Where are colours? Inside, outside or somewhere in
between? Using Goethe’s criticism of both the objective (Newtonian) and
subjective (as in the works of Schopenhauer) treatment of colour phenomena the
author aims to give a criticism of both. While doing so he compares two such
criticisms, one by a recent writer (Evan Thompson 1995. Colour Vision. A Study in
Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception), one by a turn of the
century interpreter of Goethe (Rudolf Steiner, editor of the Weimar edition of
Goethe’s scientific writings). The aim is to investigate and compare these
criticisms, two solutions for a relationist science of colours.
Keywords: vision,
colour, visual science, research traditions, J. W. Goethe, E. Thompson, R.
Steiner,
‘For at this moment I am sensible that […] like the
vulgar, I am only a partisan. Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a
dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the questions, but is anxious only
to convince his hearers of his own assertions. And the difference between him
and me at the present moment is merely this – that whereas he seeks to convince
his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself’
Plato: Phaedo
Goethe’s polemic
against Newton is well known. He loathed the French Revolution, Catholicism and
the Newtonian theory of light and colours[1],
for, in his eyes all three were despotic and tyrannical. In a letter to J.F.
Reichardt on 30 May 1791 he wrote:
“Of all my projects, the one which interests me most
is a new theory of light, shade and colours. If I am not mistaken, sometimes
even revolutions must come about in the studies of nature and art.”
He was hoping for such
a revolution, which would lead to a Republic, as it preserves a measure of
independence, and because it is characteristically liberal, not tyrannical. And
this should not be taken only politically. As Jackson pointed out (1994:680)
“He wanted to establish a republic in colour theory so that a group of learned
investigators of nature could voice their opinions”, similar to the members of
the French Republic of Letters. And to reach this the Newtonian despotism had
to be overthrown.
But his attempt to
liberate colour science from the Newtonian heritage has clearly failed in his
time. Both his Beitrage zur Optik, aimed at simply reinvestigating
Newtons experimentum crucis with his own prismatic games, and the
gigantic Farbenlehre was a failure. The reasons for its nearly total
refusal, however disturbing, were understood by Goethe as a consequence of the
rigid structure of the scientific community, “the ethos of academy” (Fink
1991:132), and the power of the Newtonian authority.
This is the better
known part of the story. The multi-talented genius, who is not understood and
accepted by his time in the field of Natural Science, the area, where he was
probably most proud of his contributions. We can sympathise with Goethe, and in
the light of current research (like Sepper 1988, Rehbock 1995) even side with
him. To rephrase his claim: science can flourish if there is an open community
of researchers following different but equally justified research programs,
instead of one canonized approach trying to eliminate all other attempts and
ways of tackling a certain problem, claiming absolute certitude and
justifiability, labelling every attempt to falsify it nonsensical.
But then how do we
understand his attitude to Arthur Schopenhauer, who was one of the few to
support his theory. Schopenhauer wanted to further develop Goethe’s theory of
colours[2],
and, on the basis of Goethe’s presentation of the phenomena, following
the footsteps of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason claimed the Farbenlehre for
physiology (Magnus 1906:127). Schopenhauer, who, like a true young rebel took sides
with Goethe in the question of colours, was one of the very few supporters of
the Goethean program, and yet, when he sent the manuscript of his first essay
on ‘Vision and Colour’, after reading it Goethe was reluctant to send it
back (even after several reminding letters by Schopenauer). Goethe, instead of
welcoming a thinker of very similar ideas, condemned Schopenhauer as a heretic[3].
This is the lesser known part of the story.
Goethe, the advocate
of the “scientific republic” turned against his own disciple in a war that was
already to be lost, and where he was left with very few allies. Isn’t this move
exactly the same as Newton’s move was towards his contemporaries trying to
question him? And is this not the same attitude (on Goethe’s side) of the 19th
century Newtonians that neglected and condemned Goethe’s own writings in his
time?
This paper is about
the seeming contradiction between Goethe’s tolerance and intolerance, about the
success of the very views condemned by Goethe, and two attempts to find a
better truth. One is Evan Thompson’s (ET), co-author of the famous The
Embodied Mind (1991. Cambridge, MIT Press) with Varela, F.J. and Rosch,
E. As his book will be frequently cited
the numbers in brackets refer to page numbers in his book (Thompson 1995). The
other is Rudolf Steiner’s (1861-1925), one of the most influential and
controversial interpreters of Goethean Science, working for years in Weimar, in
the Goethe Archives, preparing the Weimar Edition of Goethe’s writings. The
four volumes of the scientific writings edited by Steiner are still famous and
among the most often used.
