the characteristic function χ_B :

 $p'(B) \doteq \phi'_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathscr{E}(\chi_B|\mathcal{A}))$

Remarks

• p'(B) depends on three factors: \mathcal{A} , $\mathcal{E}(\cdot|\mathcal{A})$ and $\phi'_{\mathcal{A}}$

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Conditional probability

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In the special case when

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 is generated by $\{A, A^{\perp}\}$,

$$p(A) \neq 0;$$

$$p_{\mathcal{A}}'(A)=1$$
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the conditional probability can be given by the Bayes formula:

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
Elements of A can also have zero prior probability p. Hence, it is possible to obtain conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero conditioning events if one uses conditional expectations.

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
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Let $(S, \mathcal{B}(S), p)$ be the probability measure space on the sphere S with the uniform probability p on S. What is the conditional probability of being on an arc on a great circle C on condition of being on a great circle C of S?




The Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox

 \mathcal{O} : generated by Borel measurable sets of circles **parallel** to *C*




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


Uniform conditional probability

O: generated by Borel measurable sets of circles **parallel** to *C*




 \mathcal{M} : generated by Borel measurable sets of **meridian** circles containing *C*




Uniform conditional probability

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 \mathcal{M} : generated by Borel measurable sets of **meridian** circles containing *C*



Uniform conditional probability

Non-uniform conditional probability

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Borel-Kolmogorov

Remarks

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Standard view

"... we have different conditional distributions depending on how we describe the circle." (Myrvold, 2014)

The Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox is paradoxical because the conditional probabilities of the **same event** on the **same conditioning events** should not depend on the different parametrizations (violation of the Labelling Irrelevance).

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- \bullet **Proposition**. There exists no isomorphism between ${\cal O}$ and ${\cal M}.$

The Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox merely displays a sensitive dependence of conditional probabilities of the **same event** on **different conditioning Boolean subalgebras** with respect to which conditional probabilities are defined in terms of conditional expectations. These conditional probabilities are answers to different questions – not different answers to the same question.

Another standard view

Only the uniform conditional distribution is intuitively correct.

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Both conditional distributions are intuitively correct.

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
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Both conditional distributions are intuitively correct.

One obtains a **uniform** distribution on the sphere by generating points:

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
One obtains a **uniform** distribution on the sphere by generating points: **uniformly** on all circles in O.




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 singled out by pure probabilistic means.
- To single out the uniform length measure one needs to use further non-probabilistic mathematical conditions, e.g.
 - **group-theoretic**: it is the unique measure invariant with respect to the subgroup of rotations on the sphere;
 - **geometric**: it is the restriction of the Lebesgue measure to the circle as differentiable manifold.

- The proper mathematical device to handle conditional probabilities is the theory of conditional expectation.
- This theory makes it possible to conditionalize on probability zero events, as in the case of the Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox.
- Obtaining different conditional probabilities is not paradoxical because
 - they cannot be regarded as conditional probabilities of the same event with respect to the same conditioning events;
 - both are intuitively correct if seen as describing generation of points on sphere with uniform distribution.

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