Ironically enough
Goethe has condemned the two most significant and successful research programs
of colour vision. One has grown out of the Newtonian assertion that colours are
contained in white light, and can therefore be labelled as ‘objective’
approach. The other can be dated from Johannes Müller’s book on
‘The Comparative Physiology of the Visual Sense in Man and the Animals’,
appearing in 1826, only ten years after Schopenhauer’s ‘Vision and Colour’.
This approach we might term physiological, or subjective.
Both views became
extremely popular and useful in the development of the science of colour. They
managed to tackle different problems, abounded in good solutions given to very
puzzling questions. To our further discussion let us outline the problem-space
and some of the recent achievements of both programmes.
Trying to model the
way the human or another visual-system works has been a prime concern of
computational models of colour vision. To carry out the necessary calculations
computational studies have to ‘quantify’ colour. It is generally agreed that
colour perception can be described by three parameters: that of hue, saturation
and lightness. Ordering numbers to each of these we arrive at the so-called
‘phenomenal colour space’ a three-dimensional colour solid, where every point
of the solid corresponds to a colour sensation.
According to
Computational Objectivism (CO), this is the result of the intricate system of
receptors and nervous pathways. There must be then a number of ‘colour spaces’
from the receptoral level, through the postreceptoral levels, where from one we
can arrive at the other using certain rules of transformation. Obviously, these
‘colour spaces’ will have no one-to-one correspondence to definite colour
sensations. The receptoral colour space, for example, is defined by the three
cone receptor types, it is a space containing all possible triplet responses,
and serves therefore only as the basis of our colour vision (the points of the
space do not refer to any type of ‘perceived colour’ i.e. colour-sensation).
The desired aim is to
build a system, which is as consistent in ‘judging’ (that is, assigning certain
’colours’ to objects with certain spectral reflectances) as the eye. In his experimentum
crucis, Newton ‘proved’ the composite nature of light and that certain
wavelengths and colours can be ‘matched’[4].
CO has grown out of this view, according to which a certain wavelength of light
has a certain colour. Although, contrary to these so called ‘primary colours’,
light reflected from the surface of objects contain light-rays of differing
wavelength, it seems that simply detecting spectral reflectances is sufficient
to determine the colour of objects. So the simplest solution for CO seems to be
to measure surface reflectance, and from the reflectance curves decide the
colour of the object.
But this view doesn’t
take into account the simple fact, that even if the illumination changes, and
with this the surface reflectance of the surfaces, objects more or less
maintain their colour. A white sheet of paper looks white both in daylight and
in artificial lighting conditions. A white room looks white even if it reflects
less light than a black room (see Gilchrist 1979).
Just as a passing
note: if we want to prove that the illumination is different it is enough to
make video recordings inside and outside without changing the ‘white balance’[5].
This phenomena, called ‘colour constancy’ means that when calculating the
‘colour’ of the object the visual system is not measuring the spectral
reflectance, but the difference in spectral reflectance of the object
and its surroundings. When attempting to model the visual system, colour
constancy has to be accounted for[6].
Without going into
further details in respect to the actual computations and the problems that
have emerged and now seem to be solved, today it is clear (a) that the
perceived colour depends on computations that extend throughout the entire
visual field, (b) that naturally occurring lights and spectral reflectances do
not vary arbitrarily, but can be described in a linear model with a small
number of parameters; and (c) that to carry out the necessary calculations to
acquire colour constancy the visual scene must be spatially segmented, and in
this segmenting colour vision plays an important role. (1995:94)
We have touched upon
(a) when talking about colour constancy. The linear models framework theories
support claim (b) by stating, that in order to achieve colour constancy there
is no need for an infinite number of parameters to be measured. Visual systems
can ‘cope with’ only a small number of receptor types, and so actual lights and
reflectances are ‘described by representing them as the weighted sums of a
small number of illuminant and reflectance basis functions’ (1995: 91). And (c)
simply put means, that spatial segmentation is needed to decide where one
surface begins and where one ends (see also Boden 1992). Without this it is
hard to imagine how the difference of spectral reflectances can be
measured. Of course we could take every point (receptor-field) as an
independent entity, but then we fail in one of the most basic features of human
colour vision, namely that we see coloured surfaces, not only isolated coloured
points.
It would seem that by
successfully tackling colour constancy CO could provide a satisfactory
computational solution to colour vision. Some results, however, seem to limit
the applicability of this approach. If spectrally non-selective surfaces seen
against a spectrally non-selective background (that is ‘grey’ on ‘grey’) it
seems achromatic (colourless, that is, again, ‘grey’) in white light. In
chromatic light if the reflectance is near background level both surfaces are
seen as grey. But if the intensities are different everything changes: the two
‘greys’ take on colour! The ‘lighter’ grey takes on the colour of the
illuminant, the darker the complementary. Colour constancy, then, is only
approximate! Even if this so called Helson-Judd effect is disposed of by saying
that approximate colour constancy is a trade-off of the visual system, a
compromise (1995:101), CO still cannot account for is the relation of the two
colours: the hue and its complementary. A complementary colour has no intelligent
meaning in CO. “Too many of the mechanisms essential to the production of
colour that we see lie within the bodies of perceivers” as Hardin (1990:566)
says. If we try to account for complementary colours we have to deal with the
‘physique’, not only with physics.
A subjectivist
approach is not satisfied by the objectivist explanation. It claims that
colours are not ‘out there’, but ‘in the head’. This was the view of
Schopenhauer, criticised by Goethe, and from this view grew out what now may be
called Neurophysiological Subjectivism (NS). It successfully answers the
problems of complementary hues, based on studies of the nervous system.
Contrary to CO’s claim (NS) holds that (a) the notion of object colours ‘can be
eliminated in favour of the reductive identification of perceptions of objects
as coloured with psychophysical and neurophysiological states and processes
(eliminativism), and (b) that there are only chromatic visual states and these
are to be identified with neural states (neuroscientific reductionism)’
(1995:135-36, 205).
By eliminating the
objective colour-concept and by reducing colour sensation to neural states that
are responsible for this, colour sensation becomes an ‘artefact’ of the
subject, though a very useful artefact. In this case ‘colour’ must be found in
the nervous system, somewhere between the receptors of the eye and the higher
cortical areas. Contrary to a computational approach NS stresses the importance
of a close study of the nervous system.
That all hues can be
mixed using only three basic colours has long been suggested (by Palmer in
1776; by Young in 1801). But that trichromacy is based on the fact that there
are three types of cone receptors has only been confirmed in the 1960s. Before
this several attempts were made to describe colour phenomena (see details in
older textbooks, like Hartridge (1950:256-293)). It was also accepted that in
human colour perception there are two pairs of opponent hues, colours that
cannot be mixed, yellow and blue, and red and green. These four colours define
two axes in the phenomenal colour space. Today, knowing more and more about the
postreceptoral mechanisms of the human visual system, this opposition can be
explained by the nervous system’s build-up, containing ‘opponent neurons’,
responsible for colour contrast.
It would be improper
here to go into the details of the neural structure of the visual system.
Although many attempts have been made in order to correlate colour-perception
and activity of parts of the nervous system, none seem convincing. The activity
of V4 (the so called fourth visual cortical area) seems to be closely
correlated with the perceiving of colour, in fact with the colours perceived
(such as red, green, yellow), and not with the wavelength (for details see
Davidoff 1995). It is, however, unadvisable to claim that we have found the
area where colour sensation is (1995:75-79). The reasons are the following: at
present it seems that our visual system is mostly responding to colour contrast
(see also Beck (1975) and Wallach (1963)). Also it is possible, that colour and
form are not perceived separately (‘And why would they be?’ is a relevant
question from an evolutionary stance.) Lastly, seeking a one-to-one connection
between sensation and groups of neurons is a dubious enough practice, not to be
accepted without question.
ET, though seeing in
both CO and NS useful research alternatives, holds that the concept of
colour ‘as it figures in visual science
is inherently double-sided’ (1995:215), and argues for a relational approach to
colour. From this position he claims that both CO and NS are mistaken when they
try to reduce colour-perception to something external or something internal.
Computational Objectivism
aims to provide a purely physical, non-perceptual specification to colour. They
also want to see proven that the biological function of human colour vision is
to detect surface reflectance, and thus arrive at the conclusion that the
spectral reflectance (in ET’s usage the distal quality space of surface
reflectance) determines the perceptual content. They maintain that even though
the phenomenal colour space (briefly described above with the opponent
structure of yellow-blue and reed-green) might have a structure totally
incommensurable to the structure of the distal space yet it does not matter.
(1995:186) It is not trivial, however, that the one can be substituted to the
other.
ET maintains that
colours are (a) relatively stable visual qualities of the world, that (b) have
certain distinctive properties, like hue-opponency. In his opinion CO rightly
attends (a), but fails in (b), while NS vice versa (1995:139-140). Thompsons
view is relational and thus a refutation of both, and his proposed solution is
based on an evolutionary account. His claim is that privileging for the
ontology one or the other of the essential poles to colour vision (the physical
or the perceptual) makes both positions unacceptable.
ET holds that, as
colour vision is most probably of an evolutionary origin, trying to understand
the significance of colour-vision without taking this into account we commit a
major mistake. In agreeing with him, we also have to agree that although connecting
colour with different wavelengths is a very seductive idea, there is absolutely
no reason why we should do it, as this connection is unexplained by the Theory
of Evolution (1995:113). That this is exactly what CO does (connecting colour
with different wavelengths) is a shortcoming of CO, that, at present seems
incurable.
Thompson tries to
escape from falling into the other extreme with NS, namely to consider colours
based on the assumption of subjectivism. This view, as mentioned before, with
denying objectivism claims to be eliminativist with respect to colour as a
property of objects, by saying that there is no such property as ‘being
coloured’; and also reductivist with respect to colour experience by claiming
that chromatic visual states are to be reductively identified with neural
states (1995:135). This eliminativist view is question-begging. If there is no
such property as ‘being coloured’, than the colour of the objects become
dependent on illumination. This is contrary to our very basic experience, that
the colour of objects tend to be stable.
ET wants to give a
framework that is satisfying both (a) colour constancy and (b) hue-opponency.
How do we know that
colour vision exists at all outside the human sphere of experience? That is,
can we investigate the colour vision of other species? Is it the same as ours?
These are very important questions for the ecological view that have to be
answered.
Many animals have
wavelength-dependent behaviour. An excellent example of this is that certain
invertebrates lay their eggs when they are exposed to light of a certain
wavelength. There is a difference, however, between wavelength-dependent
behaviour and wavelength discrimination, and usually only the latter is taken to
be the proof of the existence of colour vision in a certain species.
An animal with one
type of receptor can only detect light intensities, that is changing degrees of
darkness and lightness. A species with two types of receptors and the necessary
neural apparatus can distinguish between two hues; its vision will be
two-dimensional, one corresponding to lightness or intensity, the other to the
ratio of the two receptor-type’s contribution to the signal. Our vision is
based on three types of receptors, and is therefore able to exhibit what we
normally call colour vision. Human colour vision is based on a pair of pairs of
colours, on the fact that certain colours (yellow with blue or reed with green)
cannot be mixed.[7]
Even if a species has
colour-vision, it can be surprisingly different to ours. Some animals have not
three but four and may be even five types of receptors. (We call these
tetrachromats and pentachromats, respectively.) This means that certain animals,
namely some birds and reptiles can have a colour vision of a higher
dimensionality than ours. This ET calls a colour hyperspace. The difference
between our vision and that of a tetrachromat, according to this theory is
similar as the difference between the vision of a dichromat (a colour-blind)
and a normal trichromat, like most of us. It means that a tetrachromat can have
a novel pair of colours similar to our yellow-blue and red-green pairs.
Why is this enormous
difference? Are we a ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ species? It seems not. Birds and
turtles have very good colour vision. Certain species have oil droplets acting
as colour filters in their receptors (like pigeons). Mammals in general have a
much inferior colour vision. It is probably a degenerate version of the
bird-reptile vision, as the ancestral forms were of nocturnal origin. Only
primates are trichromats, as a result of a gene duplication on the X
chromosome. As a result of this duplication apart from the original yellow-blue
colour axis a novel red-green axis appeared.
Therefore
the two pairs of opposite hues are not general in the animal kingdom. In fact,
even if we dispose of the many types of colour-blindness (see Lawrence (1987)
for example) current results show that some (human) females might be
tetrachromats in a strong sense. And a tetrachromat’s colour vision is to ours
as ours is to a dichromat. That is, they are incommensurable. This shows that
even within one species colour vision can differ significantly.
We have to find a more
general reason why colour vision, including non-human colour vision is
beneficial for the organism, not sticking to human colour vision only. But the perceptual task in general is
to (a) detect certain coloured objects, (b) to segment the visual scene, and
(c) to identify particular objects or states, also under different lighting
conditions (1995:195). ET’s argument based on the fact that both CO and NS are
modifications of what he calls the received view. In the light of his argument,
he claims, both CO and NS fall.
The implicit
assumption of CO is that the function of vision is to detect surface
reflectance (1995:188), is theory-laden. It is well known that the visual
system is selective, and that it is receptive to certain stimuli. Maturana’s
‘bug-detector in the frog’s visual system is an all-too-well known example.
The two claims made by
the NS[8]
are also considered fallacious by ET. He attacks the second more fiercely, by
showing that there are incommensurable differences between ‘chromatic visual
states’ and our basic colour terms. His argument is partly based on an 1969
article ‘Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution’ by Bent
Berlin and Paul Kay (1969) who state that there are 11 basic colour terms or
foci, in the over ninety investigated languages.
The
logical constitution according to NS would be two pairs of basic colours,
namely yellow-blue, and red-green. This is unsupported, and, what’s more
contradicted by our concepts of colour. There are numerous colour categories
that cannot be predicted from neurophysiology alone, like orange, purple,
brown, and pink (1995:210). Instead of his many examples (1995:211-214) I will
show only one (see also Beck (1975) and Hardin (1990)).
Orange
and brown are obviously different sets of colours. But looking at their
spectral profile we realise that they are the same, only browns are ‘blackened’
oranges. By looking through a tube at a bar of chocolate in bright light, it
ceases to look brown, instead it looks dim yellow or orange (Hardin 1990:559).
This in itself seems more like an argument against CO. But that in different
languages brown is subsumed by black, and in others by yellow (1995:211) cannot
be explained by NS[9]. This is
unexplained by our knowledge of our neurophysiological build-up. For reasons
similar to this, although rightly addressing hue-opponency, NS cannot give a
detailed enough answer to the question of the existence of basic colour
categories.
Since Newton and Locke
colour is usually not considered a fundamental property of things. To say it
less vaguely: colours are dispositional and subjective properties, so called
‘secondary qualities’, contrary to the ‘primary qualities‘, that are not relational.
Both Steiner and Thompson claim that this view is deeply linked ‘both
conceptually and empirically’ to the Newtonian conception of colour (1995:3).
This ‘received view’ is the basis of the criticism of both Steiner and
Thompson. Let us give a brief outline of the argument.
Both agree that the
distinction between primary and secondary qualities is an artificial one. Their
criticism only differs in how they attempt to reach a solution.
Thompson believes that
an ecological argument is better than either NS or CO. His description is a
relational one, not accepting the one-sidedness of NS and CO. He holds that
what the CO describes as the role of perception, namely that ‘vision is the
process of discovering from images what is present in the world’ is fallacious
(1995:178). Vision is not representing what is present in the world, but
presenting it. The received view (inherent in both CO and NS) considers
the organism as a passive object, forgetting that it is also the subject of its
own evolution (1995:219). Organisms and their surrounding interact (like bee
colour vision and the colour of the flowers). Organisms also determine the
relevant signals of their environment, and the significance of these signals
depends on the organism. They also alter the external world as they interact
with it, changing its pattern, which, in turn will affect the organism as well.
Apart from this
relational claim ET also holds that (based on the evolutionary theory and the
comparative anatomical results) the relevant object for visual reception
probably changes depending on the type of the colour-vision system involved
(1995:200). His argument is based on research results that show that colour
vision varies considerably throughout the animal world, probably because colour
vision ‘plays a role in segmenting the visual scene into regions of distinct
surfaces and/or objects’ (1995:201), and different ‘segmenting’ is beneficial
to organisms.
That
his criticism is valid and that it stands – I agree. But before
subscribing to his solution let us investigate another argument – that
of Rudolf Steiner’s.
Steiner’s concept of
colour and vision was mainly formed and developed during his intense study of
Goethe’s scientific writings in the years 1889-1896. While editing the four
volumes of Goethe’s scientific writings, he also wrote three books about
Goethean science and Goethe’s world-view[10].
The Goethean conception of Nature and Science greatly shaped his own thinking.
He was the first – and to my knowledge the only one – to try to build up the
philosophical system implicit in Goethe’s writings. It is true, that Hegel is
often considered to be the philosopher of Goethean ideas, but it must be clear
that what Hegel tried to do is to shape philosophy to make intelligible
Goethe’s Archetype and Urphenomenon. What Steiner tried to do is
to create the philosophical system corresponding to Goethe’s Weltanschauung.
The reception of this
system resembles the reception of Goethe’s Farbenlehre. And as now there
is renewed interest in Goethe’s scientific endeavours, the interest in
Steiner’s philosophy probably also deserves some attention.
The argument below is
taken from the 4th and 5th Chapters of Die Philosophie
der Freiheit (1894). It was written while Steiner was still working in
Weimar. In many senses this is one of his best attempts to expound his
philosophy growing out of Goethe’s views. [My addenda are in square
brackets].
His ‘received view’ is
what he calls the view of ‘critical idealism’. He believes that this view is
mistaken. It starts from what is given to the ‘naïve’ conception: the perceived
object. Then it proves, that what is given to us as a perception would not
exist if we didn’t have sense organs. If there is no eye: there is no colour
[there is surface reflectance, light rays of all different wavelengths, but
there is nothing that we can call ‘colour’]. So in the object we see no colour
yet [meaning ‘chromatic visual states’]. So colour is only born in the
interaction of the eye and the object [therefore it can be taken as relational].
But there is no colour [i.e. colour sensation] in the eye, either, as here we
only find chemical and physical interactions. Colour is only the result of
physiological processes in the brain. But instead of experiencing colour in the
brain, we first project it on the object, and that’s where we feel we perceive
it. We have run a full circle.
But
this is what happens. First we see a coloured object. Then we start thinking.
If I had no eyes, the object would be colourless. So I cannot claim that colour
is inherent in the object. Therefore I start searching for it. I can’t find it
in the eye [all I find is receptors, neurones, etc.], and I can’t find in the
brain [I find intricate systems of neurons, action potentials instead of
‘colour’, etc.]. I only find it in the soul, but not connected to the object.
So, running a full circle I can only find colour where I have started from, and
I believe that ‘colour’ is a product of my soul, which was thought to be in the
outer world by a naïve observer.
Stopping
here, everything seems to be in order. But let us look at the whole reasoning
again. At the beginning – as a naïve person – I believed that my perceptions
are perceptions of something objective – that is what there is without me. But
now I realise that these sense-perceptions are simply modifications of my
mental states [or, again, ‘chromatic visual states’]. What seemed objective
before, now disappears. But if colours are subjective, as they are mediated by
sense-organs, so must be forms – it is only through our senses that we perceive
them. And, following this, a table, which I believed to have objective
existence, becomes a mere notion. But then my own perceptory organs, my eye,
the nerve-endings in my skin, the visual pathways, and all the processes in my
eye and my brain become subjective. If my first reasoning is correct, and we
use the same reasoning for the parts of our process of cognizing, we arrive at
a confusing web of concepts. There is no reason to talk about causal
relationships between these concepts. I can’t say that my concept of an object
effects my concept of the eye and that in this interaction my ‘colour’ concept
emerges.
The
absurdity of this argument is visible as soon as we realize that even about our
perceptions and our organs of perceiving we can only gain knowledge through
perceptions. It is true, that I have no perception without an organ that
perceives. But it is just as true, that without perception there is no
perceiving organ. We perceive the colour of an object. And we also perceive the
processes in the eye. But these two don’t resemble each other in any way. [When
talking about the significance of the discovery of a mutation in a visual
pigment Thompson cites Mollon (1995:166): “Here is a case where a difference of
a single nucleotide places people in different phenomenal worlds and where we
know almost all the steps in the causal change from gene to molecule to neural
signals; only the final steps from cortical activity to sensation elude us”.
This step is exactly what Steiner objects, and finds impossible.] I
cannot negate my sense-perception by showing what processes take place while
I have the colour-experience.
Can
the ‘objective’ and the ‘subjective’ ever meet? Critical idealism [the received
view in modern science still resembles this view] makes a mistake when it
differentiates between sense-experiences. One it takes to be conceptual, but
uses the other in exactly the same way as naïve realism used it, the very view
that it wanted to falsify. Critical idealism can thus only be proven by being a
naïve realist in certain areas, and negating the results of naïve realism in
other areas.
But
it would be just as fallacious to accept that the ‘world is my idea’[11],
because if my sense-perceptions of the world are taken to be subjective, than
so are my sense-perceptions of my senses, my ‘subject’. This mistake, when seen
in this light turns out to be rooted in the same mistake as the first one.
The two criticisms
agree in finding the received view fallacious. ET’s ‘ecological’ view is
naturalistic, not purely conceptual and a priori (1995:216) as the received
view, underlying both CO and NS. The ‘subjective’ attitude to colour is also
based on the received view according to both Thompson and Steiner.
But in the light of
Steiner’s critique the naturalistic view itself is based on conceptual or a
priori statements. I hope to show that Steiner’s solution takes one step back
and contains less a priori elements. Clearly by stating that his view is
‘ecological’[12], ET
stresses the importance of adaptive and co-evolutionary mechanisms.
And what is wrong with
that? – one might ask. The problem is that with the ‘ecological’ view ET
remains within a framework affected by Neo-Darwinism, which, no doubt, takes
the organism more as a living, interacting being than ET’s received view, yet
it is still within the ‘received view’ in many respects.
Neo-Darwinism’s
indebtedness to Darwin cannot be overemphasised. And as Darwin never questioned
the validity of the Newtonian approach to phenomena, it raises the question, as
to how one can escape from the ‘received view’, by following a research
program, that took its origins from the same view. The questions that Darwin
faced, when trying to understand the ‘origin of species’, are questions already
in the problem-space of the received view. They are, by far, not obvious in,
for example, a Goethean world-view[13].
Polányi in his Personal
Knowledge described two criticisms of the Newtonian concept of space as
absolute rest. The
difference of Thompson’s argument and that of Steiner’s reminds one of this
incident. The two scientists were Ernst Mach and Albert Einstein. Mach
‘prefigured the great theoretic vision of Einstein’ (1973:12), that is gave a criticism of the
Newtonian concept, that showed its incoherence. It was then Einstein, who
proved that Newton’s conception of space is not meaningless, but false. Mach
was a forerunner of Einstein, and it is interesting, that even though Einstein
surpassed him in his insight, he still wanted to follow the positivist
programme supported by Mach.
The case is different
with Thompson and Steiner. Steiner was the forerunner, and, to my belief his
criticism is far more explicit, to the point, and I dare say correct than that
of Thompson. And although Einstein ‘built on’ Mach and surpassed him, thus
breaking out of the Newtonian Universe, Thompson builds on the Goethean view[14]
but remains in the received (Newtonian) view. His breakthrough is like the
breakthroughs of Stephan Jay-Gould, or Daniel C. Dennett according to some
critics; a breakthrough in the ‘belt’ of a research program, but carefully not
touching its ‘core’.
Finally then, what are
we to think of Goethe’s criticism of Schopenhauer? Is it the stubborn reply of
a dogmatic old man? Or does Goethe sense the same mistake in Schopenhauer as he
sensed in the Newtonian theory of white light? Schopenhauer was the first in
colour science to fully accept Kant’s views, and make a sharp distinction
between sensation and stimulus (Magnus 1902:195). He once wrote about Goethe in
1814:
‘This Goethe was so much of a realist, he simply did
not want to understand that objects as such are present only as far as they are
portrayed by the cognizing subject
What? He said while looking at me with his Jove-like eyes, the light
only exists if you see it? No! You wouldn’t exist if the light didn’t see you.’
The gap seems
impassable. What Steiner and Goethe are saying is hardly comprehensible for
someone ‘trained’ in the received view. I believe that Goethe’s rejection of
Schopenhauer’s ‘subjective’ approach is not that of a stubborn old man, but is
based on his insight, that Schopenhauer’s attempt to escape the trap of the
‘received view’ is in vain. His attitude is not despotic, but based on the firm
belief that in order to escape despotism one has to condemn research programs
that try to simplify and monopolize the problem of colour. The problem is not
with simplification, as it is a more than useful tool, but that our
thought-structures quickly gain priority over experience, which gave rise to
them in the first place. In his Maximen und Reflexionen, No. 1222 Goethe
writes:
‘Hypotheses are the scaffolding which is set up
before the building itself and which is dismantled when the building is
completed. They are indispensable to the worker; but he must on no account
mistake the scaffolding for the building itself.’
‘Scaffoldings’, then,
are useful. What’s more, indispensable. But the ‘received view’ goes further
than this: it stands between our first-hand experience and reality. This is
probably nowhere as visible as in colour science. If Steiner’s and Thompson’s
criticism is valid, then the ‘critical idealism’ is a thought-structure that is
not built on stable ground. And, therefore, if Goethe attacked Newton
justifiably, than his attack on Schopenhauer is just as valid.
Thompson wants to escape from the ‘received
view’ by setting a new research program. One, that might give rise to another
set of useful answers to intriguing problems. He is right in his criticism, and
he gives us a useful tool to investigate colour phenomena. But he does not give
us back ‘colour’. He simply builds a picture, where the emergence of colour
‘makes sense’. It is, just like evolutionary theory explains that what is,
could have developed. It gives an answer to the question ‘how’. But, similarly to evolutionary theory it
cannot answer the question ‘what’. In evolution the emergence of species is now
more or less understood. But this is not the same as understanding the
individual form, as it is given to the senses. The same applies to
colour.
Steiner’s criticism
shows this. And in showing that parts of what we thought were the building are
only a parts of the scaffolding, his criticism is very useful. It does not,
however, directly yield in a new approach to colour. Thompson gives us a new,
and probably useful tool, while Steiner gives us a good manual about how to use
these tools and how not to. Both are useful, and hopefully direct the study of
colours towards a Goethean aim: a pluralism of mutually fruitful and coexisting
views.
Boden, Margaret 1992. ‘The mind
of a very special machine?’ In: New Scientist, 18 January 1992,
Vol.133 No.1804
Davidoff,
Jules, Concar, Davis. 1995. ‘Brain cells made for seeing: How do we
visualise the world?’ in New Scientist, 10 April 1993, Vol.138
No.1868
Fink,
Karl, J. 1991. Goethe’s History of Science (Cambridge:Cambridge Univ.
Pr.)
Gilchrist,
Alan. 1979. The Perception of Surface Blacks and Whites’ in: Scientific American. 1979/3
pp.62-75
Hardin, C. L. 1990. ‘Color and Illusion’ in
W.Goethe Lycan (ed.): Mind and Cognition: A Reader. (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell)
Hartridge, Hamilton. 1950. Recent Advances in
the Physiology of Vision. (London: Churchill)
Jackson, Myles W. 1994. Natural and Artificial
Budgets: Accounting for Goethe’s Economy of Nature. In Science in
Context 7,3, pp. 409-431
Lawrence, K., Birch, J. Reimchen, T.E., 1987. ‘Not
Seeing Red’ in New Scientist, 22 July 1995, Vol.147 No.1987
Lenoir, Timothy. 1982. The Strategy of Life: Teleology
and Mechanics in Nineteenth-century German Biology (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press)
Magnus, Rudolf. 1906. Goethe as a Scientist.
(New York: Henry Schuman) [transl. In 1949]
Mueller, Bertha (transl.)
1989. Goethe’s Botanical Writings. (Connecticut: Ox Bow Press)
Polanyi, Michael. 1973. Personal Knowledge.
Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul)
Rehbock, Theda. 1995 Goethe und die ‘Rettung
der Phänomena’.
(Konstanz: Verlag am Hockgraben)
Sepper, Dennis L. 1988. Goethe contra Newton
(Polemics and the project for a new science of color). (Cambridge: Camb.
University Press)
Steiner Rudolf 1996. Die Philosophie der
Feiheit. Dornach
Steiner, Rudolf. 1940. The Theory of Knowledge
Implicit in Goethe’s World-Conception. Anthroposophic Press, New York
(trans. from: Grundlinien einer Erkenntnistheorie der Goetheschen
Weltanschaaung, 1886)
Steiner, Rudolf. 1985. Goethe’s World Wiew.. Mercury
Press, N.Y. (tr. from: Goethe’s Weltanschauung, 1963, Dornach: R.
Steiner Verlag)
Thompson, Evan.1995. Colour Vision. A Study in
Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception.. (New York, London:
Routledge)
Wallach, Hans. 1963. ‘The perception of Neutral Colors’ in: Sientific American 1963/1 pp. 107-116
[1] One of Goethe’s main arguments against the Newtonian way of dealing with colour phenomena, is that “…the whole no longer resembles a free republic but a despotic court circle” in his essay Der Versuch als Vermittler … translated in Mueller (1959, p. 220-227)
[2] See his letters written to Goethe in the year 1812
[3] Rudolf Magnus finds the reason in Schopenhauer’s assertion that white light can be obtained by the mixture of spectral colours (Magnus 1902:195). But, as this paper attempts to show, there might be oher reasons for Goethe’s rejection.
[4] See a detailed argument based on Newton’s Correspondence in Sepper (1988:116-118) that validates the use of inverted commas.
[5] Or, we can carry out a very simple investigation that was already known in Goethe’s time. By sitting between two different light sources, for example next to a window, when there is a lamp on our other side, and placing a white sheet in front of us with a pencil held perpendicularly to the sheet we will see two shades of the pencil. One will be bluish, the other yellowish. Yet if we close the shutter or switch the light off (or, in this case, put the candles out) the page remains – in both cases - white. (If we have only one source of illumination than the colour of the shadow is grey!) The previously perceived colours disappear.
[6] ET follows Hilbert’s opinion: not even difference in spatial reflectance corresponds to difference in colour. Colour is ‘objectively subjective’. This attitude is called anthropocentric realism (1995:115-133). It makes a distinction between being coloured (objective) and looking coloured (subjective).
[7] Some question the validity of this statement.
[8] (a) that there is no such property as being coloured (eliminativism, something that already appeared in Schopenhauer) and (b) that there are only chromatic visual states, and these are to be reductively identified with neural states
[9] This argument is based on the lack of our knowledge of the nervous system. There is no reason, why more detailed neurophysiological data would not be available in a matter of years.
[10] Grundlinien einer Erkenntnistheorie der Goetheschen Weltanschauung in 1886, Goethes Weltanschauung in 1897, Goethes Naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften, Einleitungen, between 1883-1897
[11] This is how Shopenhauer begins his ‘Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung’.
[12] The ‘ecological’ view is naturalistic, phenomenological: ‘the role neuronal processes play is revealed by neuroethology rather than neurophysiology per se’ (1995:217); and it considers the animal, together with its environment (Umwelt) as a part of a larger creature: the environmental ecosystem. (1995:216-220)
[13] It is very interesting, and deserves more attention to understand how Goethe’s notion of the Typus or Archetype was corrupted as it travelled through the Channel, and how Darwin misunderstands its real significance in Chapter 13 of the Origin of Species. Also see more about an alternative approach to questions of origin in Lenoir (1982). The Kant-Blumenbach tradition (one, that is in many cases parallel to Goethe’s approach) gave fundamentally different answers to the same questions.
[14][14] In his criticism of the received view ET heavily relies on Sepper (1988), and Westphal, both deeply ‘involved’ in attempts to understand Goethean science. Sepper wrote both his PhD thesis and his first, influential book on the Goethe-Newton controversy, and Westphal also wrote articles in the topic (see ‘Whiteness’ in: Goethe and the Sciences: a Reappraisal, 1987. BSPS 97. Boston.) Goethe also had an effect on many others, like Wittgenstein (Remarks on Colour) and most of the Continential Philosophers, Phenomenological Movement, etc.